Lapp v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KATIE LAPP,
Plaintiff
V.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants
No. 3:25-CV-0243
(Judge Munley)
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MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Katie Lapp initiated the above-captioned prose action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,1 alleging violations of federal law by officials at the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (DOC) with respect to her exercise of religion. 	The
remaining Defendants in this case now move for summary judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 	Because Lapp has not responded to
Defendants' motion and thus has failed to carry her Rule 56 burden on her
Section 1983 claims, the court will grant judgment as a matter of law in
Defendants' favor.
1 Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by
state officials. 	The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves as a mechanism for
vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. 	See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273 ,
284-85 (2002) .
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I. 	BACKGROUND 2
Lapp initially filed this Section 1983 lawsuit in February 2025. 	(See
generally Doc. 1 ). 	Following screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the claims
in this case were narrowed to a First Amendment free exercise claim and an
official capacity claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C . § 2000cc. 	(See Doc. 14113). 	Those claims
targeted Secretary of Corrections Laurel Harry and Religious Services
Administrator Ulli Klemm . (See id.). 	Lapp's complaint alleged that certain DOC
policies requiring her institutional identification photograph to be taken without
her religious head covering violated her First Amendment and RLUIPA rights.
(See generally Doc. 1; see Doc. 3711115-7) .
After the close of fact discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 	(Doc. 36). 	Lapp has not opposed this
motion in any way, and the time for responding has passed. 	Defendants'
unopposed motion for summary judgment is therefore ripe for disposition.
2 Local Rule of Court 56 .1 requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported "by a
separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts , in numbered paragraphs , as to
which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried ." 	LOCAL RULE OF COURT
56 .1. 	A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of
material facts , responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party's statement
and identifying genuine issues to be tried. 	kL. 	Defendants properly filed their statement of
material facts , (Doc. 37) , but Lapp failed to respond to that statement. Accordingly, the court will
deem admitted the facts in Defendants' Rule 56 .1 statement. 	See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56 .1.
2
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II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
"One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses ." 	Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 	Summary judgment is appropriate where
"the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. " 	FED . R. CIv. P. 56(a).
Material facts are those "that could alter the outcome" of the litigation , and
"disputes are 'genuine' if evidence exists from which a rational person could
conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed
issue is correct. " EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg . Sys., Inc ., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir.
2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern Grp. Ltd ., 9 F.3d 321 , 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).
At the Rule 56 stage, the court's function is not to "weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter" but rather "to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial. " Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 249
(1986). The court must view the facts and evidence presented " in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party" and must "draw all reasonable inferences in
that party's favor ." 	Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir.
2014). This evidence, however, must be adequate-as a matter of law-to
sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving party on the claim or claims at
issue. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
3
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Radio Corp ., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986). A "scintilla of evidence" supporting
the nonmovant's position is insufficient; "there must be evidence on which the
jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]. " Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. ,
776 F.3d 181 , 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252)
(alteration in original). 	Succinctly stated , summary judgment is "put up or shut up
time" for the nonmoving party. 	Daubert v. NRA Grp. , LLC , 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d
Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir.
2006)).
Ill. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants assert that Lapp cannot proffer evidence that her religious
rights were violated. 	Due to Lapp's failure to oppose Defendants' Rule 56
motion , the court finds that there is no dispute of material fact and judgment must
be granted in Defendants' favor.
A. 	Failure to Oppose Rule 56 Motion
Initially, Lapp has failed to carry her burden at summary judgment because
she has not opposed Defendants' Rule 56 motion in any way. 	Lapp has not
identified any record evidence that would rebut Defendants' contention (and
supporting evidence) that the at-issue DOC policies do not violate Lapp's federal
rights. 	Lapp has not, for example, pointed to a declaration or affidavit, witness
statement, documentary support, or any other evidence that could sustain a
4
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verdict in her favor. 	In fact, Lapp has not even responded to Defendants' Rule
56 motion, meaning that-pursuant to Local Rule 7.6-the motion is deemed
unopposed. 	See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 7.6 (stating that failure to file a brief in
opposition to a motion, including one for summary judgment, results in said
motion being deemed "unopposed").
At summary judgment, "the non-moving party must oppose the motion and,
in doing so, may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings
but, instead, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. 	Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not suffice."
Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2018)
(alteration omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting D. E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist.,
765 F.3d 260, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2014)). 	Moreover, "[t]he court need consider only
the cited materials" when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 	FED. R. CIv.
P. 56(c)(3). 	No materials have been provided or cited by Lapp in opposition to
Defendants' Rule 56 motion. 	Thus, because Lapp has failed to establish that
there is a genuine dispute of material fact by failing to oppose the motion for
summary judgment, the court must grant judgment in Defendants' favor.
8. 	Merits of Claims
A second reason that summary judgment must be granted in Defendants'
favor is that, upon consideration of the record, there is no evidence that would
5
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sustain a verdict in Lapp's favor on her RLUIPA claim and, by extension , her First
Amendment free exercise claim .
Section 3 of RLUIPA provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or
confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, " unless the government establishes that the burden furthers "a
compelling interest, " and does so by the "least restrictive means ." 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-1 (a)(1 ), (2). RLUIPA defines "religious exercise" to include "any exercise
of religion , whether or not compelled by , or central to , a system of religious
belief." 	kl§ 2000cc-5(7)(A); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.S. 709, 715
(2005).
To establish a claim under RLUIPA, a plaintiff must prove that the prison
placed a "substantial burden" on the plaintiff's sincerely held religious belief. 	See
Washington v. Klem , 497 F.3d 272, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2007). "[A] substantial
burden exists where: (1) a follower is forced to choose between following the
precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to
other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to
receive a benefit; or (2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent
to substantially modify his behavior to violate his beliefs." 	lit at 280. 	If a
prisoner-plaintiff establishes a substantial burden on a sincerely held religious
6
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belief, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the policy or practice
furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of
doing so. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 , 361 -62 (2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-1 (a)).
According to Lapp, her sincerely held religious belief mandates that she
have her head covered in the presence of men. (See Doc. 1 ,r 13; Doc. 37,I 6).
Prison officials granted Lapp's accommodation request to wear an approved
head covering , provided that she remove the covering when requested during
searches and during institutional identification photographs , both of which can be
facilitated by female staff outside the presence of male officers. (Doc. 37 ,r,r 17-
18 , 24-25, 41 , 44 ). Furthermore, Defendants have established a compelling
government interest in having inmates photographed without religious headgear,
as this standardized photo process allows "quick and reliable identification of
prisoners" within the prison and if an inmate escapes. 	(kt ,r,r 29-36).
Under these undisputed facts , Lapp's RLUIPA claim fails at the initial
inquiry. 	That is, Lapp has provided no evidence that the DOC's policies
substantially burden her sincerely held religious belief. 	Even assuming (without
evidence) that Lapp holds a sincere religious belief that her hair is to remain
covered in the presence of men , the policies at issue do not violate that tenant.
The few times Lapp must have her hair uncovered (during searches and during
7
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institutional identification photographs), it is feasible for only female officers to be
present. 	(See id. ,m 18 , 41 , 44 ). 	Thus, there is no burden on Lapp's religious
belief, much less a substantial one.
The court need not independently consider Lapp's First Amendment free
exercise claim. 	Because she has not established a substantial burden on her
religious exercise, her First Amendment claim fails , too. 	See Adams v. Corr.
Emerg. Response Team , 857 F. App'x 57, 60 (3d Cir. 2021) (nonprecedential)
(noting that because RLUIPA provides greater protections for a prisoner's
religious exercise, "a claim that cannot satisfy RLUIPA's threshold merits inquiry
necessarily fails as to the First Amendment"); Van Wyhe v. Reisch , 581 F.3d
639, 657-58 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Where an inmate has not put forth sufficient
evidence under RLUIPA to demonstrate a substantial burden on his rel igious
exercise, his claim fails under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
as well." (citation omitted)).
Without evidence of a substantial burden on her sincerely held religious
belief, Lapp cannot move beyond the Rule 56 stage and take her claims to trial.
Thus , even if the court were to reach the merits of Lapp's claims (despite her
failure to oppose the instant Rule 56 motion), Defendants' motion for summary
judgment would still be granted .
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing , the court will grant Defendants' unopposed motion
for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 	An appropriate
Order follows .
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