Hawley v. Salamon et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTONIO HAWLEY, 	: 	Civil No. 3:23-CV-1434
:
Plaintiff 	:
:
v. 	: 	(Judge Munley)
:
WARDEN BOBBI JO SALAMON, 	:
et al., 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
This inmate pro se civil rights action, which comes before us for consideration
of a second motion to compel discovery, (Doc. 132), is currently proceeding on
several discrete legal claims. These claims, in turn, define the scope of what is
relevant for discovery purposes.
Specifically, the plaintiff, Antonio Hawley, alleges that: (1) prison staff
violated his rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments when they conducted
strip searches of the plaintiff between March 5 and 7, 2023; (2) the conditions of his
confinement during March and April of 2023 at SCI Rockview violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) these strip
searches and unsanitary cell placements were ordered in retaliation for Hawley’s
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exercise of his right to grieve about conditions in the Restricted Housing Unit at the
prison.
The parties are now engaged in discovery and embroiled in some discovery
disputes, disputes which have inspired Hawley to file this second motion to compel.
(Doc. 132). Broadly speaking, in this motion Hawley seeks the following categories
of information: Hawley first requested copies of his own prior complaints of sexual
assault under the Prison Rape Elimination Act. Second, Hawley sought “any and all
policies, directive or instructions to staff concerning sanitation, personal hygiene, &
inspection of cells both in population & RHU, and of indigent status inmates.” Third,
Hawley requested “all reports, memos, email pertaining to the plaintiff’s subject civil
matter at hand i.e. condition of confinement, retaliation, excessive strip searches.”
Fourth, Hawley sought “Federal & State inspection of SCI Rockview reports, memo,
result, complaints for the passed [sic] 2025 to 2020.” Notably, the temporal scope of
many of these requests is unclear, and the requests are not limited to the RHU where
Hawley was housed at the time of the events alleged in his complaint but appear to
extend throughout the prison. Finally, Hawley tendered interrogatories which asked
whether SCI Rockview was being shut down and inquired why Rockview was being
shut down. 1
1 Hawley has also complained about the redaction of some documents previously
provided to him, but the defendants have averred that the redactions relate solely to
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With Hawley’s discovery demands framed in this fashion, the defendants have
lodged objections based upon relevance, overbreadth, and institutional security
concerns. This motion to compel is fully briefed and is therefore ripe for resolution.
Upon consideration of the parties’ positions, for the reasons set forth below,
will GRANT the motion, in part, and DENY it in part.
II. 	Discussion
A. Guiding Principles
The parties’ discovery disputes are judged against familiar legal guideposts.
As we have observed when addressing similar discovery issues:
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery are matters consigned
to the court's discretion and judgment. A court's decisions regarding the
conduct of discovery will be disturbed only upon a showing of abuse of
that discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d
Cir. 1983). This far-reaching discretion also extends to rulings by
United States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly
broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See
Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. San Clemente Fin.
Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J. 1997).
When 	a 	magistrate 	judge's 	decision 	involves 	a
discretionary [discovery] matter ..., “courts in this district
have 	determined 	that 	the 	clearly 	erroneous 	standard
implicitly becomes an abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi
v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.
Pa. 2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F.
Supp. 501, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Under the standard, a
magistrate judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great
information that is irrelevant and would adversely effect institutional security. We
deem this response to be adequate.
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deference and is reversible only for abuse of discretion.”
Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys. Co., 169
F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J. 1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica 	Hous. 	Servs., 	190 	F.R.D. 	42, 	44-45
(N.D.N.Y. 	1999) 	(holding 	that 	discovery 	rulings 	are
reviewed under abuse of discretion standard rather than de
novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100,
102 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution 	of 	discovery 	disputes 	deserves 	substantial
deference and should be reversed only if there is an abuse
of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 2735702, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept.
27, 2010).
The exercise of this discretion is guided, however, by certain basic
principles. At the outset, Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure generally defines the scope of discovery permitted in a civil
action, prescribes certain limits to that discovery and provides as
follows:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits.
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court
order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties'
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within
this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence
to be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
Thus, our discretion is limited in a number of significant ways by the
scope 	of 	Rule 	26 	itself, 	which 	provides 	for 	discovery 	of 	only
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“nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.”
Therefore, “[t]he Court's discretion in ruling on discovery issues is,
therefore, 	restricted 	to 	valid 	claims 	of 	relevance 	and 	privilege.”
Robinson v. Folino, No. 14-227, 2016 WL 4678340, at *2 (citing
Jackson v. Beard, No. 11-1431, 2014 WL 3868228, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 6, 2014) (“[a]lthough the scope of relevance in discovery is far
broader than that allowed for evidentiary purposes, it is not without its
limits.... Courts will not permit discovery where a request is made in
bad faith, unduly burdensome, irrelevant to the general subject matter
of the action, or relates to confidential or privileged information”)).
Accordingly, at the outset it is clear that Rule 26's definition of that
which can be obtained through discovery reaches any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense, and valid claims
of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict the court's discretion
in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of discovery
permitted by Rule 26 embraces all relevant information, a concept
which is not confined to admissible evidence but is also defined in the
following terms: “Information within this scope of discovery need not
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rather, Rule 26 states that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense.” This concept of relevance is tempered, however, by principles
of proportionality. Thus we are now enjoined to also consider whether
the specific discovery sought is “proportional to the needs of the case,
considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the
amount 	in 	controversy, 	the 	parties' 	relative 	access 	to 	relevant
information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Thus,
it has been said that the amended rule ‘restores the proportionality
factors to their original place in defining the scope of discovery.’ ”
Fassett v. Sears Holdings Corp., 319 F.R.D. 143, 150 (M.D. Pa. 2017)
(quoting Wertz v. GEA Heat Exchangers Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1991, 2015
WL 8959408, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2015)).
Lawson v. Love's Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-1266, 2020 WL
109654, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2020).
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Further:
One other immutable factor governs the scope of discovery under Rule
26.
“It is an obvious truism that a court should not enter an
order compelling a party to produce documents where the
documents do not exist.” Wells v. JPC Equestrian, Inc.,
No. 3:13-CV-2575, 2014 WL 5641305, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
Nov. 4, 2014). It is clear, therefore, that the court cannot
compel the production of things that do not exist. Nor can
the court compel the creation of evidence by parties who
attest that they do not possess the materials sought by an
adversary 	in 	litigation. 	See, 	e.g., 	AFSCME 	District
Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund v. Ortho-McNeil-
Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL
5186088 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon,
No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251 (M.D. Pa. April 9, 2009).
See Lawson v. Love's Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc.,
No. 1:17-CV-1266, 2019 WL 5622453, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 31, 2019).
Lopez v. Wetzel, No. 3:21-CV-1819, 2024 WL 2055041, at *4 (M.D. Pa. May 6,
2024).
In addition, there are factors unique to prison litigation that inform the
exercise of our discretion when addressing inmate discovery issues. In a prison
setting, inmate requests for information relating to security procedures can raise
profound security concerns, and implicate a legitimate governmental privilege, a
governmental privilege which acknowledges a governmental need to confidentiality
of certain data but recognizes that courts must balance the confidentiality of
governmental files against the rights of a civil rights litigant by considering:
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(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes
by discouraging citizens from giving the government information; (2)
the impact upon persons who have given information of having their
identities 	disclosed; 	(3) 	the 	degree 	to 	which 	governmental 	self-
evaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by
disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or
evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking the discovery is an
actual or potential defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending
or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether
the police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any intra-
departmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from
the investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff’s suit is non-frivolous and
brought in good faith; (9) whether the information sought is available
through other discovery or from other sources; and (10) the importance
of the information sought to the plaintiffs case.
Torres v. Harris, No. 4:17-CV-1977, 2019 WL 265804, at *3–4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18,
2019) (quoting Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973)).
Finally, it is clear that a party moving to compel discovery bears the initial
burden 	of 	proving 	the 	relevance 	of 	the 	requested 	information. Morrison 	v.
Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Once that initial
burden is met:
The party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of
relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not
come within the broad scope of relevance as defined under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm
occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in
favor of broad disclosure.
In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D. Kan. 2009).
These legal tenets guide us in the resolution of the instant discovery disputes.
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B. The Motion to Compel will be Denied in Part and Granted in Part
Upon consideration, we note that the outset that Hawley’s request for copies
of his own prior PREA complaints now appears to be moot since the defendants
indicate that they have provided these prior complaints to the plaintiff.
As for Hawley’s request for “all reports, memos, email pertaining to the
plaintiff’s subject civil matter at hand i.e. condition of confinement, retaliation,
excessive strip searches,” we construe this to be nothing more than a demand for
production of all documentation in the defendants’ possession, custody or control
relating to the incidents alleged by the plaintiff in his complaint. Construed in this
fashion, the request seeks information that is both relevant and proportional to the
needs of the case. Therefore, the motion to compel production of this information is
granted. To the extent that the defendants have already produced all 	relevant
materials in their possession, they shall confirm this fact for Hawley.
Hawley also seeks “any and all policies, directive or instructions to staff
concerning sanitation, personal hygiene, & inspection of cells both in population &
RHU, and of indigent status inmates,” along with “Federal & State inspection of SCI
Rockview reports, memo, result, complaints for the passed [sic] 2025 to 2020.” We
agree that these requests, as proffered, are overly broad in their temporal and topical
scope. Hawley’s allegations relate to a specific time frame, 2023 and entail events
which allegedly took place in a particular unit within the prison, the RHU. Yet, as
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we read these discovery requests Hawley seeks information which is institution-wide
and spans many years. In the past we have denied similar discovery requests which
lack reasonable temporal or topical definition. See Torres v. Harris, No. 4:17-CV-
1977, 2019 WL 265804, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2019) (collecting cases). Therefore,
since Hawley’s requests are unbounded by any clear topical or temporal limits, we
will deny these requests without prejudice to the plaintiff seeking additional
discovery specifically regarding RHU conditions between 2022 and 2024, the
relevant time frame in this case. 2
Finally, Hawley tendered interrogatories which asked whether SCI Rockview
was being shut down and inquired why Rockview was being shut down. We
understand that these discovery demands are designed to ascertain whether the
prison was closed due to deteriorating conditions, a matter which could be relevant
to the plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim. The defendants object to these
requests on relevance grounds but to the extent that the closure of SCI Rockview
and the publicly stated reasons for that closure shed some light on this issue, we
disagree. Therefore, the defendants will be required to confirm the closure of this
institution and provide Hawley with the statement relating to the reasons for that
closure which they have referenced in their pleadings.
2 We note that, at the defendants’ request, the discovery deadline has been extended
to February 28, 2026. (Doc. 143). Therefore, Hawley would still be able to submit
more narrowly tailored discovery demands in this case.
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An appropriate order follows.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: December 23, 2025
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTONIO HAWLEY, 	: 	Civil No. 3:23-CV-1434
:
Plaintiff 	:
:
v. 	: 	(Judge Munley)
:
WARDEN BOBBI JO SALAMON, 	:
et al., 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
Defendants. 	:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23d day of December 2025, in accordance with the
accompanying Memorandum, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s second motion
to compel (Doc. 132) is GRANTED, in part and DENIED, in part as follows:
Hawley’s request for copies of his own prior PREA complaints is DEEMED
MOOT since the defendants indicate that they have provided these prior complaints
to the plaintiff.
Hawley’s request for “all reports, memos, email pertaining to the plaintiff’s
subject civil matter at hand i.e. condition of confinement, retaliation, excessive strip
searches,” which we construe as nothing more than a demand for production of all
documentation in the defendants’ possession, custody or control 	relating to the
incidents alleged by the plaintiff in his complaint, is GRANTED.
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Hawley’s demand for “any and all policies, directive or instructions to staff
concerning sanitation, personal hygiene, & inspection of cells both in population &
RHU, and of indigent status inmates,” along with “Federal & State inspection of SCI
Rockview reports, memo, result, complaints for the passed [sic] 2025 to 2020,” is
DENIED as overbroad without prejudice to the plaintiff seeking additional discovery
specifically regarding RHU conditions between 2022 and 2024, the relevant time
frame in this case.
With respect to Hawley’s interrogatories which asked whether SCI Rockview
was being shut down and inquired why Rockview was being shut down, these
requests for discovery are GRANTED IN PART in that the defendants are required
to confirm the closure of this institution and provide Hawley with the statement of
reasons relating to that closure which they have referenced in their pleadings.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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