Pearsall v. UPMC et al

1:25-cv-01614PamdJan 28, 2026

Full text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TERRENCE PEARSALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
UPMC, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 1:25-CV-1614
(JUDGE NEARY)
(Magistrate Judge Latella)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se Plaintiff Terrance Pearsall originated this action by filing
what was styled as a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on
August 29, 2025, alleging that he was subjected to a sexual assault
during a medical appointment. (Doc. 1). While he claimed various
constitutional violations, he also alleged sexual harassment and sexual
assault, which, liberally construed, constitute pendent claims under
Pennsylvania state law. He failed to allege, however, that the
Defendants were acting under the color of state law when he was
sexually assaulted and therefore could not state a claim under section
1983. Accordingly, a screening order was issued advising Plaintiff of
the elements necessary to plead a section 1983 claim, and the critical
element that the defendant’s actions must have been committed under
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color of state law. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint but
again failed to allege that any of the defendants were state actors. (Doc.
1). A second Order, giving even more extensive pleading guidance was
issued. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, again
alleging a sexual assault, and requesting that the matter be moved to
the Court of Common Pleas for Dauphin County. For the reasons that
follow, it will be recommended that any section 1983 claims raised in
the Second Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that
any state claims be dismissed without prejudice.
I. 	Background
On August 29, 2025, the Plaintiff, Terrence Pearsall, initiated this
action by filing a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc.
1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff averred that at the time of filing he was
an inmate confined at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution
at Rockview. (Doc. 1, ¶ 3). Named as Defendants were the University
of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC); Eric Tater, an employee of
UPMC; and Dr. Khem Adhilari, a physician at UPMC. (Doc. 1). On
that same date, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis (IFP), (Doc. 2), and a Motion to Amend Complaint. (Doc. 3).
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By Order dated October 10, 2025, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP was
granted, but service of the Complaint was held in abeyance pending the
Court’s screening obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). (Doc. 5).
By separate Order also dated October 10, 2025, the Plaintiff was
advised of several deficiencies in the Complaint which rendered it
subject to dismissal. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff was advised of the general rules
of pleading provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and advised of
potential deficiencies with Plaintiff’s Complaint, including that it
appeared to fall short of the minimal pleading requirements established
by Rule 8. (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff was informed that his
Complaint may be subject to dismissal pursuant to Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted because “[a] § 1983 plaintiff ‘must establish that she was
deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor,’”
and Plaintiff “does not indicate that UPMC, a non-profit corporation, is
a state actor. Nor does [he] allege facts permitting such an inference.
Thus, [Plaintiff’s] constitutional claims against UPMC are [subject to
be] dismissed.” (Id.) (quoting Gunsallus v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr,
No. 4:21-CV-00368, 2022 WL 36368, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2022)).
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Further, and significantly, Plaintiff was advised that if he sought
to redress federally protected rights under § 1983, while “seemingly
private behavior may be [] fairly treated as that of the State itself” he
must allege state action. (Id.) (quoting Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d at 646).
Plaintiff was advised that the Third Circuit has explained:
[T]he principal question at stake is whether there is such
a close nexus between the State and the challenged action
that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself. To answer that question, we have
outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court
jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists:
(1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that
are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2)
whether the private party has acted with the help of or in
concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state has
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity.
(Doc 6, p. 5) (quoting Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d at 646). Because the
original Complaint that Plaintiff filed completely failed to allege state
action sufficient to maintain a § 1983 action, he was granted twenty-one
(21) days in which to file an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff
filed a request for an extension of time to file an Amended Complaint,
and that request was granted by Order dated November 9, 2025. (Doc.
9).
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An Amended Complaint was filed on December 9, 2025. (Doc. 10).
The Amended Complaint again named Eric Tater and Dr. Khen
Adhikari as Defendants; however, the Amended Complaint named Penn
State Health, not UPMC, as a Defendant. Additionally, it alleged that
Tater and Adhikari are employees of Penn State Health, not UPMC.
However, the Amended Complaint again failed to allege any action on
the part of the state or that the Defendants were state actors. Plaintiff
alleged that on August 29, 2023, he attended a medical appointment at
Penn State Health and that he was sexually assaulted during the
examination by Defendant Tater. Although he indicated that he was
currently confined at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at
Rockview, Plaintiff did not indicate in the Amended Complaint whether
he was an inmate at the time of his medical appointment nor did he
allege any relationship between the named Defendants and any state
institution. Accordingly, Plaintiff was given another opportunity to
amend his complaint. In assisting in the filing of a Second Amended
Complaint, the Court provided the following additional guidance.
First, Plaintiff is again reminded that “to establish a
successful claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the challenged conduct was committed
by a person acting under color of state law and deprived
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the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Mollett
v. Leclerc, No. 3:25-CV-185, 2025 WL 817601, at *2 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 14, 2025). 	Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is
devoid of any allegations of state actions. “[W]here—as
here—a defendant is not alleged to be a public entity, the
allegations 	must 	plausibly 	show 	that 	the 	private
defendant should be considered a state actor for purposes
of section 1983. Although there is no simple line between
state and private actors, the principal question at stake
is whether there is such a close nexus between the State
and 	the 	challenged 	action 	that 	seemingly 	private
behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”
Langston v. Hershey Med. Ctr., No. 1:15-CV-2027, 2016
WL 6780702, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2016).
(Doc. 11). Plaintiff was granted twenty-one days to file a Second
Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies outlined above. On
January 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, (Doc.
14), again alleging a sexual assault committed by Defendant Tater but
again failing to allege state action. For relief, the Plaintiff requested
that the case “be moved” to the Court of Common Please for Dauphin
County. (Doc. 14, p. 2).
II. 	Discussion
A. 	Applicable Standards
i. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915
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The statute governing proceedings in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. §
1915 directs that “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at
any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal—(i) is
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
“The United States Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)’s term ‘frivolous’ when applied to a complaint, ‘embraces
not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual
allegation,’ such that a claim is frivolous within the meaning of §
1915(e)(2)(B) if it ‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact’”
Romeo v. State of Delaware, No. CIV.A. 04-153-SLR, 2004 WL 1043196,
at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 27, 2004) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)).
This statutory text of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors the language of
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Therefore,
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“[w]hen reviewing complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the
court must apply the standard of review set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).” 	Romeo, 2004 WL 1043196, at *1. While both 12(b)(6) and §
1915(e)(2)(B) warrant dismissal, § 1915 allows for a claim to be
dismissed prior to the service of the complaint, while courts should not
rely on 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint sua sponte prior to service of
process. 	Green v. LG Elecs. USA, No. 23-1062, 2023 WL 3915102, at *2
(3d Cir. June 9, 2023), cert. dismissed, 144 S. Ct. 874, 218 L. Ed. 2d 59
(2024), reconsideration denied, 144 S. Ct. 2516, 219 L. Ed. 2d 1198
(2024). However, the standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim
is the same for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 12(b)(6). 	See Treadway v. DOC
Pennsylvania, No. 25-CV-2800, 2025 WL 1888208, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July
8, 2025) (“Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”) (citing
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also
Bush v. Doe (I), 858 F. App’x 520, 522 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
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ii. 	The 12(b)(6) Standard
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a claim
must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This requires the
Plaintiff to put forth evidence that, “when taken as true, suggest[s] the
required elements of a particular legal theory.” 	McNeilly v. City of
Pittsburgh, 40 F. Supp. 3d 643, 650 (W.D. Pa. 2014). The Plaintiff must
state “sufficient factual allegations which ‘nudge’ its claims ‘across the
line from conceivable to plausible.’” 	Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 680, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). The
purpose is to ensure “fair notice of the factual basis of a claim while
raising a ‘reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
the necessary element.’” 	Id. at 651.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a
defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This means
that a complaint may be dismissed if it does not present sufficient facts
to support a plausible claim: “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss
may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the
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complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.”
Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)).
The court must accept both the Plaintiff’s allegations and any
reasonable inferences that can be drawn as true and construe them in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 	Monroe v. Beard, 536
F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). However, it need not accept “‘unsupported
conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.’” 	Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir.
2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Reciting the elements that make up a cause of action and supporting
them with “mere conclusory statements” is insufficient to give those
statements the presumption of truth. 	McNeilly, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 650
(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937).
When faced with a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), a court
should conduct a two-part analysis: 1) separate the factual and legal
elements of a claim; and 2) “determine whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim
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for relief.” 	Id. (internal citation removed). The court may consider facts
alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated
into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
judicial notice.” 	Tellab, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 322 (2007). This analysis requires the court to look at the claims
on a case-by-case basis and rely both “on its judicial experience and
common sense.” 	McNeilly, 40 F.Supp.3d at 650. 	The court will not be
reaching legal conclusions, but instead is merely determining “whether
the plaintiff should be permitted to offer evidence in support of the
allegations.” 	Id. 	(citing Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.
2000)).
iii. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff’s three Complaints bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The basis of federal jurisdiction asserted is federal question
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In all three Complaints,
Plaintiff failed to allege that any of the Defendants were state actors or
any of their actions were taken under color of state law. As noted
above, Plaintiff was twice advised that to properly plead a section 1983
claim, he would have to allege that the defendants acted under color of
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state law. Plaintiff alleged that on August 29, 2023, he attended a
medical appointment at Penn State Health, Harrisburg. (Doc. 14, p. 2).
He alleged that Defendant Eric Tater sexually assaulted and abused
him during the visit. (Id.). He asserts that Defendant Dr. Adhikari was
aware of Tater’s conduct and failed to protect Plaintiff. (Id.).
According to its website, “Penn State Health is an integrated
academic health system serving patients and communities across 15
counties in central Pennsylvania.”
https://www.pennstatehealth.org/about-us. Penn State Health is listed
on the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) public website as a 501(c)(3)
nonprofit organization. 	https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/details/. “Penn
State Health is a non-profit corporation incorporated and existing under
the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” 	United States ex rel.
Shannon v. Penn State Health St. Joseph Reg'l Health Network, No. CV
21-2351, 2025 WL 984353, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2025). All three of
Plaintiff’s complaints are completely devoid of any allegations that
Penn State Health or either of the Defendants, employees of Penn State
Health at the time of the alleged incident, were state actors or working
in connection the State or any of its agencies. “[T]o establish a
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successful claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the challenged conduct was committed by a person acting under color of
state law and deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 	Mollett v.
Leclerc, No. 3:25-CV-185, 2025 WL 817601, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14,
2025) (citing Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997)). 	See also
Fata v. Delgado, No. 25-1888, 2026 WL 36123, at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 6,
2026) ([Plaintiff’s] attempt to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails
because defendants, who are private citizens, are not state actors and
were not acting under color of law.”).
As outlined above, Plaintiff was advised that in some instances
private parties may become state actors for purposed of section 1983
and that:
[T]he principal question at stake is whether there is such
a close nexus between the State and the challenged action
that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself. To answer that question, we have
outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court
jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists:
(1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that
are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2)
whether the private party has acted with the help of or in
concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state has
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
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with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity.
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, “there are no
allegations that [Penn State] Health or the Defendant doctors ‘acted
with the help of or in concert with state officials,’ for example, or met
any of the other two tests for state action. Absent such facts, nothing in
the Complaint suggests a legal basis for concluding that Defendants are
state actors for the purposes of § 1983.” 	Downes v. St. Luke's Univ.
Health Network, No. 5:25-CV-5104, 2025 WL 3299242, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 26, 2025) (quoting Pinnock v. Univ. of Pa. Hosp., No. 25-5276, 2025
WL 2901060, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2025) and collecting cases).
Because none of the Defendants are alleged to have acted under
color of state law and there have been no allegations that would, even
given the most strained reading, support an inference of state action,
the section 1983 claims should be dismissed.
iv. 	The State Law Claims
In all three of his Complaints, Plaintiff references sexual assault
and or sexual abuse. Liberally construing these pro se pleadings, as we
must, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed
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pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (cleaned up), it appears that Plaintiff
has attempted to bring supplemental state claims arising out of
Pennsylvania law. Where a district court has dismissed all claims over
which it had original jurisdiction, the Court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Whether the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within its
discretion. 	Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). “That
decision should be based on the values of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity. In the usual case in which all federal-law claims
are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”
KL by & through Locker v. Dunmore Sch. Dist., No. 3:24-CV-01461,
2025 WL 2723547, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2025) (cleaned up); see
also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding
that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not
insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be
dismissed as well.”); Brown v. Patel, No. 3:18-CV-01242, 2019 WL
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2502337, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2019), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 3:18-CV-1242, 2019 WL 3562656 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2019)
(recommending that federal claims be dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) and that remaining state law claims be dismissed without
prejudice).
Therefore, it is recommended that any state law claims Plaintiff
attempts to assert be dismissed without prejudice to his right to raise
them in state court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
v. 	Plaintiff’s Request to Move the Case to State
Court
This matter was originated in federal court. Accordingly, there is
no authority to remand it to state court. However, the Pennsylvania
legislature has envisioned situations where claims erroneously filed in
federal court that were dismissed on jurisdictional bases could be
brought in state court and the statute of limitations preserved pursuant
to Section 5103(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(b). “Once the
federal court dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction, it is then
incumbent upon the litigant to take further action under the statute to
move the case to state court. To preserve the timeliness of an action
under this statute, a litigant, upon having [a] case dismissed in federal
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court for lack of jurisdiction, must promptly file a certified transcript of
the final judgment of the federal court and, at the same time, a certified
transcript of the pleadings from the federal action. The litigant shall not
file new pleadings in state court.” 	Bradley v. W. Chester Univ., 273 A.3d
106, 112 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2022), aff'd, 291 A.3d 349 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned
up).
Accordingly, it is incumbent on plaintiff to transfer this matter to
state court in accordance with Pennsylvania state law.1
C. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is
vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must
permit 	a 	curative 	amendment, 	unless 	an 	amendment 	would 	be
1 It will be recommended that the Clerk of Court be directed to provide
the Plaintiff with a certified copy of the docket in this matter to assist in
transferring it to state court.
Additionally, it should be noted that Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually
assaulted by “Eric Tater” during a medical visit at Penn State Health
Harrisburg. Media reports abound about that facility having terminated
Eric Alphonso Tarter Jr. for the type of conduct alleged by Plaintiff here.
Eric Alphonso Tarter Jr. is currently pending trial in Dauphin County on
multiple counts of indecent assault in CP-22-CR-0000323-2024. Plaintiff
might have another avenue of relief through the Dauphin County District
Attorney’s Office.
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inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108
(3d Cir. 2002). 	In Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 153 (3d Cir. 2025),
the Court instructed:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs courts to
grant 	motions 	for 	leave 	to 	amend 	“when 	justice 	so
requires.” So leave to amend should be liberally given
unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. Long v.
Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 2004); Phillips, 515
F.3d at 245. And because courts have a special obligation
to be “more 	forgiving of pro 	se 	litigants,” 	Garrett v.
Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019), this
Circuit has a “longstanding policy of allowing pro se
plaintiffs to amend their complaints before the court
rules upon defendants' motions to dismiss,” Roman v.
Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 196 n.8 (3d Cir. 1990) (collecting
cases).
Leave to amend in this case, however, would be futile. The only basis
for federal jurisdiction is Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim. He was fully
instructed on the requirements necessary to plead a section 1983 claim
on two separate occasions yet was unable to so. The failure to properly
plead a section 1983 claim was for good reason; Penn State Health, a
private nonprofit healthcare provider, and its employees are not state
actors. Plaintiff’s sexual assault claims should have been brought in
state court and no amendment would vest this Court with jurisdiction
to hear those claims.
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III. 	Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be DISMISSED
with prejudice;
2. The sexual assault claims be DISMISSED without prejudice;
3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case;
4. The Clerk of Court be directed to provide Plaintiff with a
certified copy of the Docket in the matter.
Dated: January 28, 2026 	/s/ Leo A. Latella
Leo A. Latella
United States Magistrate Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TERRENCE PEARSALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
UPMC, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 1:25-CV-1614
(JUDGE NEARY)
(Magistrate Judge Latella)
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered
the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated January 28, 2026.
Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation
pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s
proposed findings, recommendations or report
addressing a motion or matter described in 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner
case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and
serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify
the portions of the proposed findings,
recommendations or report to which objection is
made and the basis for such objections. The
briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2
shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations
Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 20 of 21
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to which objection is made and may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing
only in his or her discretion or where required by
law, and may consider the record developed
before the magistrate judge, making his or her
own determination on the basis of that record.
The judge may also receive further evidence,
recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Dated: January 28, 2026 	s/ Leo A. Latella
LEO A. LATELLA
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:25-cv-01614-KMN Document 15 Filed 01/28/26 Page 21 of 21

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