Diaz v. Warden of FCI-Schuylkill

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ARIEL DIAZ,
Petitioner
v.
WARDEN OF FCI-SCHUYLKILL,
Respondent.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-01306
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Presently pending before the Court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by petitioner Ariel Diaz (“Diaz”), an inmate confined at the Federal
Correctional Institution Schuylkill (“FCI-Schuylkill”). (Doc. 1). Diaz asserts that the Bureau
of Prisons (“BOP”) has failed to properly award him prior jailtime credit and seeks the
application of his projected time credits he has yet to earn under the First Step Act (“FSA”).
(Doc. 1). Because Diaz failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the Court will dismiss
the petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 23, 2023, Diaz pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute 500 gram and more of cocaine hydrochloride and 100 grams and more of heroin.
United States v. Diaz, No. 1:21-CR-00238-013-JPW, Doc. 565 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2023). He
was sentenced to sixty (60) months with “the intention of the court that this sentence run
consecutive to the state parole revocations on Philadelphia County Docket Nos. CR-0710211-
2004 and CR-1003521-2005.” Diaz, No. 1:21-CR-00238-013-JPW, Doc. 565. At the time of
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filing the petition, he had an estimated release date of September 18, 2027, through Good
Conduct Time and July 20, 2027, through FSA earned time credits.1 (Doc. 1-2).
Diaz filed his petition and paid the filing fee on July 17, 2025. (Doc. 1; Doc. 4). In his
§ 2241 petition, Diaz contends that he his sentence has not been properly credited for the time
he has already served and that the BOP has failed to apply both earned and projected FSA
credits. (Doc. 1). Diaz admits that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies because he
“raised the issue with staff, who conceded they could not offer a remedy,” and he states that
“[e]xhaustion is futile given the liberty interest at stake and recent binding federal policy
changes.” (Doc. 1, at 2).
The Court entered an order serving the petition on Respondent on July 18, 2025. (Doc.
5). Following an extension of time, Respondent filed a response on August 22, 2025. (Doc.
9.) Respondent argues that Diaz’s § 2241 petition must be dismissed because: (1) he failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the instant habeas petition; (2) the BOP’s
updated sentence calculation is proper; and (3) he is not legally entitled prelease custody
placement under the Second Chance Act. (Doc. 9). The Court finds that he has failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies and will dismiss the petition.
II. D ISCUSSION
Although there is no explicit statutory exhaustion requirement for § 2241 habeas
petitions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has consistently held that
exhaustion applies to such claims. See Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
1 Respondent’s briefing demonstrates that there was an error in calculating his release
date, but it was not in Diaz’s favor. (Doc. 9). His updated estimated release date is now
November 26, 2027 through Good Conduct Time and July 29, 2027 through FSA time
credits. (Doc. 9-8).
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Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986)); Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). Exhaustion allows the relevant agency to develop a factual
record and apply its expertise, conserves judicial resources, and provides agencies the
opportunity to “correct their own errors” thereby fostering “administrative autonomy.”
Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62 (citations omitted). The BOP has a specific internal system through
which federal prisoners can request review of nearly any aspect of their imprisonment. See
generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.19. That process begins with an informal request to staff and
progresses to formal review by the Warden, appeal with the Regional Director, and—
ultimately—final 	appeal 	to 	the 	General 	Counsel. 	See 	28 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	542.13-.15. 	No
administrative remedy appeal is considered fully exhausted until reviewed by the General
Counsel. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a).
Exhaustion is the rule in most cases, and failure to exhaust will generally preclude
federal habeas review. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761. Only in rare circumstances is exhaustion
of administrative remedies not required. For example, exhaustion is unnecessary if the issue
presented is one that consists purely of statutory construction. See Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d
431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Exhaustion is likewise not required when it would be futile. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
516 n.7 (1982). Furthermore, a district court can conclude that an administrative process is
unavailable to a habeas petitioner if “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking
advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”
Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643–44 (2016).
Diaz’s Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval report reveals that he has not
filed a since administrative remedy request while in BOP custody. (Doc. 9-5). Diaz’s futility
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argument, that he asked staff and was told there was nothing that could be done, fails. “Courts
in 	the 	Middle 	District 	of 	Pennsylvania 	have 	consistently 	held 	that 	‘exhaustion 	of
administrative remedies is not rendered futile simply because a prisoner anticipates he will be
unsuccessful in his administrative appeals.’” See Ross v. Martinez, No. 4:09-cv-1770, 2009 WL
4573686, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009) (quoting Malvestuto v. Martinez, No. 1:09-cv-1339,
2009 WL 2876883, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2009)); see also Suarez-Sanchez v. Lane, No. 4:18-
cv-1431, 2019 WL 1645231, at *3–4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2019) (concluding that the petitioner’s
§ 2241 petition was subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust because the petitioner “never
fully and properly appealed [his] grievance because he apparently deemed the grievance
process to be a waste of time”), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1620339
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2019).
Finally, Diaz’s assertion that he is excused from exhaustion based on the recent
binding federal policy changes and because a “liberty interest at stake” is not accurate. A
recent policy change does not necessarily concern statutory construction. Furthermore, logic
dictates that if BOP policy has recently changed, the most efficient means to redress his
sentence concerns would be alerting the BOP to the potential sentencing errors through the
administrative process. This case concerns factual assertions for which a record could and
should have been developed prior to filing a habeas petition in this matter. See, e.g., Rosario v.
Spaulding, No. 21-1160, 2021 WL 3884343, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2021) (while exhaustion
may be excused for cases solely raising statutory construction issues, this exception does not
apply where a petitioner's request for relief also requires a factual determination as to
completed programming and the amount of credits earned).
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the Court will dismiss the petition and close the case. An
appropriate order follows.
Dated: February 2, 2026 	s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
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