4:25-cv-02217•Robinson v. Montgomery County et al
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MICHAEL J. ROBINSON, : Civil No. 4:25-CV-2217 : Plaintiff, : : (Judge Neary) v. : : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom) MONTGOMERY COUNTY, et al., : : Defendants. : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Introduction This case comes before us for a screening review of the plaintiff’s pro se civil complaint. 1 The plaintiff, Michael Robinson, brings this action against Montgomery County, Columbia County, and Shamokin City. From what we can discern from the complaint, Robinson appears to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and state tort law against these defendants. However, Robinson’s complaint is largely unintelligible, in 1 Doc. 1. Case 4:25-cv-02217-KMN Document 5 Filed 12/23/25 Page 1 of 9
2 that it fails to describe how any of the defendants allegedly violated his constitutional rights or committed racketeering activity. 2 Along with this complaint, Robinson filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 3 We will grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis for screening purposes only but after consideration, we will recommend that the complaint be dismissed. II. Discussion A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 4 We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 5 This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 2 Robinson attached multiple documents to his complaint that appear to relate to his appeal before the Third Circuit. See Doc. 1, Ex. 1. We are compelled to note that the documents do not illuminate his claim. 3 Doc. 2. 4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 5 Id. Case 4:25-cv-02217-KMN Document 5 Filed 12/23/25 Page 2 of 9
3 Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 6 With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 7 In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, 8 and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” 9 However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 10 As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized: [A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two- 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 8 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 9 Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). 10 Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”). Case 4:25-cv-02217-KMN Document 5 Filed 12/23/25 Page 3 of 9
4 part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 . Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 11 Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. 12 A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”13 Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the 11 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009). 12 Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). 13 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Case 4:25-cv-02217-KMN Document 5 Filed 12/23/25 Page 4 of 9
5 court may consider such document in its determination. 14 However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. 15 Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.’” 16 We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. 17 B. This Complaint Should be Dismissed. After review, we conclude that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 dictates that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”18 It is well established that “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint 14 See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). 15 Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. 16 Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f)). 17 Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)). 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Case 4:25-cv-02217-KMN Document 5 Filed 12/23/25 Page 5 of 9
6 has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”19 A complaint must contain “more than unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” 20 Rather, it must include factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”21 Here, Robinson’s complaint fails to meet these federal pleading standards. The allegations set forth by Robinson are confusing, disjointed, and vague, thereby rendering his complaint incomprehensible to the Court. In addition, Robinson’s complaint does not identify or describe any wrongdoing by the defendants or when and where such wrongdoing is alleged to have occurred. 22 Rather, his complaint only broadly asserts what appears to be an alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, claiming the defendants failed to protect him by “letting a know[n] mentally-broken person stay free and 19 Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citations omitted). 20 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 21 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). 22 This is especially concerning when one of the defendants listed in Robinson’s complaint is Montgomery County, which is located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Case 4:25-cv-02217-KMN Document 5 Filed 12/23/25 Page 6 of 9
7 harm helpers.” 23 He further asserts “intentional infliction of emotional [distress] [] by keeping Travis Gower insane and dangerous.” 24 As to the RICO claim, the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations pertaining to an alleged pattern of racketeering activity. This is simply not enough to comply with Rule 8’s basic requirement that the complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 25 While the Court is mindful of the well-established principle that the plaintiff's pro se pleading, “however inartfully pleaded,” shall be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” 26 the Court is equally mindful that his pro se status does not excuse his 23 Doc. 1 at 2. The Court further notes that “failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). 24 Id. Robinson appears to bring claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only “provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” See Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Robinson’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed with prejudice. 25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 26 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Case 4:25-cv-02217-KMN Document 5 Filed 12/23/25 Page 7 of 9
8 failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 27 Accordingly, because the plaintiff's complaint does not provide fair notice of his claims or the grounds upon which his claims rest, we conclude that this complaint violates Rule 8.28 However, while we have concluded the Robinson’s complaint does not state a claim at this time, recognizing that Robinson is a pro se litigant, we recommend that the court allow him an opportunity to amend his complaint to endeavor to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 29 III. Recommendation Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to 27 See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (providing that procedural rules in civil litigation should not “be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel” (footnote omitted)). 28 See Glover v. F.D.I.C., 698 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that “Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint be presented with clarity sufficient to avoid requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift through its pages in search of the nature of the plaintiff's claim” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 29 See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Case 4:25-cv-02217-KMN Document 5 Filed 12/23/25 Page 8 of 9
9 the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts within 20 days of any dismissal order. The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Submitted this 23rd day of December 2025. s/ Daryl F. Bloom Daryl F. Bloom Chief United States Magistrate Judge Case 4:25-cv-02217-KMN Document 5 Filed 12/23/25 Page 9 of 9
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