Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT EUGENE : No. 3:25-CV-1325
REICHNER, JR., :
: (Caraballo, M.J.)
Plaintiff :
:
v. :
:
FRANK J. BISIGNANO, :
Commissioner of Social :
Security Administration, :
:
Defendant :
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Robert Reichner, Jr., seeks judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”)
denying his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 42,
United States Code, Section 405(g), and Title 28, United States Code,
Section 636(c).
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Reichner raises two primary challenges to Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) Charles Dominick’s determination that Reichner was not
disabled under the Social Security Act. First, Reichner contends that
the ALJ failed to properly evaluate medical opinion evidence and
determine Reichner’s residual functional capacity. Doc. 9 at 29.
Second, Reichner posits that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his
personal testimony. Id. at 43. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for
decision.
As explained below, ALJ Dominick’s residual functional capacity
determination was not supported by substantial evidence because he
failed to explain why, despite finding the relevant medical opinions
partially persuasive, he declined to incorporate their limitation to one or
two step tasks. This discrepancy precludes meaningful judicial review
because, absent further explanation from the ALJ, the Court cannot
discern whether the limitation was considered and intentionally
rejected, or inadvertently omitted. Accordingly, the Court vacates the
Commissioner’s decision to deny Reichner’s claims for social security
disability benefits and remands this case for proper consideration of the
identified one or two step task limitation.
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II. Background1
On May 18, 2022, Reichner applied for disability insurance
benefits, alleging disability beginning February 4, 2022, due to anxiety,
major depressive disorder, back pain, cervical spine impairment,
degenerative disc disease, dysthymic disorder, lumbar spine
impairment, hypertension, neck pain, panic disorder with agoraphobia,
and gastroesophageal reflux disease. Tr. 93, 257-63, 292. The Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Reichner’s application on
November 3, 2022, id. at 93-104, and again upon reconsideration on
July 14, 2023. Id. at 105-16. Reichner accordingly requested and
received a hearing on March 18, 2024. Id. at 41-72, 141-42.
On July 30, 2024, ALJ Dominick issued a decision concluding that
Reichner was not disabled. Id. at 15-40. Reichner appealed to the
Social Security Appeals Council on September 12, 2024. Id. at 235-43.
The Appeals Council denied his request on May 30, 2025. Id. at 1-7.
1 As the parties and the Court are well-acquainted with the facts underlying this
appeal, the Court only provides a brief summary of the procedural history, and
addresses the pertinent facts in the discussion below.
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The instant appeal followed. Doc. 1. The parties then filed their
respective briefs, leaving this matter ripe for decision. Docs. 9-11.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Review of the Commissioner’s decision denying a claimant’s
application for social security disability benefits is limited to
determining whether the factual findings of the final decisionmaker are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).
Substantial in this context is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence
but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d
1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Put more pointedly, it is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In an
adequately developed record, this can mean “something less than the
weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision]
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from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
Comm’n., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citations omitted).
Under this deferential standard, “[f]actual findings which are
supported by substantial evidence must be upheld.” Ficca v. Astrue,
901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). This Court’s role is not to re-weigh the evidence and make
factual determinations, but to simply review the record and ensure that
the ALJ provided “a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of
reasoning for her conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial
review.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citations and quotations omitted). An ALJ meets that standard by
stating “in her decision which evidence she has rejected and which she
is relying on as the basis for her finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of SSA,
181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Moreover, when
there is countervailing evidence, an ALJ must “give some reason for
discounting the evidence she rejects.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,
429 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Mason v. Shalala,
994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that substantial evidence
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standard is unmet when the ALJ fails to resolve conflicts created by
countervailing evidence).
B. The ALJ’s Failure to Explain the Exclusion of a One or
Two Step Task Limitation
Reichner posits that, notwithstanding ALJ Dominick’s
determination that the opinions of two state agency psychologists were
partially persuasive, the ALJ failed to include in his residual functional
capacity recommendations that Reichner could perform jobs involving
“simple one or two step tasks.” Doc. 9 at 41; see Tr. 102, 114.
Specifically, Reichner contends that ALJ Dominick’s failure to address
the limitation to one or two step tasks is highly prejudicial and conflicts
with the ALJ’s step five determination, which concluded that Reichner
could perform jobs requiring reasoning levels of 2 and 3. Doc. 9 at 41.
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ was not required to adopt the
above stated limitation, and that, in any event, “one ‘or’ two steps is not
the same as one ‘to’ two steps,” and thus, no conflict exists. Doc. 10 at
11 n.1.
The ALJ is tasked with assessing a claimant’s residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (S.S.A.
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1996). “Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an
individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her
impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d
Cir. 2000) (quoting Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 359 (3d Cir. 1999)).
A residual functional capacity reflects the most that an individual can
still do, despite his or her limitations, and is used at steps four and five
of the ALJ’s analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1545; SSR 96-8P,
1996 WL 374184, at *2. Although all evidence of record is considered,
the ALJ’s determination must be supported by medical evidence. Doak
v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1986).
The ALJ need not adopt every limitation expressed by an expert,
as it is well-established that “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining
physicians or State agency consultants – must make the ultimate
disability and [residual functional capacity] determinations.” Chandler
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). Nevertheless,
“while the ALJ may choose which medical opinions are persuasive, for
each limitation opined necessary by a persuasive medical source, the
ALJ is obligated to either: (1) incorporate that limitation in the
claimant’s [residual functional capacity], or (2) explain the basis for
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discounting that limitation. Such an obligation ensures that any
omission was intentional and supported by substantial evidence in the
record.” Lombardo v. Bisignano, 2026 WL 674198, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
2026) (citations and quotations omitted).
With these obligations in mind, several courts have recently held
that an ALJ’s “unexplained failure [] to incorporate a one-to-two-step
task limitation set forth in a medical opinion deemed persuasive
constitutes error which may compel remand.” Id.; see also Simon v.
Kijakazi, 2022 WL 828935, at *10 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (“While the ALJ
certainly was not required to include this [one-to-two step] limitation,
the ALJ was required to explain the failure to include this limitation,
particularly because the ALJ found this opinion to be generally
persuasive and supported by the record.”); Shipman v. Kizakazi, 2023
WL 5599607, at *8 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (same); Pokorny v. Kijakazi, 2023
WL 6988360, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (same).
At issue here are the medical opinions of two state agency
psychologists, Melissa Lynn Franks, Psy.D., and Karen Evelyn
Weitzner, Ph.D. On November 2, 2022, Dr. Franks completed a
Psychiatric Review Technique and Mental Residual Functional
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Capacity Assessment, in which she identified mild to moderate mental
impairments and opined that Reichner “could manage, understand, and
complete simple one or two step tasks.” Tr. 102. Dr. Weitzner
completed the state agency reassessment on June 23, 2023, affirming
the mild to moderate impairments and one or two step task limitation
identified by Dr. Franks, except that Reichner had no significant
limitations in his ability to (1) accept instructions and respond
appropriately to criticism from supervisors, or (2) get along with
coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral
extremes. Id. at 113-14.
ALJ Dominick deemed both opinions “partially persuasive,”
reasoning that the experts’ assessment of mild limitations in Reichner’s
ability to understand, remember, and apply information was
inconsistent with other examinations in the record, which indicated
impaired memory.2 Id. at 29. Accordingly, the ALJ deemed this
2 The Court notes that, to the extent state agency experts opined that Reichner had
only mild limitations in his ability to understand, remember, and apply
information, while simultaneously finding he had the mental capacity to “manage,
understand, and complete simple one or two step tasks,” these conclusions are
“inherently contradictory.” See McCleary v. Bisignano, 2026 WL 625113, at *5 (M.D.
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evidence “consistent with a moderate limitation in [Reichner’s]
understanding, remembering, or applying information.” Id. In other
words, ALJ Dominick departed from the medical opinions only to the
extent that they understated certain mental limitations, and, on that
basis, determined that greater restrictions were warranted. The ALJ
nevertheless failed to address one of the more restrictive limitations
identified by the experts—a limitation to one or two step tasks—either
by incorporating it into Reichner’s residual functional capacity or
explaining that omission. Absent such an explanation, the Court is
unable to discern whether the one or two step task limitation was
considered and intentionally rejected or, rather, inadvertently omitted.
To this extent, the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. Further, this error is not harmless and warrants remand for
the reasons discussed below.
Pa. 2026) (discussing this scenario and explaining that such “findings are
inherently contradictory since, under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the
ability to perform one-to-two-step tasks confines a worker to reasoning level 1 jobs,
the most severe restriction on workplace reasoning”). Accordingly, the Court
cautions the Commissioner against the “casual conflation of one-to-two step
[residual functional capacities] in medical opinions with widely varying opinions
regarding the claimant’s degree of impairment.” Id. at *14.
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The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) describes the
general educational development of each occupation, including the
required reasoning development levels. The DOT explains that, in
occupations with a reasoning level of 1, satisfactory job performance
requires that an employee be able to “[a]pply commonsense
understanding to carry out simple one-or two-step instructions.” DOT,
Appendix C, 1991 WL 688702. In occupations with a reasoning level of
2, satisfactory job performance requires that an employee be able to
“[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but
uninvolved written or oral instructions.” DOT, Appendix C, 1991 WL
688702. Courts have interpreted this to mean that, generally, a
limitation to one or two step tasks is consistent with occupations
requiring a reasoning level of 1, but inconsistent with occupations
requiring reasoning levels of 2 or above. See, e.g., Shipman, 2023 WL
5599607, at *10; Ferrebee v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 905153, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
2022); Lombardo, 2026 WL 674198, at *2.
Here, ALJ Dominick determined that Reichner “can understand,
remember, and carry out simple instructions.” Tr. 24. Based on this
finding, the ALJ concluded that Reichner could not return to his past
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work but could perform other work in the national economy, namely,
reasoning level 2 or 3 occupations that exceeded the one or two step
task limitations opined by the state agency experts.3 Because ALJ
Dominick did not identify at least one occupation existing in significant
numbers that Reichner can perform with a reasoning level of 1, the
ALJ’s failure to explain his decision not to incorporate the one or two
step task limitation is not harmless error. See Michelle M. v. Bisignano,
2025 WL 2713737, at *8 (M.D. Pa. 2025). Accordingly, the Court will
remand this case to the Commissioner for further consideration.
While the Court concludes that this error compels a remand,
nothing in this opinion should be deemed as expressing a judgment on
what the ultimate outcome of any reassessment should be. Instead,
that judgment remains entirely within the province of the ALJ.4
3 During the hearing, the vocational expert testified that the following jobs were
available to the hypothetical individual ALJ Dominick described, which the ALJ
relied upon in determining that other work existing in significant numbers in the
national economy was available to Reichner: (1) clerk, DOT 209.587-010 (reasoning
level 2); (2) ticket checker, DOT 219.587-010 (reasoning level 3); and (3) document
preparation clerk, DOT 249.587-018 (reasoning level 3). Tr. 67-68.
4 Because the Court has determined that remand is required to properly consider
the one or two step task limitation, the Court declines to address Reichner’s
remaining challenges. The Court nevertheless recognizes the detail and
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will VACATE the
decision of the Commissioner and REMAND this case for further
proceedings. A separate order shall follow.
Date: October 9, 2026 s/ Phillip J. Caraballo
Phillip J. Caraballo
United States Magistrate Judge
thoroughness of the ALJ’s decision and notes that, to the extent any remaining
contention would require re-weighing the evidence already considered by the ALJ, it
would not afford a basis for disturbing the ALJ’s decision. See Diaz v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009).
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