Pauletta v. Officer Sanguinito et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT PAULETTA,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER SANGUINITO, et al.,
Defendants.
: 	NO. 1:24-CV-01299
:
: 	(WILSON, D.J.)
:
: 	(CAMONI, M.J.)
:
:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court are Defendants Officer Sanguinito and
Andrew Parsons (“Police Defendants”) and Michael Carroll’s motions to
dismiss, 	docs. 	34-35, 	Plaintiff 	Robert 	Pauletta’s 	Second 	Amended
Complaint, doc. 32. The undersigned respectfully recommends that the
Court grant the Defendants’ motions.
I. 	BACKGROUND 1
In July 2024, officer Sanguinito pulled over Pauletta’s vehicle to
conduct a window tinting test. Doc. 32 ¶¶ 11-12. Pauletta’s vehicle failed
that test because it exceeded the “30 percent regulation on all the
windows.” Id. ¶ 12. As a result, Officer Sanguinito issued two notices to
1 In considering this motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all factual
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as true. See Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).
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Pauletta’s vehicle, requiring Pauletta to remove a tinted covering from
his license plate, and all window tinting. Id. ¶ 13.
On August 2, 2024, the Police Defendants removed Pauletta’s state
court action to this Court. Notice of Removal, Doc. 1. Following the
Defendants’ previous motions to dismiss, Pauletta has amended the
complaint twice. See Docs. 17, 26.
In the Second Amended Complaint, Pauletta alleges three causes
of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) “Arbitrary”; (2) “Violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment”; and (3) “Regulation is Unconstitutional.” Doc.
32 ¶¶ 28, 38, 47.2 The Defendants moved to dismiss. Docs. 34-35. The
motions are fully briefed and ripe for resolution. Docs. 36-37, 39-40.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
2 The three causes of action are substantively the same. In essence, all
three claims challenge Pennsylvania’s window tint statute, 67 Pa. Code
§ 175.67, 	doc. 	32 	¶ 16, 	as 	unconstitutional 	under 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 30-31, 46, 56.
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more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation modified).
A 	district 	court 	must 	conduct 	a 	three-step 	analysis 	when
considering the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Malleus v.
George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must identify
“the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). Second, the court must identify all of the
plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, accept them as true, and
“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The court
can discard bare legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations
that merely state the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678, citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Third, the court must
determine whether “the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d
at 211, quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A facially plausible claim “allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 210, quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. On a
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no
claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750
(3d Cir. 2005).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The undersigned begins with Defendant Carroll’s motion to dismiss
as it raises a threshold issue: whether Pauletta has standing to sue.
Def.-Carroll’s Br., doc. 36 at 16-19; O’Hanlon v. Uber Techs., Inc., 990
F.3d 757, 763 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[S]tanding is always a threshold issue.”).
A. 	Carroll’s Motion to Dismiss
1. 	Standing
Carroll argues that Pauletta has not plausibly pleaded standing.
Doc. 36 at 16-19. Specifically, Carroll contends that Pauletta has not
pleaded: (1) injury in fact because Pauletta was not driving his vehicle
when officer Sanguinito issued the tint-violation ticket; (2) causation
because 	Pauletta 	does 	not 	plead 	that 	Carroll 	was 	involved 	with
promulgating the window tint regulation; and (3) redressability because
Carroll is not the proper party to ensure that the window tint regulation
is abandoned. Id.
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Article 	III 	of 	the 	Constitution 	limits 	federal 	courts 	to 	the
adjudication of cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Courts
meet 	the 	case-or-controversy 	requirement 	through 	the 	justiciability
doctrines. 	Allen 	v. 	Wright, 	468 	U.S. 	737, 	750 	(1984). 	Justiciability
doctrines include “standing, ripeness, mootness, the political question
doctrine, and the prohibition on advisory opinions.” Toll Bros., Inc. v.
Township of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009).
Standing 	doctrine 	consists 	of 	three 	elements 	that 	form 	an
“irreducible constitutional minimum” necessary to invoke the jurisdiction
of this Court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). It
requires 	a 	plaintiff 	to 	demonstrate: 	(1) 	a 	concrete, 	particularized
injury-in-fact, which must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) causation; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable decision
would redress the injury. See id. “As the Supreme Court has explained,
‘[g]overnment regulations that require or forbid some action by the
plaintiff almost invariably satisfy both the injury in fact and causation
requirements.” Bryman v. Murphy, 161 F.4th 174, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2025),
quoting FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024). Here,
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Pauletta has alleged sufficient facts that establish injury in fact and
causation.
Pauletta 	pleaded 	that 	he 	owns 	the 	vehicle 	that 	violated
Pennsylvania’s window tint regulation, and that the regulation requires
him to remove the tints which would lead Pauletta to spend “thousands
of dollars in modifications.” Doc. 32 ¶¶ 16, 43. He has alleged that a
Pennsylvania statute, 67 Pa. Code § 175.67, forbids him from tinting his
vehicle’s windows above a certain level and requires him to replace his
windows. Thus, Pauletta has sufficiently alleged injury in fact and
causation. See Bryman, 161 F.4th at 179-80.
Pauletta also pleaded redressability. It is likely that Pauletta’s
injuries will be redressed if the Court were to declare Pennsylvania’s
window tint regulation as unconstitutional and unenforceable because he
will no longer have to pay to fix his windows. Although Carroll argues
that he is not the right party, doc. 36 at 19, standing to sue “is generally
not an inquiry into whether the plaintiff has got the right defendant.”
Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 348 (3d Cir. 2016). Thus, at this stage,
the undersigned finds that Pauletta has standing to sue.
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2. 	Sovereign Immunity
Carroll 	further 	argues 	that 	the 	Eleventh 	Amendment 	bars
Pauletta’s suit against him. Doc. 36 at 25. Carroll is correct in so far as
Pauletta is seeking damages. Doc. 32 ¶¶ 68-73.
State governments and their subsidiary units are immune from suit
in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Betts v. New Castle
Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, under § 1983,
“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
‘persons’,” subject to a lawsuit for damages. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,
26 (1991), quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). 	This 	is 	because 	the 	“Eleventh 	Amendment 	has 	long 	been
interpreted to prohibit,” “a suit brought by a citizen against his own
state.” Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). The
amendment, 	however, 	“does 	not 	bar 	a 	suit 	seeking 	declaratory 	or
injunctive relief against the same officials.” Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661
F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir. 1981), citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
“The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation is a state agency,” and
“Congress has not abrogated the States’ immunity from section 1983
actions, . . . and Pennsylvania has withheld its consent to suit in federal
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court.” Nails v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 414 F. App’x 452, 455 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted).
Here, Pauletta does not specify whether he sues Carroll in his
individual or official capacity. See doc. 32 ¶ 2. To the extent that Pauletta
sues Carroll in his official capacity for damages, his suit is barred under
the Eleventh Amendment because Carroll is an official of a state agency.
See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 26; Nails, 414 F. App’x at 455; see also Pa. Env’t
Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238, 247 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (holding
that the Pennsylvania secretary of highways is immune from lawsuits
even though the plaintiff has also sued the secretary in his individual
capacity because relief can only realistically be granted against the State
itself).
3. 	Personal Involvement
“The eleventh amendment does not bar an action for damages
against an official sued in his individual capacity.” Thornburgh, 661 F.2d
at 26. Pauletta does not specify whether he sues Carroll in his individual
capacity, but the undersigned construes his pro se pleading broadly and
assumes 	arguendo 	that he does. Under that assumption, the Court
should still dismiss Pauletta’s suit against Carroll because Pauletta
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“alleged no facts showing that [Carroll] had any personal involvement”
in Pauletta’s alleged injury. Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver &
Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019). “Because § 1983 does not
allow vicarious liability, ‘a plaintiff must plead that each Government-
official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.’” Id., quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
Here, Pauletta’s injury stems from Officer Sanguinito issuing a
ticket based on his vehicle’s violation of Pennsylvania’s window tint
regulation. Doc. 32 ¶¶ 12, 16. Pauletta fails to allege any facts that
suggest 	Carroll 	was 	involved 	in 	either 	issuing 	the 	ticket 	or 	in
promulgating the regulation. In fact, the Second Amended Complaint is
devoid 	of 	any 	factual 	allegations 	against 	Carroll. 	See 	doc. 	32
¶¶ 10-16. Because 	Pauletta 	fails 	to 	establish 	Carroll’s 	personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs, the undersigned recommends that the
Court grant Carroll’s motion to dismiss. 	See Gillow v. Pa. Dep’t of
Transp., No. 23-521, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13805, at *9-10 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 25, 2024) (dismissing a plaintiff’s complaint that failed to allege
Secretary Carroll’s personal involvement or state a claim against him).
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4. 	Failure to state a claim
Having concluded that dismissal of Pauletta’s claim for damages
against Carroll in his official and individual capacity is appropriate, the
undersigned addresses whether Pauletta states a plausible claim against
Carroll for injunctive or declaratory relief.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, no state shall “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Pauletta alleges that Pennsylvania’s window tint
regulation “is unconstitutional” because “the regulation illegally racially
targets minorities resulting in illegal stop and frisk.” Doc. 32 ¶ 48. But
contrary 	to 	Pauletta’s 	allegations, 	Pennsylvania’s 	window 	tint
regulation, 67 Pa. Code § 175.67, is race neutral. The regulation does not
classify individuals based upon “race, alienage, or national origin.” City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
Pauletta alleges further that under the regulation:
White males are less likely to be illegal [sic] racially profiled
and illegally stopped and frisked since they drive pickup
trucks / SUVs, as pick-up trucks and SUVs have no tinting
requirements for rear side windows and rear windows [ ]. In
opposite, blacks / minorities are more likely to be illegal [sic]
racially profiled and illegally stopped and frisked. The most
popular cars among the black minorities are Toyota Camry,
Honda Accord, Chevrolet Impala, Ford Mustang and Nissan
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Altima. All of these cars are very popular for window tinting,
espically [sic] late model cars.
Doc. 32 ¶ 52.
Taking 	his 	allegations 	as 	true, 	Pauletta 	may 	be 	alleging 	a
disparate-impact 	claim. 	The 	Supreme 	Court, 	however, 	has 	plainly
rejected the idea that “a law, neutral on its face and serving ends
otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the
Equal 	Protection 	Clause 	simply 	because 	it 	may 	affect 	a 	greater
proportion of one race than of another.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976). It held that absent proof of discriminatory purpose, a law
or official act does not violate the constitution “solely because it has a . . .
disproportionate impact.” Id. at 239 (emphasis in original). “At bottom,
Davis 	was 	a 	recognition 	of 	‘the 	settled 	rule 	that 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results.’” Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 375 (1996), quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 273 (1979).
Here, Pauletta fails to plead any facts to raise a plausible claim that
Pennsylvania’s window tint regulation has a discriminatory purpose or
that it is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Doe
ex rel. Doe v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 524, 551 (3d Cir. 2011),
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citing United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that
rational basis review applies “absent a racially discriminatory purpose,
explicit or inferable, on the part of the [decisionmaker].”).
Under rational basis review, the challenged regulation must be
upheld if it is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id., citing
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Pennsylvania’s
window tint regulation is rationally related to a legitimate interest “if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.” Id., citing Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2
F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1993).
Because Pauletta has failed to allege any facts that indicates the
window tint regulation has a discriminatory purpose or is not rationally
related to a legitimate government interest, the undersigned finds that
Pauletta’s Equal Protection claim fails to state a claim.
B. 	Police Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Turning 	to 	the 	Police 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	the
undersigned 	recommends 	that 	the 	Court 	grant 	the 	motion 	because
Pauletta fails to allege the personal involvement of police chief Parsons
and Officer Sanguinito is entitled to qualified immunity.
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1. 	Personal Involvement
The personal involvement analysis discussed above applies with
equal force to Pauletta’s claims against Police Chief Parsons. As the
Police Defendants correctly point out, “the Complaint does not identify a
single action or inaction taken by Andrew Parsons.” Police Defs.’ Br., doc.
37 at 13; see doc. 36 ¶¶ 10-16. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends
that the Court dismiss Andrew Parsons from the action. See Hudson v.
McKeesport Police Chief, 244 F. App’x 519, 522 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming
dismissal of a defendant because the plaintiff failed to provide “any basis
for a claim against him,” and “merely includes [the defendant] in the
caption of his complaint”); Walsh v. Fuentes, No. 16-1498, 2016 WL
4070167, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 29, 2016) (finding appropriate to dismiss
an action for failure to state a claim where the complaint fails to allege
any personal involvement by any of the captioned defendants).
2. 	Qualified Immunity
The Police Defendants next contend that Officer Sanguinito is
entitled to qualified immunity. Doc. 37 at 13. To determine whether
government officials should receive qualified immunity, courts apply a
two-part test: (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of any
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constitutional or statutory rights; and (2) whether those rights were
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct, such that a
reasonable official would have known that the conduct violated the
plaintiff’s rights. Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 99 F.4th 639,
642 (3d Cir. 2024), citing Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 188 (3d
Cir. 2024). The Court must determine whether a constitutional right is
clearly established such that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that
his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Donaldson v.
Mugavero, 126 F. App’x 63, 65 (3d Cir. 2005), quoting Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “The evaluation of objective reasonableness is
based upon the information possessed by the officer at the time of the
illegal conduct.” Id., quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 207-08. “[Q]ualified
immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the immunity is
established 	on 	the 	face 	of 	the 	complaint.” 	Thomas 	v. 	Independence
Township, 463 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2006), quoting Leveto v. Lapina, 258
F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001).
Here, officer Sanguinito’s qualified immunity is clearly established
on the face of the Second Amended Complaint because both prongs of the
test weigh in favor of immunity. First, Pauletta’s only constitutional
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claim is that the window tint regulation results in enforcement based on
racial profiling and illegal stop and frisks. Doc. 32 ¶¶ 39, 49. Assuming
that the window tint regulation could have such a disparate impact on
minorities, Pauletta fails to allege how Sanguinito’s conduct in pulling
over 	his 	vehicle 	was 	illegal. 	Taking 	Pauletta’s 	allegations 	as 	true,
Sanguinito merely enforced the law to pull over his vehicle for illegal
tinting in violation of 67 Pa. Code 175.67(d)(4) and issued a ticket to fix
the windows. Doc. 32 ¶¶ 11-12, 16. At bottom, Pauletta’s constitutional
claim is based on his claim that the regulation itself is unconstitutional,
not that officer Sanguinito’s conduct was illegal.
To be sure, even if Pauletta had alleged that Sanguinito’s conduct
was objectively unreasonable in enforcing the tint regulation, courts in
the Third Circuit have held that police officers enforcing Pennsylvania’s
window 	tint 	regulation 	are 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity. 	Gass 	v.
Murphy, No. 11-1584, 2013 WL 5488712, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2013)
(holding that officers are entitled to qualified immunity because they
were justified in pulling over the vehicle for the tinted window violation);
Grooms Hauling LLC v. Robinson, No. 18-5404, 2020 WL 374449, at *4,
*8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2020) (holding that individual police officers are
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protected by qualified immunity for enforcing Pennsylvania’s window
tint regulation against a plaintiff claiming that the officers selectively
enforced the window tinting law based on racial profiling).
The 	Second 	Amended 	Complaint 	merely 	establishes 	that
Sanguinito followed a Pennsylvania law to issue a ticket for Pauletta’s
vehicle which violated a window tint regulation. Therefore, Sanguinito is
entitled to qualified immunity.3
IV. 	LEAVE TO AMEND
The Third Circuit instructs this Court to grant leave to amend when
a pro se plaintiff has filed a complaint subject to dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6), unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. Mullin v.
Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). In consideration of Pauletta’s
status as a pro se litigant, he was given two chance to correct deficiencies
in his pleadings. See May 8, 2025, Order, doc. 31 at 4 (“The Court thus
elects to grant Pauletta’s motion [for leave to amend], but as Pauletta has
amended his complaint twice thus far, . . . further amendments may not
3 	Because 	the 	undersigned 	recommends 	dismissal 	of 	the 	Police
Defendants on other grounds, the undersigned does not reach their Rule
12(b)(6) argument.
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be 	granted 	absent 	exceptional 	circumstances.”). 	For 	the 	reasons
explained here, it would be futile to permit Pauletta to amend a third
time. The undersigned, therefore, respectfully recommends that the
Court dismiss the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.
V. 	RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
(1) 	Defendant 	Carroll’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	doc. 	34, 	be
GRANTED;
(2) 	The 	Police 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	doc. 	35, 	be
GRANTED; and
(3) 	The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written 	objections 	which 	shall 	specifically 	identify 	the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
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recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may 	also 	receive 	further 	evidence, 	recall 	witnesses, 	or
recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Date: February 6, 2026 	s/ Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge
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