Perez v. Harry et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHNNY PEREZ,
Plaintiff
V.
LAUREL HARRY, et al.,
Defendants
Civil No. 3:25-cv-2134
(Judge Mariani)
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Johnny Perez ("Perez"), an inmate confined at the State Correctional
Institution, Camp-Hill, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Camp Hill"), initiated this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Perez seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. 	(Doc. 5).
The complaint is presently before the Court for preliminary screening. 	For the
following reasons, the Court will dismiss Perez's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1) without prejudice and grant him leave to file an amended complaint.
I. 	Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil complaint in which
a prisoner is seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 F. App'x 195,
197 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it is "frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[,]" or "seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 	The Court has
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 1 of 18

a similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis and actions concerning
prison conditions. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), or 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) is the same as that for
dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Brodzki v. Tribune Co., 481 F. App'x 705, 706 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Dodrill,
696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), if it
does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face ." Bell At/.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). 	The
plaintiff must aver "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
"Though a complaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations, ... a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."' De/Rio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop.
Inc. , 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S . at 555). 	In other words,
"factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."
Covington v. Int '/ Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court "take[s] as true all the factual
allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those
2
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 2 of 18

facts, but. .. disregard[s) legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott
Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to
determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim. 	Second, the court should identify allegations that ,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.
Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch . Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).
"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). This "plausibility" determination will be a "context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. " Id.
However, even "if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court
must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or
futile." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 , 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a
defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment
3
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 3 of 18

Id.
would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she
has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.
Because Perez proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his
complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations
omitted).
II. 	The Complaint
In the complaint, Perez names the following Defendants: Secretary Laurel Harry,
Superintendent Kendell, Deputy Superintendent Albert, Deputy Superintendent Jennifer
McClellan, Major Kevin Bly, Major Ross Miller, Corrections Classification Program Manager
("CCPM") Lacosta Mussoline, CCPM Erin Miller, Lieutenant Mohn, Unit Manager Dodson,
Counselor Roth, Captain Baptiste, Captain Elwell, Lieutenant Eddon, Correctional Officer
Allison, Correctional Officer Reyes, Correctional Officer Garcia, and Sergeant Shruggs.
(Doc. 1, at 1).
Perez alleges that on October 15, 2025, he and another inmate entered a fellow
inmate's cell to play a joke on him. 	(Doc. 1, at 1-2). As a result, Perez got into a "verbal
altercation" with Correctional Officer Garcia, who called him names and allegedly informed
Perez that he was being placed in the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU"). 	(Id.). 	Perez alleges
that he was placed in the RHU in a dirty cell, he was exposed to excessive amounts of
Oleoresin Capsicum ("OC") spray, and mail was not promptly collected from the inmates'
4
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 4 of 18

cells. (Id. at 3-4). 	He also alleges that , on November 4, 2025, Captain Elwel searched his
housing unit, Lieutenant Eddon "interfered" during the search, and non-defendant
correctional officers confiscated his personal items. (Id. at 4-5). 	Perez claims that other
inmates informed him that Captain Allison "thinks she 's above the law and went in [his] cell
and was in there alone ." (Id. at 5). 	Perez asserts that he informed the Program Review
Committee ("PRC")-consisting of Defendants McClelland, Bly, Miller , Mussoline, Miller,
Dodson, and Roth-of his living conditions and the failure to provide any reason or notice
for his placement in the RHU . (Id . at 5). The PRC members allegedly informed Perez that
the conditions did not "look bad[.]" (Id.). 	Perez also wrote to Lieutenant Smith about these
events. 	(Id. at 6).
The complaint does not set forth any factual allegations against Secretary Laurel
Harry , Superintendent Kendall, Deputy Superintendent Albert, Lieutenant Mohn , Captain
Baptiste, Correctional Officer Reyes, or Sergeant Shruggs, and does not allege that these
individuals were involved in the alleged events.
Perez asserts that Defendants violated a multitude of his rights , including violation of
equal protect ion , violation of due process , conspiracy , cruel and unusual punishment ,
defamation, harassment, violation of the code of ethics, violation of the Publ ic Official and
Employee Ethics Act, violation of the State Adverse Interest Act , and violation of The
Americans with Disabi lities Act. (Id. at 2, 7).
5
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 5 of 18

Perez seeks monetary relief, court costs, attorney's fees, and an inspection of the
prison. 	(Id. at 2).
Ill. 	Discussion
A. 	Claims against Secretary Laurel Harry, Superintendent Kendall, Deputy
Superintendent Albert, Lieutenant Mohn, Captain Baptiste, Correctional
Officer Reyes, and Sergeant Shruggs
"To state a claim under§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988). "A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in
the alleged wrongs" to be liable. 	Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
Individual liability can be imposed under§ 1983 only if the state actor played an "affirmative
part" in the alleged misconduct and "cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat superior." Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode,
845 F.2d at 1207). Such allegations, however, must be made with appropriate particularity
in that a complaint must allege the particulars of conduct, time, place, and person
responsible. 	Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. Alleging a mere
hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal knowledge or involvement in depriving
the plaintiff of his rights is insufficient to establish personal involvement. 	Rode, 845 F.2d at
1208. A claim of a constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on the fact that the
6
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 6 of 18

named defendant was the prison warden, or a prison supervisor, when the incidents set
forth in the complaint occurred. 	Id. at 1207.
Perez has named Secretary Laurel Harry, Superintendent Kendall, Deputy
Superintendent Albert, Lieutenant Mohn, Captain Baptiste, Correctional Officer Reyes , and
Sergeant Shruggs as Defendants (see Doc. 1, at 1), but he does not mention them
anywhere in the body of his complaint. 	Perez is obligated to explain how each individual
named as a Defendant was personally involved in the violation of his constitutional rights ,
whether due to the prison official's own misconduct or the official's deliberate indifference to
known deficiencies in a policy or procedure that violated Perez's rights. 	See Barkes v. First
Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 320 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds, Taylor v.
Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). 	Because Perez fails to mention Secretary Laurel Harry,
Superintendent Kendall, Deputy Superintendent Albert, Lieutenant Mohn, Captain Baptiste,
Correctional Officer Reyes, and Sergeant Shruggs in the body of his complaint, he has not
stated a plausible basis for imposing liability against them and any claims against them will
be dismissed without prejudice. 	See Hudson v. City of McKeesport, 244 F. App'x 519,522
(3d Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of defendant because complaint did not provide any basis
for a claim against him) .
To the extent that Perez seeks to hold these individuals liable based on their
supervisory roles, this claim also fails. 	It is well-established that officials may not be held
liable for unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat
7
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 7 of 18

superior. 	See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 . Thus, Perez's claims against Secretary Laurel
Har ry, Super intendent Kendall, Deputy Superintendent Albert, Lieutenant Mohn , Captain
Baptiste, Correctional Officer Reyes, and Sergeant Shruggs based on a respondeat
superior theory of liability are also subject to dismissal.
B. 	Claims against Correctional Officer Garcia, Captain ElweL Lieutenant Eddon,
Correctional Officer Allison, Deputy Superintendent McClelland, Major Bly,
CCPM Miller, CCPM Mussoline, Major Ross Miller, Unit Manager Dodson,
and Counselor Roth
Perez has failed to state a plausible claim against any of the remaining Defendants.
As stated , in a§ 1983 action, the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged
constitutional violation is a required element , and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each
defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims. 	See Rode,
845 F.2d at 1207). Moreover, "[s)uits against high-level government officials must satisfy
the general requirements for supervisory liability ." Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234 , 243
(3d Cir . 2017). There are "two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable
for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates ." Barkes , 766 F.3d at 316 , reversed
on other grounds by Taylor, 575 U.S. 822 . First , a supervisor may be liable if he or she
'"with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a pol icy,
practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm. "' Barkes, 766 F.3d at
316 (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572 , 586 (3d
Cir . 2004) (a lt eration in original)). 	"Second, 'a supervisor may be personally liable under§
8
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 8 of 18

1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them ,
or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced' in the subordinate's
unconstitutional conduct." Id.
Perez alleges that he got into a verbal altercation with Correctional Officer Garcia
and Garcia informed him that he was being placed in the RHU. 	(Doc. 1, at 2-3). Once in
the RHU, Perez alleges that he was placed in a dirty cell, exposed to excessive amounts of
OC spray, and that inmate mail was not promptly collected from their cells. 	(Id. at 3-4) .
With respect to the cell search on November 4, 2025, Perez asserts that "Capt. Elwel
decided to search our section[,]" Lieutenant Eddon "took it upon himself to interfere[,]" non-
defendant correctional officers confiscated his personal items, and Captain Allison was in
his cell "alone." (Id. at 4-5). 	Perez also alleges that he wrote to Lieutenant Smith about
these events. (Id. at 6).
1. 	Eighth Amendment Claim against Garcia
Perez alleges that Correctional Officer Garcia verbally threatened him and was
profane. (Doc . 1, at 2-3). Garcia's alleged statements or threats to Perez, without any
accompanying physical injury, do not amount to malicious behavior violative of the Eighth
Amendment. 	See Dunbar v. Barone, 487 F. App'x 721, 723 (3d Cir . 2012) ("[V]erbal threats
or taunts, without more, are not sufficient to constitute a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.") ; Quiero v. Muniz, No. 14-225, 2015 WL 13738994, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3,
2015) ("Allegations of verbal abuse or threats, unaccompanied by injury or damage , are not
9
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 9 of 18

cognizable under § 1983, regardless of whether the inmate is a pretrial detainee or
sentenced prisoner."). This claim fails because Perez cannot state a claim for cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment by alleging only verbal harassment or
threats.
2. 	Fourteenth Amendment Claim against Garcia
Perez also appears to assert a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim
against Correctional Officer Garcia for his alleged statement that Perez was being placed in
the RHU, but the fellow inmate who also "played a... joke" was not being placed in the RHU.
(Doc. 1, at 3). Other than this conclusory statement, there are no other factual allegations in
the complaint which suggest that Correctional Officer Garcia acted with an intent or purpose
to discriminate against Perez. 	In order to state an equal protection violation, Perez must
allege "that he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, and that this
different treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a
protected class." Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing
Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2015)). 	Perez's conclusory
allegation that Correctional Officer Garcia discriminated against him by placing him in the
RHU, without more, does not plausibly state a claim for a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 	See Jones v. Sposato, 783 F. App'x 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (general
allegations that plaintiff was treated "less favorably" are not sufficient). The Court will
dismiss Perez's equal protection claim against Correctional Officer Garcia without prejudice.
10
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 10 of 18

See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that "a
complaint must do more than allege the plaintiffs entitlement to relief," rather, "[a] complaint
has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts.").
3. 	Supervisory Claims against Elwel, Eddon, and Allison
To the extent that Perez included Captain Elwel, Lieutenant Eddon, and Captain
Allison as Defendants simply because they hold supervisory positions, any claims against
them based on their supervisory positions would nonetheless be implausible because
liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior basis. 	Chavarriaga v.
N.J. Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015). 	Generalized allegations that a
supervisory defendant is "in charge of' or "responsible for" an office or facility are insufficient
to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional violation. 	See Saisi v. Murray,
822 F. App'x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354) ("Saisi
asserted that some defendants were 'in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen,'
and that liability stemmed merely from defendants' 'belief that their conduct would be
'tolerated.' However, a director cannot be held liable 'simply because of his position as the
head of the [agency]."').
4. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim against McClelland,
Bly, Miller, Mussoline, Miller, Dodson, and Roth
Insofar as Perez asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the
Program Review Committee Members-McClelland, Bly, Miller , Mussoline, Miller, Dodson,
and Roth-based on their failure to transfer him back to general population, any such claim
11
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 11 of 18

fails. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life ,
liberty , or property , without due process of law ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. As a
threshold matter , "[ i]t is axiomatic that a cognizable liberty or property interest must ex ist in
the first instance for a procedural due process claim to lie ." Mudric v. Attorney Gen., 469
F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir . 2006) (citing Bd. of Regents of State Coifs. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 569
(1972)). 	In the prison context, such liberty interest is interpreted narrowly , and the Supreme
Court has concluded that the Constitution provides no liberty interest in, among other things ,
remaining in the general population, see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 , 485-86 (1995) ;
staying at a particular institution, see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-27 (1976) ;
remaining in a particular prison within a state, see 0/im v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-
47 (1983); or any particular security classification, see Wilkinson v. Austin , 545 U.S . 209 ,
221-22 (2005) (holding that the Constitution does not give rise to a liberty interest in
avoiding transfers to more adverse conditions of confinement) . See also Chavarriaga , 806
F.3d at 225 ("A state has broad authority to confine an inmate in any of its institutions ." ).
Accordingly , insofar as Perez seeks relief for failure to transfer him to general population , he
has not set forth a plausible constitutional claim against the Program Review Committee
Members-McClelland, Bly, Miller , Mussoline , Miller, Dodson, and Roth-and these claims
will be dismissed without prejudice .
12
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 12 of 18

5. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
Perez also claims that his placement in the RHU violated his right to procedural due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment because he did not receive proper notice related
to his confinement in the unit. 	(Doc. 1, at 3) . He further claims that, while in the RHU , he
was placed in an unclean cell and exposed to OC spray. (Id. at 3-4).
To state a procedural due process claim , the inmate-plaintiff must allege facts to
support that he has a liberty or property interest that is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 	Holland v. Rosen , 895 F.3d 272, 297 (3d Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). 	Under
this standard , the Court only reaches the issue of the adequacy of the procedural process
provided if the inmate-pla intiff first establishes an interest protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 	See Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 325 (3d
Cir. 2010) (instructing that a court reviewing a procedural due process claim first determines
whether the plaintiff raises an interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and, if such
an interest exists, then whether the procedures provided to the plaintiff afforded that
individual due process of law) (citing Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107 , 116 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Perez's due process claim fails at the first step of the analysis because the complaint does
not allege facts to support a protected interest.
"It is well-settled that placement in administrative confinement will generally not
create a liberty interest." 	Williams v. Armstrong , 566 F. App'x 106 , 108 (3d Cir. 2014) ; see
also Riley v. Carroll, 200 F. App'x 157, 158 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Because administrative
13
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 13 of 18

segregation is the sort of confinement that [plaintiffj should reasonably anticipate receiving
at some point in his incarceration, his transfer to less amenable and more restrictive
quarters does not implicate a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.") (citing
Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2002)). 	Rather, "[i]n a prison context, due
process protection is limited to those situations where the deprivation rises to the level of an
'atypical and significant hardship on inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life ."' Thomas v. Rosemeyer, 199 F. App'x 195 , 197 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484).
"Such a hardship exists if the circumstances of a prisoner's confinement fall[] outside of the
expected parameters of comparable confinement." 	Williams, 566 F. App'x at 108. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has found that confinement in restrictive
housing for periods from 120 days up to 15 months was not an "atypical or significant
hardship." Id. at 108 (120 days); Thomas, 199 F. App'x at 197-98 (270 days); Smith v.
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641,645,654 (3d Cir. 2002) (7 months); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d
703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997) (15 months).
Perez alleges a due process violation based on an approximate one-month stay in
the RHU. 	He does not allege any facts to support that his disciplinary detention in the RHU
imposed an atypical and significant hardship upon him such that the Fourteenth
Amendment required due process protections . See Diaz v. Canino, 502 Fed. Appx . 214,
217 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that state inmate's placement in the RHU for 360 days of
disciplinary confinement did not impose an atypical and significant hardship on inmate to
14
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 14 of 18

implicate a protected liberty interest, and thus the alleged procedural deficiencies at a
misconduct hearing did not violate the inmate's due process rights, even if the inmate was
exposed to continuous searches, subjected to regular relocation of his cell, and was unable
to sleep as a result of lights that remained turned on in RHU).
Perez also asserts a liberty interest based on the adverse effects he experienced
because of his exposure to OC spray and unsanitary cell conditions. 	(Doc.1, at 3-4). On
the issue of significant hardship , a court must consider the nature of the prison conditions in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 	Williams v. Sec 'y Pa. Dep 't of Corr., 848 F.3d
549, 563 (3d Cir. 2017). The exposure to OC spray and its resulting adverse effects may
support a protected liberty interest only if they imposed an atypical and significant hardship
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life . Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 	Under the facts
alleged here, Perez's exposure to OC spray cannot be considered an atypical and
significant hardship . "The use of mace, tear gas or other chemical agent of the like nature
when reasonably necessary .. . to subdue recalcitrant prisoners does not constitute cruel
and inhuman punishment." Passmore v. lane/lo, 528 F. App'x 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted). 	Pennsylvania law also recognizes that OC spray is a reasonable tool
available to corrections officers to respond to an inmate's refusal to comply with legitimate
directions. 	See 61 Pa. C.S.A. § 5907. And an inmate's exposure to unsanitary cell
conditions does not constitute a substantial risk of serious harm and, thus, cannot be
considered an atypical and significant hardship based on the facts alleged in Perez 's
15
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 15 of 18

complaint. 	See , e.g., Gilb/om v. Gillipsie, 435 F. App'x 165, 169 (3d Cir . 2011) (denying
conditions of confinement claim when inmate spent approximately thirty-six hours in a cell
with his own excrement). The conditions of which Perez complains reflect typical
restrictions in administrative custody . Moreover, the conditions, while perhaps unpleasant,
do not present any atypical or significant hardship on Perez in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life. 	In light of Perez's failure to establish a protected liberty interest , his
procedural due process claim will be dismissed.
6. 	Claims against Smith
Finally, the only specific allegation Perez asserts against Lieutenant Smith is that he
wrote to him about his placement in the RHU and the conditions in the RHU, and that Smith
never contacted him about his complaints. 	(Doc. 1, at 6). 	Perez's purported attempt to
assert a civil rights claim against Lieutenant Smith based on the handling of his complaints
or grievances is not plausible because "[p]rison inmates do not have a constitutionally
protected right to a grievance process." Jackson v. Gordon, 145 F. App'x 774, 777 (3d Cir .
2005) (percuriam); see also Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F. App'x 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (per
curiam). Accordingly, the facts alleged by Perez about Lieutenant Smith's failure to respond
to his complaints or grievances does not give rise to a plausible basis for a constitutional
claim and will be dismissed. 	See also Woods v. First Corr. Med. Inc., 446 F. App'x 400, 403
(3d Cir . 2011) (per curiam) (citing Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir . 1991))
("[B]ecause a prisoner has no free-standing constitutional right to an effective grievance
16
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 16 of 18

process, [a prisoner] cannot maintain a constitutional claim ... based upon his perception that
[the defendant] ignored and/or failed to properly investigate his grievances.").
IV. 	Leave to Amend
Before dismissing a civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless the amendment
would be inequitable or futile. 	Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. 	Leave to amend may be denied
based on undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue
of allowance of the amendment, or futility of amendment. 	Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 ,
182(1962).
The Court finds that the pleading deficiencies of Perez's complaint are largely factual
in nature and thus conceivably could be cured by an amended pleading. 	Therefore, Perez
will be granted the option of filing an amended complaint to attempt to cure the defects
discussed above. 1
1 	If Perez chooses to file an amended complaint , it must be a complete document that does not
rely on the initial complaint , or other papers filed in this case .
17
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 17 of 18

V. 	Conclusion
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court will grant Perez leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and will dismiss his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) without
prejudice. 	The Court will allow Perez leave to file one all-inclusive amended complaint.
A separate Order shall issue.
R
United States District Judge
~ 	.
Dated: January 1 	,2026
18
Case 3:25-cv-02134-RDM-CA Document 10 Filed 01/05/26 Page 18 of 18