Steppe v. Carrols LLC et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document 31 _ Filed 03/09/26 Page 1 of 13

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DIANNE STEPPE, : No. 4:25cv609
Plaintiff
(Judge Munley)
V.

CARROLS LLC D/B/A BURGER :
KING; and CARROLS eo oe
D/B/A BURGER KING,

Defendants

OCC eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee ee eee ee ey
Poe eee eee ee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee ee eee ee eee eee ee ey

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Diane Steppe asserts claims against Defendants Carrols LLC d/b/a
Burger King and Carrols Corporation d/b/a Burger King for disability
discrimination pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 12101, ef seq. (“ADA”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43
PA. STAT. § 951, ef seg. (“PHRA’”). Specifically, Steppe alleges in her amended
complaint that defendants did not hire her because of her intellectual and
learning disabilities.

Before the court is a motion to dismiss Steppe’s amended complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 18). For the reasons

that follow, the motion to dismiss will be denied.

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document 31 _ Filed 03/09/26 Page 2 of 13

Background

Steppe lives with both an intellectual disability and a learning disability.
(Doc. 17, Am. Compl. J 21). At all relevant times, testing using the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale allegedly placed Steppe in the borderline range of
intellectual functioning compared to individuals of the same age. (Id. J 22).

Despite her disabilities, Steppe pursued her education and sought gainful
employment. From grade school through high school, Steppe attended special
education classes under an individualized education program. (Id. {] 24). Then,
as an adult, she worked through organizations that provide employment
opportunities for individuals with disabilities. (Id. {] 25). For instance, plaintiff has
been employed for several years as a custodian through the AbilityOne Program
at the federal courthouse in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. In that role, Steppe’s
responsibilities include cleaning chambers, courtrooms, and offices. (Id. {J 26).

Steppe asserts that the Social Security Administration has recognized her
disabilities. (Id. ] 28). As a child, plaintiff first received childhood disability
benefits. (Id.) And now as an adult, she receives social security disability

benefits. (Id.)

1 These background facts are derived from plaintiff's amended complaint. At this stage of the
proceedings, the court must accept all factual allegations as true. Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The court makes no
determination, however, as to the ultimate veracity of these assertions.

2

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document 31 _ Filed 03/09/26 Page 3 of 13

According to Steppe, her disabilities appear not only in records and testing
but also in how she speaks and carries herself. (Id. ] 40). Plaintiff asserts that
she has a distinctive vocal tone and mannerisms often associated with
individuals who have intellectual disabilities. (Id.)

On or about August 29, 2023, plaintiff applied for a crew member position
at defendants’ Williamsport location. (Id. | 30). The position required prior
experience in a fast-paced food service environment. (Id. [ 32). Plaintiff asserts
that she met the qualifications listed for the job and could perform the essential
functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodations. (Id. J] 31,
59). According to Steppe, she also had relevant experience working at a food
concession stand during the heavily attended Little League World Series
(“LLWS’). (Id. J 32).

On September 1, 2023, defendants’ general manager, Brandy Davis,
interviewed Steppe. (Id. J 33). During the interview, plaintiff sooke openly about
her background and explained that, despite her disabilities, she considers herself
to be a quick learner. (Id. §] 35). Steppe described her work experience with
organizations that provide employment opportunities for individuals with
disabilities. (Id. ] 36). Plaintiff also disclosed that, although she was still working
as a custodian at the Williamsport federal courthouse, she was applying for the

position with defendants because she wanted to work more hours. (Id.)

a

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document 31 _ Filed 03/09/26 Page 4 of 13

Steppe asserts that Davis knew that she was disabled. (Id. {] 41).
According to plaintiff, she disclosed her disabilities to Davis. (Id.) Plaintiff
contends that her distinctive vocal characteristics and mannerisms, associated
with those disabilities, also made this apparent. (Id.)

According to plaintiff, Davis did not inquire further into her work experience.
(Id. 42). Instead, Davis stated that plaintiff's involvement in concessions at
LLWS did not qualify as a fast-food experience. (Id. 44). Davis also told plaintiff
directly that the position with defendants was not suitable for her because it
could, at times, be overwhelming. (Id. {[ 47). Davis then ended the interview and
informed plaintiff that she would not be hired. (Id.)

Based on the above allegations, Steppe’s amended complaint advances
two causes of action: disability discrimination under the ADA (Count I) and under
the PHRA (Count Il). (Doc. 17).2. Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion seeks
dismissal of this action with prejudice. (Doc. 18).

Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must provide ‘a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Doe v.

? As plaintiff brings suit pursuant to the ADA, a federal statute, the court has federal question
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). The court has
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's PHRA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

4

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document 31 _ Filed 03/09/26 Page5of13

Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2)). This means a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). Aclaim has facial plausibility when factual content is pled which allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

The court evaluates motions to dismiss using a three-step process. The

first step involves identifying the elements of each claim. Oldham v. Pennsylvania

State Univ., 138 F.4th 731, 743 (3d Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). The second
step involves reviewing the operative pleading and disregarding any formulaic
recitation of the elements of a claim or other legal conclusion, as well as
allegations that are so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross the line

between the conclusory and factual. See Lutz v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,

LLC, 49 F.4th 323, 328 (3d Cir. 2022) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The third step evaluates the plausibility of the remaining allegations. Id.
In evaluating plausibility of the plaintiffs’ allegations, the court accepts all factual

allegations as true, construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document 31 _ Filed 03/09/26 Page 6 of 13

plaintiffs, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. Id. (citations
omitted).
Analysis
1. Plaintiff's ADA/PHRA Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff brings discriminatory failure to hire claims under the ADA/PHRA.°
To recover for unlawful discrimination alleging a failure to hire, an applicant must
establish that: “(1) [she] belongs to a protected category; (2) [she] applied for and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite
[her] qualifications, [she] was rejected; and (4) after [her] rejection, the position
remained open... or [was filled] with a person not belonging to the protected

category.” Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996)).

Defendants challenge the first and last elements of Steppe’s prima facie
case of discrimination—protected disability status and discriminatory conduct.4

(Doc. 21, Br. in Supp. at 5, 15). The court will address each argument in turn.

3 Defendants contend that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC’”). (Doc. 21, Br. in Supp at 4). However,
plaintiff asserts that the PHRC mailed the “Notice of Complainant’s Rights After Closure of
Complaint” to defense counsel and maintains that she has satisfied the PHRA’s administrative
exhaustion requirement. (Doc. 27, Br. in Opp. at 2, 13). In support of her position, plaintiff
attached the notice to her brief in opposition. (See Doc. 27-1). Defendants failed to address
plaintiff's argument in their reply brief. Thus, based on the parties’ submissions, the court
concludes that Steppe has exhausted her administrative remedies.

4 The parties analyze plaintiff's ADA and PHRA claims using the same legal theories. The
court will address those claims collectively under the same legal standard. See Morgan v.
Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, 114 F.4th 214, 220, n. 21 (3d Cir. 2024) (“federal courts should
continue to interpret the PHRA in harmony with the ADA.”); Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d

6

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document 31 _ Filed 03/09/26 Page 7 of 13

a. Disability

Under the ADA, it is unlawful for a covered entity to “discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application
procedures ... [and]... hiring [.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A plaintiff has a
“disability” within the meaning of the ADA if she: (1) has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of her “major life activities”; (2)
has “a record of such an impairment”; or (3) is “regarded as having such an
impairment.” Morgan, 114 F.4th at 221 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). Claims
arising under the first part of the definition are called “actual disability” claims
under ADA case law. Id. Claims stemming from the second part of the definition

are called “record of’ disability claims. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d

426, 437 (3d Cir. 2009). Lastly, the third part of the definition forms the
foundation of “regarded as” disability claims. Morgan, 114 F.4th at 223-24.

In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Steppe clarifies that she is not
pursuing a “record of” disability claim. (Doc. 27, Br. in Opp. at 10). Rather, she is
advancing “actual disability” and “regarded as” disability claims.

Actual Disability Claim — Steppe contends that she suffers from an

intellectual developmental disorder, an intellectual disability, and a learning

495, 500, n. 2 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he same legal standard that applies to the ADA applies
equally to disability discrimination claims under the PHRA.”).

7

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document 31 _ Filed 03/09/26 Page 8 of 13

disability. (Doc. 17, Am. Compl. 9] 21). Congress amended the ADA to ensure
that individuals with certain impairments, including “intellectual and
developmental disabilities[,]” receive the protection the statute was intended to

provide. Koller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco, 850 F. Supp. 2d 502, 513 (E.D.

Pa. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Morgan, 114 F.4th at 217-18.

In assessing alleged impairments, “[t]he specific issue in each case... Is
whether the plaintiff's particular disorder impairs [her] life in a manner which

renders [her] disabled or handicapped under the acts.” Gaul v. AT & T, Inc., 955

F. Supp. 346, 350 (D.N.J. 1997), affid sub nom. Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134

F.3d 576 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Stated differently, the ADA requires a
plaintiff-specific analysis. Id. Whether an individual is disabled depends less on
the name or diagnosis of the impairment and more on how that impairment
affects the particular individual. Id. Accordingly, “[t]he inquiry is, of necessity, an
individualized one — whether the particular impairment constitutes for the
particular person a significant barrier to employment.” Id. (citation omitted).

As for the major life activities substantially limited by a mental impairment,
the ADA provides a non-exhaustive list that includes “learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

In her amended complaint, Steppe describes her alleged disability as

follows:

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document 31 _ Filed 03/09/26 Page 9 of 13

21. At all times relevant hereto, Steppe has been
diagnosed with both an Intellectual Disability (intellectual
developmental disorder) and a Learning Disability.

22. At all times relevant hereto, Steppe was in the
borderline range of functioning compared to same-aged
peers per the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Score testing.

23. At all times relevant hereto, Steppe's disabilities and
cognitive deficits related thereto substantially limited one or
more major life activities including, but not limited to,
communication, learning, gathering and _ organizing
thoughts, verbal comprehension, memory,
articulation/speech, attention, concentration, math,
perceptual reasoning, processing speed, intellectual
functioning, fund of general information, self-care, self-
direction, and work.

24. During her grade school through high school education,
from on or about August 1986 through on or about June
1999 when she graduated with a high school diploma,
Steppe was in special education with an IEP due to her
intellectual and learning disabilities.
(Doc. 17, Am. Compl. 9] 21-24).
Steppe has plausibly pleaded that she has a mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of her major life activities. Steppe “is not
required, at this early pleading stage, to go into particulars about the life activity

affected by her alleged disability or detail the nature of her substantial

limitations.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus,

defendants’ motion to dismiss Steppe’s “actual disability” claim will be denied.

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document 31 Filed 03/09/26 Page 10 of 13

Regarded As Disability Claim — Defendants also move to dismiss Steppe’s

“regarded as’ disability claim. According to defendants, Steppe failed to plead
facts supporting her claim that defendants regarded her as a disabled individual.®
(Doc. 21, Br. in Supp. at 12).

In comparison to an actual disability claim, “the requirements for a prima
facie ‘regarded as’ claim are less demanding.” Morgan, 114 F.4th at 224 (quoting

Mancini v. City of Providence by & through Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 46 (1st Cir.

2018)). Proof of a “regarded as” claim requires showing of prohibited action
taken by the employer “because of an actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major

life activity.” Id. at 223-24 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)).

> Defendants attached notices from the PHRC, Steppe’s complaint which had been dual filed
with the PHRC and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and
defendants’ PHRC answer to their motion to dismiss. (Docs. 21-1 — 21-2). In deciding a motion
to dismiss, “a court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant
attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the
document.” Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d
Cir. 1993). “[A] document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be
considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.” Schmidt
v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (cleaned up)); see also Doe, 30 F.4th at 342 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).

Steppe expressly references her PHRC complaint and defendants’ PHRC answer in her
amended complaint. (Doc. 17, Am. Compl. ff] 8-10). Moreover, Steppe does not dispute the
authenticity of the attached documents. Thus, the court will consider these documents.

10

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document31 Filed 03/09/26 Page11of13

Here, Steppe alleges that “Davis knew of Steppe's disabilities . . . and
regarded Steppe as being disabled, through what Steppe told her and Steppe's
distinctive vocal characteristics and mannerisms as a result of her disabilities.” °
(Doc. 17, Am. Compl. 4] 41). These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion

to dismiss since Steppe “need|s] only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable

8 Defendants argue that Steppe is barred from bringing this argument before the court in this
matter. According to defendants, “[i]f such mannerisms and characteristics were clearly
distinct and commonly attributed to Plaintiff's alleged disability, she should have, and was
required, to plead such allegations in her PHRC complaint” before the EEOC. (Doc. 21, Br. in
Supp at 13). Although plaintiff does not address this argument, the court will briefly consider it
for the sake of completeness.

“The test for exhaustion is ‘whether the acts alleged in the subsequent [judicial complaint] are
fairly within the scope of the prior [administrative charge], or the investigation arising
therefrom.’ ” Kopko v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, 776 F. App'x 768, 773 (3d Cir. 2019)
(quoting Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996)). Therefore, the court must
determine whether the claims presented in the judicial complaint are “reasonably related to
those in the administrative charge” by assessing “whether there is a close nexus between the
facts in the administrative charge and those in the judicial complaint.” Kopko v. Lehigh Valley
Health Network, 776 F. App'x 768, 773 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up); see also Hicks v. ABT
Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 967 (3d Cir. 1978).

Steppe alleged in her EEOC complaint that “during the interview, | made manager Brenda [sic]
... aware of my disability ... [and she] told me that the job was not the right environment for
me and that it can become overwhelming . . . [and] Respondent discriminated against me
based on my disability.” (Doc. 21-1, at ECF pp. 7-8).

Based on information available to the court, Steppe drafted the EEOC complaint herself as she
is the sole signatory to the complaint. An EEOC charge must be construed liberally,
particularly when it is prepared by a pro se plaintiff. Hicks, 572 F.2d at 965 (citing Tillman v.
City of Boaz, 548 F.2d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1977)).

Plaintiff's “mannerisms and characteristics” theory underlying her “regarded as” claim falls
within the scope of her EEOC complaint, whether or not it is construed liberally. Thus,
defendants’ argument is unpersuasive and will be rejected.

11

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document31 _ Filed 03/09/26 Page 12 of 13

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.”
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (cleaned up). Given the fact specific nature of this
inquiry, the question of whether Steppe was regarded by defendants as having a
mental impairment is better suited for a motion for summary judgment. Thus,
defendants’ motion to dismiss Steppe’s “regarded as” disability claim will be
denied.
b. The Position Remained Open and The Employer Continued to Seek

Applicants

Lastly, defendants argue that plaintiff failed to plead the last element of her
prima facie case, namely, after plaintiff's rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants. (Doc. 21, Br. in Supp. at 14).

The Third Circuit has held that “as an alternative to the fourth element. . .
the plaintiff could show that the position was filled ‘with a person not belonging to

the protected category.’ ” Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d

933, 939 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Sutton v. United Air

Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (citation omitted). “By holding that favorable

treatment outside the protected class is an ‘alternative’ element to a prima facie
case, we made clear that this element can be present but by no means must be
present.” Id

Here, Steppe alleges in her amended complaint that “Carrols continued to

12

Case 4:25-cv-00609-JKM Document 31 Filed 03/09/26 Page 13 o0f13

advertise for the position, the position remained open, Carrol[s] interviewed other
candidates for the position, and the position was filled with an individual who did
not have an intellectual disability and learning disability and manifestations of the
same such as Steppe.” (Doc. 17, Am. Compl. {J 58).

Defendants deny these allegations and assert that they possess evidence
to prove their falsehood. (Doc. 21, Br. in Supp. at 15). By doing so, defendants
seek to fast-forward this case to the summary judgment phase. At this juncture,
Steppe does not need to present any evidence that would substantiate her
allegations. Summary judgment is a more appropriate vehicle to assess the
strength of plaintiff's allegations, alongside her evidence.

For these reasons, Steppe’s allegations are sufficient to establish the fourth
element of her prima facie discrimination case. Accordingly, defendants’ motion
to dismiss will be denied.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be

denied. An appropriate order follows.

lene 4 =
JUDGE;JULIA K. MU

United States District Court

13