Sessum v. Sage

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAURENCE SESSUM,
Petitioner
v.
WARDEN J. SAGE,
Respondent.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-01997
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Laurence Sessum, incarcerated at USP Lewisburg in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed a
habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, requesting that the Bureau of Prisons be
ordered to recalculate his First Step Act time credits and his estimated date of placement in
prerelease custody. (Doc. 1). Because he is not entitled to seek the requested relief under
Section 2241, the Court will dismiss the petition.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sessum is serving a 135-month term of imprisonment imposed by the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina for convictions relating to a
fraudulent debt collection scheme. See United States v. Sessum, No. 3:18-cr-00292-RJC-DSC
(W.D.N.C., Jan. 23, 2020). At the time of the petition, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
estimated his release date as April 28, 2029. See (Doc. 5-2).
In his petition, filed November 18, 2024, Sessum asserted that the BOP had illegally
failed to “provide a [forecasted] projection of [his] Conditional Placement Date” premised on
time credits he expected to earn under the First Step Act (“FSA”). As relief, he requested that
the BOP “provide a manual calculation of his FSA Time Credit Assessment,” and potentially
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“expedite his placement to prerelease custody.” The respondent argues that no legal authority
guarantees the petitioner a right to prerelease custody, that courts lack the authority to order
the BOP to order such placement, and that Sessum’s claim is unripe, among other arguments.1
II. DISCUSSION
To the extent Sessum’s petition is interpreted as a request to “expedite prerelease
custody,” precedent in this circuit does not clearly resolve whether a claim of entitlement to
prerelease custody constitutes a challenge to the “execution” of a sentence for which a court
can order habeas relief. See Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[I]n order to
challenge the execution of [a] sentence under § 2241, [a petitioner] would need to allege that
[the] BOP’s conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the
sentencing judgment.”); but see Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 2012) (a prisoner
“may resort to federal habeas corpus to challenge a decision to limit his RRC placement”).
Most courts within this district have concluded that such claims are not cognizable. See Rafiq
v. Greene, No. 1:25-CV-01409, 2025 WL 3110563, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2025)
(summarizing recent decisions in the district). However, at least one court has permitted “a
claim challenging the BOP’s refusal to transfer a petitioner to prerelease custody.” Al Haj v.
LSCI-Allenwood Warden, No. 1:24-CV-1193, 2025 WL 1115751, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15,
1 The parties also dispute whether Sessum exhausted available administrative remedies
and whether exhaustion would be futile given the issues presented. Sessum attached evidence
indicating that he had been denied the appropriate form to begin the administrative remedy
process. See (Doc. 6-1). Because the petition is dismissed on other grounds, the Court does
not resolve these disputed issues. See Kashranov v. Jamison, No. 2:25-CV-05555-JDW, 2025
WL 3188399, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (the exhaustion requirement under Section 2241
is a judicially created doctrine applied at the Court’s discretion) (citing McCarthy v. Madigan,
503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)); see, e.g., Heizman v. Cuffaro, No. 1:20-CV-01565, 2024 WL 691358,
at *2 n.1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2024) (“[C]ourts may proceed to the merits without deciding
whether a plaintiff has satisfied a nonjurisdictional exhaustion rule.”).
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2025) (citing Vasquez, 684 F.3d at 433; Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 247
(3d Cir. 2005)).
Regardless, Sessum’s petition would not establish a basis for relief, because he has not
presented evidence that he is being refused prerelease custody. Rather, his argument is that
the BOP has not provided appropriate estimates of his potential eligibility. He argues that
given his statutory release date of April 28, 2030, his “earning potential over the entire
duration of sentence” would amount to 1,588 days of FSA time credit, which, if counted
prospectively, could result in a conditional placement date of February 28, 2026.
A prisoner has no statutory entitlement to anticipated FSA credits until they are
earned. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A) (“an eligible prisoner is one who has earned time
credits . . . in an amount that is equal to the remainder of the prisoner’s imposed term of
imprisonment”) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A) (“Time credits earned under
this paragraph by prisoners who successfully participate in [the corresponding programs] shall be
applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release.”) (emphasis added).2 In
supplemental filings, Sessum points to recent BOP guidance indicating that, for “release
planning” purposes, eligible inmates’ conditional placement dates should reflect anticipated
credits. However, even if he was permitted to pursue a habeas claim for prerelease custody,
2 See, e.g., Winegar v. Boncher, No. CV 22-11632-FDS, 2022 WL 17404897, at *2–3 (D.
Mass. Dec. 2, 2022) (“That [statutory] language, which is both prospective and conditional,
makes clear that a prisoner cannot earn time credits until after the required programming has
been completed . . . Furthermore, to allow the awarding of credits prospectively would
frustrate one of the purposes of the FSA, which is to ‘provide incentives and rewards for
prisoners to participate in and complete evidence-based recidivism reduction programs.’”
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)); Urena v. Warden, No. 3:24-CV-1673 (VDO), 2025 WL 1158102,
at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2025); Livingston v. Rule, No. 4:24-CV-1098-P, 2025 WL 2730227, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2025).
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he would not be entitled to habeas relief to correct purported errors in non-final estimates of
his future eligibility.3 See Porter-Bey v. Bledsoe, 456 F. App’x 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2012); see also
Curry v. Thomas, No. 1:14-CV-0756, 2014 WL 4078639, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2014)
(where “a final RRC placement decision had not been made at the time Petitioner filed his
habeas petition,” the petition must be dismissed as unripe).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: January 13, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
3 Sessum presents no evidence that the BOP has refused to apply FSA credits he has
already earned, or that it refuses to appropriately consider prerelease custody if he earns them
(or has earned them) in the manner he anticipates.
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