USA v. Gamon

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
ELIJAH GAMON,
Defendant.
No. 4:23-CR-00075
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
J ANUARY 6, 2026
I. 	BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2023, a grand jury sitting in the Middle District of Pennsylvania
returned 	a 	one-count 	indictment 	against 	Elijah 	Gamon, 	charging 	him 	with
Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance in violation of Title 21,
United States Code § 841(a)(1).1 In the run up to the February 2026 trial for this
case, the Court issued an Order requiring all motions in limine to be filed by
December 8, 2025—with briefs in oppositions due by December 22, 2025.2 In
compliance with that Order, on December 8, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion in
Limine to Exclude Reference to Prior Convictions, Wrongs, or Acts of Elijah
Gamon.3
1 	Doc. 1 (Indictment).
2 	Doc. 65 ¶ 4.
3 	Doc. 74.
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On December 22, 2025, fourteen days after the deadline to file motions in
limine had passed, the Government inexplicably filed two—along with a supporting
brief to go with each.4 Because these motions are in clear violation of my Order
setting a deadline for the submissions of motions in limine, both are denied. 5
However, District Courts in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
have found that subsequent motions in cases can be treated as responses to previous
motions, even if styled by litigants as a wholly separate motion.6 Because both the
Government’s motions and briefs in support of them can be framed as responses to
Gamon’s motion in limine and they were filed by the December 22, 2025 responsive
brief deadline, the Court will consider them as a combined response to that motion—
ergo, a brief in opposition.7
4 	Docs. 77–80.
5 	See Doc. 65 ¶ 4. If the government had offered some explanation for the motions tardiness or
had filed a motion asking for leave to submit them, as Gamon did when he sought permission
to file a second motion to suppress (Doc. 76)—the Court would not have dismissed these
motions. But ignoring an Order of this Court cannot and should not stand. Therefore, the Court
will use its inherent authority to dismiss both motions in limine filed by the Government. See
United States v. Diaz, 66 F.4th 435, 443 (3d Cir. 2023) (“Federal courts have certain powers
that are not created by statute yet are necessary by virtue of having to manage their dockets
and ensuring cases are disposed of properly”).
6 	See, e.g., Burgos v. City of Philadelphia, 270 F. Supp. 3d 788, 798 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
7 	See Docs. 78, 80. Gamon’s motion requests the exclusion of “prior convictions, wrongs, or
other acts of Elijah Gamon.” Doc. 75. As discussed in Section II of this opinion, the
Government’s first motion in limine and supporting brief addresses specific other acts of
Gamon and his second motion in limine and supporting brief addresses prior convictions. See
Docs. 77–80. Therefore, it is clear that all four of these Government filings provide an indirect
response to Gamon’s original motion.
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II. 	GOVERNMENT’S MOTIONS AND BRIEFING
The Government’s first motion in limine and brief in support contends that
three acts by Gamon should be admissible at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b): (1) his 2012 stop by Pennsylvania State Police where a bag in his trunk was
found to contain heroin and cocaine, (2) a 2021 instance of fleeing from police at
excessive speeds and his arrest following that episode, and (3) a 2022 incident—
seven months prior to the actions that caused the present case—of fleeing from
police. 8 The Government argues that these events demonstrate the state of mind or
motive of Gamon when he allegedly committed the instant offense. 9
The Government’s second motion in limine and brief in support asks the Court
to allow the use of Gamon’s four state felony convictions for use at trial if he chooses
to testify.10 Those convictions would be used for impeachment and include (1) a
2013 guilty plea and sentence for possession with intent to deliver cocaine in Lehigh
County, (2) a 2013 guilty plea and sentence for possession with intent to deliver
heroin in Lehigh County, (3) a 2022 guilty plea and sentence for driving under the
influence in Lycoming County, and (4) a 2025 guilty plea and sentence for fleeing
an 	officer 	and 	intentionally 	possessing 	a 	controlled 	substance—among 	other
convictions for the same conduct—in Lycoming County.11
8 	Doc. 77.
9 	Doc. 78, at 17-19.
10 	Doc. 79.
11 	See id.
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III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Timing of the Government’s Notification Under Rule 404(b)(3)
On December 8, 2025, Gamon specifically requested 404(b)(3) notification of
any “crimes, wrongs, or acts” the Government intended to introduce at trial. 12
Unsurprisingly, when Gamon filed his motion in limine that same day “the
Government ha[d] not filed a Rule 404(b) notice signaling an intention to seek
admission of crimes, wrongs or acts.” 13 This led Gamon to argue that if any future
notification was filed from the Government, it should be held untimely. 14 That
notification ultimately did come in the Government’s two motions in limine filed on
December 22, 2025—49 days before trial. 15
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(3)(A) requires the Government to provide
“reasonable notice” of any other acts evidence that it intends to use at trial. 16 There
is no specific time limitation provided in the Rule, other than a requirement that the
notification must be before trial.17 The “circumstances and complexity of the
prosecution” determine what constitutes reasonable notice in any specific case. 18 In
12 	Doc. 72.
13 	Doc. 75, at 3.
14 	Id.
15 	Docs. 77, 79.
16 	FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(3); see also United States v. Bishop, No. 23-1735, 2025 WL 3241555, at
*2 (3d Cir. Nov. 20, 2025).
17 	FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(3)(C); see generally, FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(3).
18 	United States v. Pollard, No. CR 20-29, 2023 WL 3569857, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 19, 2023)
(quoting United States v. Johnson, 218 F. Supp. 3d 454, 462 (W.D. Pa. 2016)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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most cases, district courts “have found that, reasonable notice under Rule 404(b) is
in the range of seven to ten days or one to two weeks prior to trial.” 19
While the Government seeks to introduce a relatively large quantity of other
acts and prior convictions, there is nothing before the Court to support a finding that
this case is an unusually complex case. Therefore, there is also nothing to suggest
that the normal notice requirements of ten to fourteen days should be cast aside.
Here, the Government has provided four times the minimum notice that most courts
have required.20 The Court believes that in a case like the one before the Court, such
time is sufficient to meet the demands of Rule 404(b)(3)(A).
B. 	Other Acts Evidence Under Rule 404(b)
Rule 404(a) provides for a fairly strict prohibition against any character
evidence being admissible at trial. 21 However, “[t]his prohibition does not prevent
evidence of ‘other crimes, wrongs or acts’ from being admitted ‘for another purpose,
such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.’”22 The United States Court of Appeals for
19 	Id.; see also United States v. Long-Parham, 183 F. Supp. 3d 746, 750 (W.D. Pa. 2016); United
States v. Buckner, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5485, at *14–15 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2020).
20 	See Pollard, 2023 WL 3569857, at *1; Long-Parham, 183 F. Supp. 3d at 750; Buckner, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5485, at *14–15.
21 	FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (“[e]vidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible
to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or
trait.”).
22 	United States v. Miah, 120 F.4th 99, 110 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting F ED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)).
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the Third Circuit has set out an explicit test for determining whether such other acts
evidence is admissible:
A four-part test governs the admissibility of other-acts evidence
under Rule 404(b). Such evidence must: (1) have a proper, non-propensity
purpose; (2) be relevant to that non-propensity purpose; (3) satisfy the
requirement under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 that its probative value is not
substantially 	outweighed 	by 	the 	risk 	of 	unfair 	prejudice; 	and 	(4) 	be
accompanied by a limiting instruction where requested.23
It is important to note that “[t]he party seeking admission, here the government,
‘must do more than conjure up a proper purpose—they must also establish a chain
of inferences no link of which is based on a propensity inference.” 24 However, the
Government is correct in noting that “Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than
exclusion” 	— meaning it favors inclusion.25 Therefore, this rule only excludes
evidence when there lacks “any other purpose than to show the defendant’s
propensity to commit the charged offense. 26
In the Government’s brief in support of its first motion in limine, it provides
in-depth descriptions of all three other acts it seeks to admit. 27 It sets forth that all
three instances will be intended to show either Gamon’s motive or state of mind at
the time of the crime—what the Government refers to as “planning, preparation, and
23 	Id. (citing United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 241 (3d Cir. 2017)).
24 	Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 725 F.3d 340, 345 (3d Cir. 2013)).
25 	United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Givan, 320
F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir.2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26 	Id.
27 	See Doc. 78, at 5-9.
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intent.”28 Motive and these other purposes are commonly accepted non-propensity
reasons to admit what would normally be deemed character evidence.29 But the
question of whether the Government is offering these acts to actually show motive
or another non-propensity purpose is a separate question. It seems apparent from the
Government’s arguments that these non-propensity labels are simply pretexts for the
blatant propensity purposes for which it seeks to introduce the evidence.
The Government’s focus on motive is puzzling. It argues that the other acts
will demonstrate Gamon’s motive in committing the crime and fleeing from police.
But it plainly does not. None of the three previous incidents provides any indication
what laid inside of Gamon’s mind on the date of his actions related to the instant
case. 	Saying 	otherwise 	requires 	an 	improper 	propensity 	inference.30 This 	is
demonstrated by the Government’s example of the 2022 incident. 31 It contends that
because Gamon knew of the drugs in his car during that act, he must have known
about them in this incident as well. 32 This is an unmistakable attempt to use
propensity logic clothed under the guise of the non-propensity labels of motive or
absence of mistake.
28 	Id. at 17-19.
29 	United States v. Miah, 120 F.4th 99, 110 (3d Cir. 2024). After all, many of these purposes,
including motive appear in the text of FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
30 	Id.
31 	Doc. 78, at 17.
32 	Id.
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The more pressing problem for the Government is not that its motive rational
is a form of pretext, but that it carries the burden to “establish a chain of inferences
no link of which is based on a propensity inference.” 33 “The proponent must do more
than 	merely 	pigeonhole 	the 	evidence 	into 	one 	of 	the 	categories 	permitted
by Rule 404(b)(2), and instead must show that the prior convictions actually prove
something other than propensity.” 34 It has clearly failed to meet their burden here.
While the Government has identified valid non-propensity purposes for the
use of evidence, its brief spends only three pages discussing why these purposes may
be applicable to the relevant evidence here—more than one page of which include a
string citation to cases that bear little if any relation to the case at hand. 35 Far from
establishing a chain of inferences devoid of propensity links, the “chain” that the
Government sets forth amounts to no more than the statement that Gamon has
previously committed bad acts tangentially similar to the ones before the Court.
“Other than its threadbare recitals of Rule 404(b) exceptions, the government has
not explained why its proffered non-propensity purposes are of consequence in
determining the action.” 36 This simply fails to meet the burden required under Rule
404.
33 	Miah, 120 F.4th at 110.
34 	United States v. Lackey, No. 1:17-CR-269, 2019 WL 6468575, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2019)
(quoting United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
35 	Doc. 78, at 17-19.
36 	Lackey, 2019 WL 6468575, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Government’s use of these other acts evidence would require a finder of
fact to utilize propensity inferences to be of any use at all. We do not work in a
system that punishes defendants for their character or previous other acts. For these
reasons, these other acts must be deemed inadmissible in Gamon’s trial. 37
C. 	Previous Convictions under Rule 609
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) provides for “evidence of a prior felony
conviction to be offered to impeach a testifying witness.”38 But when that witness is
the defendant, “the prior conviction is admitted only if the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant.” 39 This reflects “a
reversal of the standard for admission under Rule 403” and “creates a predisposition
toward exclusion.”40
The Third Circuit has established four factors to consider when “when
weighing the probative value against the prejudicial effect under this heightened test.
37 	As a final observation on this issue, the Court wishes to note a curious inclusion in the
Government’s brief. The Government included a paragraph informing the Court that any
rulings under Rule 404(b) may only be reversed “when they are clearly contrary to reason and
not justified by evidence.” Doc. 78, at 14 (internal quotations omitted). The inclusion to review
standards in its discussion seems to imply that it would be fine for the Court to rule for the
Government on this issue because it’s unlikely that the Court would be reversed on an appeal.
The Court will not, and does not here, make any decision simply for the reason that it will not
get reversed. Rather, the focus of the Court is to correctly resolve whatever issue is before the
Court. For the instant motions, that means the Court is only worried about making a correct
determination on the admissibility of the evidence and overseeing a just resolution of the
pending matter. To imply otherwise in a filing before the Court rather misses the mark of
effective advocacy.
38 	Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 286.
39 	Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40 	Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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These factors include: (1) the kind of crime involved; (2) when the conviction
occurred; (3) the importance of the [defendant's] testimony to the case; [and] (4) the
importance of the credibility of the defendant.” 41
1. 	First Factor
“When evaluating the first factor—the kind of crime involved—courts
consider both the impeachment value of the prior conviction as well as its similarity
to the charged crime.” 42 “The impeachment value relates to how probative the prior
conviction is to the witness’s character for truthfulness.” 43 Drug convictions can be
admissible 	for 	impeachment 	purposes 	under 	Rule 	609.44 However, 	“[p]rior
convictions for the same or similar crimes are admitted sparingly.”45 This is because
“[t]he danger of unfair prejudice is enhanced if the witness is the accused and the
crime was similar to the crime now charged, since this increases the risk that the jury
will draw an impermissible inference under Rule 404(a).” 46
41 	Id. (quoting Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 761 n.4 (3d Cir.1982)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
42 	Id.
43 	Id. (citing 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 609.06
[3][b] (2d ed.2011)).
44 	United States v. Murphy, 172 F. App’x 461, 463 (3d Cir. 2006).
45 	United States v. Ponder, No. 4:16-CR-0056, 2017 WL 2633467, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 16, 2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
46 	Id. (quoting Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 287) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United
States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 297–98 (4th Cir.1992) (“Admission of evidence of a similar
offense often does little to impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant while undoubtedly
prejudicing him. The jury, despite limiting instructions, can hardly avoid drawing the inference
that the past conviction suggests some probability that defendant committed the similar offense
for which he is currently charged. The generally accepted view, therefore, is that evidence of
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Here, three of the four offered convictions that the Government are markedly
similar to the conduct at issue in this case or the charges filed in this case. Two of
the previous convictions from 2013 are nearly identical crimes—they are for
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and the charge under the
current indictment is for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. 47
Additionally, the 2025 conviction for fleeing or attempting to elude an officer is very
similar to the conduct that is likely to be at the center of this trial—Gamon’s flee
from the police.
Before addressing the issues with those three convictions, it should be noted
that the final conviction proffered by the Government is different. The 2022 driving
under the influence conviction is of a substantially different kind than the charges
Gamon faces today. However, this final conviction shows nothing about Gamon’s
“propensity for falsehood, deceit or deception.”48 As such, this conviction cannot be
admitted under Rule 609 and will be inadmissible at Gamon’s trial. 49
The Government provides a solution to the issues with the two possession
with intent to deliver convictions and the fleeing an officer conviction—to “sanitize”
similar offenses for impeachment purposes under Rule 609 should be admitted sparingly if at
all.”).
47 	Docs. 1, 79.
48 	People v. Stephens, No. ST-16-CR-377, 2019 WL 1270608, at *3 (V.I. Super. Mar. 13, 2019).
49 	Because this conviction is deemed inadmissible under the first factor, it will not be addressed
in the further analysis of the remaining factors. As such, I will refer to three convictions,
excluding the driving under the influence conviction, going forward.
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the offense by referring to it as a “prior felony” conviction. 50 This sanitized approach
solves the Court’s concerns with regard to the similarity of the convictions to the
charges and conduct at issue in the trial. 51 A sanitized version of the convictions
would lead the first factor to favor admission for impeachment purposes and is
supported by precedent.52
2. 	Second Factor
The second factor is the age of the conviction. “The age of a conviction may
weigh particularly in favor of exclusion where other circumstances combine with
the passage of time to suggest a changed character.” 53 “For example, a prior
conviction 	may 	have 	less 	probative 	value 	where 	the 	defendant-witness 	has
maintained a spotless record since the earlier conviction or where the prior
conviction was a mere youthful indiscretion. Conversely, the probative value of an
older conviction may remain undiminished if the defendant was recently released
50 	Doc. 80, at 7.
51 	Because the Court believes this sanitized version alleviates concerns about biasing the jury, I
will evaluate the remaining three factors as related to this sanitized version of the convictions.
52 	See U.S. v. Cherry, No. CRIM.A. 10-091, 2010 WL 3156529, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2010)
(allowing the Government to impeach the Defendant charged with possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon with a prior robbery conviction “sanitized of any reference to the use of a
firearm; U.S. v. Faulk, 53 F. App’x. 644, 645 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that permissible
questioning typically is limited to the number of convictions, and the nature, time, and date of
each; and that the Government generally may not elicit the specific circumstances and details
of the conviction.); U.S. v. Gaston, 509 F. App’x. 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming the District
Court’s admission of sanitized prior convictions); U.S. v. Hursh, 217 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2000)
(affirming the District Court’s allowance of sanitized Rule 609 evidence).
53 	United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 287 (3d Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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from confinement or has multiple intervening convictions, both of which could
suggest his character has not improved.”54
While the two possession with intent to deliver a controlled substances
charges were close to ten years old at the time this indictment was laid down, the
continuation of Gamon’s criminal record indicates that this is not a scenario where
his character and discretion have improved. Further, the fleeing conviction came
after this indictment was levied. Therefore, the age of convictions demonstrates a
pattern of conduct that weighs in favor of admission.
3. 	Third Factor
The third factor addresses the importance of the defendant’s testimony to his
defense at trial. “The fact that a defendant’s testimony is important to demonstrate
the validity of his or her defense constitutes a factor weighing against the admission
of a prior conviction.” 55 However, even if the defendant’s testimony would be
“critical,” 56 a sanitized version of convictions can render this factor neutral.57 The
Government’s willingness to sanitize the three convictions here means that in this
analysis the third factor is neutral.
54 	Id.
55 	Id.
56 	The Government argues that Gamon’s testimony at trial will be essential to the case. See Doc.
80, at 12.
57 	United States v. Ponder, No. 4:16-CR-0056, 2017 WL 2633467, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 16,
2017).
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4. 	Fourth Factor
The final factor concerns the significance of the defendant’s credibility to the
trial. If Gamon testifies at his trial, his credibility will assuredly be front and center
as a critical issue in the case because one of his defenses is likely to be that he had
no knowledge of the controlled substances in his trunk.58 “When the defendant’s
credibility is a central issue, this weighs in favor of admitting a prior conviction.”59
Given that the three convictions at issue are somewhat probative of credibility, 60 this
factors weighs in favor of their admission.
As all four factors either favor admission or are neutral, the probative value
of the three sanitized versions of the convictions proffered by the Government
outweighs any prejudicial effect to Gamon and they are admissible under Rule 609.
5. 	Rule 403 Balancing
“Rule 609 evidence may not be admitted if, under Rule 403, the trial court
finds that ‘its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair
prejudice.’” 61 I conclude that the danger of unfair prejudice is mitigated by the
Government’s sanitized approach. The Third Circuit has approved of this approach
58 	See id. at *4.
59 	Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 288.
60 	See United States v. Gaston, 509 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2013) (“prior drug convictions
were probative of his credibility”). It is also logical that a prior conviction for fleeing or
attempting to elude an officer could be probative of a witness’s credibility.
61 	U.S. v. McGavitt, 532 F. App’x 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting F ED. R. EVID. 403).
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explaining that the “District Court minimized any prejudice that may have resulted
from the admission of the convictions by limiting the government.” 62
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, both of the Governments motions in limine are
denied due to the tardiness of their filing, and Gamon’s motion in limine is granted
in part—as to other acts evidence—and denied in part—as to specific prior
convictions.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
62 	Gaston, 509 F. App’x at 161 (“The District Court minimized any prejudice that may have
resulted from the admission of the convictions by limiting the government to asking about the
fact of the conviction and the date of the conviction”).
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