RICARDO JOSE ROSADO LOPEZ

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
IN RE:
RICARDO JOSE ROSADO LOPEZ,
Debtor.
CASE NO. 26-00381 MAG13
Chapter 13
FILED & ENTERED ON 10/5/2026
OPINION AND ORDER
On January 31, 2026, Ricardo José Rosado López (“Debtor”) filed a petition for relief
under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Pending before the court is the objection by Chapter
13 Trustee José R. Carrión (the “Trustee”) to Debtor’s claimed homestead exemption under
Puerto Rico law. For the reasons stated below, the objection filed by the Trustee is denied and
Debtor’s homestead exemption is allowed.
I. 	JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1334 and 157(a), L. Civ. R. 83K(a), and the General Order of Referral of Title 11 Proceedings
to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico, dated July 19, 1984
(Torruella, C.J.). This is a core proceeding in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
II. 	BACKGROUND
On January 31, 2026, Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Dkt. # 1.
On February 18, 2026, Debtor filed Schedule C, claiming a homestead exemption in his
residence located at 115 Inabón St., Urb. Monte Rio, Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico (the “Residential
Property”) under the Puerto Rico Homestead Right and Family Home Protection Act (the
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“Homestead Act”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1858. Dkt. # 10, at p. 12. Per Schedule C, the
Residential Property is registered in the Puerto Rico Property Registry as Property Number
26,711. Id. Debtor scheduled the Residential Property with a value of $140,000 and claimed a
homestead exemption in the amount of $77,847. Id. Schedule D further reflects that Banco
Popular de Puerto Rico holds a security interest on the Residential Property with a claim in the
amount of $62,153 secured with a mortgage over the same. Id. at p.14.
The 11 U.S.C. §341 meeting of creditors was held on March 9, 2026. Dkt. #13. Per the
minutes, the meeting was held open for twenty-one (21) days and would be deemed closed
thereafter. The minutes further state: “LOCAL HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION CASE - Debtor
has failed to submit evidence of having complied with Articles 9, or 11 and 12, of the local law.
A separate objection will be filed. The Trustee notes that he does not live on this property. His
dependents live there with his wife. (separated)” Id.
On April 23, 2026, the Trustee objected to Debtor's claimed homestead exemption. Dkt. #
21. Relying on In re Pérez Hernández, 487 B.R. 353 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2013); Méndez García v.
Rushmore Loan, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168523 (D.P.R. Sept. 27, 2018); and Albarran v. Rivera
(In re Rivera), 627 B.R. 765 (B.A.P. 1 st Cir. 2021), the Trustee contends that Debtor failed to
submit evidence that he asserted his homestead right before the petition date, as required by
Article 9 of the Homestead Act.
The Trustee notes that Banco Popular de Puerto Rico filed a proof of claim for the debt
secured with a lien encumbering the Residential Property. Claims Register # 8-1. The proof of
claim includes a postpetition title search report showing that said property is registered in
Debtor’s name in the Puerto Rico Property Registry. According to the Trustee, because the
Property was registered in Debtor’s name, Debtor was required to comply with Article 9 of the
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Homestead Act before filing the petition. The Trustee further asserts that the title search report
contains no indication that Debtor’s homestead right was declared, presented for recordation, or
otherwise reflected in the Property Registry prior to the petition date.
Debtor responded that he properly claimed the homestead exemption. Dkt. # 22. Relying
on In re Concepción, Case No. 13-01827(MCF7), Dkt. # 20 (Bankr. D.P.R. Aug. 7, 2013); In re
Agosto Vega, 2025 Bankr. LEXIS 2779 (2025) (Bankr. D.P.R. Oct. 28, 2025); and In re
Villanueva Ojeda, 2026 Bankr. LEXIS 973 (Bankr. D.P.R. Apr. 15, 2026), Debtor argues that
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(a) requires a debtor to claim exemptions solely by listing the exempt
property on schedule C signed under penalty of perjury. Debtor maintains that he complied with
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(a) by listing the Residential Property on Schedule C, identifying the
applicable Puerto Rico homestead-exemption statute, and stating the amount claimed as exempt.
Debtor further contends that the Homestead Act must be construed liberally in favor of the
exemption.
In his surreply, the Trustee argues that the authorities cited by Debtor are distinguishable.
Dkt. # 28. The Trustee contends that Agosto Vega concerned a debtor’s claim of a homestead
right under Article 12 of the Homestead Act, whereas the present matter implicates Article 9.
Specifically, Agosto Vega involved property co-owned by the debtor and other heirs who
claimed the homestead under Article 12. Similarly, the Trustee argues that Concepción involved
a debtor who was not the registered owner of the residential property according to the Property
Registry and therefore had to proceed under Article 12.
With respect to Villanueva Ojeda, the Trustee asserts that the court applied federal
bankruptcy procedure, under the Erie doctrine, to the debtor’s claim of a Puerto Rico homestead
exemption. According to the Trustee, although Villanueva Ojeda permitted the debtor to claim
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the homestead exemption through schedule C, schedule C was required to be filed with the
petition or within 14 days thereafter, absent an extension of time under Fed. R. Bankr. P.
1007(c)(1). The Trustee argues that Debtor did not satisfy this requirement because the petition
was filed on January 31, 2026, but Schedule C was not filed until February 18, 2026. The
Trustee further notes that Debtor did not seek an extension of time to file the Schedules before
the expiration of the period prescribed by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(c)(1).
In his surreply, Debtor responds that the Trustee’s Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(c)(1)
contention constitutes a new objection raised for the first time after expiration of the objection
period under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b). Dkt. # 29. Debtor further argues that, even if the court
considers the argument, the Schedules were filed only one day after the applicable deadline when
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a) is applied. Debtor contends that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the
Bankruptcy Rules authorize disallowance of an otherwise valid exemption solely because of that
delay. Debtor also notes that Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a) permits amendment of schedules at any
time before the case is closed.
At the confirmation hearing held on July 15, 2026, the parties argued their respective
positions. Dkt. # 33. The court observed that, to claim a homestead exemption, a debtor or his or
her family must own and reside in the property, and that Debtor satisfies both requirements.
The Trustee nevertheless argues that in this case, for Debtor to claim the exemption on
Schedule C, the homestead deed had to have been presented in the Property Registry before the
petition date. The Trustee distinguishes the authorities relied upon by Debtor on the ground that,
here, the Residential Property is registered in Debtor’s name and, therefore, Debtor can only
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claim the exemption after having presented the homestead deed for recordation before filing the
petition under Article 9 of the Homestead Act.1
Debtor, in turn, argues that he has satisfied the substantive requirements for the
homestead exemption. Debtor therefore contends that he may claim the exemption on Schedule
C without having presented a homestead deed in the Property Registry before the petition date.
On July 28, 2026, the Trustee filed a certified translation of the title-search report for the
Residential Property, dated February 10, 2026. Dkt. # 36. The report reflects that the property is
recorded in Debtor’s name and that no homestead deed has been recorded as to the Residential
Property.
III. 	APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION
Upon the filing of a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, all of debtor's assets become property
of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), a debtor
may exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate that would otherwise be available for
distribution to creditors. Nealon v. Matthews (In re Nealon), 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 193, at *18
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. Jan. 20, 2016). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a]n exemption is an
interest withdrawn from the estate (and hence from the creditors) for the benefit of the debtor.”
Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991). “Liberal construction of exemptions in favor of
debtors falls easily within the ambit of the Bankruptcy Code's ‘fresh start’ policy.” In re Toppi,
378 B.R. 9, 11 (Bankr. D. Me. 2007). “This ‘fresh start’ is only feasible if the debtor emerges
1 Although the Trustee did not present this issue in his written submissions, he asserted at the
confirmation hearing that Debtor was required to protect the claimed homestead right against judgment
creditors—including a chapter 13 trustee—by recording, or presenting for recordation, a homestead
declaration in the Property Registry. The Trustee further contended that, under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a), a
chapter 13 trustee has the status of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor and may exercise the statutory
avoidance powers. The court declines to address this unbriefed argument. See United States v. Zannino,
895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some
effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”)
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from bankruptcy with a means of providing the necessities of life, including a roof overhead, and
the homestead exemption is directed at making this attainable.” Bartlett v. Giguere (In re
Bartlett), 168 B.R. 488, 493 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994). Under 11 U. S.C. § 522(b), a debtor may
elect either the federal bankruptcy exemptions listed in § 522(d), or the exemptions available
under the law of the debtor’s state of residence, together with applicable federal nonbankruptcy
exemptions. Hildebrandt v. Collins (In re Hildebrandt), 320 B.R. 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2005). Pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 522(l), a debtor must file a list of property claimed as exempt. Fed. R. Bankr. P.
4003(a) implements such statute by requiring a debtor to list exempt property on Official Form
106C, Schedule C.
Here, Debtor claimed a homestead exemption under Puerto Rico law, which recognizes a
homestead right pursuant to the Homestead Act. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1858. The Homestead
Act “is intended ‘to provide the broadest protection to the homes or principal residences of the
residents of Puerto Rico and their families in bankruptcy proceedings.’” Albarran v. Rivera (In re
Rivera), 627 B.R. 765, 772 (B.A.P. 1 st Cir. 2021) (quoting Méndez García v. Rushmore Loan,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168523, at *5 (D.P.R. Sept. 27, 2018)). Pursuant to Article 3 of the
Homestead Act, a claimant must own or lawfully possess the property and either the claimant or
the claimant’s family must occupy it exclusively as a principal residence. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,
§ 1858.
The Homestead Act, however, “does not expressly address how Puerto Rico residents
who file for bankruptcy must claim the homestead right in their bankruptcy petitions.” In re
Pérez Hernández, 487 B.R. 353, 365 (2013). In Pérez Hernández, the court held that to claim the
Puerto Rico homestead exemption in bankruptcy, the debtor must have satisfied the Act’s
requirements as of the petition date. Id.; see also Méndez García, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168523,
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at *14 (“A bankruptcy debtor who wishes to properly claim the Puerto Rico Home Protection
Act exemption must comply with the requirements of said law as of the date of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.”). This result follows from 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), which determines the
availability of exemptions in bankruptcy as of “the date of the filing of the petition.”
For purposes of this dispute, the Homestead Act contains two relevant mechanisms for
asserting or formalizing the homestead right. Article 9 is the ordinary recordation route for a
titled, registered property such as the present case. Under Article 9, which applies when the
owner holds title to the residential property and the property is registered in the Puerto Rico
Property Registry, the claimant must execute a notarial act or public deed, before a notary public,
declaring the property as one’s homestead and recording the act or deed in the Property Registry.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1858f. The declaration then must be presented for recordation or
annotation in the Property Registry. Id. Article 9 provides that “[s]uch declarations or notations
shall only constitute prima facie evidence of the homestead right of such property.” Id.
In turn, Articles 11 and 12 provide the means to claim the protection where the property
is unregistered or the homestead right has not been recorded or annotated; through a sworn
request made in the court where execution or similar collection proceedings are underway
against the homestead claimant. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1858h-i. Article 11 states that “[t]he
fact that a parcel has not been registered in the Property Registry, or that the declaration of
homestead has not been filed with or entered in the Property Registry, shall in no way impair the
owner’s homestead right thereon, provided that such right has been timely claimed as provided
in §1858i [Article 12] of this title.” P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1858h. Thus, Article 11 preserves
the ability to invoke homestead protection notwithstanding the absence of a registry annotation.
And, Article 12 requires that the claimant file a sworn motion in the court asserting the
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homestead benefit within sixty (60) days after a creditor seeks execution against the residential
property of the claimant to satisfy a judgment, seeks an attachment or preliminary annotation, or
employs another mechanism to secure or enforce a judgment.2 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1858i.
The Trustee bears the burden of proving that Debtor is not entitled to the exemption
claimed. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c). That burden is significant in this instance in light of Puerto
Rico law’s policy favoring protection of the principal residence. The Homestead Act must be
construed liberally in favor of the person asserting the exemption “to effectuate the humanitarian
purpose of the lawmaker.” Méndez García, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168523, at *13-14. “[I]n
Puerto Rico, ‘[h]omestead exemptions are to be construed liberally on behalf of the
homesteader.’” In re Rivera, 627 B.R. at 772 (quoting In re Estrada Lopez, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS
2800 (Bankr. D.P.R. July 10, 2013)).
Here, the record establishes that Debtor owns and that he or his family resides in the
Residential Property. Thus, Debtor satisfies the substantive predicates for homestead protection
under the Homestead Act: ownership and use of the property as a principal residence. The
Trustee does not dispute either fact. Rather, the Trustee contends that Debtor’s exemption fails
because he did not record, or present for recordation, a homestead deed or act in the Property
Registry before filing the bankruptcy petition as required by Article 9 of the Homestead Act.
The court acknowledges that Pérez Hernández stated that Article 9 governs where the
property is registered in the Property Registry and that a bankruptcy debtor claiming homestead
in registered property must show prepetition compliance with Article 9. 487 B.R. at 368. In this
case, Debtor could have used Article 9’s Registry-based procedure before filing this case.
2 Act No. 8 of January 4, 2026, amended Article 12 of the Puerto Rico Homestead Act to extend the
period for filing a sworn motion asserting the homestead right in court from 30 to 60 days. See
https://aldia.microjuris.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Ley-Num.8-2026.pdf.
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However, the court declines to interpret Article 9 as converting recordation, or prepetition
presentment for recordation, into a substantive prerequisite to an otherwise valid homestead
claim in bankruptcy.
Article 9 provides a means to formalize the homestead declaration and place third parties
on notice through the Property Registry. But the lack of a recorded declaration does not, standing
alone, negate the underlying homestead right. As the District Court stated in Méndez García,
“Article 9 does not entail a recordation requirement directed at homestead claimants upon which
the validity of a homestead rights declaration depends.” 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168523, at *17.
Rather, “the recordation mandate included in Article 9 is directed at the Property Registry of
Puerto Rico regarding notarial acts declaring homestead rights that titular registrants may present
in order to secure legal rights over real property before third parties Id.* at 17. The court in Pérez
Hernández likewise recognized that the Property Registry ordinarily is declarative in nature and
that recordation generally is not required to establish the validity of a transaction, except where
the law expressly so provides. 487 B.R. at 366.
Article 11 reinforces that conclusion. It expressly states that the absence of an entry in the
Property Registry does not impair the owner’s homestead right, subject to timely assertion under
Article 12. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1858h. In an ordinary Puerto Rico enforcement proceeding,
Article 12 requires a sworn court motion to invoke the right within sixty (60) days after a
creditor seeks execution against the claimant’s residential property to satisfy a judgment, or
otherwise pursues an attachment, preventive annotation, or comparable judgment-enforcement
measure.
The court declines to construe the Homestead Act to impair a debtor’s homestead right in
bankruptcy based solely on the absence of registry recordation under Article 9 where the
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Homestead Act does not expressly make this condition a substantive prerequisite to such right.
After all, “the intent of the Puerto Rico Legislature is to provide the broadest protection to the
homes or principal residences of the residents of Puerto Rico and their families in bankruptcy
proceedings.” In re Pérez Hernández, 487 B.R. at 356.
Moreover, the court finds persuasive the conclusion in Villanueva Ojeda that the
procedural means of asserting the exemption is governed by federal bankruptcy law. 2026 Bankr.
LEXIS 973, at *10. Applying the Erie doctrine, the court explained that, although state law
supplies the substantive basis for an exemption elected by a debtor, federal law governs the
procedures by which the exemption must be claimed and adjudicated in bankruptcy. Id. at 7. See
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (establishing that federal courts apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law). Thus, Puerto Rico law remains controlling as to the
property interest protected by the Homestead Act, the persons entitled to invoke it, and the
substantive requirements for its availability. The Bankruptcy Code and Rules, however, govern
the manner in which the exemption is asserted, including the filing of schedules and litigation of
objections. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(a)-(b).
In Villanueva Ojeda, the Chapter 13 Trustee objected to a claimed homestead exemption
in co-owned property based, among other things, on the absence of information regarding the
residence’s registry inscription and the asserted need for the co-owners’ consent. The court
overruled the objection. It held that a debtor claims an exemption under Fed. R. Bankr. P.
4003(a) through schedule C and “not by deed, not by sworn motion, and not by sworn
statement.” 2026 Bankr. LEXIS 973, at *12. It also concluded that the relevant inquiry is
whether the debtor meets Puerto Rico’s substantive requirements, including ownership and
residence, and whether the exemption is properly identified on schedule C. As stated by the
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court, “the inscription of the homestead right in the Property Registry serves the purpose of
providing public notice, and not as a substantive requirement to claim the homestead exemption
in bankruptcy.” 2026 Bankr. LEXIS 973, at *12-13.
The court has also considered Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Santiago-Salicrup, 630
B.R. 374 (D. P. R. 2021). There, the District Court reversed the bankruptcy court’s allowance of
a homestead exemption because the record did not establish that the debtor’s ownership interest
had been registered in the Property Registry as of the petition date and the debtor had not shown
compliance with Articles 11 and 12 applicable to unregistered property. To the extent Santiago-
Salicrup restates Pérez Hernández’s observation that a debtor with registered property must
demonstrate prepetition compliance with Article 9, this court reads that discussion in the context
of the issue presented there: whether a debtor whose ownership interest was not registered could
invoke Article 9 rather than Articles 11 and 12. The Santiago-Salicrup court did not conduct the
analysis of Villanueva Ojeda, distinguishing Puerto Rico’s substantive requirements from the
federal bankruptcy procedure for asserting the exemption on schedule C.
The court finds the reasoning in Villanueva Ojeda persuasive. Although that case
involved co-owned property, its distinction between Puerto Rico substantive law and federal
bankruptcy procedure applies here as well. Schedule C supplies the procedural mechanism for
asserting a homestead exemption in bankruptcy; ownership and principal-residence use are the
relevant substantive conditions shown on this record.
Here, Debtor properly asserted the exemption on Schedule C by identifying the
Residential Property, the applicable Puerto Rico homestead statute, and the amount claimed as
exempt. Debtor signed the Schedules under penalty of perjury. These disclosures gave the
Trustee and creditors notice of the claim and the opportunity to object under Fed. R. Bankr. P.
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4003(b). The Trustee does not dispute Debtor’s ownership of the Residential Property, nor that
he or his family reside there as a principal residence.
The court therefore holds that Debtor’s failure to record, or present for recordation, a
homestead declaration under Article 9 before the petition date does not defeat his otherwise valid
claim for a Puerto Rico homestead exemption in Schedule C in this bankruptcy case. Because
Debtor has demonstrated ownership and principal-residence use of the Residential Property, and
the Trustee has not satisfied the burden imposed by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c), to prove that the
exemption was not properly claimed, the objection is overruled.
The Trustee argues in his sur-reply that under Villanueva Ojeda, Schedule C was required
to be filed with the petition or within 14 days thereafter, absent an extension of time under Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 1007(c)(1) and that Debtor failed to do so. The court does not consider the Trustee’s
argument under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007 as an independent basis to deny the claimed exemption.
The Trustee’s original objection challenged the absence of an Article 9 declaration; it did not
challenge the timeliness of Schedule C. The Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(c)(1) ground was raised in
reply, after the Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b) objection period had expired. A reply may respond to
arguments raised in an opposition, but it may not introduce a new ground for objection after
expiration of the objection deadline.
But, even if the court were to consider the argument, the result would be the same. Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 1007(c)(1) establishes a deadline for filing schedules; it does not prescribe forfeiture
or disallowance of an otherwise valid claimed exemption as the sanction for a delay in so doing.
The Rules instead provide mechanisms for an extension, dismissal in appropriate circumstances,
and amendment. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a) permits amendment of schedules before the closing
of the case. Debtor filed Schedule C on February 18, 2026. Whether the filing was one day late
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under the governing computation rules or otherwise tardy, the delay alone does not eliminate a
valid exemption claim where Debtor listed the Residential Property on Schedule C and complied
with the substantive requirements to claim the same under the Homestead Act.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Trustee’s objection at Dkt. # 21 to Debtor’s claimed
homestead exemption is denied. Therefore, Debtor is entitled to the homestead exemption over
the Residential Property.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In Ponce, Puerto Rico, this 5th day of October 2026.
María de los Ángeles González
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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