Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JASHANDEEP SINGH, 	: Civil No. 3:25-CV-2388
:
Petitioner, 	:
: (Judge Munley)
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
TODD M. LYONS, et al., 	:
:
Respondents. 	:
:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Statement of the Case
This case comes before us for consideration of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by the petitioner,
Jashandeep Singh, an immigration detainee.1 	Singh is a native of and
citizen of India who has resided in the United States since 2023.2
According to immigration documents, Singh entered the United States
on May 24, 2023, was arrested by United States Border Patrol, and
subsequently released with a Notice to Appear, which indicated that
Singh 	was 	“not 	then 	admitted 	or 	paroled 	after 	inspection 	by 	an
1 Doc. 1.
2 Doc. 1 at 11; Doc. 8-1 at 1.
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Immigration 	Officer.” 3 	Singh 	was 	apprehended 	by 	immigration
authorities in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in November of 2025 at a
commercial 	vehicle 	inspection 	checkpoint. 4 	He 	was 	arrested 	and
transferred to the Pike County Correctional Facility, where he remains
detained pending the outcome of his removal proceedings. 5 	Singh also
has an asylum application pending in immigration court. 6
In his petition, Singh asserts that he is being wrongfully detained
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and instead, should be considered for
release under § 1226(a) and provided the opportunity for a bond hearing. 7
Singh argues in large part that he is a member of the “Bond Eligible
Class” certified in
Maldonado Bautista,8 and as such, he is entitled to a
bond hearing under § 1226(a).9 	For their part, the respondents contend
that
Maldonado Bautista is not controlling on this court, and further,
3 Doc. 8-1 at 2; Doc. 8-2 at 1.
4 Doc. 8 at 5; Doc. 8-1.
5 Doc. 1 at 11; Doc. 8-1 at 5; Doc. 8-3.
6 Doc. 1 at 11.
7
See Doc. 1.
8
Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, et al., Civ. No. 25-1873, 2025 WL
3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).
9
Id.
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that Singh is properly detained under § 1225 and thus not entitled to a
bond hearing. 10
After careful consideration, we will recommend that the petition be
denied.
II. 	Discussion
Claims by immigration detainees in federal custody “fall within the
‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus[,]” and must be brought in a petition
for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.11 	Jurisdiction for a core
habeas petition “lies in only one district: the district of confinement.” 12
While 	the 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	has 	seemingly 	narrowed 	this 	court’s
jurisdiction to consider claims related to immigration detention during
an alien’s removal proceedings, 13 	the parties to the instant petition
concede that we have jurisdiction to consider this petitioner’s claim
regarding his ongoing detention. 14
10 Doc. 8.
11
Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 372 (2025) (quoting
Nance v. Ward, 597
U.S. 159, 167 (2022));
Kumarasamy v. Attorney General of U.S., 453 F.3d
169, 172 (3d Cir. 2006).
12
J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 672 (quoting
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443
(2004)).
13
Khalil v. President, United States of America, et al., --- F.4th ---, 2026
WL 111933 (3d Cir. Jan. 15, 2026).
14 Doc. 11.
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In the instant petition, we must determine whether the petitioner
is subject to the provisions of Section 1225(b)(2) or Section 1226(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). 15 	These provisions govern the
detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. 16 	We begin with
the petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing pursuant
to
Maldonado Bautista. The petitioner asserts that he is a member of the
nationwide class certified by the United States District Court for the
Central District of California in
Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz,
et al. 17
In November of 2025, the
	Bautista Court broadly certified a “Bond
Eligible Class” consisting of:
All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who
(1) have entered or will enter the United States without
inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon
arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), §1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the
Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody
determination. 18
It 	then 	extended 	the 	declaratory 	relief 	previously 	granted 	to 	the
petitioners in that matter to the class as a whole, declaring DHS’ policy
15 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2), 1226(a).
16
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287-89 (2018).
17
Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, et al., Civ. No. 25-1873, 2025 WL
3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).
18
Id. at *9.
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unlawful and finding that such relief “secures a right [of the class
members] to an individualized hearing.” 19
At the outset, the petitioners in
Bautista did not request class-wide
habeas relief; only the named petitioners applied for habeas relief. 20 	As
the 	Court 	there 	noted, 	“[i]f 	Petitioners 	had 	requested 	classwide
declaratory habeas relief, such relief could extend only to members of the
Bond Eligible Class
residing within this judicial district.” 21 	Accordingly,
even if the petitioner believed he is considered a class member entitled to
such relief, he must seek that relief in the Central District of California.
Further, as one district court examining this issue noted, the Supreme
Court of the United States has cast doubt on whether “class relief may be
obtained in a habeas proceeding[,]” reasoning that “[t]he Supreme Court
has 	‘never 	so 	held, 	and 	it 	is 	highly 	questionable 	whether 	it 	is
permitted.’”22
19
Id. (“When considering this determination with the MSJ Order, the
Court extends the same declaratory relief granted to Petitioners to the
Bond Eligible Class as a whole.”).
20
Id.
21
Id. (citing
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004)) (emphasis
added).
22
Tecum Pastor v. Director of Detroit Field Office, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, --- F. Supp. 3d. ---, 2025 WL 3746495, at *5 (N.D.
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In any event, contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, we are not
bound by
Bautista. It is well settled that “[a] decision of a federal district
court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district,
the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different
case.” 23 While we respect the
Bautista Court’s holding as to those within
its purview, we respectfully disagree that the petitioner here, who is
detained in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, is afforded relief by way
of that holding. 	Accordingly, the petitioner’s reliance on
Bautista is
unavailing and, in our view, does not entitle him to habeas relief.
Next, 	we 	must 	determine, 	then, 	if 	the 	petitioner 	is 	properly
detained pursuant to Section 1225(b). 	Courts nationwide have been
tasked with interpreting this statute given what some have characterized
as ambiguity in the phrases “applicant for admission” and “seeking
admission” in Section 1225. “As in any statutory construction case, ‘[w]e
start, 	of 	course, 	with 	the 	statutory 	text,’ 	and 	proceeding 	from 	the
Ohio Dec. 24, 2025) (quoting
A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 107 (2025)
(Alito, J., dissenting)).
23
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (quoting 18 J. Moore
et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.02[1] [d], p. 134–26 (3d ed.2011)).
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understanding that, ‘[u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are
generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.’”24
Section 	1226(a) 	broadly 	applies 	to 	noncitizens 	facing 	removal
proceedings and provides that individuals detained under this section
may be released on bond pending a final order of removal. 25 On the other
hand, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires that “an alien who is an applicant
for admission, if the examining officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the
alien
	shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this
title.” 26 	This section defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives
in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . .
.)[.]”27 The statute does not clearly define the phrase “seeking admission.”
Courts across the country have grappled with this statutory text,
with a majority concluding that the phrases “applicant for admission”
24
Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (citation omitted).
25 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
26
Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphases added).
27
Id. § 1225(a)(1).
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and “seeking admission” are legally distinct.28 In these cases, courts have
found that noncitizens who have resided in the United States for some
period of time, but who have not actively sought legal status, qualify as
“applicants for admission” but not as individuals “seeking admission,”
and thus, they are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of
Section 1225(b)(2)(A). 29 	The rationale behind several of these decisions
appears to be based on thos courts’ findings that “seeking admission”
requires the physical act of arriving at the border, and as such, an alien
that has resided in the United States for some period of time cannot
qualify as “seeking admission,” even though such person wishes to be
admitted and remain in the United States.30 	Other courts have found
28
See e.g.,
Galvan Lopez v. Noem, et al., Civ. No. 25-1288, 2026 WL
252513 (D.N.M. Jan. 30, 2026);
Malacidze v. Noem, et al., Civ. No. 25-
1527, 2026 WL 227155 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 28, 2026);
Quispe v. Rose, et al.,
Civ. No. 25-2276, 2025 WL 3537279 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025); Anirudh v
McShane, et al., Civ. No. 25-6458, 2025 WL 3527528 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9,
2025);
Martinez-Elvir v. Olson, et al., ---F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3006772
(W.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2025);
Zumba v. Bondi, et al., Civ. No. 25-14626, 2025
WL 2753496 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025).
29
See id.
30
See e.g.,
Zumba, 2025 WL 2753496, at *9 (discussing a distinction
between “a noncitizen who is ‘seeking admission’ to the country and one
who is ‘already in the country’”);
Quispe, 2025 WL 3537279, at *5 (noting
that courts in the Third Circuit have described “seeking admission” as
“active and ongoing conduct, such as physically attempting to come into
the United States at a border or port of entry.”).
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that “seeking admission” requires the affirmative act of applying for some
sort of legal status, such as for asylum or a visa.31 	Ultimately, these
courts have concluded that noncitizens who have resided in the United
States for some period of time cannot be characterized as “seeking
admission” since they are already in the United States and are therefore
not subject to Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision.
A minority of district courts and the only circuit court to decide this
issue, however, have concluded that the plain text of Section 1225
establishes 	that 	“applicants 	for 	admission” 	are 	necessarily 	“seeking
admission,” 	and 	therefore 	subject 	to 	detention 	under 	Section
1225(b)(2)(A).32 After careful consideration, we agree that “one who is an
31
See e.g.,
Galvan Lopez, 2026 WL 252513, at *4 (“ ‘Seeking admission’
requires an active request for lawful admission. . .”) (citations omitted);
Martinez-Elvir, 2025 WL 3006772, at *9 (finding that the petitioner,
“who ha[d] been present in the country for over twelve years . . . [and]
has never attempted to gain lawful entry into the United States” was not
“seeking admission.”);
32
See e.g.,
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, et al., --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL
323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026);
Chen v. Almodovar, et al., Civ. No. 25-
9670, 2026 WL 100761 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2026);
Singh v. Noem, et al.,
Civ. 	No. 	25-157, 	2026 	WL 	74558 	(E.D. 	Ky. 	Jan. 	9, 	2026);
	Gomez
Hernandez v. Lyons, et al., Civ. No. 25-216, 2026 WL 31775 (N.D. Tx.
Jan. 6, 2026);
Montoya v. Holt, et al., Civ. No. 25-1231, 2025 WL 3733302
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025);
Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons, et al., ---F. Supp.
3d ---, 2025 WL 3199872 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025);
Mejia Olalde v. Noem,
et al., Civ. No. 25-168, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025).
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‘applicant for admission’ is, by definition, ‘seeking admission[,]’” 33 and is
consequently subject to the mandatory detention provision of Section
1225(b)(2)(A).
We 	begin 	with 	the 	statute’s 	definition 	of 	an 	“applicant 	for
admission,” which as we have noted encompasses “[a]n alien
present in
the United States who has not been admitted.”34 	The INA defines
“admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 35 	Thus, the
plain reading of this text is not limited to those physically arriving at the
border; it necessarily includes noncitizens who have been residing in the
United States but have not been lawfully admitted. 	Indeed, as at least
one court has noted, while subsection (b)(1) specifically contemplates
“aliens
arriving in the United States[,]”36 “nothing in § 1225(b)(2)(A)
limits its applicability to ‘arriving’ aliens.”37 	Thus, the fact that a
petitioner has resided in the United States does not automatically render
33
Singh, 2026 WL 74558, at *4.
34 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis added).
35
Id. § 1101(13)(A).
36 § 1225(b)(1) (emphasis added).
37
Singh, 2026 WL 74558 at *4;
Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3
(describing subsection (b)(2) as the “catchall” provision of Section 1225).
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Section 	1225(b)(2)(A) 	inapplicable—the 	text 	of 	the 	statute 	plainly
encompasses aliens who are “present in the United States” who have not
lawfully been admitted. 38
While the phrase “seeking admission” is not defined in the INA,
Section 1225 twice “expressly treats applicants for admission as among
those 	seeking 	admission.”39 	As 	the 	Honorable 	John 	Cronan 	aptly
explained:
First, Section 1225(a)(5) provides that “[a]n applicant for
admission 	may 	be 	required 	to 	state 	under 	oath 	any
information sought by an immigration officer regarding the
purposes and intentions
of the applicant in seeking admission
to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5) (emphasis added).
This provision contemplates that an applicant for admission
is one who, by default, is seeking admission.
Second, and similarly, Section 1225(a)(3) specifies that “[a]ll
aliens 	(including 	alien 	crewmen) 	who 	are 	applicants 	for
admission
or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to
or transit through the United States shall be inspected by
immigration officers.”
Id. § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added). That
provision 	“reinforces 	the 	reading 	that 	all 	‘applicants 	for
admission’ are ‘seeking admission’ because it recognizes that
there are ‘other[ ]’ ways to seek admission besides being an
‘applicant[ ] for admission.’ ”
Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10,
2025);
accord Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons, --- F. Supp. 3d ----,
No. 2:25-cv-9785-SVW-AJR, 2025 WL 3199872, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 12, 2025). The word “otherwise,” after all, means to
38 8 U.S.C. §1225(a)(1).
39
Chen, 2026 WL 100761, at *9.
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do something “[i]n a different way” or “in another manner,”
Otherwise, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024), so Section
1225(a)(3) recognizes that one way to seek admission is to be
an applicant for admission, even if there are other ways to do
so.
	Accord 	Otherwise, 	Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/otherwise (last
visited 	Jan. 	14, 	2026) 	(defining 	“otherwise” 	as 	(1) 	“in 	a
different way or manner,” (2) “in different circumstances,” and
(3) “in other respects”). 40
As 	explained 	by 	another 	court 	examining 	the 	interplay 	of 	Section
1225(a)(3) in this context, “[t]he word ‘otherwise’ establishes that ‘aliens
. . . seeking admission’ is the category to which “applicants for admission’
belong.” 41 	And because Congress created this relationship between the
phrases “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” in the same
statute, we cannot “abandon [the] usual presumption that ‘identical
words used in different parts of the same statute’ carry ‘the same
meaning.’”42 	Indeed, as another court noted, “it makes no sense to
describe an active applicant for admission as somebody who is not
‘seeking’ admission. To ‘seek’ is a synonym of to ‘apply’ for.”43
40
Id. at *9.
41
Montoya, 2025 WL 3733302, at *8.
42
Id. at *9 (quoting
Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 582 U.S.
79. 85 (2017) (internal citation omitted)).
43
Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3.
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To find otherwise would create illogical implications. As the
Singh
Court noted, if we conclude that an alien is not seeking admission unless
or until he or she formally applies for legal permission to remain in the
United States, we would essentially be encouraging those who reside
here but who have not lawfully been admitted to do nothing while
punishing those who have taken steps to obtain lawful permission by
subjecting them to mandatory detention. Such an outcome is nonsensical
in our view.
Nor can we conclude that there is some geographic or temporal
limitation after which an alien residing in the United States is no longer
“seeking admission.” 	As the
Mejia Olalde Court noted, the surrounding
provisions, such as Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and (b)(1)(A)(iii), specifically
apply to an alien “arriving” in the United States and an alien who must
show continued presence in the United States “continuously for the 2-
year 	period 	immediately 	prior[,]” 	respectively. 44 	Because 	Section
1225(b)(2) contains no such limiting language, it is logical to conclude
that “[i]f Congress meant to say that an alien is no longer ‘seeking
admission’ after some amount of time in the United States, Congress
44 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1)(A)(iii).
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knew how to do so.” 45 Thus, we do not read Section 1225 to limit an alien’s
act of “seeking admission” to physically arriving at the border or only
immediately following their arrival to the United States or some other
finite period.
This reading of Section 1225 was very recently adopted by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,
et al.46 	As of
the time this Report and Recommendation is written, the Fifth Circuit is
the only circuit to have squarely addressed this issue.47 	In holding that
an “applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admission,” the
Court of Appeals set forth a thorough and reasoned analysis of the plain
text of Section 1225. 48 Similar to our analysis above, the Court looked at
the surrounding provisions of Section 1225, including 1225(a)(3) and
1225(a)(5), and found that the plain meaning of the words used in these
provisions supports the conclusion that those who are “applicants for
45
Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *4.
46
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, et al., --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 323330 (5th
Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).
47
See Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 161 F.4th
1048, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 2025) (concluding in the context of a request for
injunctive relief that the government was not likely to succeed on the
merits of its argument regarding mandatory detention under Section
1225).
48
Id. at *4-10.
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admission” are necessarily “seeking admission.”49 	The Court reasoned
that any other reading of the statute “would return to the pre-IIRIRA
regime in which illegal entrants receive favorable treatment compared to
aliens lawfully undergoing admission procedures.” 50 	The Court was
further unpersuaded by the petitioners’ argument that the government’s
longstanding practice, alone, justified a reading of the text that goes
against the plain meaning of the statute.51 	We agree with this reasoned
analysis and the others we have found persuasive and conclude that an
“applicant 	for 	admission” 	is 	necessarily 	“seeking 	admission,” 	and
therefore, is subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
Turning to the instant petition, Singh arrived in the United States
in 2023, and despite residing here for over two years, was never lawfully
admitted or paroled.52 	Singh, who currently has an asylum application
pending, 	is 	contesting 	his 	removal 	from 	the 	United 	States, 	which
necessarily means he is seeking lawful admission to the United States.
Accordingly, we conclude that Singh is an applicant for admission and
49
Id.
50
Id. at *6.
51
Id. at *8.
52 Doc. 8-2.
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seeking admission, and thus, is properly detained pursuant to § 1225(b).
Because we conclude that Singh is properly detained pursuant to §
1225(b), we recommend that his requests for release and for an order
directing immigration officials to afford him a bond hearing be denied.53
In closing, we recognize that we are among the minority of courts
to reach this conclusion, and we appreciate the reasoned analyses of our
colleagues in this district and elsewhere that have reached a different
conclusion. 	However, we are persuaded by and agree with those courts
that have concluded that Section 1225(b) compels mandatory detention
for petitioners like Singh.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, upon consideration of this
petition for writ of habeas corpus, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the
petition be DENIED.
53 Because we are recommending the petition be denied, we decline to
reach the petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access
to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 	However, we note that this issue is currently
pending in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
	See Santana-Rivas v.
Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, Civ. No. 3:25-CV-1896, 2025 WL
3513152, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Wilson, J) (citing
	Abioye v.
Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Center, No. 24-3198 (3d Cir.)).
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The petitioner is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local
Rule 72.3:
Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written 	objections 	which 	shall 	specifically 	identify 	the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may 	also 	receive 	further 	evidence, 	recall 	witnesses 	or
recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: February 10, 2026
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