LUIS ORTEGA FIGUEROA and DIGNA RIZO ROCHA

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
IN RE:
LUIS ORTEGA FIGUEROA 	CASE NO. 08-08769 BKT
DIGNA RIZO ROCHA 	Chapter 13
XXX-XX-7415
XXX-XX-2764
FILED & ENTERED ON 02/17/2011
Debtors
DECISION AND ORDER
This proceeding is before the Court upon the Debtors’ motion for summary judgment [Dkt.
No. 95], and General Electric Capital of Puerto Rico’s (“GECC”) opposition to the Debtor’s motion
for summary judgment [Dkt. No. 100].
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Debtors filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101 et. seq., on December 22, 2008. On February 4, 2009, GECC submitted a proof of claim with
two security agreements and a financing statement attached, all of which purporting to secure the
debt owed to GECC by the Debtors. One of the security agreements refers to a “2000 Manitex Boom
Crane, Model number 2592” (“the crane”), and the other refers to a truck which has apparently been
damaged and returned to GECC. Only the financing statement, which describes the crane as the sole
collateral securing the Debtors’ obligation to GECC, was filed with the Department of State.
Case:08-08769-BKT13 Doc#:106 Filed:02/17/11 Entered:02/17/11 16:56:36 Desc: Main
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II. LEGAL DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), made applicable in bankruptcy by Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, summary judgment is available “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). As to issues on which the movant, at
trial, would be compelled to carry the burden of proof, it must identify those portions of the
pleadings which it believes demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 	In re
Edgardo Ryan Rijos & Julia E. Cruz Nieves v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya & Citibank (In re Rijos), 263
B.R. 382, 388 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2001). A fact is deemed "material" if it potentially could affect the
outcome of the suit. Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporación Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1997).
Moreover, there will only be a "genuine" or "trial worthy" issue as to such a "material fact," "if a
reasonable fact-finder, examining the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences helpful to the
party resisting summary judgment, could resolve the dispute in that party's favor." Id. The Court
must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In re Rijos, 263 B.R. 382,
at 388. Therefore, summary judgment is “inappropriate if inferences are necessary for the judgment
and those inferences are not mandated by the record.” Id.
In this case, there are no material facts in dispute, the financing agreement included in the
opposition to summary judgment clearly indicates that the crane is the only collateral securing the
debt in question. [P. 18 - Dkt. No. 100]. Therefore, the Court hereby orders the parties to stipulate to
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an agreed value for the crane, and inform the Court at the Confirmation hearing set for 02/24/11, or
an evidentiary hearing will be scheduled to determine the same.
SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico this 17 day of February, 2011.
Brian K. Tester
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Case:08-08769-BKT13 Doc#:106 Filed:02/17/11 Entered:02/17/11 16:56:36 Desc: Main
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