USA v. Gamon

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
ELIJAH GAMON,
Defendant.
No. 4:23-CR-00075
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
J ANUARY 7, 2026
I. 	BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2023, a grand jury sitting in the Middle District of Pennsylvania
returned 	a 	one-count 	indictment 	against 	Elijah 	Gamon, 	charging 	him 	with
Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance in violation of Title 21,
United States Code § 841(a)(1).1 Gamon eventually filed a Motion to Suppress
Evidence on January 6, 2025 and an evidentiary hearing was conducted on May 13,
2025.2 That motion was denied in a previous memorandum opinion and order.3 Now,
after being granted leave, 4 Gamon has filed a second Motion to Suppress Evidence. 5
As the Court is now in receipt of briefing on the issues, the motion is ripe for
disposition. For the reasons that follow, it is denied.
1 	Doc. 1 (Indictment).
2 	Doc. 35 (First Mot. to Suppress).
3 	Docs. 51, 52.
4 	Doc. 81.
5 	Doc. 82 (Second Mot. to Suppress).
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II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. 	The Initial Chase
On December 18, 2022, Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Trooper Eric
Dreisbach (“Dreisbach”) was in an unmarked patrol vehicle equipped with an MVR
camera watching traffic near mile marker 213 along Interstate 80.6 At approximately
12:24 p.m., Dreisbach observed a Jeep Cherokee traveling westbound; he ran the
“license plate through Clean NCIC, and [he] observed that the registered owner,
Elijah Gamon, was DUI-suspended.”7 Dreisbach’s search of the database also
revealed that Gamon was the vehicle’s sole registered owner and it provided him
with a copy of Gamon’s driver’s license picture.8 Dreisbach concluded that Gamon
was “similar in appearance” to the black male in the license photograph.9
When Gamon’s vehicle passed, Dreisbach pulled out and began a pursuit,
noting 	that 	Defendant 	quickly 	“gain[ed] 	considerable 	distance” 	from 	him. 10
Dreisbach then activated his emergency lights,11 and it eventually became apparent
to Dreisbach that Gamon was fleeing when he “went down [an] off ramp and
immediately blew the stop sign and went right back up the ramp to I-180.” 12
6 	Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Doc. 46 at 11:3-10.
7 	Id. at 11:17-21. Clean NCIC is the PSP’s system used to access certain information about
individuals such as their vehicle registration, “records checks,” and warrants. Id. at 12:6-8.
8 	Id. at 12:16-18.
9 	Id. at 38:21-24.
10 	Id. at 13:7-16.
11 	Id. 13:16-21.
12 	Id. at 13:24-14:2.
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As he pursued Gamon, Dreisbach reviewed “headers” of investigations into
Defendant through PSP’s “mobile data terminal.”13 Through this, he discovered
Gamon “had a fleeing and eluding with possession with intent to deliver from the
year prior.” 14
Defendant eventually “abruptly” exited the interstate “at the last second.” 15
He took the exit “at an extreme high rate of speed” and struck a large sign after he
drove through an intersection “into the far shoulder” of the road.16 When he hit the
sign, Gamon “disabled or blew out his front left tire.” 17
Remarkably, the high-speed pursuit continued now along Route 220, with
Gamon driving still at “70, 80 miles per hour, even without that front left tire.” 18 He
recklessly weaved in and out of traffic and “almost hit numerous vehicles head on.”19
Gamon eventually ran through an intersection, in the process “almost” striking a
pedestrian, and proceeded down a side road.20 He lost control of his vehicle and
struck a tree head-on after briefly being airborne. 21
13 	Id. at 14:20-24, 15:8-9.
14 	Id. at 15:12-13.
15 	Id. at 16:1-3.
16 	Id. at 16:22-25.
17 	Id. at 17:1-5.
18 	Id. at 17:10-14.
19 	Id.
20 	Id. at 18:7-12.
21 	Id.
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B. 	The Aftermath of the Crash
Dreisbach exited his “patrol vehicle with [his] firearm drawn” and then
“approached his vehicle from the driver’s side [and] tried to give [Defendant]
commands.” 22 “It was very smokey inside; the airbags went off. It was hard to see.” 23
Given the severity of the accident, Dreisbach attempted to open the locked driver’s
side and passenger side doors.24 He then began “trying to smash the driver’s side
window out” with his Asp baton. 25
“[A]t this point, [he was] in now life-saving measures.” 26 Upon managing to
open the driver’s side door, Dreisbach removed Gamon from the vehicle.27 “He was
semi-unconscious, mumbling, not really saying anything.”28 Dreisbach also feared
the vehicle would catch fire as it was smoking.29
Dreisbach “put [Gamon] on his back on the ground” and handcuffed him. 30 A
bystander, 	off-duty 	paramedic 	approached 	the 	scene 	and 	“started 	assisting
[Dreisbach] with treating” Gamon.31 The paramedic “asked [Dreisbach] if [he] had
a blanket or anything to keep [Gamon] warm.” 32 Dreisbach then “tried to find
22 	Id. at 18:17-21.
23 	Id. at 18:20-21.
24 	Id. at 18:22-24.
25 	Id. at 18:25-19:1.
26 	Id. at 19:9.
27 	Id. at 19:9-13.
28 	Id.
29 	Id.
30 	Id.at 19:14-15.
31 	Id. at 19:14-18.
32 	Id. at 20:2-3.
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something to cover him with” and eventually “popped the rear hatch area and located
. . . a black jacket that [he] brough out and put on him or laid on him.” 33 Gamon was
eventually arrested and his car impounded.34
C. 	The Searches
The next day, December 19, 2022, a search warrant was sought and obtained
for the car that Gamon was driving.35 Part of what was found as a result of that search
was a green Apple iPhone and a bag containing white powder that was later
determined to be a mixture of heroin and fentanyl.36 On January 31, 2023, a search
warrant was sought and obtained for the digital contents of the iPhone. 37 This
included a “an examination and extraction of the mobile communication device” to
find “all user generated data stored on the handset, SIM car and/or MicroSD card.” 38
In the affidavit of probable cause attached to the search warrant, the
investigating officer, PSP Trooper Jeremy Hoy, started by attesting to the allegations
regarding the car chase. 39 He then recounted some of Gamon’s criminal history and
mentioned that there were substances found to be fentanyl and heroin in the car at
the time that the phone was seized.40 He also included a summary of the ways those
33 	Id. at 20:5-8.
34 	See id. at 65:14-15
35 	Id. at 65:9-21; Doc. 84, at 2.
36 	Doc. 82, Ex. A, at 5 (Search Warrant for the Phone); Doc. 84, at 2.
37 	Doc. 82, Ex. A, at 2.
38 	Id.
39 	Id. at 4.
40 	Id.
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involved in the distribution and sale of controlled substances utilize cell phones:
including mentioning their ability to take pictures and videos of “their product,” to
communicate between customer and supplier, and to maintain records.41 He finally
closed in conclusory fashion stating “[b]ased upon my training experience and
knowledge of this investigation, I believe GAMON used his cellular mobile phone,
specifically the cellular telephone/communication device seized on December 18,
2022 to arrange, execute, monitor, and complete the intrastate transportation of
Controlled Substances, and to arrange and complete the delivery of those Controlled
Substances to his customers.” 42
III. 	ANALYSIS
In the motion before the Court, Gamon raises two potential issues with the
search warrant for the iPhone: (1) that the affidavit supporting the search warrant
does not establish probable cause and (2) that the search warrant for the phone is
overbroad.43 Each issue will be addressed in turn.
A. 	Sufficiency of Probable Cause
The Fourth Amendment provides that, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” 44 Therefore, a search warrant is
required to demonstrate probable cause “that contraband or evidence of the crime
41 	Id. at 3.
42 	Id. at 5.
43 	Doc. 83.
44 	U.S. CONST . amend. IV.
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will be found in a particular place.” 45 Because Gamon challenges the facial
sufficiency of probable cause in the warrant to search the iPhone, my job “is not to
decide probable cause de novo, but to determine whether ‘the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.’” 46 In doing so, I must
pay deference to the fact that “[i]t is distinctly the magistrate’s task to make the
‘practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” 47 Thus, “[i]f a substantial basis exists
to support the magistrate’s probable cause finding, [I] must uphold that finding even
if a ‘different magistrate judge might have found the affidavit insufficient to support
a warrant.’” 48
Here, there are several facts contained in the affidavit accompanying the
search warrant that support a finding of probable cause: (1) Gamon was driving a
car that fled the police, (2) a mixture of fentanyl and heroin was found in the car,
and (3) a cell phone was also found in the car. 49 While the Defendant is correct in
noting that there were no facts in the warrant application “connecting the phone to
45 	Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
46 	United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 554 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238).
47 	United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 350-51 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at
238).
48 	Stearn, 597 F.3d at 554 (quoting United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1205 (1993)).
49 	Doc. 82, Ex. A, at 4-5.
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[his] alleged drug trafficking,” no direct evidence is required. 50 Rather, “a magistrate
may issue a search warrant even without direct evidence. Probable cause can be, and
often is, inferred from ‘the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the suspect's
opportunity for concealment and normal inferences about where a criminal might
hide [evidence].’” 51 The narcotics nature of the instant offense, the contents of the
phone sought, and the inferences inherent in the procession of drug distributors all
support the magistrate’s finding that probable cause existed. The facts alleged in the
complaint further support this proposition. A substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed, and that evidence of the crime was to be found on Gamon’s
phone. Therefore, I must uphold the finding of probable cause and deny the motion
to suppress made on this basis.
B. 	Overbreadth of the Search Warrant
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches
and 	seizures,” 52 police 	must 	generally 	obtain 	a 	warrant 	before 	conducting 	a
search. 53 A valid search warrant must (1) be based on probable cause; (2) be
supported by a sworn affidavit; (3) describe particularly the place of the search; and
(4) describe particularly the persons or things to be seized. 54
50 	Doc. 83, at 5.
51 	Stearn, 597 F.3d at 554 (quoting United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993)).
52 	U.S. CONST . amend. IV.
53 	See, e.g., Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999).
54 	See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004).
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“The purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement is to
prevent general exploratory searches.”55 A warrant will offend the particularity
requirement “when it amounts to a ‘general warrant’ or one that is unconstitutionally
overbroad.” 56 A general warrant “vest[s] the executing officer with unbridled
discretion to conduct an exploratory rummaging ... in search of criminal evidence.” 57
Meanwhile, an overbroad warrant will allow for “the seizure of items as to which
there is no probable cause” 58 because it describes what is seized “in both specific
and inclusive generic terms.” 59
In the case at bar, Gamon argues that the search of his iPhone was effectuated
pursuant to an unconstitutional, general warrant.60 This argument fails. For a warrant
to be invalidated as general, “it must vest the executing officers with unbridled
discretion to conduct an exploratory rummaging through [defendant’s] papers in
search of criminal evidence.” 61 That is not the case here. This warrant “confined the
officers’ discretion by limiting their search to a specific place ([Gamon’s] iPhone)
and limiting their search to specific categories of evidence (images, text messages,
55 	United States v. Dewald, 361 F. Supp. 3d 413, 416 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (citing Maryland v.
Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)).
56 	Id.
57 	United States v. Leveto, 540 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2008).
58 	U.S. v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents ($ 92,
422.57), 307 F.3d 137, 149 (3d Cir. 2002).
59 	United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 753-54 (3d Cir. 1982).
60 	See Doc. 82 ¶ 14.
61 	United States v. Dewald, 361 F. Supp. 3d 413, 418 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (quoting United States v.
Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 753 (3d Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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social media data, [etc.]).” 62 Further, the rest of the application “enhanced the
specificity of the warrant” because it identified the specific statutory offense alleged
to have been committed (a violation of Pennsylvania’s Controlled Substance, Drug
Device, and Cosmetic Act).63 “Courts have not suppressed evidence obtained
pursuant to warrants that identify specific devices, enumerate specific crimes, and
categorically delineate the type of evidence police are authorized to seize.” 64
The warrant at issue here did not authorize officers to engage in an exploratory
rummaging; rather, they were only authorized to search for evidence related to the
drug crimes set forth in the warrant and accompanying application.65 The warrant
includes broad language but does not amount to a blank grant to search the contents
of the phone for “all data” contained within it as Gamon alleges.66 Therefore, the
62 	Id.
63 	Id.; Doc. 82, Ex. A, at 5.
64 	Dewald, 361 F. Supp. 3d 413 at 418; see also United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 393 (3d
Cir. 2006) (explaining that particularity clause was not violated where warrants authorized
search for evidence of certain enumerated crimes, the search was limited in time, and the search
was limited in by subject matter); United States v. Karrer, 460 F. App’x 157, 161 (3d Cir.
2012) (explaining that a warrant to seize images of child pornography obtained pursuant to
images discovered during initial search for evidence involving unlawful contact with a minor
was not a general warrant where it “identified particular devices and file types to be searched
for evidence of a specific statutory offense.”); United States v. Atwell, 289 F.Supp.2d 629, 635
(W.D. Pa. 2003) (citing Christine, 687 F.2d at 760) (“The use of generic classifications in a
warrant is [sufficient] to delineate the categories of items to be seized when, due to the
circumstances of the investigation, a more precise description is not feasible.”); United States
v. Hawkins, No. 1:11cr61, 2014 WL 7335638, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2014) (warrant
limited search to defendant’s apartment and computer devices used therein, the warrant
identified the statutory violation for which evidence was sought, and “the nature of the
contraband believed to be possessed in violation of that statute was identified in specific detail
in the accompanying affidavit”).
65 	See Dewald, 361 F. Supp. 3d 413 at 418-19.
66 	See Doc. 83, at 6.
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search warrant was not a general warrant and does not offend the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 67
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Gamon’s second motion to suppress is denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
67 	See Dewald, 361 F. Supp. 3d 413 at 419.
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