Deleman v. HighLevel, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN MICHAEL DELEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
HIGHLEVEL, INC.,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-01284
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff John Michael Deleman (“Deleman”) commenced this pro se action on July 9,
2025, by filing a complaint in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. 1-2). On
July 14, 2025, Defendant HighLevel, Inc. (“HighLevel”) removed this action to this Court
based on diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). On July 15, 2025, Deleman filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (Doc. 3). On July 16, 2025,
HighLevel filed a motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. 14). On July 25, 2025, this Court issued
an order denying Deleman’s motion for a temporary restraining order, granting HighLevel’s
motion to compel arbitration, and staying this case pending arbitration. (Doc. 41). Before the
Court is Deleman’s motion to lift the stay. (Doc. 42). For the reasons discussed below, the
Court DENIES Deleman’s motion.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Deleman operates Elite Marketing Authority Co. (“EMA”), a marketing SaaS
business.1 (Doc. 1-2, at 3). HighLevel is a digital services provider and platform which
1 “SaaS” stands for “software as a service” and is a software distribution method in
which a service provider gives customers access through the internet to applications, usually
ones developed and owned by the provider. SaaS, Dictionary.Com, DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/saas (last visited Nov. 19, 2025).
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provides marketing agencies with various tools to design websites, manage social media,
manage client-relations, and manage client communications. (Doc. 1-2, at 3). Deleman and
EMA utilized HighLevel’s platform and services since 2019. (Doc. 22, ¶¶ 1, 15). According
to Deleman, he began utilizing HighLevel’s platform and services after making a verbal
agreement with HighLevel CEO Shaun Clark (“Clark”). (Doc. 22, ¶¶ 1, 15). On November
30, 2024, Deleman encountered HighLevel’s terms of service and clicked a box accepting
those terms of service to obtain a fifty percent discount on HighLevel’s services. (Doc. 14-5,
¶¶ 1, 15; Doc. 22, ¶¶ 1, 15). HighLevel’s terms of service contain arbitration provision which
states in relevant part:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to these Terms shall be
exclusively settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration
Association in accordance with Commercial Arbitration Rules, then in effect.
This arbitration provision is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. The
arbitration proceedings shall be held in Dallas, Texas. Any arbitration award
may be entered in a court of competent jurisdiction.
(Doc. 14-6, at 54).
HighLevel’s terms of service also contain a merger clause which states:
Except as noted below, these Terms constitute the sole and entire agreement
between you and HighLevel with respect to the Platform and supersede all prior
and 	contemporaneous 	understandings, 	agreements, 	representations 	and
warranties, both written and oral, with respect to the Platform. These Terms
may not be altered, supplemented, or amended by the use of any other
document(s) unless such document is signed by an authorized representative of
HighLevel.
(Doc. 14-6, at 52).
HighLevel’s terms of services further include a forum selection clause stating, “[t]he
laws of the State of Texas will govern these Terms of Service and any disputes under them,
without giving effect to any principles of conflict of laws.” (Doc. 14-6, at 53). The terms of
service contain a limitation on liability clause which states:
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Your exclusive remedy and our entire liability, if any, for any claims arising out
of these Terms and your use of the Platform or the Services shall be limited to
the amount you paid us for Services purchased on the Platform during the three
(3) month period before the act giving rise to the liability, provided however,
this limitation will not apply to you if you only use the free Services, and in this
case, if HighLevel determines to have any liability to you or any third party
arising from your use of the free Services, then HighLevel’s aggregate liability
will be limited to one hundred U.S. dollars.
(Doc. 14-6, at 50).
Finally, HighLevel’s terms of service contain a clause limiting the time to file claims which
states:
ANY CAUSE OF ACTION OR CLAIM YOU MAY HAVE ARISING OUT
OF OR RELATING TO THESE TERMS OR THE PLATFORM MUST BE
COMMENCED WITHIN THREE (3) MONTHS AFTER THE EVENT
GIVING 	RISE 	TO 	THE 	ACTION 	OR 	CLAIM 	OCCURRED,
REGARDLESS OF WHEN YOU KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN
ABOUT IT; OTHERWISE, SUCH CAUSE OF ACTION OR CLAIM IS
PERMANENTLY BARRED.
(Doc. 14-6, at 51).
On June 17, 2025, HighLevel terminated Deleman’s account on the platform, blocked
Deleman from accessing its platform, and ceased all services it provided Deleman and EMA.
(Doc. 10-9, at 3). On July 9, 2025, Deleman filed a complaint alleging various claims against
HighLevel under Pennsylvania law. (Doc. 1-2). In the complaint, Deleman requests both
monetary and injunctive relief. (Doc. 1-2, at 16-17).
On July 15, 2025, Deleman filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining
order 	and 	preliminary 	injunction 	requesting 	the 	Court 	order 	HighLevel 	to 	reinstate
Deleman’s 	accounts 	and 	enjoin 	it 	from 	further 	interfering 	with 	Deleman’s 	business
operations. (Doc. 3). On July 16, 2025, HighLevel filed a motion to compel arbitration. (Doc.
14). The Court denied Deleman’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
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injunction, granted HighLevel’s motion to compel arbitration, and stayed this case pending
the outcome of arbitration. (Doc. 40; Doc. 41).
Deleman now asks the Court to lift the stay and “restore the case to the Court’s active
docket.”2 (Doc. 42). HighLevel opposes the motion, arguing that the Court should deny the
motion both as a motion to lift the stay and as an improperly filed, untimely motion for
reconsideration. (Doc. 44).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. MOTION TO LIFT STAY
“The decision to stay litigation. . . pending the outcome of a related arbitration is one
left to the discretion of the district court.” Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Underwriters, Inc., 846 F.2d
196, 199 (3d Cir. 1988). Whether to lift a stay is at the discretion of the Court and “‘[w]hen
circumstances have changed such that the court's reasons for imposing the stay no longer exist
or are inappropriate, the court may lift the stay.’” Sager v. Allied Interstate, LLC, No. 3:18-CV-
220, 2021 WL 9406785, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2021) (quoting Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin
GmbH, 271 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D.D.C. 2002)); see Piazza v. Young, No. 4:19-CV-00180, 2023
WL 1994388, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2023); see also McCall v. Avco Corp., No. 4:18-CV-01350,
2019 WL 2004358, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2019). Where new circumstances are not
presented, and no new hardship exists, a motion to lift the stay should be denied. KGaA v.
2 The Court notes that Deleman did not file a brief in support with his motion to lift
the stay but rather appears to have incorporated a brief into his motion. (Doc. 42). Deleman
filed a brief in support on October 16, 2025, after HighLevel filed a brief in opposition. (Doc.
44; Doc. 45). Given Deleman’s pro se status, the Court will liberally construe his initial motion
as being both a brief in support and motion and his second brief as an additional reply brief.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (stating “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be
liberally construed’” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Bell v.
Pleasantville Hous. Auth., 443 F. App'x 731, 735 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating the same).
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Hopewell Pharma Ventures, Inc., No. CV 22-1365, 2025 WL 894551, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 24,
2025) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see Piazza, 2023 WL 1994388, at *3.
B. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited utility which may only be used to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered precedent or evidence.
Harasco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). To prevail, a party seeking
reconsideration must demonstrate one of the following: “(1) an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court
granted the motion . . . ; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent
manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d
Cir. 1999). “Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions
for reconsideration should be granted sparingly.” Continental Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc.,
884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Deleman avers that the Court should lift its stay for three reasons: 1) arbitration is no
longer available because HighLevel failed to initiate arbitration proceedings; 2) HighLevel
waived its rights to arbitration by failing to initiate arbitration proceedings;3 and 3) continuing
to enforce the relevant arbitration agreement would be unconscionable. (Doc. 42).
A. DELEMAN IS THE PARTY REQUIRED TO INITIATE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS.
3 Deleman also argues that HighLevel waived arbitration by removing this case to
federal court. (Doc. 42, at 6). However, removing a case to federal court does not constitute
waiver of the right to arbitration. See Grimm v. First Nat. Bank of Pennsylvania, 578 F. Supp. 2d
785, 796 (W.D. Pa. 2008); see also Kelly v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:22-CV-00821, 2022 WL
17584234, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2022), dismissed, No. 22-3387, 2023 WL 4058327 (3d Cir.
Jan. 4, 2023); see also Martin v. Discover Bank, No. CIV.A. 12-2469, 2012 WL 6197992, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2012).
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Deleman avers that the Court should lift the stay because HighLevel never initiated
arbitration, “arbitration has expired,” and HighLevel waived its right to arbitration by failing
to initiate arbitration. (Doc. 42, at 2-4, 6-7). HighLevel counters that the Court should reject
Deleman’s arguments because under both the terms of the arbitration agreement and the
Court’s previous order compelling arbitration, Deleman was obligated to initiate arbitration,
not HighLevel. (Doc. 44, at 5-7). HighLevel further argues that the timeliness of arbitration
is a matter for the arbitrator to decide and, accordingly, the Court must reject Deleman’s
arguments based on arbitration expiring. (Doc. 44, at 5).
Where 	an 	arbitration 	agreement 	clearly 	states 	that 	the 	American 	Arbitration
Association’s (“AAA”) Commercial Arbitration Rules govern arbitration, courts must apply
the AAA’s rules. See Richardson v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 811 F. App'x 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2020)
(nonprecedential) (stating that because the relevant contract stated that the AAA’s rules
applied, “[c]learly and unmistakably then, the AAA Rules govern the arbitration of any
dispute between [the parties]”); see also loanDepot.com v. Crosscountry Mortg., Inc., No. CV 18-
12091, 2019 WL 2613265, at *5 (D.N.J. June 24, 2019) (applying the AAA’s rules).
AAA Rule 4 states “[arbitration] shall be initiated by the initiating party (‘claimant’)
filing with the AAA a Demand for Arbitration, the administrative filing fee, and a copy of the
applicable arbitration agreement from the parties’ contract which provides for arbitration.”
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, American Arbitration Association,
https://www.adr.org/media/lwanubnp/2025_commercialrules_web.pdf (hereinafter “AAA
Rules”). Relatedly, AAA Rule 5 states “[a] respondent may file an answering statement
within 14 calendar days after notice of the filing of the Demand” or “a counterclaim at any
time after notice of the filing of the Demand.” AAA Rules. Based on these rules, the party
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bringing the claim is the party who must file a demand for arbitration with the AAA because
it would defy logic for a party defending itself against a claim to initiate an action based on
the other party’s claims, be labeled as a “claimant,” and then have the party with a claim file
an answer and counterclaims. See Jaludi v. Citigroup, No. 3:15-CV-2076, 2023 WL 9604965,
at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:15-2076, 2024
WL 554146 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2024), aff'd, No. 24-1358, 2025 WL 289173 (3d Cir. Jan. 24,
2025) (noting that the AAA’s rules indicate that the party with the claim “bears the burden of
initiating arbitration”). This interpretation of the AAA’s rules is consistent with the general
rule that after a plaintiff is compelled to arbitrate their claims, a district court may dismiss an
action for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff refuses to commence arbitration against the
defendant. See R & C Oilfield Servs. LLC v. Am. Wind Transp. Grp. LLC, 45 F.4th 655, 658 (3d
Cir. 2022); see also Hoffman v. Genpact, No. 3:22-CV-00009, 2023 WL 6609020, at *2 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 10, 2023).
The Court previously determined that the parties are subject to an enforceable
arbitration 	agreement. 	(Doc. 	40, 	at 	10-13). 	The 	arbitration 	agreement 	states 	“[a]ny
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to these Terms shall be exclusively settled by
arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association in accordance with
Commercial Arbitration Rules, then in effect.” (Doc. 14-6, at 53). Based on this language, the
Court must apply the AAA’s rules for arbitration. See Richardson, 811 F. App'x at 103; see also
loanDepot.com, 2019 WL 2613265, at *5. Under the AAA rules, it is Deleman, not HighLevel
who is obligated to file a demand for arbitration with the AAA. See AAA Rules; see also Jaludi,
2023 WL 9604965, at *4 (finding that under the AAA’s rules, “the complaining party, here,
[plaintiff], should initiate arbitration”). This reading is consistent with the Court’s previous
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order stating that “Deleman is compelled to arbitrate his claims with HighLevel in accordance
HighLevel’s terms of service.” (Doc. 41, at 1). Because Deleman, not HighLevel, was required
to initiate arbitration proceedings, the Court will not penalize HighLevel based on Deleman’s
failure to do so.
Deleman also avers the Court should lift the stay because arbitration is no longer
available. (Doc. 42, at 2). According to Deleman, under the arbitration agreement, all
demands for arbitration must be brought within three months “after the cause of action
accrues” and more than three months have passed since his cause of action accrued. (Doc.
42, at 2). Putting aside that it was Deleman, not HighLevel, who failed to initiate arbitration,
the timeliness of a demand for arbitration “is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator, not
for the judge.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84-85 (2002); see Bakery,
Confectionary, Tobacco Workers & Grain Millers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC Loc. 6 v. Morabito
Baking Co., No. 10-CV-5141, 2011 WL 1883298, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2011). Accordingly,
Deleman’s failure to initiate arbitration proceedings is not a basis to lift the stay.
B. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS NOT UNCONSCIONABLE.
Deleman also submits that the Court should lift its stay pending arbitration because
the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. (Doc. 42, at 4-5). Deleman provides two
arguments as to why the agreement is unconscionable: 1) he previously relied on an oral
agreement with Clark, HighLevel’s CEO, which did not have an arbitration provision, and 2)
under the arbitration agreement, he can only recover a maximum of $1,491, and he would be
required to spend between $2,650 to $4,500 to arbitrate his claims in Texas. (Doc. 42, at 4-5).
HighLevel avers that this argument is a de facto untimely motion for reconsideration because
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the 	Court 	already 	rejected 	Deleman’s 	arguments 	that 	the 	arbitration 	agreement 	was
unconscionable when granting its motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. 44, at 7-8).
As an initial matter, HighLevel is correct that the Court previously considered and
rejected Deleman’s argument that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. (Doc. 40, at
12). Although Deleman denies that his motion is a motion for reconsideration, his argument
is premised on a disagreement with the Court’s previous ruling, and he requests the Court
reconsider whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. (Doc. 42, at 4-5; Doc. 46, at
3-4). “[A] party may not ‘avoid both the filing deadlines of a motion for reconsideration and
the legal requirements of such a motion by disguising such a motion as. . . another motion.’”
Migliore v. Archie, No. CIV.A. 11-4018, 2014 WL 2738222, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2014)
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mallela, No. CV-00-4923, 2002 WL 31946762, at *14
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002)); see also Viking Yacht Co. v. Composites One LLC, 622 F. Supp. 2d
198, 200 (D.N.J. 2009), aff'd. 385 F. App'x 195 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that a court may deny
a motion in limine where it is in effect an untimely motion for reconsideration filed as a motion
in limine). Under Local Rule 7.10, “[a]ny motion for reconsideration. . . must be accompanied
by a supporting brief and filed within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the order
concerned.” Deleman filed his motion seventy-one days after this Court’s order. (Doc. 41;
Doc. 42). On this basis alone, the Court may reject Deleman’s arguments regarding
unconscionability. See Ndaula v. Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 1:20-CV-1160, 2021 WL
620934, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2021); see also Jones v. Behe, No. 1:17-CV-493, 2017 WL
2778628, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 27, 2017) (stating that because a plaintiff “missed the deadline
[to file a motion for reconsideration] by more than two weeks” the motion “must be denied
as untimely”).
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However, even if the Court considers the merits of Deleman’s motion, reconsideration
would not be warranted. Deleman presented this exact same argument and does not present
any binding caselaw or facts the Court had not previously considered.4 See Ogden v. Keystone
Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (denying a motion for reconsideration
where the plaintiff repeated arguments already rejected by the court); see also Smalis v. City of
Pittsburgh, No. 2:19-CV-1609, 2024 WL 2319508, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2024) (same).
Deleman presents a new argument that he had not previously raised that the
arbitration agreement is unconscionable because under HighLevel’s terms of service, the cost
of arbitration would exceed his maximum potential reward if he were to prevail in
arbitration.5 (Doc. 42, at 4-5). According to Deleman, the costs of arbitration would range
from $2,650 to $4,500, and HighLevel’s terms of service limit his potential reward to a
maximum of $1,491. (Doc. 42, at 4-5). Deleman’s argument fails for two reasons. First, he
does not present any evidence or provide any allegations in the complaint supporting his
assertions regarding the costs of arbitration. Texas law governs the arbitration agreement due
to a forum selection clause in HighLevel’s terms of service. (Doc. 14-6, at 53; Doc. 40, at 4).
“Under Texas law, the party asserting unconscionability of a contract bears the burden of
4 Deleman also requests, in the alternative, that the Court “permit discovery into
Plaintiff’s onboarding agreement with CEO Shaun Clark.” (Doc. 45, at 11). However, this
discovery is unnecessary because under the merger clause in HighLevel’s terms of service,
any agreement between Clark and Deleman is superseded by HighLevel’s terms of service.
(Doc. 14-6, at 52). Thus, even if discovery reveals that Deleman had an oral agreement with
Clark which did not contain an arbitration agreement, that oral agreement would not change
the fact that Deleman is now subject to an arbitration agreement. Accordingly, Deleman’s
request for discovery is DENIED. (Doc. 45, at 11).
5 The Court notes that although Deleman filed an exhibit he claims to be HighLevel’s
terms of service, that exhibit does not actually contain HighLevel’s terms of service and is
instead what appears to be an AI generated statement describing the terms of service. (Doc.
42-1). The Court will rely on the terms of service previously filed by HighLevel. (Doc. 14-6).
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proving. . . unconscionability.” Ski River Dev., Inc. v. McCalla, 167 S.W.3d 121, 136 (Tex. App.
2005); see also Ramirez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., No. CIV.A. H-12-1922, 2013 WL 2152113,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2013), aff'd, 549 F. App'x 262 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating “[w]hether a
contract is unconscionable is a question of law, and the party asserting unconscionability
bears 	the 	burden”). 	“Speculation 	about 	possible 	harm 	is 	insufficient 	to 	establish
unconscionability. Rather, the party opposing arbitration must offer evidence such as
invoices, expert testimony, reliable cost estimates, and affidavits to prove the likelihood of
incurring expected costs.” Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Skufca, 650 S.W.3d 660, 680 (Tex.
App. 2021) (citations omitted); see Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. James, No. 3:15-CV-1999-
N, 2016 WL 9306254, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2016) (finding a plaintiff failed to “meet its
burden” to establish unconscionability where it “fail[ed] to provide any evidence of. . .
unconscionability”). Deleman asserts that he will incur various costs associated with
arbitrating this case in Texas, but he does not support these assertions with any facts properly
alleged in the complaint or with evidence outside of what appears to be an artificial
intelligence generated estimation of costs. (Doc. 42, at 5; Doc. 43-2, at 5; Doc. 45, at 10).
Because Deleman fails to present proper evidence, he fails to meet his burden of establishing
unconscionability. See Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc., 650 S.W.3d at 680; see also Travelers, 2016
WL 9306254, at *7.
Second, Deleman’s assertion that he may only recover a maximum of $1,491 is not
supported by the record. As discussed supra Section III.A, under the arbitration agreement,
the Court must apply the AAA’s rules for arbitration. (Doc. 14-6, at 53); see Richardson, 811
F. App'x at 103. Under AAA Rule 49, “[t]he arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that
the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties.”
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AAA Rules. AAA Rule 49 is consistent with the general principle that arbitrators have a
“‘wide latitude’ in fashioning an appropriate remedy.” Sherrock Bros. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors
Co., LLC, 260 F. App'x 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2008) (nonprecedential) (citing Coll. Hall Fashions,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Joint Bd. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am., 408 F. Supp. 722, 728 (E.D.
Pa. 1976)). Further, if the arbitrator abuses its discretion in fashioning a remedy, the Court
may “vacate an arbitration award [after arbitration] if ‘the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.’” Verizon Pennsylvania, LLC v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-
CIO, Loc. 13000, 13 F.4th 300, 306 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (a)(4)). The
arbitrator may also issue injunctive relief where warranted. See Somerset Consulting, LLC v.
United Cap. Lenders, LLC, 832 F. Supp. 2d 474, 489 (E.D. Pa. 2011); see also Pyo v. Wicked
Fashions, Inc., No. CIV09-2422, 2010 WL 1380982, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2010).
HighLevel’s terms of service, which contain the arbitration agreement, only expressly
limit liability for claims arising out of “these Terms [of service] or [the user’s] use of the
Platform or the Services.” (Doc. 14-6, at 50). Deleman argues that this provision limits his
total recovery to a maximum of $1,491, however, his claims do not all arise out of HighLevel’s
terms of service or his use of the platform. For example, Deleman raises intentional infliction
of emotional distress and defamation claims. (Doc. 1-2, at 6-7, 9-10). A reasonable arbitrator
may use their discretion under AAA Rule 49 to determine that Deleman is entitled to damages
outside of the agreement’s listed limit. See Sherrock Bros., 260 F. App'x at 502 (noting an
arbitrator has wide ranging discretion). Further, Deleman requests injunctive relief which he
asserts is necessary to prevent him from continuing to lose revenue. (Doc. 1-2, at 16-17).
According to Deleman, he lost over a million dollars of revenue after being removed from
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HighLevel’s platform, and injunctive relief is necessary to “prevent further harm.” (Doc. 1-2,
at 16-17). The arbitrator may issue Deleman injunctive relief if appropriate. See Somerset
Consulting, LLC, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 489; see also Pyo, 2010 WL 1380982, at *7. Deleman
himself alleges that he stands to gain thousands of dollars by being reinstated onto
HighLevel’s platform through injunctive relief. (Doc. 1-2, at 16-17). Deleman’s assertion that
he may only recover a maximum of $1,491 if he were to prevail in arbitration is unfounded.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Deleman’s motion to lift the stay
pending arbitration. (Doc. 42). The Court further DENIES Deleman’s request to allow
discovery. (Doc. 45, at 11).
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
Dated: January 5, 2026 	s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
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