USA v. RIVERA et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
CHANDLER GEORGE,
Defendant
No. 3:25-cr-201-5
(Judge Munley)
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MEMORANDUM ORDER
Defendant Chandler George has filed two motions to dismiss the criminal
charges against him due to selective enforcement. (Docs. 89, 161 ). 	That is,
George asserts that he is being prosecuted solely because his purported conduct
was not done to further the political interests of President Donald J. Trump. 	As
discussed below, the motions are unsupported and will be denied.
Background
George has been indicted on charges one count of conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute in excess of 50 grams of a mixture and
substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, an unspecified
amount of cocaine, an unspecified amount of fentanyl, and an unspecified
amount of benzodiazepines, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841 (a)(1 ), and
841 (b)(1 )(Band C), and four counts of use of a communication facility in
committing a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846. (Doc. 175).
Eight other defendants were charged in the same superseding indictment: Marvin
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Rivera , Oliver Rivera , Mark Reynolds , Sherrielee Stout, Angela Ruggiero , Joel
Fernandez, Eric Konnick, and Catherine Linden .
Duri ng the pendency of this case, George filed two motions to dismiss due
to selective enforcement, which are opposed by the government.
Analysis
Upon review, George believes that the United States Attorney's office is
acting inconsistently by charging him with drug trafficking crimes. He cites to
President Trump's pardons of individuals convicted and sentenced for their
conduct at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021 . 	He also argues that
President Trump's administration "has thrown money" at the Estate of Ashli
Babbit "as a reward for her insurrectionist conduct. " (Docs. 89 , 161 ). 	In support,
George cites to Wikipedia articles and nothing else. Given such arguments, the
court briefly addresses their merits or lack thereof.
Under the law, the Executive Branch , headed by the President, is vested
with the exclusive authority to prosecute criminal cases . See United States v.
Nixon , 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974). " In our criminal justice system , the Government
retains 'broad discretion ' as to whom to prosecute ." Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598 , 607 (1985) (quoting United States v. Goodwin , 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11
(1982)). When probable cause exists, the decision of whether to prosecute or to
present charges to a grand jury is generally committed entirely to the
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prosecutor's discretion. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
This "broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
Prosecutorial discretion , however, is not "unfettered." United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124-125 (1979). 	The charging decision must not run
afoul of the rights and protections afforded by the United States Constitution . ~
at 125 ("Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is, of course, subject to
constitutional constraints."). 	The Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution protects against both selective prosecution and selective
enforcement. Washington, 869 F.3d at 214.
Selective prosecution and selective enforcement claims "are generally
evaluated under the same two-part test, which is derived from a line of seminal
Supreme Court cases about the collision between equal protection principles and
the criminal justice system. "1 kt 	Though "selective prosecution" and "selective
enforcement" have been used interchangeably, the Third Circuit has clarified that
these are separate claims, noting that " '[p]rosecution' refers to the actions of
prosecutors (in their capacity as prosecutors) and 'enforcement' to the actions of
law enforcement and those affiliated with law-enforcement personnel. " ~
1 The Supreme Court has laid out a framework for analyzing claims of selective prosecution ,
known as the Armstrong/Bass test. See United States v. Armstrong , 517 U.S. 456 (1996) ; see
also United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002) .
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Nevertheless, a "defendant challenging a criminal prosecution at either the law
enforcement or prosecution inflection points must provide 'clear evidence' " of:
(1) discriminatory effect; and (2) discriminatory intent or purpose. kt_
Establishing the first prong , i.e. , discriminatory effect, "generally requires
evidence that similarly situated individuals of a differen[t] race or classification
were not prosecuted , arrested, or otherwise investigated ." kt_ 	Meanwhile,
discriminatory intent requires "show[ing] that the decision to prosecute" or
enforce "was made on the basis of an unjustifiable standard , such as race,
religion, or some other arbitrary factor[ .]" United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d
64 , 68 (3d Cir. 1989). 	Each of these elements must be shown with "clear
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity that attaches to
decisions to prosecute ." United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182, 197 (3d Cir.
2012) (cleaned up). This standard is "a demandi ng one. " Armstrong , 517 U.S. at
463.
Against this standard , George's arguments fail at the starting line. With
respect to discriminatory intent, George offers no evidence that the decision to
prosecute him was based on an unjustifiable standard , such as race, religion , or
some other arbitrary factor. See Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d at 68. 	As the government
asserts, the charges against George and his co-defendants stem from an
investigation into drug trafficking within Northeastern Pennsylvania. (Doc. 147).
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George has failed to demonstrate how alleged drug trafficking conduct reflects
inconsistent treatment or bears any relation to the individuals pardoned for their
criminal conduct during the events of January 6, 2021 .
With respect to discriminatory effect, George is one of eight co-defendants
implicated in the same alleged drug trafficking activity between January 1, 2025
and July 30, 2025. 	George's co-defendants, each similarly situated individuals,
are being prosecuted by the government in the same action for the same or
similar alleged conduct. 	~ 	Without more, George cannot establish that the
government has selectively enforced the law against him as all similarly situated
individuals have been treated the same manner as he has.
Additionally, although George's arguments are political in nature, the
defendant has not presented any evidence or arguments linking this case to any
of his political activities or associations. 	He has not proffered any claims or
evidence suggesting that President Trump's exercise of his plenary pardon
authority bears any relation to this case.
And finally, as for George's reference to a government settlement with an
estate, the defendant has made a categorical error. 	A civil settlement is not a
declaration of prosecutorial policy. 	The government's decision to settle a tort
claim has no bearing on whether it may constitutionally prosecute a person for
entirely unrelated events, which allegedly occurred many years later. George
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has offered no evidence that the criminal prosecutors in this case were
influenced at all by any civil settlement in any other case.
In sum , defendant has provided no evidence of similarly situated individuals
being treated differently and his comparisons of himself to those involved in
January 6 are legally irrelevant. 	Defendant's motions to dismiss based on
selective enforcement and/or selective prosecution, (Docs. 89 , 161 ), are thus
DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
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