USA v. Dimitris Smith, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
DIMITRIS SMITH, JR.,
Defendant.
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-00106
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
In a superseding indictment, the Government charged Dimitris Smith, Jr. (“Smith”)
with five counts – one count of distribution of fentanyl resulting in serious bodily injury and
death in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and four counts of distribution of fentanyl and/or
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). (Doc. 23). The delivery of a controlled substance
resulting in death allegedly occurred on December 11, 2023. (Doc. 67, at 1; Doc. 23, at 1-2).
Counts II through V allege drug deliveries Smith made to an undercover officer on four
occasions in March and April 2024. (Doc. 67, at 2). Smith is the sole defendant in this case,
which is set for trial on January 5, 2026. (Doc. 83).
On September 22, 2025, Smith filed a motion for severance pursuant to Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure 8 and 14, requesting that the Court sever Count I from Counts II
through V because joinder of the claims is improper and that he will be unduly prejudiced by
the inflammatory “death resulting” allegation in Count I. (Doc. 66, at 2). For the following
reasons, Smith’s motion to sever counts of the indictment for trial is DENIED. (Doc. 66).
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I. LEGAL STANDARD
The purposes of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8 and 14 are “to promote
economy and efficiency and to avoid multiplicity of trials, [so long as] these objectives can be
achieved without substantial prejudice to the right of the defendants to a fair trial.” Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1968). In pertinent part, Rule 8(a) provides:
(a) Joinder of Offenses. The indictment or information may charge a defendant
in separate counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged--whether
felonies or misdemeanors or both--are of the same or similar character, or are
based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts
of a common scheme or plan.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a).
“Rule 8 requires severance where defendants were improperly joined.” Walker, 657
F.3d at 170. Even if defendants are properly joined under Rule 8, the Court may sever
defendants or offenses under Rule 14 “[i]f the joinder of offenses or defendants in an
indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or
the government.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). “[A] district court should grant a severance under
Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right
of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or
innocence.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). However, severance is not
mandatory with a showing of prejudice, and Rule 14 leaves that determination of any risk of
prejudice and remedy to the discretion of the district court. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 541.
A defendant must demonstrate “clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a
manifestly unfair trial.” United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991). Less drastic
measures, such as limiting instructions, “often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.”
Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. The appropriate question for the Court on a motion under Rule 14 is
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“whether the jury will be able to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate
defendants in view of its volume and limited admissibility.” United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d
173, 182 (3d Cir. 2005); Walker, 657 F.3d at 170.
II. DISCUSSION
First, Smith argues that the Government improperly joined the claims against him
because the Government has not provided information linking the drug transactions from
Counts II through V to the death charged in Count I. (Doc. 66, at 1-2). The Government
submits that the claims are properly joined under Rule 8 because each claim is for a violation
of § 841(a)(1), which occurred between December 2023 and April 2024. (Doc. 72, at 3).
Courts generally construe Rule 8 liberally in favor of initial joinder. United States v. Thompson,
219 F. Supp. 3d 502, 507 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing United States v. Bullock, 71 F.3d 171, 174 (5th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Rankin, 365 F. App’x 358, 363 (3d Cir. 2010). In evaluating joinder
of claims, the Third Circuit has instructed courts to primarily consider the indictment and to
look beyond the indictment only in limited circumstances to clarify the connection between
the counts. United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 242 (3d Cir. 1992). The moving party carries
the burden of establishing improper joinder of offences. United States v. Stevens, 188 F. Supp.
3d 421, 423 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
Further, joinder under Rule 8(a) does not require offenses to be identical. United States
v. Deshields, No. 1:19-CR-099, 2021 WL 1401790, at *7 (M.D. Pa. April 14, 2021) (finding
charges of distribution for different substances is not so dissimilar as to render joinder
improper). Counts are sufficiently similar for joinder under Rule 8(a) when they are
“somewhat alike” or “otherwise have a sufficient logical connection and can be tried using
the same evidence.” United States v. Heilman, 377 F. App’x 157, 202 (3d Cir. 2010). Offenses
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may also be joined if they “occurred within a relatively short period of time of each other and
the evidence of each overlaps.” Heilman, 377 F. App’x at 203.
In this case, the five counts in the superseding indictment are of the “same or similar
character,” regardless of temporal or evidentiary connectedness, and the counts are properly
joined under Rule 8(a). United States v. Owens, 187 F. Supp. 3d 488, 496 (M.D. Pa. 2016)
(finding two counts of possession with intent to distribute heroin and two counts of possession
of a firearm are of similar character and are properly joined, regardless of the lack of temporal
or evidentiary connectedness); Stevens, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 422 (finding a counts of assault with
intent to commit murder, two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, and two counts of
possessing contraband in prison, related to two separate assaults, are of the same or similar
character and properly joined); Deshields, 2021 WL 1401790, at *6 (finding that four counts
of possession of a firearm and two counts of possession with intent to distribute occurring
over the span of over a year are of similar character and properly joined). The counts are also
properly joined because of their close temporal proximity, with only a three-month gap
separating the charges. (Doc. 23); United States v. Askew, 4:17-CR-00291, 2019 WL 1531986,
at *3 (M.D. Pa. April 9, 2019) (finding a transactional nexus for joinder with distribution
charges for different substances over a short time span, in the same geographical area, with
several overlapping witnesses); Deshields, 2021 WL 1401790, at *6.
Next, Smith avers that even if the claims are properly joined, they should still be
severed pursuant to Rule 14 due to the undue risk of “spillover prejudice.” (Doc. 66, at 2).
Smith argues the jury is likely to find the distribution resulting in death allegation to be
inflammatory and will improperly consider the allegation as evidence of guilt for counts two
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through five. (Doc. 66, at 2). The Government counters that Smith fails to meet his burden
demonstrating that severance of the claims is warranted. (Doc. 72, at 7-9).
Only where there is a serious risk that joinder would compromise a specific trial right
of a defendant or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment should a court grant a
motion for severance under Rule 14. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993); United
States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 2005). A moving party must establish “clear and
substantial prejudice that would result in a manifestly unfair trial.” Deshields, 2021 WL
1401790, at *6 (citing United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 335 (3d Cir. 2010).
Smith contends that severing Count I may increase his chances of acquittal for Counts
II through V, by separating the inflammatory “resulting in death” distribution charge from
the others. (Doc. 67, at 2). Merely having a better chance at acquittal in separate trials does
not entitle a defendant to severance. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540. Further, Smith has not
demonstrated that the jury will not be able to compartmentalize evidence against him
regarding the drug distribution charges he faces. The indictment alleges Smith distributed
either cocaine or fentanyl on five occasions over a four-month period, one such distribution
of fentanyl resulted in a death. (Doc. 23). The charges are not particularly complex, and
proper jury instructions may adequately manage the possibility of a jury conflating or
otherwise misusing evidence. See Stevens, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 425 (finding limiting instructions
would sufficiently safeguard against prejudice with charges stemming from two incidents with
uncomplicated facts); see also Deshields, 2021 WL 1401790, at *7 (finding charges of possession
with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm were not complex, such that a jury would
not be able to compartmentalize evidence with appropriate instruction). Severance is not
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required under Rule 14 even if prejudice is shown, and the appropriate relief is left to the
sound discretion of the district court. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Smith’s motion to sever counts of the indictment for trial
(Doc. 66) is DENIED. The five counts against Smith will be tried together on January 5, 2026.
An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: December 15, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
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