Stephens v. Trump

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GLENN STEPHENS,
Plaintiff,
v.
PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP,
Defendant.
CIVIL NO. 4:25-cv-02356
(Magistrate Judge Latella)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On December 9, 2025, the Plaintiff, Glenn Stephens, filed an
absurd pro se Complaint requesting this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing the President of the United States to conduct
drone or missile attacks on the District Attorney of Lycoming County
and a former Inspector General of the Department of Defense. (Doc. 1).
He filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) along with
the Complaint. (Doc. 3). The Motion to proceed without payment of
fees was granted by Order of even date with this Report and
Recommendation.
Because this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain this matter,
it will be recommended that it be dismissed on preliminary screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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I. 	Background
The Complaint, set forth in narrative form, begins with reference
to Plaintiff’s law school legal writing course and mention of his various
professors. (Doc. 1-1, p.1). Plaintiff then describes the President’s
foreign policy authority and discretion to act against narco-terrorists.
(Id. at p. 2). A section titled “Applicable Law” contains a discussion of
the Federal Torts Claims Act and writs of mandamus. (Id. at pp. 2–4).
An “Analysis” follows where Plaintiff makes rambling and unsupported
allegations against the District Attorney of Lycoming County and a
former Inspector General of the Department of Defense. The substance
of the allegations, that these individuals are narco-terrorists and
antisemitic, does not bear reiteration in detail. What bears mention is
that the Complaint is completely devoid of any allegations that Plaintiff
suffered any cognizable harm. He requests that the Court issue a writ
of mandamus to the President directing drone and/or missile attacks on
these individuals.
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II. 	Discussion
A. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is
required to conduct a preliminary review of the Complaint. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring sua sponte dismissal of actions which
are “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fail[] to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.”).
In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the Court employs the same standard applicable
to motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), Tourscher v. McCollough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999),
which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Conclusory allegations do not suffice. 	Id. 	If the case fails to state a
claim, the screening may result in dismissal.
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B. Jurisdiction
This Court is without jurisdiction to hear this fanciful matter for a
number of reasons. The Complaint should be dismissed, without
prejudice, for want of subject matter jurisdiction.1
First, this Plaintiff has no standing. Article III, section 2 of the
Constitution specifies that “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and . . . to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a
State and Citizens of another State.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “And ‘[n]o
principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our
system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court
jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
U.S. 330, 337, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016)
1 “[W]hen a district court dismisses claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the dismissal should be without prejudice.” 	Mohn v.
United States, No. 23-1023, 2023 WL 4311609, at *2 (3d Cir. July 3,
2023) (citing N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. President of U.S., 653 F.3d 234,
241 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011)).
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(quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d
849 (1997)). “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional
understanding of a case or controversy.” Id. at 338. The Supreme Court
explained that the standing doctrine developed “to ensure that federal
courts do not exceed their authority as it has been traditionally
understood ... The doctrine limits the category of litigants empowered to
maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.”
Id. 	Importantly, the High Court noted, “the law of Article III standing
... serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the
powers of the political branches … and confines the federal courts to a
properly judicial role.” Id. (cleaned up).
“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
three elements: injury in fact, causation, and redressability…The first
requirement, injury in fact, requires the plaintiff to demonstrate an
injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, not
speculative.” Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. Env't Prot. Agency,
606 U.S. 100, 111, 145 S. Ct. 2121, 2133 (2025) (cleaned up). “For an
injury to be particularized, it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way…Particularization is necessary to establish injury in
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fact, but it is not sufficient. An injury in fact must also be concrete…A
concrete injury must be de facto; that is, it must actually exist.” 1789
Found., Inc. v. Schmidt, 781 F. Supp. 3d 282, 310 (M.D. Pa. 2025)
(quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339, 136 S.Ct. 1540).
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege “an injury that is
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, not speculative.”
Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC, 606 U.S. at 111. Indeed, no
remediable injury to the Plaintiff is alleged or could be liberally
construed from a reading of Plaintiff’s narrative. Plaintiff has not
alleged any set of facts that could confer standing in the matter.
Because an actual case or controversy is not presented here, subject
matter jurisdiction does not exist.
In addition to a lack of standing, an actual case or controversy is
not presented here under the substantiality doctrine because the claims
in the Complaint are wholly insubstantial and patently frivolous.
Germany v. Power 105.1 Radio, 790 F. App’x 442, 443 (3d Cir. 2019) (“A
federal court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(1) when the
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allegations within the complaint ‘are so attenuated and unsubstantial
as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’” (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528, 536–37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, (1974))). 	See also Clay v. Department
of Defense., No. CV 25-3726, 2025 WL 3282744, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 24,
2025) (dismissing pro se complaint in screening for lack of jurisdiction
based on sustainability doctrine); James v. Trump, No. CV 25-01789,
2025 WL 1726031, at *1 (D.D.C. June 20, 2025), aff’d, No. 25-5237, 2025
WL 3076752 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 2025) (same).
III. 	Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has voiced a strong preference for allowing the
filing of an amended complaint in cases where the original complaint is
subject to dismissal. In Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 153 (3d Cir.
2025), the Court instructed:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs
courts to grant motions for leave to amend “when
justice so requires.” So leave to amend should be
liberally 	given 	unless 	amendment 	would 	be
inequitable or futile. Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390,
400 (3d Cir. 2004); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. And
because 	courts 	have 	a 	special obligation to 	be
“more 	forgiving 	of 	pro 	se 	litigants,” 	Garrett 	v.
Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019), this
Circuit has a “longstanding policy of allowing pro
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se plaintiffs to amend their complaints before the
court rules upon defendants’ motions to dismiss,”
Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 196 n.8 (3d Cir.
1990) (collecting cases).
Leave to amend in this case would undoubtedly be futile. There are no
set of facts that could potentially support Plaintiff’s request for an order
directing the President of the United States to order a drone or missile
attack on the individuals named in the Complaint, or of anyone else.
Accordingly, leave to amend should not be granted.
IV. 	Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this
case be dismissed, without prejudice, for want of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Dated: December 30, 2025 	/s/ Leo A. Latella
Leo A. Latella
United States Magistrate Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GLENN STEPHENS,
Plaintiff,
v.
PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP,
Defendant.
CIVIL NO. 4:25-cv-02356
(Magistrate Judge Latella)
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered
the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated December 30,
2025.
Any party may obtain a review of the Report and
Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s
proposed findings, recommendations or report
addressing a motion or matter described in 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner
case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and
serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify
the portions of the proposed findings,
recommendations or report to which objection is
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made and the basis for such objections. The
briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2
shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made and may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing
only in his or her discretion or where required by
law, and may consider the record developed
before the magistrate judge, making his or her
own determination on the basis of that record.
The judge may also receive further evidence,
recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Dated: December 30, 2025 	/s/ Leo A. Latella
LEO A. LATELLA
United States Magistrate Judge
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