Jenkins v. Department of Corrections et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WAHEED JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Defendants.
No. 4:25-CV-01680
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
J ANUARY 8, 2026
Plaintiff Waheed Jenkins filed the instant pro se Section 19831 lawsuit,
alleging constitutional violations by officials at the State Correctional Institution in
Coal Township, Pennsylvania (SCI Coal Township). Because Jenkins fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court will dismiss his complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) but will grant him leave to amend.
I. 	BACKGROUND
During the events that underlie the instant lawsuit, Jenkins was incarcerated
at SCI Coal Township. It appears that after filing his complaint, Jenkins was
released from prison and moved to Bear, Delaware. 2
1 	42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional
wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves
as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).
2 	See Doc. 8.
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According to Jenkins, on July 25, 2025, he fell asleep on the top bunk in his
cell and then rolled off, falling onto the floor.3 Although not clearly alleged, it
appears that Jenkins hit his head during the fall, as he indicates that he did not
know “what happened” and claims that he injured his “head and back.”4
According to Jenkins, Nurse Kevin Hall responded to the incident and
administered Narcan, apparently believing that Jenkins was suffering from a heroin
overdose. 5
Jenkins was transferred to the infirmary and then to the Restricted Housing
Unit (RHU), as he was facing a disciplinary investigation based on prison officials’
belief that he had ingested narcotics.6 Jenkins alleges that he spent 15 days in the
RHU during the investigation and was not released until his toxicology lab results
came back negative. 7 He further recounts that, on August 9, 2025, he had a visitor
while he was being held in the RHU, and corrections officer “Je. Shearn” informed
the visitor that Jenkins was being held in the RHU “for drugs.” 8
Jenkins lodged the instant Section 1983 complaint in this Court in
September 2025.9 He sues four defendants: the Pennsylvania Department of
3 	Doc. 1 at 5.
4 	Id.
5 	Id. at 4, 5.
6 	Id.
7 	Id. at 5.
8 	Id.
9 	See generally Doc. 1.
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Corrections (DOC), Nurse Hall, Corrections Officer Shearn, and Superintendent
Thomas McGinley. 10
It is difficult to discern what types of Section 1983 claims Jenkins is raising.
As best as the Court can tell, he appears to be asserting an Eighth Amendment
claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and an Eighth
Amendment “failure-to-protect” claim. 11 It is possible that Jenkins is also
attempting to assert a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. 12 It is
unclear which Defendant or Defendants are targeted by each claim. Jenkins seeks
compensatory and punitive damages against all Defendants.13
II. 	STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se
prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees. 14 One
basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted[.]” 15 This language closely tracks Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to
10 	Id. at 2-3.
11 	See id. at 4, 5.
12 	See id. at 3, 6, 7.
13 	Id. at 5.
14 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
15 	Id. § 1915A(b)(1).
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screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as
they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).16
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire
“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims.” 17 The court must accept as true the factual
allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.18 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of
the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to
a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these
documents.19
When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a
three-step inquiry.20 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” 21 Second, the court should distinguish well-
pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal
16 	See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien
v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);
cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
17 	Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.
1996).
18 	Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
19 	Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
20 	Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).
21 	Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).
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conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be
disregarded.22 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations
“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 23
Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 24
Because Jenkins proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed
and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” 25
III. 	DISCUSSION
Upon review of Jenkin’s complaint, he fails to state a Section 1983 claim
upon which relief may be granted. The Court will address his pleading
deficiencies in turn.
A. 	Personal Involvement
It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be
“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”26 Rather, a Section
1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal
involvement in the alleged misconduct.”27 Personal involvement can include direct
22 	Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
23 	Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
24 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
25 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
26 	Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context).
27 	Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).
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wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through
allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge and acquiescence”;
however, such averments must be made with particularity.28 Furthermore, it is
equally settled that involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does
not give rise to Section 1983 liability. 29
Jenkins appears to assert an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim
against Superintendent McGinley. He does not, however, plausibly allege how
Superintendent McGinley was personally involved in the allegedly deficient
medical care or the disciplinary process. Jenkins offers one sentence with respect
to Superintendent McGinley’s conduct, alleging that he “failed to protect” Jenkins
“by not enforcing the policies of this prison from the wrong [of] the initial
nurse.”30 This assertion is a classic example of respondeat superior (that is,
vicarious liability), which does not apply to Section 1983 claims. It is also a legal
conclusion that is not entitled to the assumption of truth and may be disregarded.31
28 	Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).
29 	See id. (affirming dismissal of claims against prison officials for lack of personal involvement
when officials’ “only involvement” was “their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s grievance”);
Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp. 3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases); Brooks v.
Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v. Gennarini, 144
F. App’x 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s claims against
certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations against them “merely
assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance process”).
30 	Doc. 1 at 4.
31 	See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787.
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To plausibly plead a Section 1983 claim, Jenkins must specify each
Defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional misconduct in order
to state a claim against them. Jenkins does not do so for Superintendent McGinley.
Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the Section 1983 claim against
Superintendent McGinley under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for lack of personal
involvement.
B. 	Claim(s) Against the DOC
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” 32 Only “persons” are subject to suit under Section 1983, and
entities such as state agencies, prisons, medical departments, or private medical
companies generally do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of Section 1983.33
32 	Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (emphasis added) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983)).
33 	See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65, 71 (1989) (explaining that a state
is not a “person” for Section 1983 purposes); Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.
1973) (holding that “New Jersey Prison Medical Department” was a state agency and not a
“person” under Section 1983); Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 264 n.3 (3d Cir.
2006) (affirming on other grounds and observing that district court properly “dismissed Clarion
County Jail as a defendant in this case,” quoting district court’s reasoning that “‘it is well
established in the Third Circuit that a prison is not a “person” subject to suit under federal civil
rights laws’”); Stankowski v. Farley, 487 F. Supp. 2d 543, 554 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that
PrimeCare Medical is not a “person for purposes of Section 1983” and thus not subject to
liability under that statute); Foye v. Wexford Health Sources Inc., 675 F. App’x 210, 215 (3d
Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against prison and Department
of Corrections because they “are not persons subject to suit under” Section 1983).
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Jenkins, therefore, cannot sue the DOC under Section 1983 because the
DOC is not a “person” subject to Section 1983 liability. 34 Additionally, any claim
against a state agency is akin to suing the state itself, and such claims are generally
barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.35 Accordingly, any Section
1983 claim for damages against the DOC will be dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
C. 	Eighth Amendment Medical Indifference
In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires
prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has
incarcerated.” 36 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “(1) he had
a serious medical need, (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that
need; and (3) the deliberate indifference caused harm to the plaintiff.” 37 A serious
medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment
34 	See Fischer, 474 F.2d at 992; Foye, 675 F. App’x at 215.
35 	See Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that any Section 1983
action by prisoner against Pennsylvania Parole Board is barred by Eleventh Amendment);
Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The eleventh amendment’s bar
[against civil rights suits in federal court targeting a state] extends to suits against departments
or agencies of the state having no existence apart from the state.”); Foye, 675 F. App’x at 215.
36 	Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
37 	Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted); see also Natale v.
Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
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or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.” 38
Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional
refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of
medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,
or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of
injury.39 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,
requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” 40 Claims
sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice. 41
Assuming Jenkins has stated a serious medical need with respect to his fall-
related injuries, his medical indifference claim fails at the second and third
elements. That is, he has not plausibly alleged facts that would show that Nurse
Hall was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs or that such
deliberate indifference caused Jenkins harm.
The gravamen of the instant complaint is that Nurse Hall believed that
Jenkins’ symptoms were related to a heroin overdose (rather than a head injury), so
he administered Narcan to Jenkins to treat the apparent overdose. This type of
38 	Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).
39 	See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
at 346).
40 	Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).
41 	Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.
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allegation is a quintessential medical negligence claim. Jenkins essentially
contends that Nurse Hall should have provided different treatment on the day in
question than the care he provided. While this contention may implicate
professional negligence, it does not come close to establishing deliberate
indifference on the part of Nurse Hall and therefore does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.42
Furthermore, Jenkins does not allege that Nurse Hall’s purportedly negligent
treatment on July 25 caused him harm. It is well established, however, that
inmates claiming that they received constitutionally deficient medical care must
show that they were physically harmed by the state actor’s deliberate
indifference. 43 Jenkins’ complaint does not contain any such allegation of harm or
42 	See Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.
43 	See Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that prisoner’s claim
could not survive Rule 56 challenge because “he presented no evidence of any harm resulting
from a delay in medical treatment”) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)); Joh
v. Suhey, 709 F. App’x 729, 731 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (finding that brief delay in
treatment did not demonstrate that medical provider disregarded “an excessive risk” to
inmate’s safety because inmate did not allege that “the delay in treatment led to any serious
harm”); see also DeJesus v. Delaware, 833 F. App’x 936, 940 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that
deliberate indifference to serious medical need must have caused “harm or physical injury” to
plaintiff); Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 551 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Delay in medical care can only
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if there has been deliberate indifference that results
in substantial harm,” which can include the “pain suffered during the delay itself”) (citation
omitted)); Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Delay in medical care
only constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation where the plaintiff can show that the delay
resulted in substantial harm.”); Kellum v. Mares, 657 F. App’x 763, 771 (10th Cir. 2016).
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injury caused by Nurse Hall, so the Eighth Amendment claim against him must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 44
D. 	Official Capacity Claims
Jenkins, perhaps unintentionally, sues all Defendants in their official
capacities. 45 However, any official capacity claim seeking monetary damages from
state officials is barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents federal
courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or citizens of foreign
states—brought against a state. 46 This immunity from private suit extends to state
agencies as well as state officials acting in their official capacity, because such
lawsuits are essentially civil actions “against the State itself.” 47 States may waive
this immunity if they choose, but Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its
immunity with respect to claims brought under Section 1983.48 There are two
exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to private suits against nonconsenting
44 	Any Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim leveled against Superintendent McGinley
must also be dismissed under Section 1915A(b)(1). 	Jenkins fails to plead any element of a
medical indifference claim with respect to McGinley, as his single allegation against McGinley
is a legal conclusion that attempts to invoke vicarious liability for Nurse Hall’s treatment.
45 	See Doc. 1 at 2-3.
46 	U.S. CONST . amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
47 	Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
48 	See 42 PA. CONS . STAT . § 8521(b); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.
2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42
PA. CONS . S TAT . § 8521(b)).
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states: (1) “Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity” and (2) “parties may sue
state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.” 49
Jenkins seeks only money damages as relief. To the extent these damages
are sought against Defendants in their official capacities, such claims are barred by
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Thus, Jenkins’ official capacity claims
must be dismissed as well.
E. 	Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claim
It is possible that Jenkins is asserting a Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process claim regarding his 15-day detention in the RHU while prison officials
waited for his toxicology results. If so, that claim fails as well.
To plausibly state a Section 1983 claim for infringement of procedural due
process rights, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual
interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of
‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide
‘due process of law.’” 50 If a plaintiff cannot identify a protected interest that is “at
stake,” the analysis is at an end.51
49 	Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998)
(emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
50 	Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki,
227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)).
51 	See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Hill, 455 F.3d at 234-35.
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Jenkins’ due process claim is fatally flawed because he cannot identify a
protected interest that is at stake. The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that disciplinary segregation alone—under conditions that mirror those “imposed
upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody”—generally
does not reflect an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life” such that it implicates a protected liberty
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.52 And the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has repeatedly held that disciplinary segregation for
periods much longer than that which Jenkins experienced does not rise to the level
of an atypical and significant hardship.53 Therefore, because Jenkins has not
identified a protected liberty interest that is at stake for his Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process claim, the analysis is at an end and this claim must be
dismissed.
F. 	Claim Against Corrections Officer Shearn
Jenkins also names corrections officer “Je. Shearn” as a defendant in this
action. The only allegation against Shearn is that he informed a visitor that Jenkins
was “in the R.H.U. for drugs.”54 It is entirely unclear how this allegation
52 	Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 486 (1995).
53 	See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months); Torres v. Fauver,
292 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2002) (135 days); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 705-07 (3d Cir.
1997) (fifteen months); Dunbar v. Barone, 487 F. App’x 721, 725 (540 days).
54 	Doc. 1 at 5.
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implicates constitutional misconduct or a violation of federal law. Jenkins does not
plead what amendment or federal right Shearn purportedly infringed, nor how this
single act by Shearn could violate federal law. Accordingly, any Section 1983
claim against Shearn will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
G. 	Leave to Amend
Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” 55 Jenkins will be granted limited leave
to amend in the event that he can plead facts that would plausibly state a Section
1983 claim.
Several claims, however, will be dismissed with prejudice. Jenkins’
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim will be dismissed with
prejudice because that claim is legally—rather than factually—deficient. Jenkins
has not, and cannot, identify a protected liberty interest such that he could assert a
procedural due process claim. The Court will also dismiss with prejudice any
Section 1983 claim against Corrections Officer Shearn, as notifying a visitor that
an inmate is in disciplinary custody for illicit drug use is not a violation of federal
law. All official capacity claims for money damages will be dismissed with
55 	Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.
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prejudice, as they are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
Finally, any Section 1983 claim against the DOC will be dismissed with prejudice,
as that entity is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983. Granting leave to
amend these claims would be futile, as the substance of the claims does not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation.
If Jenkins chooses to file an amended complaint in conformity with this
Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document, complete in itself and without
reference to any previous pleadings. The amended complaint should set forth his
Eighth Amendment claim or claims in short, concise, and plain statements, and in
sequentially numbered paragraphs. Jenkins must leave one-inch margins on all
four sides of his pleading.56 Any exhibits or documents he wishes to present
should be attached to his amended complaint. Jenkins may not include claims that
have been dismissed with prejudice. He must name proper defendants and specify
the offending actions taken by a particular defendant. He must also sign the
amended complaint and indicate the nature of the relief sought.
If Jenkins does not timely file an amended complaint, dismissal of any
Section 1983 claims without prejudice will automatically convert to dismissal with
prejudice and the Court will close this case.
56 	See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 5.1.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Jenkins’ complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because he fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. Jenkins may file an amended complaint in accordance with this
Memorandum. If no amended complaint is timely filed, dismissal without
prejudice will automatically convert to dismissal with prejudice and the Court will
close this case. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
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