Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DIEGO SOLIS SANTOS,
Petitioner,
v.
JESSICA SAGE, et al.,
Respondents.
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Civil No. 1:26-CV-00211
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 filed by Petitioner Diego Solis Santos (“Santos”). (Doc. 1.) Santos argues
that he is being wrongfully detained without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b) and, instead, should be immediately released or provided an opportunity
for a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. For the reasons that follow, the court
will grant Santos’s petition and order him released from custody.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL H ISTORY
Santos is a 21-year-old native and citizen of El Salvador. (Doc. 1, ¶ 1.) He
entered the United States in May 2021, was arrested by United States Border Patrol
agents on May 15, 2021, and processed as an unaccompanied minor. (Id. ¶ 2; Doc.
9-2, p. 7.) 1 On May 18, 2021, Santos was transferred to an emergency influx
1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
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shelter, and on June 17, 2021, was released on an order of release of recognizance
to his sponsor, his cousin living in New Jersey. (Doc. 1, ¶ 2; Doc. 9-2, p. 7.)
On June 6, 2023, Santos was arrested in New Jersey for charges of
aggravated assault with a weapon and attempted murder and was interviewed by
ICE at the Camden County Jail the same day. (Doc. 1, ¶ 28.) Santos was acquitted
following a jury trial on all charges and released from pretrial detention on March
4, 2025. (Id. ¶ 29.) He was then charged by ICE as removable under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), §§ 212(a)(6)(A), because he was in the
United States without being admitted or paroled, and transferred to ICE custody.
(Id. ¶¶ 29–30.) Santos was detained at the Moshannon Valley Processing Center
until January 22, 2026, when he was transferred to FCI Lewisburg, where he
remains detained. (Id. ¶ 30.)
Santos was found removeable by an immigration judge on May 5, 2025.
(Doc. 1-7, p. 2.) On May 22, 2025, he filed an application for asylum, which was
denied on November 28, 2025. (Doc. 1, ¶ 40; Doc. 1-7.) Santos appealed that
decision and his appeal remains pending. (Doc. 1, ¶ 40; Docs. 9-5.)
On January 29, 2026, Santos filed the instant petition requesting release
from detention or a bond hearing against Jessica Sage, Warden of FCI Lewisburg;
Michael T. Rose, Acting Filed Office Director of Enforcement and Removal
Operations, Philadelphia Field Office, ICE; and Kristi Noem, Secretary of the
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Department of Homeland Security (collectively, “Respondents”). 2 (Doc. 1.)
Respondents filed a response on February 24, 2026,3 and Santos filed a traverse on
March 3, 2026. (Docs. 9, 12.) Thus, this petition is ripe for review.
S TANDARD OF REVIEW AND J URISDICTION 4
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a district court may consider a writ of
habeas corpus when an immigration detainee is “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Claims related to an
immigration detainee’s request for release from confinement must be brought as a
habeas petition as these “claims fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus.”
Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 167
(2022)). Jurisdiction for “core habeas petitions . . . lies in only one district: the
district of confinement.” Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443
2 Respondents, in a footnote, submit that the only proper respondent is Jessica Sage because she
is the Warden of FCI Lewisburg. (Doc. 9, p. 1 n.1.) In this case, consistent with Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004), Petitioner has named the Warden as a respondent. Padilla,
542 U.S. at 447 (“Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical
custody within the United States, he should name his warden as respondent.”) The court will not
address an argument requesting dismissal of other Respondents when only raised in a footnote.
3 Respondents originally filed their response on February 13, 2026. (Doc. 4.) However, counsel
realized that only a portion of his brief uploaded to CM/ECF and requested to supplement the
response on February 20, 2026, with no opposition from Santos. (Docs. 5, 6.) The court granted
the request on February 23, 2026, and a full response was filed on February 24, 2026. (Docs. 8,
9.)
4 Unlike prior habeas petitions before this court that presented similar issues, Respondents do not
argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case, thus, the court will not address
that issue here. (See Doc. 9.)
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(2004)) (internal quotations omitted). Santos is detained at FCI Lewisburg, which
is within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See 28 U.S.C. § 118(b).
DISCUSSION
Santos argues that he was improperly detained under Section 1225(b) of the
INA, which relates to applicants for admission. (Docs. 1, 12.) Santos submits that
he should have been detained, if at all, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and provided
a bond hearing because he is not an applicant for admission.5 (Docs. 1, 12.)
Santos requests the following forms of relief: a declaration that Santos’s detention
violates the INA, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, and the
Constitution; an order immediately releasing Santos from custody, permanently
enjoining Respondents from re-detaining Santos under Section 1225(b) and
enjoining Respondents from detaining Santos under Section 1226(a) without
adequate pre-deprivation due process; alternatively, a custody hearing in this court
to consider Santos’s detention or an order releasing Santos within 10 days unless
Respondents hold an appropriate hearing under Section 1226(a) before an
immigration judge; and award Santos costs and attorney fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Doc. 1, pp. 52–53.)
5 Santos also argues that because he was released from custody after being designated an
unaccompanied minor, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act also bars Section
1225(b) from governing his detention. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 60–66.) Because the court finds, infra, that
Section 1225(b) does not apply to Santos, the court need not address this issue.
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Respondents agree that Santos is detained pursuant to Section
1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 9, p. 3.) They assert that Santos falls within the statutory
definition of “applicant for admission,” he is properly detained under Section
1225(b)(2), and Section 1226(a) is inapplicable to him. (Doc. 9, pp. 21–44.)
Respondents submit that the plain language of Section 1225(b)(2) requires
detention of applicants for admission and that the section’s reference to noncitizens
“seeking admission” does not narrow the scope of Section 1225(b)(2). (Id. at 21–
35.) They further argue that their interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not
make Section 1226(a)’s discretionary detention authority superfluous and Jennings
does not undermine Respondents’ interpretation. (Id. at 35–44.) Respondents also
assert that Santos’s temporary detention does not violate due process. (Id. at 48–
58.) Alternatively, if the court wishes to grant Santos’s petition, Respondents
request that the court order a bond hearing rather than releasing Santos. (Id. at 58–
59.)
Section 1225 of the INA is titled “Inspection by immigration officers;
expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225. It defines “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” Id.
§ 1225(a)(1). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides:
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an
applicant 	for 	admission, 	if 	the 	examining 	immigration 	officer
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determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a of this title.
Noncitizens subject to this mandatory detention may only be released while their
removal proceedings are pending “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. The BIA recently decided Matter of
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 2016 (Sept. 5, 2025), wherein the BIA held that
noncitizens who enter the United States without admission are subject to
mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), and thus, immigration judges
lack the authority to provide a bond hearing.
Conversely, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) provides, in relevant part:
(a) Arrest, detention, and release
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested
and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States. 	Except as provided in subsection (c) and
pending such decision, the Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(a) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing 	conditions 	prescribed 	by, 	the 	Attorney
General; or
(b) conditional parole; but
(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including
an ‘employment authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate
work permit), unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent
residence 	or 	otherwise 	would 	(without 	regard 	to 	removal
proceedings) be provided such authorization.
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The parties agree that Santos is detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and
neither party alleges that Santos is subject to Section 1226(c).6 (See Docs. 1, 9,
12.)
Federal district courts across the country and within this district have,
overwhelmingly, rejected Respondents’ position regarding the applicability of
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) to detainees like Santos, a noncitizen who previously
entered and had been living in the United States prior to his detention.7 See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Kunes, No. 1:25-cv-1847, 2026 WL 411726 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13,
2026) (Wilson, J.) (holding Section 1225(b) was inapplicable to petitioner);
Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 3:25-cv-1896, 2025
WL 3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Wilson, J.) (adopting report and
recommendation finding that Section 1225 was inapplicable to petitioner); Patel v.
O’Neil, No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025)
(collecting cases within the Third Circuit as of December 8, 2025); Quispe v. Rose,
3:25-cv-2276, 2025 WL 3537279 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (holding that petitioner
was improperly detained under Section 1225(b)(2)(A)); Patel v. O’Neill, 3:25-cv-
6 Section 1226(c) requires detention of noncitizens who are inadmissible or deportable because
they have committed a criminal offense identified in this section. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
7 The court acknowledges that there are some district courts, as well as the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, who have agreed with Respondents’ interpretation of Section 1225. (See Doc. 9, p. 4–
5.) Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6,
2026). However, none of these decisions are binding on this court.
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2289, 2026 WL 323121 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2026) (same). “The vast majority of
courts confronting this precise issue have rejected the Government’s interpretation,
and the BIA’s interpretation of Hurtado, as contradictory to the plain text of
§ 1225.” Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243 (citing Ayala Amaya v. Bondi, No. 25-
16429, 2025 WL 3033880, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2025) (collecting cases)).
The court is persuaded by and agrees with the majority of federal district
courts that have ruled on this issue to date in rejecting Respondents’ interpretation
of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Santos’s detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is
unlawful because Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “applies only to noncitizens who are
actively, i.e., affirmatively, ‘seeking admission’ to the United States.” Bethancourt
Soto v. Soto, No. 25-cv-16200, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7
(D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025). Thus, this section simply does not apply to someone like
Santos, who has been residing in the United States for nearly five years. Id.
(collecting cases adopting the same conclusion).
In reaching this conclusion, the court holds that Respondents’ interpretation
of “seeking admission” violates the rule against surplusage and contradicts the
plain meaning of the statutory text. Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *5
(finding that respondents’ interpretation “violates the rule against surplusage and
negates the plain meaning of the text.”); see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *5
(citing Centeno Ibarra v. Warden of Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No. 25-cv-6312, 2025
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WL 3294726, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025)) (same). If Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
applied to every “applicant for admission,” the phrase “seeking admission” would
become unnecessary and surplusage. 8 Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *6
(citations omitted); see also United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res.,
Inc., 599 U.S. 419 (2023) (explaining that “every clause and word of a statute
should have meaning” and “no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant”). Further, “seeking admission” connotes “some affirmative,
present-tense action” such that it “requires an act currently underway not a static
condition.” Id. at *5 (citations omitted). Thus, Respondents’ argument that
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not require any “affirmative act” is contrary to the
plain meaning of the words “seeking admission.”9
8 Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at*6, provides a helpful example of why Respondents’
interpretation violates the rule against surplusage:
[R]emoving the words “seeking admission” from § 1225(b)(2)(A) would not alter its
meaning under Respondents’ theory: “[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained[.]”
That result is inconsistent with the principle that courts must interpret a statute to give
meaning to “every clause and word” that Congress chose to include. See Polansky, 599
U.S. at 432, 143 S.Ct. 1720 (quotation marks omitted).
9 Again, the examples provided by the court in Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *6, are
illustrative of why Respondents’ argument fails:
For example, one could deem every person in the country a “potential homebuyer,” but
they are not “seeking to buy a home,” without taking some affirmative action towards that
goal. Nor is every “employable adult” in the country “applying for a job,” simply because
jobs exist. 	Or, as Judge Ho explained in Benitez, “someone who enters a movie theater
without purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film
would not ordinarily then be described as ‘seeking admission’ to the theater. Rather, that
person would be described as already present there.” Benitez, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2025
WL 2371588, at *7. Further, “[e]ven if that person, after being detected, offered to pay for
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Respondents’ interpretation also makes Section 1226(c)’s mandatory
detention provision superfluous and redundant. Centeno Ibarra, 2025 WL
3294726 at *6 (“Under the government’s interpretation, § 1225 would require such
mandatory detention regardless of criminal charges or convictions. If this was the
case, Congress would have no need to create additional requirements for
mandatory detention.”).
In sum, Santos is not currently “seeking admission” to the United States.
That was his status in May 2021. At that time, a government official made the
decision to release him in the United States to the care of his cousin. Therefore,
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him as he is not currently “seeking
admission” to the United States.
Addressing Santos’s constitutional claims, it is undisputed that “once an
alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process
Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 693 (citations omitted). Thus, the court must determine what process is due
to Santos, who is currently subject to mandatory detention without a bond hearing,
by applying the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as ‘seeking admission’ ... at that point—
one would say that they had entered unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining
there.” Id.
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Mathews requires the court to weigh three factors: (1) “the private interest that will
be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
The first factor weighs heavily in Santos’s favor because the “official
action” has deprived him of his physical liberty. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 529 (2004) (“[T]he most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being
free from physical detention by one’s own government.”). The second factor
similarly swings in Santos’s favor because he “is presently and erroneously
detained under the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225, without an
opportunity for a bond hearing.” Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *8
(emphasis in original). As to the third factor, the court recognizes Respondents’
interest in detaining noncitizens to ensure “the appearance of aliens at future
immigration proceedings” and “preventing danger to the community.” Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 690. Still, this factor weighs in favor of Santos because Respondents
do not contend that he poses a danger to the community or that he is a flight risk.
Accordingly, the Mathews factors weigh in Santos’s favor and the court finds that
his mandatory detention without a bond hearing under Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
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violates his procedural due process rights. See Bethencourt Soto, 2025 WL
2976572 at *8 (“Taken together, the Court finds that the Mathews factors weigh
decisively in Petitioner’s favor, and as such his mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) violates his procedural due process rights.”) (citations omitted);
Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *6 (holding same). Thus, the court will grant Santos’s
petition and release him again, as a government official did in May 2021.
Santos also requests costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as provided by the
EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Doc. 1, p. 53.) Respondents request that the court defer
any decision on EAJA fees until a motion is made by Santos and that the motion
should not be entertained until final judgment is entered in this case. (Doc. 9, pp.
59–60.) The court will not make a determination of fees and costs here but will
permit Santos to file an appropriate motion for costs and fees pursuant to the EAJA
within thirty days of the entry of final judgment.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court will grant Santos’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus and order his immediate release. An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: March 4, 2026
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