Feinberg et al v. Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
HADASSAH FEINBERG, et al., 	: 	CIV. NO. 1:25-CV-768
:
Plaintiffs, 	: 	(Judge Saporito)
:
v. 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
DAUPHIN COUNTY CHILDREN 	:
AND YOUTH, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on a letter request by Hadassah Feinberg
that we appoint counsel to represent her minor children in this case. (Doc. 77). This
request arises in a decidedly unusual factual setting. Feinberg initially pursued this
case pro se in her name and in the names of her children. After being advised that
she could not advance claims on behalf of third parties as a pro se litigant, Feinberg
procured the assistance of an attorney from Florida who entered an appearance on
behalf of all plaintiffs. That Florida attorney, in turn, secured local counsel.
Within the past week a bizarre series of events have unfolded. On November
19, 2025, local counsel for the plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw his appearance.
(Doc. 74). The motion was supported by an extraordinary and detailed factual recital
including averments that “Ms. Feinberg had procured [co-counsel’s] imprisonment
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for eight days in a Florida jail,” and the revelation that local counsel recently
“discovered that Ms. Feinberg has made accusations that Governor Josh Shapiro had
engaged in a conspiracy to engineer the assassination attempt directed at then-former
President Trump in Butler, PA in July, 2024. “ (Doc. 74 ¶¶ 21, 22). On November
20, 2025, we granted this motion, finding that “it is difficult to imagine an event
which would more thoroughly undermine the trust relationship that must exist
between attorneys and a client than the imprisonment of a lawyer, allegedly
instigated by the client.” (Doc. 75).
At 1:52 a.m. on Sunday, November 23, 2025, a pro se submission was then
emailed by the plaintiff to our chambers email account. In this submission the
plaintiff identified herself as Hadassah Harris, and averred that she was now the
spouse of lead counsel in this case. Ms. Feinberg-Harris also confirmed that she had
instituted 	legal 	proceedings 	against 	her 	attorney-husband. 	Most 	recently, 	the
plaintiff alleges that she has obtained an injunction which forbids her spouse, and
lead counsel, from communicating with her and her family, a circumstance which
seems to make lead counsel’s continued representation of the plaintiffs in this case
impossible. (Doc. 77). In light of these developments, we have directed the
plaintiff’s spouse-attorney to either address these issues explaining why he does not
labor under an inherent conflict given the legal actions instigated by his client-spouse
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against him or submit a motion to withdraw on or before December 1, 2025.
In the meanwhile, Feinberg now seeks appointment of counsel for the
remaining plaintiffs in this case.1 She makes this request, however, at a time when
the viability of these legal claims is in doubt, and we are considering multiple
motions to dismiss this case. While we appreciate the plaintiff’s interest in securing
court-appointed counsel, we also recognize that there is neither a constitutional nor
a statutory right to counsel for civil litigants. Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-
57 (3d Cir. 1997); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). Instead, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) simply provides that “[t]he court may request an attorney to
represent any person unable to employ counsel.” Under §1915(e)(1), a district
court’s appointment of counsel is discretionary and must be made on a case-by-case
basis. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157-58. In Parham, the United States Court of Appeals
outlined the standards to be considered by courts when reviewing an application to
appoint counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In passing on such requests we
must first:
[D]etermine[] that the plaintiff's claim has some merit, then [we] should
1 While we have allowed plaintiff’s lead counsel until December 1 to withdraw as
counsel or explain why his withdrawal is not necessary, we are constrained to
observe that events may be overtaking this choice by counsel since Ms. Feinberg-
Harris’ latest submission clearly indicates that she intends to fire her spouse as her
counsel in this case.
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consider the following factors: (1) the plaintiff's ability to present his or
her own case; (2) the complexity of the legal issues; (3) the degree to
which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of the
plaintiff to pursue such investigation; (4) the amount a case is likely to
turn on credibility determinations; (5) whether the case will require the
testimony of expert witnesses; [and] (6) whether the plaintiff can attain
and afford counsel on his own behalf.
Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d at 457. There is yet another practical consideration
which must be taken into account when considering motions for appointment of
counsel. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly
observed:
Finally, in addressing this issue, we must take note of the significant
practical restraints on the district courts' ability to appoint counsel: the
ever-growing number of prisoner civil rights actions filed each year in
the federal courts; the lack of funding to pay appointed counsel; and the
limited supply of competent lawyers who are willing to undertake such
representation without compensation. We have no doubt that there are
many cases in which district courts seek to appoint counsel but there is
simply none willing to accept appointment. It is difficult to fault a
district 	court 	that 	denies 	a 	request 	for 	appointment 	under 	such
circumstances.
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 1993). Mindful of this consideration, it
has been emphasized that volunteer lawyer time is extremely valuable. Hence,
district courts should not request counsel under § 1915(d) indiscriminately. As the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has warned: “Volunteer lawyer time is a
precious commodity. . . . Because this resource is available in only limited quantity,
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every assignment of a volunteer lawyer to an undeserving client deprives society of
a volunteer lawyer available for a deserving cause. We cannot afford that waste.”
Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989). See also Tabron v.
Grace, 6 F.3d at 157.
In this case, our analysis of these factors leads us to conclude that counsel
should not be appointed in this case at the present time. Appointment of counsel
would be premature since we have not had the opportunity to fully consider the
threshold factor we must examine: the arguable merits of the plaintiffs’ claims which
are the subject of pending motions to dismiss. Taking all of these factors into account
we DENY this request to appoint counsel, (Doc 77), at this time without prejudice
to re-examining this issue as this litigation progresses.
SO ORDERED, this 25 th day of November 2025.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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