SMITH v. SCI DALLAS et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JUSTIN CORNELIUS SMITH,
Plaintiff
v.
RYAN STAPLES,
Defendant
CIV. ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-1941
(JUDGE MANNION)
MEMORANDUM
Presently 	before 	the 	court 	in 	this 	prisoner 	civil 	rights 	case 	is
defendant's motions for summary judgment for plaintiff's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The motion will be granted.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Justin 	Cornelius 	Smith, 	filed 	this 	complaint 	in 	the 	United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, on October 15,
2024, 	alleging 	that 	defendants 	employed 	at 	Dallas 	State 	Correctional
Institution ("SCI-Dallas") denied him needed mental health treatment from
April 2024 to July 2024. (Doc. 2). The case was transferred to this district on
November 8, 2024. (Doc. 4 ). On January 3, 2025, the court dismissed all
defendants other than Ryan Staples for failure to state a claim , but directed
the Clerk of Court to serve Staples with process. (Doc. 11 ).
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On April 3, 2025, Staples moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. 	(Doc. 	18). On 	December 18 , 2025, the
court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment because the
issue of administrative exhaustion required review of matters outside the
pleadings. 	(Doc. 22). The 	court directed 	Staples to file 	a statement of
material facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 within fourteen days, and directed
Smith to respond to the statement within twenty-one days of receiving it. (Id.)
Staples timely fi led his statement of material facts on December 30, 2025.
(Doc. 23). Smith has not responded , and the deadline to do so has expired.
The motion is accordingly ripe for review.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment 	is 	appropriate "if the pleadings, the 	discovery
[including , depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file]
and disclosure materials on file , and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to 	any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. " Fed . R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine if a
reasonable jury could find for the non -moving party, and is material if it will
affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 254 (1986); Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co . v.
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Ericksen , 903 F. Supp. 836, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1995). At the summary judgment
stage, "the 	judge's 	function 	is 	not 	himself to 	weigh 	the 	evidence 	and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial. " Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see a/so Marino v. Indus. Crating
Co ., 358 F.3d 241 , 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (a court may not weigh the evidence
or make credibility 	determinations). Rather, the 	court must consider all
evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641 , 647 (3d Cir. 2007).
To prevai l on summary judgment, the movi ng party must affirmatively
identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The moving party
can discharge that burden by showing that "on all the essential elements of
its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could
find for the non-moving party. " In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir.
2003); see a/so Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets this initial
burden , the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is
some me taphysical doubt as to material facts ," but must show sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny,
139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 	v.
Zeni th Radio Corp ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). However, if the non-moving
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party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant]
will bear the burden of proof at trial ," Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary
judgment 	because 	such 	a 	failure 	"necessarily 	renders 	all 	other 	facts
immateria l." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).
Ill. 	MATERIAL FACTS 1
A. 	Grievance Policy
Exhaustion of administrative remedies in the DOC is governed by the
three-step process outlined in the DOC's grievance policy, DC-ADM 804.
(See DC -ADM 804, Doc. 23- 2) . Under DC-ADM 804, a prisoner must first
1 Local Rule 	56 .1 requires a motion for summary judgment to " be
accompanied by a separate, short and concise statement of the material
facts , in numbered paragraphs , as to which the moving party contends there
is no genuine issue to be tried" and requires that the party opposing a motion
for 	summary 	judgment 	file 	a 	statement 	responding 	to 	the 	numbered
paragraphs in the movant's statement of material facts, which "shall include
references 	to 	the 	parts 	of 	the 	record" 	that 	support 	the 	nonmovant's
opposition to the motion. M. D. Pa . L.R. 56 .1. If a non-moving party fails to
respond as required by Local Rule 56 . 1, the facts asserted in the moving
party's statement are "deemed to be admitted." Id. In this case, after the court
converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, Staples
timely filed a statement of material facts as required by Local Rule 56.1. ,
(Doc. 23), but Smith has not responded to the statement. The facts included
in Staples's statement are accordingly deemed admitted for the purpose of
resolvi ng the motion for summary judgment. M. D. Pa . L.R. 56.1. The court
cites directly to Staples's statement as to any facts included in the statement.
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submit a grievance within fifteen working days from the date of the incident.
Id. 	§1 (A)(8). DC-ADM 	804 	provides that the grievance must include "a
statement of the facts relevant to the claim ," "identify individuals directly
involved in the events, " and "specifically state any claims [the inmate] wishes
to make. " Id. §1 (A)(11 ). If the inmate is unable to comply with the fifteen-day
deadline, he 	may 	request 	an 	extension 	of time to file 	a grievance. 	Id.
§1 (C)(2). Next, the prisoner must submit a written appeal to an intermediate
review level within fifteen working days. Id. §2(A)(1 )(a). Finally, the inmate
must submit an appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and
Appeals ("SOIGA") within fifteen working days. Id. §2(8)(1 )(b).
B. 	Plaintiff's Grievances
Smith's claims assert generally that he was denied mental health care
from Apri l 2024 to July 2024. (See Doc. 2). Staples has provided evidence
that Smith filed approximately thirty grievances between April 2024 and the
beg inning of January 2025, but did not appeal any of those grievances
through final review by SOIGA. (Doc. 23 ,I,I?-9; Doc. 23-1 ).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Under 	the 	Prison 	Litigation 	Reform 	Act 	("PLRA"), 	prisoners
complaining 	about 	the 	conditions 	of 	their 	confinement 	must 	exhaust
available administrative remedies before they may file suit in federal court.
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42 	U.S.C. 	§1997e(a). 	The 	PLRA 	requires 	proper 	exhaustion, 	meaning
plaintiffs must administratively grieve their claims 	in accordance with the
procedural rules of the prison in which they are incarcerated. Downey v. Pa.
Dep' tofCorr., 968 F.3d 299,305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Woodfordv. Ngo, 548
U.S. 	81, 	88 	(2006)). 	Failure 	to 	exhaust 	administrative 	remedies 	is 	an
affirmative defense that defendants must plead and prove; it is not a pleading
requirement for plaintiffs. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).
A prisoner is only required to exhaust administrative remedies that are
"available. " 	Rinaldi 	v. 	United 	States, 	904 	F.3d 	257, 268 	(2018) 	(citing
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93). An administrative remedy is unavailable, and
administrative exhaustion is thus excused , in three situations: "(1) when 'it
operates as a simple dead end-with officers unable or consistently unwilling
to provide any rel ief to aggrieved inmates'; (2) when it is 'so opaque that it
becomes, practically speaking , incapable of use ,' such as when no ordinary
prisoner can discern or navigate it ; or (3) when 'prison administrators thwart
inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation , or intimidation ."' Id. at 266-67 (quoting Ross v. Blake, 578
U.S. 	632, 	643-44 	(2016)). 	If 	defendants 	establish 	failure 	to 	exhaust
administrative remedies, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
administrative remedy process was unavailable. Id. at 268.
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Staples argues that Smith failed to exhaust administrative remedies
because he did not appeal any grievances through final review by SOIGA
during the relevant period. 	(Doc. 21 ). 	Staples has provided evidence to
support this fac t, and Smith has not provided any argument or evidence to
refute it. The burden accordingly shifts to Smith to show that the grievance
process was unavailable to him . Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268. Smith has clearly
failed to meet that burden because he has not responded to Staples's motion
in any manner. Thus , the court will grant the motion for summary judgment
based on Smit h' s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoi ng reasons, the court will grant defendant's motion for
summary judgment and close this case. An appropriate order shall issue.
Dated:
24-1941 -01
I ~~4---_ 	____:===:::::::...- 	--
y E. Mannion
States District Judge
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