Garg v. Greene

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SUMITGARG, 	No. 3:25cv2005
(Judge Munley)	Petitioner
v.
WARDEN J. GREENE,
Respondent
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MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Sumit Garg ("Garg") filed the instant petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 2241. 	(Doc. 1). 	Garg asserts that his due
process rights were violated in the context of a prison disciplinary hearing, and
that the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") failed to timely start the accumulation
of his First Step Act ("FSA") time credits, and he seeks credits purportedly owed
to him by the BOP. 	(Docs. 1, 2). 	The petition is ripe for disposition and , for the
reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied and dismissed .
I. 	Background
A. 	Garg's Criminal Conviction
Garg is serving a 108-month term of imprisonment for cyberstalking,
conspiracy to engage in cyberstalking, and cyberstalking in violation of a criminal
order, imposed by the United States District Court for the Western District of
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Washington. 	(Doc. 8-3, Public Information Inmate Data; Doc. 21-4, Public
Information Inmate Data). 	According to BOP documentation submitted by
respondent, Garg was sentenced on July 9, 2024, and his projected release
date, via FSA release, is June 8, 2028. 	(Doc. 21 -2, Second Supplemental
Declaration of BOP Attorney Jennifer Knepper ("Knepper Second Supplemental
Deel. ") ,I 3; Doc. 21-3, FSA Time Credit Assessment; Doc. 21-4). However, a
review of the BOP's inmate locator indicates that Garg's projected release date is
now May 9, 2028.1
8. 	BOP Disciplinary Process
The BOP's disciplinary process is fully outlined in Code of Federal
Regulations ("C.F.R. "), Title 28, Sections 541 th rough 541.8. 	These regulations
dictate the manner in which disciplinary action may be taken should a prisoner
violate, or attempt to violate, institutional rules. 	The first step requ ires fi ling an
incident report and conducting an investigation pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 541.5.
Staff is required to conduct the investigation promptly absent intervening
circumstances beyond the control of the investigator. 28 C.F.R. § 541 .5(b).
Following the investigation , the matter is then referred to the Unit Disciplinary
Committee ("UDC") for an initial hearing pursuant to 28 C.F. R. § 541. 7. If the
1 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS ' INMATE LOCATOR , https://www.bop .gov/inmateloc/
(searching Inmate Number 33491 -509) (last visited Jan . 30 , 2026) .
2
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UDC finds that a prisoner has committed a prohibited act, it may impose minor
sanctions. kl 	If the alleged violation is serious and warrants consideration for
more than minor sanctions, or involves a prohibited act listed in the greatest or
high category offenses, the UDC refers the matter to a Disciplinary Hearing
Officer ("OHO") for a hearing . kl 	Greatest Severity category offenses carry a
possible sanction of, inter alia , loss of good conduct time credits. 	kl§ 541.3. 	In
the event that a matter is referred for a hearing , the Warden is required to give
the inmate advance written notice of the charges no less than 24 hours before
the OHO hearing and offer the inmate a full-time staff member to represent him
at the OHO hearing. 	kl§ 541.8 (c) and (d).
At the OHO hearing, the inmate is "entitled to make a statement and
present documentary evidence" and has the right to present documents and
submit names of requested witnesses and have them called to testify. 	kl §
541.B(f). The OHO shall "call witnesses who have information directly relevant to
the charge[s] and who are reasonably available ." 	kl§ 541.8(f)(2). The OHO
need not call repetitive witnesses or adverse witnesses. 	kl § 541 .8(f)(3). 	The
inmate has the right to be present throughout the OHO hearing except during
"OHO deliberations or when [his] presence wou ld jeopardize institution security,
at the DHO's discretion. " kl§ 541 .B(e). 	The OHO must "consider all evidence
presented during the hearing ." 	kl§ 541 .B(f). 	"The DHO's decision wi ll be based
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on at least some facts and, if there is conflicting evidence, on the greater weight
of the evidence. " .!fL. The OHO has the authority to dismiss any charge , find a
prohibited act was committed , and impose available sanctions . .!fL. § 541.8. The
OHO must prepare a record of the proceedings sufficient to document the
advisement of inmate rights, DHO's findings , "DHO's decision", specific
"evidence relied on by the OHO " and must identify the reasons for the sanctions
imposed. kl_ § 541 .8(f)(2). 	A copy must be delivered to the inmate. 	Id .
C. 	Incident Report Number 4083418
On March 13 , 2025, staff was monitoring a phone call placed by Garg to a
phone number listed in his contacts as a "friend ." 	(Doc. 8-5, Declaration of OHO
David Lupotsky ("Lupotsky Deel. ") ,r 4; Doc. 8-6, Incident Report No . 4083418).
While monitoring the phone call , staff noticed that the voice changed after the call
was placed and the individual began speaking in another language. (Doc. 8-6, at
1). Further investigation revealed that Garg placed the call on his account,
completed the voice recognition , and then handed the phone to another inmate-
Tumanyan (Garg's cellmate). 	(.!fL.) . 	Staff then reviewed institutional video of the
area where Garg placed the phone call. 	(.!fL.). 	Still photographs from the video
showed that Garg was on the phone, he placed the phone down , and inmate
Tumanyan picked up the receiver and completed the phone call using Garg's
phone minutes. 	(.!fL.). 	The investigation also revealed that Garg allowed inmate
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Tumanyan to use his phone on 16 different occasions from February 18 , 2025 to
March 13 , 2025. 	(kt).
As a result, on March 14, 2025, Garg received Incident Report Number
4083418, charging him with violating Prohibited Act Code 297-phone abuse to
disrupt monitoring . (Doc. 8-6, Incident Report). 	On that same day, Garg
appeared before the UDC and provided a written statement. 	(~ at 2, 4). 	The
UDC found the incident report to be accurate for the charges. 	(~ at 2).
On March 14 , 2025, a staff member informed Garg of his rights at the OHO
hearing and provided him with a copy of the "Inmate Rights at Discipline Hearing"
form . (Doc. 8-6, at 6, Inmate Rights at Discipline Hearing). 	Garg was also
provided with a "Notice of Discipline Hearing before the Discipline Hearing Officer
(OHO)" form. 	(kt at 5, Notice of Discipline Hearing before the OHO). Garg
signed both forms , he requested representation by a staff member and elected to
call witnesses on his behalf. 	(~ at 5- 6) .
The OHO hearing convened on May 1, 2025. (Doc. 8-7, OHO Report).
During the May 1, 2025 hearing , the OHO confirmed that Garg received
advanced written notice of the charges and that he had been advised of his rights
before the OHO . (~ at 2). 	Garg waived his right to representation by a staff
member, waived his right to call witnesses on his behalf, and expressed an
understanding of his rights before the OHO . (~ at 1-3). 	He provided the
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followi ng statement: "I let my celly use my phone. I didn't get this incident report
here and I think it should be a code 397 instead of code 297. " 	(~ at 2). Garg
cited no procedural issues and offered no additional documentary evidence.
(J..gJ.
The OHO ultimately found sufficient evidence that Garg committed the
code 297 violation , and reasoned as follows :
The OHO considered your statements and defense, your
documentary evidence, some facts, and the evidence presented.
The OHO concludes . You allowed another inmate to utilize your
phone account. 	This was evidenced by staff observing another
inmate talking on the phone using your phone account via video
review. There are still photo[ ]s showing th is interaction. 	There is a
staff memorandum supporting this incident occurred as written .
There are TRUSYSTEM documents corroborating this incident report
and you admitted doing this . You disagreed with the charge code of
297 and stated that you believe what you did constitutes a code 397.
You argued that what you did does not circumvent monitoring
procedures. 	Your documentary evidence which you submitted does
not contain any exculpatory evidence related to this case. Instead , it
consists of arguments and opinions to include your request to have
the charge amended to code 499 which you stated that you would
plead guilty to. The OHO disagrees with your rationale and denied
you r request to amend the charge. 	Allowing another inmate to use
you r phone account absolutely circumvents the phone system
procedures as outlined in policy. 	You provided the OHO with no
substantive evidence to support that you did not commit the act of
phone abuse.
Based on the greater weight of the evidence outlined above, the OHO
finds that you have committed the prohibited act of, use of the
telephone for abuse other than criminal activity, code 297.
(kt at 4 ).
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The finding of guilt for the code 297 violation resulted in disallowance of 27
days of good conduct time and loss of phone privileges for six months. 	(J_g_J
The OHO cited the following reasons for imposition of the sanctions:
The action/behavior of any inmate to use the telephone in an
unauthorized manner interferes with the ability of the staff to
accurately monitor telephone conversations and poses a serious
threat to the security and orderly operation of the institution. 	The
disallowance of good conduct time was imposed because you were
sentenced under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) which
mandates the disallowance of good conduct time per policy. 	The loss
of phone sanction was imposed to deter misconduct.
(~ at 4-5).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the OHO advised Garg of his appeal
rights, and a copy of the report was delivered to Garg . (~ at 5) .
0 . 	The First Step Act
With the enactment of the FSA, Congress charged the Attorney General
with creating a risk and needs assessment system that would be used to: (1)
determine each prisoner's recidivism risk as part of the intake process; (2)
assess the risk of violent or serious misconduct of each prisoner; (3) individually
assign appropriate programming for each prisoner; (4) periodically reassess
prisoners' recidivism risk; (5) reassign programming based on new assessments;
(6) provide incentives and rewards for participation; (7) determine when a
prisoner may transfer to prerelease custody or supervised release; and (8)
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determine appropriate use of technology for those with dyslexia. 	18 U.S.C. §
3632(a)(1 )-(8).
The FSA also provides that a prisoner "who successfully completes
evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities shall
earn time credits .. .. " 	18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). 	Under the statute, prisoners earn
10 days of credits for every 30 days of "successful participation in evidence-
based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities. " 	18 U.S.C. §
3632(d)(4)(A)(i). The number of credits earned in each period of 30 days may
increase if the prisoner maintains a low risk level. 	18 U.S.C . § 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii).
However, a prisoner cannot earn time credits for successful completion of
programming "(i) prior to the date of enactment of [the First Step Act] ; or (ii)
during official detention prior to the date that the prisoner's sentence commences
under section 3585(a) ." 	18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(B). 	Congress has
unambiguously defined "commence" in the context of federal prison sentences.
According to 18 U.S.C . § 3585(a), "[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment
commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting
transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the
official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served ."
The BOP regulation that specifies when an eligible inmate may begin
earning FSA time credits, 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(a), provides: "An eligible inmate
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begins earning FSA Time Credits after the inmate's term of imprisonment
commences (the date the inmate arrives or voluntarily surrenders at the
designated Bureau facility where the sentence will be served). " !fl An inmate
must also be "successfully participating" in designated programming to earn FSA
time credits . 28 C.F.R. § 523.41 (c)(1 ). 	'" Successful participation' requires a
determination by Bureau staff that an eligible inmate has participated in the
EBRR programs or PAs that the Bureau has recommended based on the
inmate's individualized risk and needs assessment, and has complied with the
requirements of each particular EBRR Program or PA. " !fl§ 523.41 (c)(2).
Additionally, in order to be considered to be successfully completing recidivism
reduction programs sufficient to earn or apply credits under the FSA, a prisoner
may not "opt out" of participating in the programs provided by the BOP. 	See & §
523.41 (c)(2)-(4 ). 	An inmate who "opts out" of a recommended recidivism
reduction program is "exclu[ded] from further benefits or privileges allowable
under the FSA, until the date the inmate 'opts in ' (chooses to participate in the
EBRR programs or PAs that the Bureau has recommended based on the
inmate's individualized risk and needs assessment, as documented by staff) ." 	Id.
§ 523.41 (c)(5)(iii).
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II. 	Discussion
A. 	Due Process Claim
Garg claims that his due process rights were violated in the context of the
disciplinary hearing process because "the disciplinary conviction was not
supported by 'some evidence. "' (Doc. 2, at 3). 	The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides: " No person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. " U.S.
CONST. amend . V. Not every prison disciplinary action is subject to procedural
due process requirements; due process rights attach only where a protected
liberty interest is implicated . See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-87
(1995); Wilkinson v. Austin , 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) ("We need reach the
question of what process is due only if the inmates establ ish a constitutionally
protected interest" ). 	Prisoners have a protected liberty interest in good conduct
time. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill , 472 U.S. 445, 454
(1985). 	Conversely, no liberty interest attaches to lesser disciplinary sanctions,
such as periods of disciplinary segregation or denial of other privileges. 	See,
§.&. , Sandin , 515 U.S. at 484-87 (30 days of disciplinary segregation and a
temporary denial of privileges do not give rise to a protected liberty interest).
"Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls
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within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law. " & at
485.
Where due process applies to a prison disciplinary action , a prisoner must
receive: ( 1) at least 24-hour advance written notice of the claimed violation; (2)
an impartial hearing body; (3) a written statement by a factfinder regarding the
evidence relied upon and the reasons for the discipline imposed; (4) an
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense,
when to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or
correctional goals; and (5) the ability to seek help from a fellow inmate or from
the staff where the matter is complex. Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 563-71
(1974). 	Disciplinary proceedings are not criminal prosecutions , and the
institutional needs of the prison further support some limitations upon the
prisoner's rights. 	& at 555-56 ("Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes
unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen. ").
Determining whether prison disciplinary proceedings comply with due
process "does not require examination of the enti re record , independent
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weight of the evidence. " Hill , 472
U.S . 445, 455. Rather, the relevant question is whether there is "any evidence in
the record that could support the conclusion reached" by the factfinder. !fl at
455-56. 	The "any evidence" standard requires only "some evidence from which
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the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. " !ft (citing
Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)). 	A prison guard's
testimony and written report are sufficient evidence to satisfy due process
requirements applicable to OHO hearings. 	Hill, 472 U.S. at 456.
Here, the record confirms that Garg was afforded all of the required
procedural rights set forth in Wolff. 	He received the incident report on March 14,
2025. He appeared before the UDC. 	He was properly informed of his rights
before the OHO hearing , as well as given the opportunity to make his own
statement, present documentary evidence, have a staff representative, and to
present witnesses on his behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, Garg received
a written decision setting forth the evidence relied upon by the OHO and the
rationale behind the decision. 	Garg was also notified of his right to appeal.
Garg argues that the OHO found him guilty of phone abuse (code 297)
instead of phone abuse (code 397), an act, he claims he was not originally
charged with. 	(Doc. 1, at 2; Doc. 2, at 2-3; Doc. 2-1 ; Doc. 14). 	BOP policy, as
codified at 28 C.F.R. § 541 .8(a)(1), provides that the OHO may find that an
inmate "committed the prohibited act(s) charged , and/or a similar prohibited
act(s) as described in the incident report. "
According to BOP Program Statement 5270.09, Inmate Discipline Program,
code 297 is described as: "[use] of the telephone for abuses other than illegal
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activity which circumvent the ability of staff to monitor frequency of telephone
use, content of the call , or the number called ; or to commit or further a High
category prohibited act. " Inmate Disciple Program , BOP Program Statement No.
5270.09 , at 48 , available at: https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5270_009.pdf.
(last visited Jan. 30, 2026). Code 397 is described as : "[u]se of the telephone for
abuses other than illegal activity which do not circumvent the ability of staff to
monitor frequency of telephone use, content of the call , or the number called; or
to commit or further a Moderate category prohibited act. " .!J;L at 53. The OHO
found that when Garg allowed another inmate to utilize his phone account, he
circumvented the ability of staff to monitor his telephone use, including the
content of his call and the number he called. 	(Doc. 8- 7) . Thus , the record clearly
reveals the existence of sufficient evidence to allow the OHO to conclude that the
greater weight of the evidence supported that Garg had committed the prohibited
act of telephone abuse, in violation of code 297. 	(.!J;L) .
Since Garg was afforded all of his procedural rights , the only rema ining
issue is whether there was "some evidence" to support the decision by the OHO .
The record clearly reveals the existence of some evidence to allow the OHO to
conclude that Garg was guilty of the charge. 	In concluding that the greater
weight of the evidence supported a finding of guilt, the OHO considered the
incident report, staff memorandum, still photos showing Garg placing the phone
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call , setting down the receiver, and allowing another to pick up the phone. 	(Doc.
8-7, at 3-4 ). 	The DHO's reliance on this documentary evidence supports a
conclusion that the decision has some basis in fact and is supported by some
evidence.
Finally, the court finds that all sanctions imposed by the OHO were within
the limits of 28 C.F.R. § 541, et seq. 	Garg was found guilty of a 200-level , high
severity prohibited act. 	Pursuant to 28 C.F. R. § 541 .3, the following are the
sanctions available for 200-level prohibited acts:
A. 	Recommend parole date rescission or retardation.
8 . 	Forfeit and/or withhold earned statutory good time or non-
vested good conduct time up to 50% or up to 60 days,
whichever is less, and/or terminate or disallow extra good time
(an extra good time or good conduct time sanction may not be
suspended).
8.1 	Disallow ordinarily between 25% and 50% (14-27 days) of good
conduct time credit available for year (a good conduct time
sanction may not be suspended).
8.2 	Forfeit up to 27 days of earned FSA Time Credits for each
prohibited act committed.
C. 	Disciplinary segregation (up to 6 months).
D. 	Make monetary restitution.
E. 	Monetary fine.
F. 	Loss of privileges (e.g ., visiting , telephone, commissary,
movies, recreation).
G. 	Change housing (quarters).
H. 	Remove from program and/or group activity.
I. 	Loss of job.
J. 	Impound inmate's personal property.
K. 	Confiscate contraband.
L. 	Restrict to quarters.
M. 	Extra duty.
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28 C.F.R. § 541.3 (Table 1).
The sanctions imposed by the OHO were consistent with the severity level
of the prohibited acts and within the maximum available to the OHO .
Further, "[t]he Eighth Amendment is violated only when a punishment is
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense." Levi v. Holt, 192 F. App'x
158, 162 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271-74 (1980)).
Therefore, only sanctions that "impose [ ] atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life ," may be deemed
excessive. Moles v. Holt, 221 F. App'x 92 , 95 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Sandin , 515
U.S. at 484). 	The penalties imposed here, loss of good conduct time and loss of
phone privileges, do not work an "atypical and significant hardship" on Garg and
do not serve to extend his confinement beyond the expected parameters of his
sentence. 2 Sandin , 515 U.S. at 484-85. Consequently, he is not entitled to relief.
B. 	Equal Protection Claim
"[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal
protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously
discriminating between individuals or groups. " Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239 (1976). 	In order to establish an equal protection claim , a litigant "must
2 As stated , Garg 's projected re lease date is May 9, 2028. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS ' INMATE LOCAT OR , https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.
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allege that he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, and
that this different treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based on
his membership in a protected class .. . " Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d
286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016).
Garg alleges that he was treated differently from other similarly situated
inmates-he alleges that his cellmate used his account to place a phone call,
and his cellmate received a lighter sanction. 	(Doc. 2, at 3). 	Garg does not allege
that he is a member of a protected class, as required for an equal protection
claim , nor could he because prisoners are not a suspect class under equal
protection principles. 	See Myrie v. Comm'r, N.J. Dep't of Corr., 267 F.3d 251,
263 (3d Cir. 2001 ). 	Merely claiming that other prisoners received less severe
punishment for the same violation does not create an equal protection claim.
See Millard v. Hufford, 415 F. App'x 348 (3d Cir. 2011 ).
Additionally, the record is devoid of proof that Garg received a more severe
sanction that his cellmate. 	OHO Lupotsky attests that, upon review of Garg's
cellmate's disciplinary history, he was also charged with a violation of code 297
and received a disallowance of 27 days of good conduct time and 90 days loss of
e-mail and commissary privileges. (Doc. 8-5, Lupotsky Deel. ,i 10). 	The record
does not support a finding that BOP officials engaged in purposeful
discrimination. 	Rather, the record shows that the discipline imposed on Garg
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was based on evidence that he violated the BOP's rules. Accordingly, Garg's
equal protection claim fails.
C. 	The BOP's Calculation of Garg's FSA Time Credits
Garg seeks the award of earned time credits under the FSA and requests
that the BOP recalculate his release date. 	(Doc. 2, at 4-5; Doc. 2-2; Doc. 13 , at
1). 	In response , respondent has recalculated the application of Garg's FSA time
credits and has applied those credits to Garg 's sentence. 	(Doc. 21 -3).
Respondent asserts that the most recent FSA Time Credit Assessment
(dated December 24, 2025), shows that Garg is eligible for application of FSA
time credits as of the December 24, 2025 assessment date and , thus , 155 days
of FSA time credits have been applied to his sentence. 	(Doc. 21, at 1- 3; Doc. 21-
2, Knepper Second Supplemental Deel. ,m 2- 3; Doc. 21-3). Respondent argues ,
therefore, that the habeas petition is now moot because Garg has received the
relief sought and has received the maximum allowable credit. 	(Doc. 21 , at 1-5).
Article Ill of the Constitution dictates that a federal court may adjudicate
'" only actual, ongoing cases or controversies. "' 	Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d
142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp ., 494 U.S. 472 ,
477 (1990)). "This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages
of federal judicial proceedings [and for jurisdiction to exist the] parties must
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continue to have a 'personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit." 	Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78).
Here, Garg's request for additional credits under the FSA became moot
when the BOP recalculated his FSA time credits and applied those credits to his
sentence. 	Based on the BOP's revised calculations, the BOP applied 155 days
towards Garg 's release date and his projected release date changed from
November 10 , 2028 to May 9, 2028. 	(Compare Doc. 8-3, 8-4, with , Docs. 21-3,
24-1 ; see also BOP INMATE LOCATOR).
As Garg has received the requested relief-recalculation of his FSA time
credits-he no longer has a concrete, redressable injury. 	This court therefore
lacks an opportunity to provide Garg with any meaningful relief in this habeas
matter, and his challenge is moot. 	See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77
F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) ("If developments occur during the course of
adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit or
prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be
dismissed as moot. " ).
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Ill. 	Conclusion
Consistent with the foregoing , the habeas petition challenging the prison
disciplinary hearing will be denied , and the habeas petition challenging Garg's
FSA time credits will be dismissed as moot.
An appropriate order shall issue.
BY THE COURT:
Dated: 	January ~ 	, 2026
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