Bowie v. Hower et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TYREE BOWIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
KYLE HOWER, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 1:24-CV-02105
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
This lawsuit arises from the prosecution of Tyree Bowie (“Bowie”) for the
murder of two-year-old Dante Mullinix (“Dante”), which resulted in acquittal.
Bowie alleges that certain Defendants instituted a malicious prosecution against
him and that others fabricated evidence in the pursuit thereof. Defendants now
move to dismiss Bowie’s claims. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant
Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
This description of facts is drawn from the materials the court may properly
consider at this stage of litigation. Here, the universe of materials is limited to the
“the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint[,]
and matters of public record.” 1 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp v. White Consol.
1 Bowie asks the court to consider two hearing transcripts from his state prosecution, which are
attached to one of his briefs. (Docs. 31-1 & 31-2.) With no objection from Defendants, the court
will consider those documents in resolving the present motions. Orndorf v. Fye, No. 3:22-cv-
00012, 2023 WL 4034449, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 15, 2023) (quoting In re Mechanicsburg
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Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). The court does not consider
allegations made for the first time in opposition briefs. See Katchur v. Thomas
Jefferson Univ., 354 F. Supp. 3d 655, 662 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (citing Pa. ex rel.
Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988)) (“[T]he Third
Circuit has instructed that a court may not consider additional or contradictory
facts alleged in an opposition brief when deciding a motion to dismiss.”).
A. Events Preceding Dante’s Death
On September 6, 2018, Bowie spent the afternoon with Leah Mullinix
(“Mullinix”) and her son, Dante. (Doc. 16, ¶ 11.) The three mostly drove together
around York, Pennsylvania, and spent time with Laci Peiffer (“Peiffer”), one of
Bowie’s friends. (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) Around 8:00 p.m., Mullinix told Bowie that she
was suffering a migraine and asked to be taken to a hospital for treatment. (Id.
¶ 16.) Bowie obliged and delivered Mullinix to York Hospital around 8:30 p.m.
(Id. ¶ 17.) Dante remained with Bowie so that Mullinix could receive treatment
without having to worry about Dante’s care. (Id. ¶ 18.) Mullinix left Bowie with a
diaper bag filled with supplies and food, including a bag of Teddy Grahams. (Id.
¶¶ 19–20.)
Fitness, Inc., 596 B.R. 24, 29 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2019)) (“Public records include criminal case
dispositions, letter decisions of government agencies, published reports of administrative bodies,
judicial opinions, and hearing transcripts.”).
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Neither Bowie nor Dante stayed with Mullinix at the hospital. (See id. ¶ 21.)
Instead, they left to go to Peiffer’s home. (See id.) Before traveling there,
however, the two stopped at a Rutter’s convenience store. (Id.) As Bowie was
parking at Rutter’s, “Dante went to the floor of the passenger side of the backseat”
and began “acting strangely.” (Id. ¶¶ 22, 123.) The complaint does not allege
what caused Dante to go the floor or in what ways he was acting strangely. Nor
does it allege whether or not Dante was in a child’s car seat. Bowie walked around
to the passenger-side rear window and observed Dante for about 15 seconds. (Id.
¶¶ 23, 118.) Eventually, Bowie and Dante, under his own power, walked together
into the Rutter’s. (Doc. 31-1, p. 8.) 2
Bowie then drove with Dante to Peiffer’s residence. (Doc. 16, ¶ 24.) They
were not able to enter, because Bowie had lost his key to the residence. (Id. ¶ 25.)
So they waited in Bowie’s car for approximately 30 to 45 minutes. (Id. ¶ 26.)
After waiting, they began traveling back to York Hospital to visit Mullinix. (Id.
¶ 27.) During this drive, Bowie video called Mullinix, who could see that Dante
appeared in good health. (Id. ¶ 28.)
Allegedly while on the phone with Mullinix, Bowie gave Dante the bag of
Teddy Grahams. (Id. ¶ 41.) Several minutes later, Bowie heard a thud and saw
Dante’s body slumped over. (Id. ¶ 31.) Bowie pulled the car over, brought Dante
2 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
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into the front seat, and noticed that Dante was having difficulty breathing. (Id.
¶¶ 32, 34.) Presumably under a belief that this difficulty was caused by an
obstruction, Bowie immediately stuck his fingers down Dante’s throat in an
attempt to dislodge the obstruction. (Id. ¶ 34.) In doing so, Bowie could feel that
half-consumed Teddy Grahams were, in fact, causing an obstruction. (Id.) Bowie
was unsuccessful in dislodging the Teddy Grahams. (Id. ¶ 35.) So, he then
performed mouth-to-mouth breathing on Dante. (Id.) This was partially successful
insomuch as Dante coughed up some Teddy Grahams onto Bowie’s face, the
residue of which Bowie wiped on his pants. (Id. ¶¶ 36–37.) Nevertheless, a
blockage remained in Dante’s airways. (Id. ¶ 39.) Realizing this, Bowie resumed
driving to York Hospital. (Id.)
On his way, Dante again video called Mullinix to inform her of Dante’s
emergency. (Id. ¶ 42.) He then attempted to perform chest compressions on Dante
while Dante laid between Bowie’s torso and the steering wheel. (Id. ¶ 43.) This,
too, was unsuccessful. (See id.) Bowie eventually delivered Dante to York
Hospital around 10:45 p.m. (Id. ¶ 44.) Once Dante was in the care of hospital
personnel, Bowie left for Peiffer’s residence, knowing that Mullinix was at the
hospital. (Id. ¶ 45.) There, Bowie allegedly threw away the bag of Teddy
Grahams. (Id. ¶ 46.) At the hospital, Dante received treatment overnight and was
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later flown to Hershey Medical Center for additional treatment. (Id. ¶ 48.)
Tragically, Dante died several days later. (Id. ¶ 49.)
B. Investigation of Dante’s Death
Defendant Kyler Hower (“Hower”) was one of the York City Police
Department detectives who investigated Dante’s death. He first interviewed Bowie
the day after Dante allegedly choked on Teddy Grahams. (Id. ¶ 70.) This
interview was allegedly “extremely aggressive” and involved Hower repeatedly
accusing Bowie of killing Dante. (Id. ¶ 71.)3 Bowie denied Hower’s accusations
and explained that Dante had choked on Teddy Grahams. (Id. ¶ 72.) To
corroborate this story, Bowie pointed out the Teddy Grahams residue on his jeans
from the night before, which he was still wearing. (Id. ¶ 73.) A second, similar
interview between Hower and Bowie occurred on September 18, 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 78–
81.) Hower allegedly again accused Bowie of killing Dante, and Bowie again
denied this charge and insisted that Dante choked on Teddy Grahams. (Id.)
On September 19, 2018, Hower filed a criminal complaint against Bowie
accompanied by an affidavit of probable cause (“Hower Affidavit”), charging
Bowie with criminal homicide and endangering the welfare of a child. (Doc. 16-
1.) The Hower Affidavit stated that an autopsy of Dante was conducted by the
3 The amended complaint does not explain why Hower would accuse Bowie of killing Dante on
September 7 when Dante allegedly died “several days” after September 6. (Doc. 16, ¶ 49.)
Nevertheless, this discrepancy is immaterial to resolving Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
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Dauphin County Coroner’s Office. (Id. at 4.) The pathologist who conducted the
autopsy was Defendant Dr. Wayne Ross (“Dr. Ross”). (Doc. 31-1, p. 16.) The
Hower Affidavit indicated that the autopsy revealed Dante’s death was a homicide
caused by traumatic brain injury, strangulation, and suffocation. (Doc. 16-1, p. 4.)
It also indicated two noteworthy statements that Bowie told Hower during their
first interview. First, Bowie was the only individual with Dante when he stopped
breathing. (Id.) Second, no other individual, beside Bowie, was present with
Dante between when Bowie delivered Mullinix to the hospital and when Bowie
delivered Dante there. (Id.)
Two days later, on September 21, Hower interviewed Peiffer at her
residence. (Doc. 16, ¶ 82.) Hower allegedly told Peiffer during the interview that
Bowie’s “story is complete bullshit” and that the police “absolutely [had] hard
evidence” linking Bowie to the charged crimes. (Id. ¶¶ 83, 84.) He then obtained
Peiffer’s consent to search her residence so that he could take pictures of Dante’s
diaper bag. (Id. ¶¶ 86, 87.) Hower subsequently inspected the diaper bag, which at
this time did not contain the empty bag of Teddy Grahams. (Id. ¶ 88.) Peiffer
offered to show the empty bag to Hower, but he refused, allegedly stating, “[w]e
don’t need them. [Bowie]’s guilty.” (Id. ¶¶ 89–90.) Subsequently, Peiffer gave
the bag to Bowie’s criminal defense attorney. (Id. ¶ 92.) 	This allegedly enraged
Hower and led him to threaten Peiffer with criminal tampering charges. (Id. ¶ 94.)
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The investigation into Dante’s death continued into 2019. By February of
that year, investigators were still awaiting laboratory testing on evidence collected
contemporaneously with the September 6 incident. (See id. ¶¶ 101–103.)
Eventually, the results confirmed that “certain tan crusty material” recovered from
Bowie’s jeans and the interior of his car was “consistent with Teddy Grahams
residue.” (Id. ¶ 104.)
C. Bowie’s Preliminary Hearing
Bowie’s preliminary hearing occurred on December 12, 2018. (Id. ¶ 96.)
Two witnesses testified at this hearing, Hower and Dr. Ross. Hower testified, in
relevant part, that Bowie “verified” several times “that he was the only one in care
of [Dante] from the time he left the hospital to the time he returned and also
verified that at the time Dante stopped breathing, he was in care of him.” (Doc.
31-1, p. 9.)
Dr. Ross reaffirmed his conclusion that Dante’s causes of death were
traumatic brain injury, strangulation, and chest compression. (Id. at 17.) Dr. Ross
detailed the injuries that led him to this conclusion. Dr. Ross observed “a series of
bruises around the scalp” and inside of the skull, id., which he described as “fresh
bruising consistent with the time period in which [Dante] went in the hospital,” id.
at 21. 	Dr. Ross also observed “bleeding on the brain” and “trauma deep in the
brain.” (Id. at 17.)
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Furthermore, Dr. Ross described “significant bruises over [Dante’s] face as
well as over his neck.” (Id.) The neck bruises, according to Dr. Ross, were “very
severe,” id. at 22, and consistent with “the hemorrhaging” he observed “deep in the
neck.” (Id. at 17.) Dr. Ross also indicated that he observed backwards neck
compression that was consistent with strangulation. (See id.)
Finally, Dr. Ross noticed bruises over the top of Dante’s chest as well as
inside it, which “indicated [Dante] also suffered chest compression.” (Id.) Dr.
Ross was pressed on cross-examination whether these chest injuries could have
been caused by CPR. (Id. at 19.) He responded that the injuries were too great to
be caused by CPR, whether done by a medical professional or a layperson. (Id. at
19–20.)
Dr. Ross also testified as to when he thought Dante sustained these injuries.
He explained that he had viewed the Rutter’s surveillance footage, which showed
Dante walking. (Id. at 17.) And, based on that video, Dr. Ross opined that Dante
suffered his injuries after the period recorded on that video. (Id. at 18.) Dr. Ross
elucidated his rationale when asked a clarifying question by the presiding
magisterial district judge:
THE COURT: And you're saying that the injuries that [Dante] had
when you examined him, you would have seen signs of that on [the
Rutter’s] video at that time?
[DR. ROSS]: Well, I would say that when I looked at the [Rutter’s]
video and compared the injuries he had, injuries that he had were so
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severe, so incapacitating, there's no way he's going to be walking
around like he was in the video.
(Id. at 23.)
Based on the evidence at the hearing, the magisterial district judge held
Bowie’s case over for trial.
D. Bowie’s Trial
Bowie’s trial began on December 5, 2022. (Doc. 16, ¶ 109.) The case was
prosecuted primarily by Rachel Sherman (“Sherman”) and Timothy Barker
(“Barker”), both of whom at the time were assistant district attorneys with the
York County District Attorney’s Office. (Id. ¶ 117.) Bowie’s amended complaint
details only one aspect of trial in particular: the testimony of Dana Ward
(“Ward”)—a detective with the York County District Attorney’s Office, id. ¶ 4—
about the Rutter’s surveillance footage.
Bowie highlights two specific aspects of Ward’s testimony, both of which
are about the accuracy of the Rutter’s footage. The first came on direct
examination by Sherman. Following presentation of the Rutter’s footage to the
jury, the following colloquy between Sherman and Ward ensued:
Q. 	The 	clips 	we 	just 	viewed, 	were 	those 	a 	fair 	and 	accurate
representations [sic] of the points of video where you see the Defendant
and [Dante] --
A. Yes.
Q. -- at the Rutter's?
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A. Yes.
(Doc. 31-2, p. 5.) The second came seemingly during cross-examination by
Bowie’s criminal defense attorney. That colloquy played out as follows:
Q. Okay. So let's move forward to the video that was taken at Rutter's,
the edited video, Commonwealth's Exhibit 65. Did you edit that video?
A. I did not.
Q. Okay. Is it your understanding, based upon your view of that video
today compared to when you saw the entire video, that basically it
encompassed everything, from the time right before my client arrived
to the point where he left?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. 	And to your knowledge, there were no glitches or missing
parts of that video when my client would have been in the picture?
A. No, sir.
(Doc. 31-2, p. 7.)
Bowie alleges that Ward’s testimony above was false. (Doc. 16, ¶ 118.) He
claims the video shown at trial by prosecutors omitted the 15-second window
during which he observed Dante in the backseat of his car. (Id.) Bowie also
alleges that Sherman and Barker both knew that Ward’s testimony was false, yet
failed to correct it in court. (Id. ¶¶ 119, 121, 122.) According to Bowie, omission
of this 15-second period was “materially misleading” at trial, because it suggested
that Bowie was not concerned about Dante’s health. (Id. ¶ 120.)
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Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on all charges, and
Bowie was released from custody. (Id. ¶ 143.) The present suit followed.
E. Procedural Posture of Present Lawsuit
Bowie filed his complaint in this matter on December 6, 2024. (Doc. 1.) He
then amended his complaint on March 20, 2025. (Doc. 16.) The amended
complaint lists five counts. Counts one and two assert malicious prosecution
claims against Hower pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania common
law, respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 150–59.) Counts three and four assert the same two
claims against Dr. Ross. (Id. ¶¶ 160–70.) Count five brings what is labelled as a
§ 1983 “Malicious Prosecution/Denial of Procedural Due Process” claim against
Hower, Ward, Sherman, and Barker. (Id. ¶¶ 171–78.)
On April 2, 2025, two motions to dismiss were filed. The first was filed
solely by Hower. (Doc. 18.) The second was filed collectively by Dr. Ross, Ward,
Sherman, and Barker. (Doc. 20.) The parties filed a panoply of briefs, all of which
the court has reviewed. (Docs. 19, 21, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 36, 37.) The motions
to dismiss are now ripe for adjudication.
J URISDICTION
The court has subject matter jurisdiction over Bowie’s § 1983 claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. Additionally, the court has supplemental
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jurisdiction over his state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is
proper in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
S TANDARD OF REVIEW
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient” to
survive a motion to dismiss. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir.
2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79). To determine whether a complaint
survives a motion to dismiss, a court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim for relief,” disregards the allegations “that are no more than
conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and determines
whether the remaining factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) abrogated on other
grounds as recognized in Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 319 n. 7 (3rd Cir. 2020).
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DISCUSSION
The parties’ briefing poses many questions of law. These include whether
Dr. Ross acted under the color of state law for § 1983 purposes, whether
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and whether Sherman and Barker
are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Many of Bowie’s arguments on
these questions, however, presuppose facts beyond what is alleged in or can
reasonably be inferred from the amended complaint. This discrepancy makes it
imprudent to consider all of these legal issues at this stage. Therefore, the court
only reaches the threshold question presented—whether Bowie has adequately
alleged his claims. The answer is no.
A. Malicious Prosecution Claims
The court begins with Bowie’s malicious prosecution claims. Both his
federal and state-law claims are only viable if probable cause did not exist to
initiate the prosecution against him. Brown v. Mercadante, 687 F. App’x 220, 223
(3d Cir. 2017) (applying Pennsylvania law); Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379
(3d Cir. 2016) (applying § 1983). The court’s analysis of Defendant’s malicious
prosecution claims begins and ends with this element.
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1. Legal Standard
A precise definition of probable cause is notoriously elusive. 4 See District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 232 (1983)) (“Probable cause . . . cannot be ‘reduced to a neat set of legal
rules.’”); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause
standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages . . . .”);
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (“Articulating precisely what . .
. ‘probable cause’ mean[s] is not possible.”). This is because probable cause “is a
‘practical, nontechnical conception’ that deals with ‘the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.’” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231).
Nevertheless, the core “substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Id. at 371 (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). In the specific context of malicious prosecution
actions, probable cause has been articulated as: “reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent man in the
same situation in believing that the party is guilty of the offense.” Napier v. City of
4 The standard for determining the existence of probable cause is the same under federal and
Pennsylvania law. Bracken v. Manor Twp., 665 F. Supp. 3d 675, 707 (W.D. Pa. 2023), aff’d sub
nom. Bracken v. Twp. of Manor, No. 23-1763, 2024 WL 4210535 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2024);
Watson v. Witmer, 183 F. Supp. 3d 607, 617 (M.D. Pa. 2016); Commonwealth v. Evans, 685
A.2d 535, 537 n.2 (Pa. 1996).
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New Castle, 407 F. App’x 578, 583 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Thomas v. E.J.
Korvette, Inc., 476 F.2d 471, 474 (3d Cir. 1973)). Meeting this standard is “not a
high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014).
When, like here, a neutral magistrate already determined that probable cause
existed by issuing an arrest warrant, the court “defers to [the warrant] unless the
officer misrepresented material information to get the warrant.” Pinkney v.
Meadville, 95 F.4th 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2024). This means that Bowie’s malicious
prosecution claims can succeed only if the Hower Affidavit included deliberately
or recklessly made material falsehoods or omissions such that probable cause
would not have existed without them. Id.; Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d
Cir. 2000).
Therefore, the court must “conduct a two-pronged analysis to determine
whether probable cause existed” to charge Bowie. Stafford v. Morris, 816 F.
App’x 712, 715 (3d Cir. 2020). First, the court must consider whether Hower
“made false statements or omissions” with “at least a reckless disregard for truth”
that “created a falsehood in applying for the warrant.” Id. (quoting Andrews v.
Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017)). Second, the court must consider
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whether such falsehoods or omissions were material to the finding of probable
cause. 5 Id.
While the analysis is “necessarily fact-intensive,” Dempsey v. Bucknell
Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 468 (3d Cir. 2016), “it is well settled that district courts may
decide the existence of probable cause as a matter of law.” Givens v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., No. 22-2989, 2023 WL 7144628, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 31, 2023). And,
indeed, courts “consistently reconstruct probable cause affidavits at the motion to
dismiss stage,” Jackson v. Sullivan, No. 24-cv-4235, 2025 WL 2731428, at *11
(D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2025), to determine whether “the facts alleged, viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the existence of probable cause.”
Nixon v. Rutter, No. 23-cv-627, 2024 WL 4651034, at *3 (D. Del. Nov. 1, 2024).
2. Reconstructing the Hower Affidavit
Bowie’s amended complaint does not explicitly identify any falsehoods or
omissions in the Hower Affidavit. Instead, it identifies two investigatory failures
that Bowie considers important generally to a probable-cause determination. (Doc.
16, ¶ 132.) First, he faults Hower and other trial witnesses for not offering a
motive as to why Bowie would harm Dante. (Id.) Second, he faults Dr. Ross for
5 Bowie argues that Hower did not make any arguments regarding this reconstruction analysis
and, thus, has waived such arguments. Regardless of specific sub-arguments, Hower clearly
argues that probable cause existed to charge Bowie. (E.g., Doc. 19, p. 18–19.) Thus, the court
does not consider this issue waived.
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not explaining the significance of the Teddy Graham residue to his cause-of-death
determination, id., even though the residue test results did not come back until after
Dr. Ross made this determination. (See id. ¶¶ 101–04.) These purported
investigatory failures do not go to the Hower Affidavit’s truthfulness.
The only mention of alleged falsehoods or omissions in the Hower Affidavit
come in Bowie’s briefing. (Doc. 25, pp. 14–15.) He identifies two. The first is
that Hower omitted from his description of the Rutter’s surveillance footage any
mention of the 15 seconds Bowie spent observing Dante through the car window.
(Id. at 14.) The second is that Hower omitted the existence of the empty Teddy
Grahams bag. 6 (Id. at 14–15.)
A generous reading of the amended complaint might support Bowie’s
assertion that Hower made these omissions with reckless disregard for truth.7
Although, there is no allegation that Hower knew about the empty bag’s existence
before his interview with Peiffer on September 21, two days after he submitted the
Hower Affidavit. (See Doc. 16, ¶ 82–89.) Nevertheless, even assuming these
6 Despite not being pleaded, these omissions are reasonable inferred from the facts alleged in the
amended complaint.
7 “[O]missions are made with reckless disregard if an officer withholds a fact in his ken that
‘[a]ny reasonable person would have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish
to know.’” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788 (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th
Cir. 1993)).
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omissions were made with reckless disregard, arguendo, Bowie has not adequately
alleged that the omissions were material to the probable-cause determination.
The Hower Affidavit details significant inculpatory evidence, none of which
Bowie alleges was included with reckless disregard for truth. It reports that the
Dauphin County Coroner’s Officer ruled Dante’s death a homicide caused by
traumatic brain injury, strangulation, and suffocation. (Doc. 16-1, p. 4.) It details
the observation of detectives that Dante “appear[ed] to be healthy and able to walk
on his own” at the Rutter’s shortly before he was brought to the hospital. (Id.) It
reports that Bowie told Hower that “no other adults,” other than himself, “were
present that could have caused these injuries” between the time Bowie and Dante
left the hospital to the time they returned. (Id.) It notes that Bowie also told
Hower that Dante was in Bowie’s care when Dante stopped breathing. (Id.)
The fact that an empty Teddy Grahams bag was at Peiffer’s residence or that
Bowie spent 15 seconds staring at Dante through a car window at the Rutter’s,
without more, does not undermine the inculpatory evidence in the Hower
Affidavit. On balance, a reasonable person would believe Bowie committed an
offense considering both the exculpatory alleged omissions and the inculpatory
evidence. See generally Cummings v. City of Philadelphia, 137 F. App’x 504, 506
(3d Cir. 2005) (“In assessing whether probable cause exists, the inculpatory
evidence should be weighed against the exculpatory evidence to determine whether
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a reasonable person would believe an offense has been committed by the
suspect.”).
3. Dissipation of Probable Cause
Bowie alternatively alleges that even if probable cause existed at the time he
was charged, probable cause “dissipated” when lab results showed that the tan
crusty material found in his car was consistent with moist Teddy Grahams residue.
(Doc. 16, ¶ 152.) Bowie is correct to suggest that probable cause must exist
throughout a criminal prosecution. See Thompson v. City of Williamsport, No.
4:22-.CV-01159, 2023 WL 8005306, at *13 n.175 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2023)
(“[T]hat the prosecution was initiated with probable cause does not necessarily
defeat a malicious prosecution action if the prosecution continued after probable
cause dissipated.”); Naslanic v. Gula, No. 3:15-CV-2208, 2018 WL 1886526, at *6
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018), R. & R. adopted sub nom., Naslanic v. Musto, 2018 WL
1886493 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2018) (“Where intervening events negate probable
cause, and the authorities know of those intervening events but fail to act,
government actors may still be sued for malicious prosecution if they persist in
pursuing a case long after probable cause has collapsed.”).
But, Bowie places too much stock in this evidence. Consider Dr. Ross’s
testimony at Bowie’s preliminary hearing, which occurred before the Teddy
Grahams testing returned. At the hearing, Dr. Ross opined that Dante suffered
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significant injuries to his head, throat, and chest. (Doc. 31-1, p. 17.) He opined
that Dante had to have suffered these injuries after he was seen walking at Rutter’s,
because his injuries would have been “so incapacitating” that he would not have
been able to walk like he did at Rutter’s. (Id. at 23.) And, consider that Bowie
admitted to Hower that no other adult was with Dante between their time leaving
the hospital and returning. (Doc. 16-1, p. 4.) These facts establish probable cause.
Now ask whether these facts are undermined by the detection of Teddy Grahams
residue in Bowie’s car. The answer plainly is no. The residue has nothing to do
with the severe injuries Dr. Ross observed during Dante’s autopsy. It has nothing
to do with Dr. Ross’s medical opinion that Dante suffered these injuries after being
at the Rutter’s. It has nothing to do with the fact that Bowie was the only
individual with Dante after they left the Rutter’s. At most, this evidence
corroborates Bowie’s description of what happened to Dante while he was caring
for him. But Bowie’s description does not clearly explain Dante’s cause of death,
and the evidence regarding cause of death contradicts Bowie’s description in any
event. Therefore, on the facts alleged here, the court cannot say that the existence
of Teddy Grahams residue in Bowie’s car negated probable cause given the
substantial evidence establishing probable cause.
Ultimately, Bowie has failed to allege that Hower lacked probable cause to
file and maintain the charges. This dooms all of Bowie’s malicious prosecution
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claims. Accordingly, the court will dismiss counts one through four of the
amended complaint.
B. Procedural Due Process Claim
As recognized by the Third Circuit, the government’s use of “fabricat[ed]
evidence to charge or convict [a] defendant” is an affront to “the defendant’s right
to due process of law.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 292 (3d Cir. 2014).
Indeed, “no sensible concept of ordered liberty is consistent with law enforcement
cooking up its own evidence.” Id. at 292–93. Bowie claims that Defendants
Ward, Bower, Sherman, and Barker violated his right to due process through the
introduction of fabricated evidence. (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 171–78.) Specifically, the
“fabricated evidence” upon which Defendants relied, according to Bowie, is an
excerpt of the Rutter’s surveillance footage shown at trial that omitted the 15
seconds when Bowie was watching Dante through the car window. (See id.)
For his claim to proceed, Bowie must adequately plead that “there is a
reasonable likelihood that, absent th[e] fabricated evidence, [he] would not have
been criminally charged.” Black v. Montgomery Cty., 835 F.3d 358, 371 (3d Cir.
2016). A “notable bar” must be cleared for “evidence to be considered
‘fabricated.’” Id. at 372. Only in the unusual case will a plaintiff prevail on a
§ 1983 fabricated-evidence claim. Boseman v. Upper Providence Twp., 680 F.
App’x 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2017); Black, 835 F.3d at 372; Halsey, 750 F.3d at 295.
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Fabricated evidence is not “testimony that is incorrect or simply disputed.” Black,
835 F.3d at 372; see Golden v. Tully, No. 14-cv-3858, 2018 WL 5296374, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2018) (“A fabrication of evidence claim will not survive where
the ‘fabricated’ evidence consists of disputed statements in a police report, or ‘he-
said, she-said’ testimony.”); Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)
(defining “fabricated evidence” as “[f]alse or deceitful evidence that is unlawfully
created, usu[ally] after the relevant event, in an attempt to achieve or avoid liability
or conviction”). Bowie has failed to satisfy this standard for two reasons.
First, Bowie has not adequately alleged that the excerpted Rutter’s video
was “fabricated.” Bowie does not allege that law enforcement or the prosecutors
altered the timeline of the footage shown at trial or surreptitiously deleted footage
from the video. Instead, his position rests on the logic that presenting an excerpt of
a longer video means it is fabricated. That is not correct. This is not to say that an
excerpted video can never be considered fabricated. One can imagine a case in
which an excerpted video might rise to the level of fabricated if, for example, the
original full video was not provided in discovery and the defendant was not aware
of the un-excerpted video. But, this is not that case here. Bowie has not alleged
that he did not have access to the full video. In fact, at trial, his counsel referred to
the video as the “edited video” when cross-examining Ward. (Doc. 31-2, p. 7.)
Here, it simply appears that prosecutors chose to play an excerpt of a longer video
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during Ward’s testimony and that Ward testified the video was a fair and accurate
representation of what happened. Bowie could have disputed this testimony by
showing another excerpt of the video to display the omitted portion. At most, this
is the type of disputed evidence that is insufficient to support a fabricated-evidence
claim.
Second, there is no allegation that Bowie likely would not have been
charged had it not been for the presentation of the excerpted Rutter’s video. The
video was presented at trial, long after probable cause had been established through
the Hower Affidavit and the testimony at the preliminary hearing. It could not
have played a role in the decision to bring charges. See Kramer v. City of
Pittsburgh, No. 19-cv-539, 2020 WL 5797940, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2020)
(dismissing § 1983 fabricated-evidence claim when the alleged fabricated evidence
only involved trial testimony, because such evidence “could not have affected
whether [p]laintiff had been criminally charged in the first place”).
Perhaps recognizing this failing, Bowie’s briefing attempts to recast his
claim. In his briefing, Bowie states that prosecutors and law enforcement altered
the Rutter’s surveillance footage throughout the investigation of Dante’s death in
order to pursue Bowie. (E.g., Doc. 24, p. 15.) Such conduct is neither alleged in
Bowie’s amended complaint nor reasonably inferred from the allegations he does
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make. The court, therefore, will not consider such claims in ruling on Defendants’
motion to dismiss. Katchur, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 662 n.3.
The court determines that Bowie has failed to plead a § 1983 claim against
Defendants for using fabricated evidence. Thus, count five of Bowie’s amended
complaint will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Bowie’s amended complaint will be
dismissed. However, the court cannot conclude that amendment would be futile,
especially given the discrepancies between the allegations in the amended
complaint and the factual assertions made in Bowie’s briefing. Therefore, the
dismissal of all counts will be without prejudice. An appropriate order will issue.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: January 28, 2026
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