3:26-cv-00215•Randolph v. The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania et al
Randolph v. The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania et al
3:26-cv-00215PamdMar 12, 2026
Full text
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA SHAWN LUKE RANDOLPH, : Civil No. 3:26-CV-215 : Plaintiff, : : (Judge Saporito) v. : : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom) : THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD : OF THE SUPREME COURT : OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., : : Defendant. : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Factual Background This case comes before us for a screening review of the plaintiff’s pro se civil complaint. 1 The plaintiff, Shawn Randolph, filed this action against the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (“Disciplinary Board”), the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners, and Attorney General David Winslow Sunday, Jr. Randolph challenges Pennsylvania’s mandatory attorney licensing requirement set forth under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2524. Randolph claims this provision violates 1 Doc. 1. Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 1 of 10
2 his Fourteenth Amendment right to work and pursue a chosen profession. 2 Randolph seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and costs. 3 Along with this complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 4 We will conditionally grant the plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis for screening purposes only, but after a screening review, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed. II. Discussion A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 5 We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 6 This statutory preliminary screening 2 Id. at 2. 3 Id. at 4. 4 Doc. 6. 5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 6 Id. Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 2 of 10
3 mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 7 With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 8 In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true9 and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” 10 However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 11 As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized: 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 9 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 10 Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). 11 Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”). Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 3 of 10
4 [A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two- part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 . Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 12 Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. 13 A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”14 Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically 12 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). 13 Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). 14 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 4 of 10
5 attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. 15 However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. 16 Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.’” 17 We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. 18 B. This Complaint Should be Dismissed After review, we conclude that this complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiff asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of his constitutional right to work and pursue a chosen 15 See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). 16 Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. 17 Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f)). 18 Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)). Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 5 of 10
6 profession under the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 19 “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”20 Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” 21 Accordingly, to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead two elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a “person” acting under color of law; and (2) that conduct deprived the 19 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 See Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 21 See id. (citation omitted). Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 6 of 10
7 plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.22 Here, Randolph attempts to sue the Disciplinary Board and the Board of Law Examiners for his violating Fourteenth Amendment right to work and pursue a chosen profession. However, it is well established that a state and its entities are not “persons” for purposes of Section 1983.23 As arms of the state, this prohibition applies to the Disciplinary Board and the Board of Law Examiners. 24 Accordingly, the claims against these defendants should be dismissed. Moreover, and more fundamentally, a plaintiff asserting a procedural due process claim under Section 1983 must allege that “(1) she was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of life, liberty, or property, and 22 See Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141– 42 (3d Cir. 1990). 23 Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 24 L. Offs. of Christopher S. Lucas & Assocs., 320 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (“the Disciplinary Board is not a “person” who can be sued within the meaning of § 1983.”); Murphy v. State Bd. of L. Examiners for Com. of Pa., 429 F. Supp. 16, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (“the State Board is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of [Section 1983]”) Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 7 of 10
8 (2) the procedures available to her did not provide due process of law.” 25 Similarly, a substantive due process claim requires the plaintiff to establish “a protected property interest to which the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection applies.” 26 Randolph claims Pennsylvania’s mandatory attorney licensing regime impedes his right to follow lawful employment in a chosen profession. This right falls within the purview of “both the ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ concepts of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 27 However, “[i]t is the liberty to pursue a calling or occupation, and not the right to a specific job, that is secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 28 Thus, due process is not violated when a state has “made procedural protection available and the plaintiff has simply refused to avail himself of them.” 29 25 Sawicki v. Kipphan, No. 1:21-CV-02031, 2023 WL 3061850, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2023) (citing Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Arneault v. O’Toole, 864 F. Supp. 2d 361, 395 (W.D. Pa. 2012). 26 Sawicki, 2023 WL 3061850, at *8–9; see also Arneault, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 401–02. 27 Piecknick v. Com. of Pa., 36 F.3d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Sawicki, 2023 WL 3061850, at *11. 28 Piecknick, 36 F.3d at 1259 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 29 Alvin, 227 F.3d at 116. Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 8 of 10
9 Here, Randolph simply refuses to avail himself of the processes available to pursue employment as a licensed attorney. While the plaintiff must overcome certain financial and educational hurdles to practice law, such requirements are not unconstitutional. Accordingly, the complaint is devoid of any allegations that Randolph is deprived of his right to pursue a chosen profession and should be dismissed. While we have concluded that Randolph’s complaint does not state a claim at this time, recognizing that Randolph is a pro se litigant, we recommend that the court allow him an opportunity to amend his complaint to endeavor to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 30 III. Recommendation Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report. The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: 30 See Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 9 of 10
10 Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination because of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Submitted this 12th day of March 2026. s/ Daryl F. Bloom Daryl F. Bloom Chief United States Magistrate Judge Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 10 of 10
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