Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FRANCIS EMILIO SANCHEZ
NAVARRETE,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-00320
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Francis Emilio Sanchez Navarrete (“Navarrete”), an Ecuadorian citizen
and asylum seeker, brings this petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). On February 9,
2026, Navarrete filed the instant petition, requesting that Respondents Kristi Noem, Pamela
Bondi, Cammilla Wamsley, and Craig A. Lowe (“Lowe”)1 release him from custody at the
Pike County Correctional Facility in Lords Valley, Pennsylvania or provide him with an
1 The government asserts that pursuant to the “immediate custodian rule,” the only proper
respondent in this case is Craig Lowe (“Lowe”), Warden of the Pike County Correctional
Facility. (Doc. 3, at 1 n.1). “The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the
proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who has custody over [the petitioner].’”
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242); 28 U.S.C. § 2243
(“[t]he writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the
person detained”); see Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2021)
(“if a § 2241 petitioner does not adhere to the immediate custodian rule, then the district court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition”). As Navarrete is detained at the Pike County
Correctional Facility, Lowe is the proper respondent. (Doc. 1, at 4); see Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at
434. As such, Respondents Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, and Cammilla Wamsley are
DISMISSED. However, the government will be bound by the Court’s judgment because
Lowe is acting as an agent of the federal government by detaining Navarrete on behalf of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). See Madera v. Decker, 18 Civ. 7314, 2018 WL
10602037, at *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2018) (finding the warden acts as an agent of the ICE
regional director when ICE makes initial custody determinations including setting of a bond
and review of conditions of release); Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton County Correctional
Facility, 3:25-cv-01896, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252280, at *22 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025)
(finding same).
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opportunity for bond redetermination. (Doc. 1, at 3). For the following reasons, Navarrete’s
petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED, and Lowe is ORDERED to release Navarrete from custody.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following background and factual summary are derived from Navarrete’s petition,
Lowe’s response, and the exhibits thereto. (Doc. 1; Doc. 3). Navarrete is a citizen of Ecuador,
who has lived in the United States since November 29, 2022. (Doc. 3-2, at 3). On December
29, 2022, Navarrete entered the United States without inspection approximately one mile
northwest of the San Luiz, Arizona port of entry and was subsequently encountered by United
States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”). (Doc. 3-3, at 3). CBP paroled Navarrete into
the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) due to time in custody constraints. (Doc. 3-3,
at 3). A Notice to Appear was never processed in association with Navarrete’s November
2022 encounter with CBP; however, Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) records
indicate that upon parole into the United States, Navarrete was issued a G-56 DHS call-in
letter and DHS tear sheet, with instructions that he must report to an ICE Field Office within
60-days. (Doc. 3-2, at 4; Doc. 3-3, at 3). Lowe asserts that Navarrete has not appeared at any
ICE check in appointments, which are typically required upon parole into the United States.
(Doc. 	3, 	at 	6). 	Since 	entering 	the 	United 	States, 	Navarrete 	obtained 	employment
authorization and applied for asylum. (Doc. 1-5; Doc. 3-3, at 3). Navarrete’s asylum
application is still pending. (Doc. 3-3, at 3).
On June 18, 2023, The Pennsylvania State Police arrested Navarrete for driving under
the influence. (Doc. 3-3, at 3). In relation to his arrest, ICE Enforcement and Removal
Operations (“ERO”) Pike Sub Office Officers encountered Navarrete in the Luzerne County
jail. (Doc. 3-3, at 3). The officers identified Navarrete as a citizen of Ecuador, who entered
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the United States illegally; however, DHS records do not indicate that the officers issued
Navarrete a Notice to Appear or revoked his parole under § 1182(d)(5). (Doc. 3, at 6; Doc. 3-
3, at 3). Navarrete pled guilty to driving under the influence, and the Luzerne County Court
of Common Pleas sentenced him to six months of probation. (Doc. 3-3, at 4).
On February 1, 2026, Pike ERO Officers, Homeland Security Investigations Scranton,
and Internal Revenue Service Scranton conducted surveillance at Navarrete’s last known
address in Hazleton, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 3-3, at 3). At 8:10 a.m., the officers visually
identified Navarrete exiting the residence, entering his car, and driving southbound on state
road 309. (Doc. 3-3, at 3). The officers stopped Navarrete’s vehicle, identified him, and took
him into custody. (Doc. 3-3, at 3). The officers charged Navarrete under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and
§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), as an alien present
without admission or parole and an immigrant without an immigrant visa. (Doc. 3-3, at 3).
The officers also issued Navarrete a notice to appear, which indicated that he is an alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled. (Doc. 3-4; Doc. 1-6). Since
February 1, 2026, Navarrete has been detained at the Pike County Jail in Lords Valley,
Pennsylvania pending his removal proceedings. (Doc. 3-3, at 4).
Navarrete filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 9, 2026.
(Doc. 1). Pursuant to the Court’s Order to Show Cause (Doc. 2), the government filed a
response to Navarrete’s petition on February 18, 2026 (Doc. 3). Navarrete filed a traverse on
February 19, 2026. (Doc. 4). Accordingly, the petition is ripe for disposition.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 2241 governs district courts’ power to grant the writ of habeas corpus.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b), the writ of habeas corpus extends to petitioners “in custody for
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an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or
decree of a court or judge of the United States.” Claims where non-citizens challenge
immigration enforcement-related detention “fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus
and thus must be brought in habeas.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting
Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 167 (2022)). “For ‘core habeas petitions,’ ‘jurisdiction lies in
only one district: the district of confinement.’” J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 672. While reviewing a
noncitizen’s 	habeas 	petition, 	courts 	evaluate 	whether 	the 	government 	complied 	with
regulatory, statutory, and constitutional protections for noncitizens. See Martinez v. McAleenan,
385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding ICE failed to comply with regulatory and
constitutional notice requirements prior to detaining a non-citizen petitioner and granting the
petitioner’s habeas petition). A court may order a bond hearing or release if the Court
determines that a noncitizen habeas petitioner is entitled to such relief under relevant
constitutional or statutory protections. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 827 (W.D. Pa.
2025) (finding that a noncitizen habeas petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing under the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment); see Cantu-Cortes v. O’Neill, No. 25-cv-6338, 2025
WL 3171639, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (finding a habeas petitioner was entitled to a
bond hearing under relevant statutory protections); see also Alexey Kashranov v. J.L. Jamison, et
al., No. 2:25-CV-05555, 2025 WL 3188399 at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (finding that the
appropriate remedy when the government detains a petitioner under an inapplicable statute,
violating due process, is release from custody).
III. 	JURISDICTION
“[F]ederal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’” Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v.
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Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 514 (2006)). 28 U.S.C. § 2241 empowers federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus
where a petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States . . . in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1),
(3). Recently, in Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2026), the Third
Circuit determined that the INA strips district courts of subject matter jurisdiction to hear
claims arising from removal actions or proceedings, when the claims could be addressed on a
petition for review of a final order of removal (“PFR”). However, the Third Circuit clarified
that district courts retain jurisdiction over habeas petitions presenting “now or never”
questions of law, that cannot be meaningfully reviewed later on a PFR. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at
273-74.
Habeas actions based on whether a petitioner is detained pursuant to the appropriate
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and is entitled to a bond hearing are “now
or never” legal questions that remain in the jurisdiction of district courts. See Kahlil, 164 F.4th
at 274-77; see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (finding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)
does not present a jurisdictional bar to challenges unrelated to review of an order of removal,
the government’s decision to detain in the first place, and the process by which removability
will be determined). A determination of whether § 1225(b) or § 1226(a) applies to a petitioner
also determines whether that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. See Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 126 (BIA 2025) (holding immigration judges lack authority to hear
bond requests for noncitizens detained under § 1225(b)); see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399 at
*5 (citing § 1226(a)) (finding § 1226(a) allows for detainees to be released on conditional parole
or bond). Such claims do not arise from removal proceedings, they arise “now.” If left to be
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raised on a PFR, the petitioner will never get the opportunity for an immigration judge to
determine their eligibility for bond during removal proceedings. See Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 274-
77 (“when [noncitizens] raise claims that courts cannot ‘meaningfully’ review through the
PFR process, those claims do not ‘aris[e] from’ the ‘action[s] taken’ or ‘proceeding[s] brought’
to remove them”). Thus, the Court retains jurisdiction because the legal questions of whether
§ 1225(b) or § 1226(a) applies to Navarrete and whether Navarrete is entitled to a bond hearing
are wholly collateral to his removal proceedings and cannot be meaningfully reviewed on a
PFR. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294; Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 274-79.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Navarrete contends that his mandatory detention under § 1225(b) is both a violation
of the INA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 1, at 19). Lowe
counters that Navarrete is subject to mandatory detention because he falls squarely under §
1225(b)(1), which provides noncitizens only with the rights and protections set forth by
Congress. (Doc. 3, at 20, 43). The Court will first address whether Navarrete was properly
detained under § 1225(b). The Court will then address whether Navarrete’s detention violates
due process.2
A. NAVARRETE WAS IMPROPERLY DETAINED UNDER 8 U.S.C. 1225(B), WHEN HE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1226(A).
2 The Court notes that Navarrete also claims relief under the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”) and the Suspension Clause of the Constitution. (Doc. 1, at 19-20). As the Court
grants the Petition on the basis that Navarrete’s detention is unlawful under the INA and
violates his procedural due process rights, the Court declines to consider Navarrete’s APA
and Suspension Clause arguments at this time. See Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, No. 25-cv-16200,
2025 WL 2976572, at *9 n. 6 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025); see Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No.
25-5488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025); see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399,
at *8; see also Ramirez v. Jamison, No. 2:25-cv-7346, 2026 WL 196474, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
26, 2026).
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Navarrete was improperly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), when he should have
been detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Navarrete avers that noncitizens who have lived in
the United States for years before ICE apprehended them are properly detained under §
1226(a), not § 1225(b). (Doc. 1, at 19). Lowe counters that Navarrete is properly detained
under § 1225(b)(1) because Navarrete was apprehended within a mile of a port of entry and
was paroled into the United States under § 1182(d)(5). (Doc. 3, at 20). Lowe reasons that once
Navarrete’s parole under § 1182(d)(5) was revoked, Navarrete was for all intents and purposes
still in line at the border and subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1). (Doc. 3, at
4, 20-23). In the alternative, Lowe contends that Navarrete meets the definition of an
applicant for admission who is present in the United States without admission and thus is
properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 3, at 24-25).
The INA is a comprehensive statute regulating immigration, which Congress has
repeatedly reworked since its enactment in 1952. Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1. Before
1996, the INA provided that noncitizens who presented themselves at ports of entry were
subject to mandatory detention during exclusion proceedings, while noncitizens who evaded
inspection by entering elsewhere were afforded the opportunity to obtain release during
deportation proceedings. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 222-223 (BIA 2025)
(citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a); 1251 (1994)). In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) amended the INA to include § 1225 and § 1226, in
part, to end the preferential treatment of noncitizens who evaded inspection when entering
the United States. OMNIBUS CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1997, PL
104–208, September 30, 1996, 110 Stat 3009; H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, at 225 (1996); see
Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223. With the IIRIRA, Congress eliminated separate exclusion
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and deportation hearings and combined them into a single removal proceeding, regardless of
where the noncitizen entered the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Since 1996, only
noncitizens who are admitted are subject to deportation, while noncitizens who have never
been formally admitted are deemed inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
Pursuant to the IIRIRA, when a noncitizen enters the United States at a designated
port of entry, they are considered an “arriving alien” and are generally subject to expedited
removal, unless they indicate an intention to apply for asylum. If the asylum officer finds a
noncitizen’s asserted fear of persecution to be credible, the noncitizen’s asylum claim will be
fully 	considered 	in 	a 	standard 	removal 	hearing. 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	208.30(f); 	8 	U.S.C. 	§
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Noncitizens are subject to detention while an immigration judge considers
their asylum application; however, DHS may grant such noncitizens parole into the United
States for humanitarian purposes. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
Humanitarian parole is not considered admission into the United States, and humanitarian
parole automatically terminates without written notice upon the noncitizen’s departure from
the United States or the expiration of time for which the parole was authorized. 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5)(A). If the purpose of the parole has been served, then the noncitizen will be
returned to the custody from which he or she was paroled. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). However,
the government must first provide written notice of and an opportunity for the noncitizen to
respond to its determination that the purpose of parole was accomplished or its determination
that “neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of an
alien in the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). 8 U.S.C. §§
1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). Lowe avers that Navarrete is still subject to mandatory detention and
expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1) because Navarrete was detained within one mile of a
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port of entry and paroled into the United States before an immigration officer conducted a
credible fear interview. (Doc. 3, at 20-23).The parties dispute whether a noncitizen, like
Navarrete, who DHS released on humanitarian parole and then re-detained is subject to
detention under §1225(b)(1), § 1225(b)(2)(A), or § 1226(a). (Doc. 1, at 7-13; Doc. 3, at 21-23).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA is a catchall provision, that applies to applicants for
admission not otherwise covered by § 1225(b)(1). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Section
1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the
examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained [pending removal
hearings].” Pursuant to this provision, noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention while
their removal proceedings are pending, but they may be released “for urgent humanitarian
reasons or significant public benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (citing § 1182(d)(5)(A));
Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1. To trigger § 1225(b)(2)(A), an examining immigration
officer must determine that an individual is (1) an applicant for admission, (2) seeking
admission, and (3) not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. Martinez v. Hyde,
792 F. Supp. 3d, 211, 214 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025), Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to a noncitizen who is both an “applicant for admission”
and “seeking admission.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *5
(collecting cases). The parties dispute whether Navarrete is still “seeking admission” to the
United States. (Doc. 1, at 7-13; Doc. 3, at 21-23).
The INA defines an applicant for admission as a noncitizen who is “present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” § 1225(a)(1);
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 286. The phrase “alien seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, so
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the Court must construe the phrase based upon its ordinary meaning and statutory context.
See Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; see also J.A.M. v. Streeval, No. 4:25-cv-34 2 (DCL),
2025 WL 3050094, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025). District courts in the Third Circuit and
across the country have found that “seeking admission” describes active and ongoing
conduct, such as physically attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of
entry. Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; Del Cid, 2025 WL2985150, at *16 n. 7; J.A.M.,
2025 WL 3050094, at *3; Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem, No. 25 CV 10865, 2025 WL 2938779, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025); see Cantu-Cortes, 2025 WL 3171639, at *2 (quoting Vazquez v. Feeley,
No. 25-cv-01542, 2025 WL2676082, at *13 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025)) (finding a noncitizen
who has already been residing in the United States cannot be characterized as “seeking entry”
consistent with the ordinary meaning of that phrase). This reading comports with the Supreme
Court’s finding in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583, U.S. 281, 285 (2018), that § 1225(b) “applies
primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States,” those who are “seeking admission
into the country.” See Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *6. This reading also preserves a distinction
between “seeking admission” and the separate term “applicant for admission,” ensuring that
each phrase carries independent meaning.3 Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6.
Section 1226 of the INA applies to noncitizens who are not seeking admission but are
already present in the United States. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89. Section 1226(a) provides
that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” The
3 The Court acknowledges that the Fifth Circuit recently issued a decision in Buenrostro-
Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330, at *5 (5th Cir. 2026), holding that under the
INA an “applicant for admission” is necessarily someone who is “seeking admission.”
However, Buenrostro-Mendez is not binding on the Court.
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Attorney General may release a noncitizen on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a)(2). Pursuant to § 1226(a), “[i]mmigration authorities make an initial custody
determination, after which the noncitizen may request a bond hearing before an immigration
judge.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)). At their
bond hearing, a noncitizen “may secure his release if he can convince the officer or
immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”4 Nielsen v.
Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397-98 (2019); see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1.
On July 8, 2025, ICE and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced a new
practice, in which that all applicants for admission, regardless of when the noncitizen was
apprehended, are now subject to the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Interim 	Guidance 	Regarding 	Detention 	Authority 	for 	Applicants 	for 	Admission,
https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-
for-applications-for-admission (last visited Feb. 25, 2026). On September 5, 2025, the BIA
adopted the DOJs new position, holding that immigration judges have no authority to
consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission,
finding all applicants for admission are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are
ineligible for release on bond. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. &N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Several
district courts across the country, including courts in the Third Circuit, reject this new policy
and the application of § 1225(b)(2)(A) to noncitizens who have been residing in the United
States for a period of time before they are detained by ICE pending removal proceedings.
4 Section 1226(c) provides for the mandatory detention of criminal aliens pending removal
proceedings. Navarrete falls under the provisions of § 1226(a), not § 1226(c) because his
driving under the influence conviction did not result in personal injury to another, is not a
crime of moral turpitude, and did not result a year or more of imprisonment. 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c)(1)(A)-(E).
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Cantu-Cortes, 2021 WL 3171639, at *2 (finding § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applicable for
petitioner who resided in the United States for approximately 25 years before ICE detained
him); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (finding “mandatory detention only applies for
aliens who are “seeking admission,” and petition who lived in the United States for almost
two years was not seeking admission but “already here”); Del Cid v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2985150
at *14-17 (finding noncitizens who had been in the United States for over two years when
arrested are subject to § 1226(a) not § 1225); Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *7 (collecting cases).
Section 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to Navarrete’s detention.
Section 1225(b)(1) explicitly applies to “aliens arriving in the United States and certain other
aliens who have not been admitted or paroled,” and Navarrete was paroled into the United
States on November 29, 2022. (Doc. 3-2, at 3). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens
who are applicants for admission and are seeking admission to the United States. See Martinez,
792 F. Supp. 3d at 214, see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; see also Soto, 2025 WL
2976572, at *5 (collecting cases). Navarrete is not actively attempting to come into the United
States; based on the plain meaning of the phrase “seeking admission,” Navarrete sought
admission when he entered the United States on November 29, 2022. (Doc. 3-2, at 3); see
Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (“seeking admission describes active and ongoing
conduct—physically attempting to come into the United States, typically at a border or port
of entry and presenting oneself for inspection and authorization”). Since his release on parole,
Navarrete has resided in the Hazleton, Pennsylvania, obtained work authorization, and
applied for asylum. (Doc. 1-5, at 7; Doc. 3-3, at 3). A noncitizen, like Navarrete, who has
established themselves in the United States, making connections since their entry, is no longer
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at the “threshold of initial entry.” See Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103,
107 (2020); see also Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1146 (D. Or. 2025).
The Court does not find persuasive the government’s contention that Navarrete is
effectively still in line at the border because he entered the United States on parole rather than
an order of release on recognizance. (Doc. 3, at 4, 21-23). If the Court adopted the
government’s argument that noncitizens who enter the United States on an order of
recognizance are subject to detention under § 1226 and afforded release on bond, while
noncitizens who are re-detained after years in the United States on parole are subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), it would recreate the incentive for noncitizens to
avoid inspection that the IIRIRA was enacted to eliminate. H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, at 225
(1996); see Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223. Furthermore, DHS did not follow the procedures
for revoking parole, but arrested Navarrete and charged him as “an alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or paroled,” in accordance with the provisions of § 1226(a).
(Doc. 3-3, at 3; Doc. 3-4); See A-J-R v. Rokosky, No. 25-17279, 2026 WL 25056, at *5 (D.N.J.
Jan 5, 2026) (finding petitioner re-detained after release on humanitarian parole could only
be properly detained under § 1226(a) because he was not re-detained under parole revocation
procedures); see also Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d 265, 276-77 (D. Mass. 2025) (finding
detention under § 1226(a) was applicable to petitioner who was arrested on a warrant, not
because humanitarian parole under § 1182(d)(5)(a) automatically terminated). Section
1226(a) applies to applicants for admission, like Navarrete, who are not actively seeking
admission but who have been residing in the United States for an extended period of time.
Cantu-Cortes, 2021 WL 3171639, at *2 (finding § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applicable for
petitioner who resided in the United States for approximately 25 years before ICE detained
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him); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (finding “mandatory detention only applies for
aliens who are “seeking admission,” and petition who lived in the United States for almost
two years was not seeking admission but “already here”). Accordingly, Navarrete was
improperly detained under § 1225(b), when he should have been detained under § 1226(a).
B. NAVARRETE’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN LOWE IMPROPERLY
SUBJECTED HIM TO MANDATORY DETENTION.
Lowe’s continued mandatory detention of Navarrete under § 1225(b)(2) violates
Navarrete’s procedural due process rights. Navarrete avers that Lowe’s refusal to consider
less restrictive alternatives to mandatory detention constitutes due process violations. (Doc.
1, at 19). Lowe counters that as an immigration detainee, Navarrete has no constitutional
right to release on bond when held pursuant to a statutory provision requiring mandatory
detention. (Doc. 3, at 43).
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens],
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). While noncitizens at the threshold of initial entry cannot claim due
process rights beyond the procedure authorized by Congress, noncitizens released on parole
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), which is granted on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian
reasons or significant public benefit, still have a right to habeas relief. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
103, 138-39 (2020); Francois v. Noem, No: 25-7334, 2026 WL 27565, at *5-*6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5,
2026) (finding that when a noncitizen paroled under § 1182(d)(5) is later apprehended,
detention is proper under § 1226(a) not § 1225(b)(2)); Sharapov v. O’Neil, No: 26-38, 2026 WL
146668, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan 26, 2026) (finding mandatory detention without the opportunity
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for a bond hearing of a noncitizen paroled under § 1182(d)(5) violated the INA); Rios Porras
v. O’Neill, No. 25-6801, 2025 WL 3708900, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (finding a
noncitizen paroled under § 1182(d)(5) was illegally detained without a bond hearing under §
1225(b)(2)).
To determine whether a government action violates due process, courts apply the
balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). The Mathews
balancing test weighs: (1) the private interest implicated by the government action; (2) the risk
of an erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3) the
government’s interest, including administrative burdens of additional procedures. Mathews,
424 U.S. at 334.
The first factor, private interest implicated by the government action, weighs heavily
in Navarrete’s favor because Lowe has deprived Navarrete of his physical liberty through
improper detention without the possibility of bond under § 1225(b). Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542
U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (“[T]he most elemental of liberty interests [is] the interest in being free
from physical detention by [the] government.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom from
imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or forms, of physical restraint-lies at the
heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects; Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *8. The
second factor, risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards, also
weighs heavily in Navarrete’s favor because Navarrete remains erroneously detained without
the possibility of release on bond pursuant to § 1225(b). See Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *8
(citing Barrios v. Shepley, No. 1:25-cv-00406-JAW, 2025 WL 2772579, at *11 (D. Me. Sept.
29, 2025); Zumba v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-14626, 2025 WL 2753496, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept. 26,
2025)) (finding the second Mathews factor weighs in petitioner’s favor when subject to
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erroneous detention without a showing from the government that petitioner presented a
public safety or flight risk); see also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *5 (finding the lack of
any individualized assessment creates a high risk of error). The third Mathews factor, the
government’s interest, also weighs in Navarrete’s favor. Generally, the government’s interest
in detaining noncitizens is to ensure the appearance of noncitizens at future immigration
proceedings and to prevent danger to the community. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Soto, 2025
WL 2976572, at *8. Here, Navarrete poses no such risk to the government’s interest in
detaining him. Lowe does not allege that Navarrete poses a flight risk, and Navarrete’s single
driving under the influence charge does not concern moral turpitude and would not even
conditionally bar a finding of good moral character under the INA. (Doc. 3-3, at 4); see INA
101(f); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Conditional Bars for Acts in Statutory
Period, 	https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-f-chapter-5 	(last 	visited
February 25, 2026). As each Mathews factor weighs in Navarrete’s favor, his mandatory
detention under § 1225(b) violates his procedural due process rights. Accordingly, Navarrete’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED, and Lowe is ORDERED to release
Navarrete from custody.5
5 The Court notes that Navarrete also seeks relief in the form of an injunction preventing
the government from removing Navarrete from the United States and attorney’s fees and costs
under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Doc. 1, at 22). Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, the Court
does not have authority to enjoin the government from removing a detained noncitizen.
Challenges to enjoin the execution of a removal order must be raised in the courts of appeals.
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009); Tazu v. AG United States, 975 F.3d 292, 296-97 (3d
Cir. 2020); Khan v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-cv-14246, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 264924, at *16-*17. The Court also cannot award attorney’s fees without first
assessing affidavits and other evidence regarding the reasonableness of the fees sought.
See Toshiba Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Valley Open MRI & Diagnostic Ctr. Inc., 674 F. App’x 130, 133
(3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (noting that the party seeking attorney’s fees bears “the
burden of producing evidence as to the reasonableness of the fees” and reversing a district
court’s grant of a request for fees based “solely [on] a declaration stating the amount
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V. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Navarrete’s 	petition 	for 	writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	is
GRANTED. (Doc. 1). Lowe is ORDERED to release Navarrete from custody. Lowe is also
permanently enjoined from re-detaining Navarrete under § 1225(b). Navarrete may move to
reopen this matter if Lowe seeks to detain him under § 1226(a) and fails to schedule a timely
bond hearing. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this matter.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
Dated: February 26, 2026 	/s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
claimed”); see also Ohm Sys., Inc. v. Senergene Sols., LLC, No. CV 23-1340, 2025 WL 2772612,
at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2025) (noting that a court cannot assess a request for attorney’s fees
without sufficient evidence regarding the reasonableness of the fees sought). Accordingly,
Navarrete must request attorney’s fees in a separate motion with accompanying exhibits.
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