Segura, Jr. v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JULIO CEASAR SEGURA, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 1:24-CV-00960
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is an amended complaint filed by Julio Ceasar Segura, Jr.
(“Plaintiff”), an inmate currently held at the State Correctional Institution Forest
(“SCI-Forest”), in Marienville, Pennsylvania, bringing constitutional claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court will screen the amended complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss the First Amendment claims of retaliation
associated with the August 21, 2023 events and the denial of access to the court.
The court will serve the amended complaint on the newly identified 17 defendants.
PROCEDURAL H ISTORY
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint in June of 2024. (Doc. 1.)
The original complaint names ten defendants: (1) the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (“DOC”); (2) Dr. Laurel R. Harry (“Harry”), Secretary of the DOC;
(3) Micheal Gourley (“Gourley”), the Superintendent/Facility Manager of SCI-
Camp Hill; (4) Albert, Major of Security at SCI-Camp Hill; (5) John Doe 1, Shift
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Commander/Captain at SCI-Camp Hill; (6) Ferringer, Lieutenant at SCI-Camp
Hill; (7) John Doe 2, Sargent at SCI-Camp Hill; (8) Vega, Correctional Officer at
SCI-Camp Hill; (9) Ebersole, Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; and (10)
John Doe 3, Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill. (Doc. 1, pp. 3–5.)1
On June 11, 2024, the court entered an administrative order requiring the
payment of the filing fee or an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 6.)
On June 26, 2024, the court received and docketed Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and a certified prisoner trust fund account statement. (Docs. 8, 9.)
On July 2, 2024, the court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis, dismissing all claims against DOC, and serving the complaint
on the remaining named Defendants. (Doc. 10.) On September 4, 2024, the
remaining Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. (Doc. 15.) On
October 7, 2024, Defendants filed their brief in support of the motion. (Doc. 21.)
On October 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition. (Doc. 23.) On January
29, 2025, the court received and docketed a letter from Plaintiff written as a
supplement to Plaintiff’s brief in opposition. (Doc. 24.)
On June 9, 2025, the court entered a memorandum and order granting the
motion to dismiss in part. (Docs. 28, 29.) The court dismissed all claims against
Defendants Harry, Vega, and Ebersole without prejudice for lack of personal
1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
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involvement. (Doc. 28, p. 8; Doc. 29.) The court dismissed all First Amendment
claims of retaliation without prejudice because Plaintiff did not identify the
grievances at issue or the subjects of the grievances at issue. (Doc. 28, p. 11; Doc.
29.) The court dismissed all First Amendment denial of access to the courts claims
without prejudice because Plaintiff did not allege that he lost the chance to pursue
a non-frivolous claim. (Doc. 28, p. 12; Doc. 29.) The court dismissed all RA and
ADA claims without prejudice because allegations that a failure to properly treat
his mental health impairments does not support such claims. (Doc. 28, pp. 14–15;
Doc. 29.) Only the Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force, cruel and
unusual punishment, and deliberate indifference and Fourteenth Amendment due
process claims 2 survived the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 28; Doc. 29.)
Defendants answered the remaining claims in the complaint on August 18,
2025. (Doc. 37.) The court then entered a case management order setting forth a
December 31, 2025 deadline to file motions to join additional parties and amend
pleadings. (Doc. 37.)
Just prior to Defendants filing an answer to the complaint in the above-
captioned action, Plaintiff initiated a second civil action in this court alleging
continued use of force occurring on August 22 and 23, 2023. Segura v. Harry, et
2 Defendants’ motion to dismiss did not address the Fourteenth Amendment claims, so the court
did not address them. (Doc. 28, p. 15.)
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al., No. 1:25-CV-01384, Doc. 1 (M.D. Pa.). On August 20, 2025, the court
screened the complaint in that matter and determined that it was substantially
related to the above-captioned action because it addressed the same period of time
and named several of the same Defendants. The court then dismissed the
complaint with instructions for Plaintiff to raise his additional claims through
amending his complaint in the above-captioned action. Id., at Doc. 9.
On October 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion amend the complaint and the
proposed amended complaint. (Docs. 40, 40-1.) On October 31, 2025, Plaintiff
filed a second motion to appoint counsel. (Doc. 42.) Defendants did not respond
to any of these pending motions. On February 9, 2026, the court granted the
motion to amend the complaint and filed the proposed amended complaint as a
separate document on the docket to serve as the operative complaint. (Docs. 51,
52.) The court will now screen the amended complaint.
S TANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a court “shall dismiss” an in forma
pauperis case “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” The legal standard for
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions
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to dismiss. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d
Cir. 2002).
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well pleaded allegations as
true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe
v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). The pleadings of self-
represented plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d. Cir. 2011). Self-
represented litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative amended complaint
even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless such an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
245 (3d Cir. 2008).
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DISCUSSION
A. Defendants Identified in the Amended Complaint
The amended complaint is a copy of the original complaint with changes
note in blue ink combined with the complaint filed in Segura, No. 1:25-CV-01384.
(Doc. 52.) In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff identifies his John Doe
Defendants: (1) Jeffrey Davidson (“Davidson”), Shift Commander/Captain at SCI-
Camp Hill as John Doe 1; (2) D. Henderson (“Henderson”), Sargent at SCI-Camp
Hill as John Doe 2; and (3) Z. Cokain (“Cokain”), Correctional Officer at SCI-
Camp Hill as John Doe 3. (Doc. 40; Doc. 52, p. 4.)
He also adds the following 17 Defendants: (1) Lorah, Captain at SCI-
Camphill; (2) Francis, Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (3) Jeffrey Elwell
(“Elwell”), Lieutenant at SCI-Camp Hill; (4) Dean, Correctional Officer at SCI-
Camp Hill; (5) William Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), Correctional Office at SCI-
Camp Hill; (6) Bernard Dugan (“Dugan”), Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill;
(7) Samuel Larty (“Larty”), Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (8) Edward
Lowe (“Lowe”), Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (9) Cecelia Umeh
Maduka (“Maduke”), a Registered Nurse at SCI-Camp Hill; (10) Monica Effi
(“Effi”), Registered Nurse at SCI-Camp Hill; (11) Liza Pokladwski-Diaz
(“Pokladwski-Diaz”), Licensed Practical Nurse at SCI-Camp Hill; (12) Michael
Huffman (“Huffman”), Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (13) Robert
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McSherry (“McSherry”), Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (14) Ragni,
Correctional Officer at SCI-Camp Hill; (15) Bennings, Correctional Officer at SCI-
Camp Hill; (16) Negrun, Sargent at SCI-Camp Hill; and (17) Tidwell, Correctional
Officer at SCI-Camp Hill. (Doc. 52, pp. 4–6.)
B. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claims Associated With The Incident August
21, 2023 Will Be Dismissed.
Plaintiff’s original complaint included a First Amendment retaliation claim
for the force used on August 21, 2023. (Doc. 1. p. 18.) The court concluded that
Plaintiff had not properly asserted a retaliation claim because he had not alleged
that any named defendants were the subject of any of his grievances or complaints
such that their actions could plausibly be in retaliation for his grievances. (Doc.
28, pp. 9–11.) Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not cure this pleading
defect.
It is well-settled that prison officials may not retaliate against an
inmate because he exercises his right of access to the courts. Fantone v.
Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2015). A prisoner asserting a retaliation
claim must allege the following elements: (1) he engaged in constitutionally
protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3)
the constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating
factor” for the adverse action. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d
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Cir. 2001); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). The
filing of a lawsuit or a prison grievance constitutes a protected activity under
the First Amendment. Fantone, 780 F.3d at 191.
This court has repeatedly refused to find a causal connection when the
alleged perpetrator of the retaliatory activity was not the subject of the
constitutionally protected activity. See Calloway v. Bauman, No. 2:20-cv-
2337, 2022 WL 4357468, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 20, 2022) citing Victor v.
Lawler, 2010 WL 5014555, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2010), aff'd, 565 F.
App’x 126 (3d Cir. 2014); also citing Evans v. Rozum, 2009 WL 5064490,
at *22 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2009) (“There is no apparent reason why [the
moving defendants] would want to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing a
lawsuit against others.”); also citing Royster v. Beard, 308 F. App’x 576,
579 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant on
plaintiff’s claim that he was retaliated against by a defendant who was not
the target of his protected activity).
In his proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff again references the
existence of grievances and complaints in relation to the events of August
21, 2023, but he does not identify the subject of those
grievances/complaints. (Doc. 52, pp. 10–12.) Upon review, the grievances
attached to the amended complaint are dated after the August 21, 2023
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incident. (Docs. 52-1, 52-2.) The only attached document that predates the
August 21, 2023 events is an August 14, 2023 hearing action in which
Plaintiff pleaded guilty to two misconduct charges and names Defendant
Albert as one of the Program Review Committee Members. (Doc. 52-1, pp.
1–2.) However, this is not a grievance and is not sufficient to establish that
Plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity as it does not
allege anything about or against Defendant Albert.
At the February 9, 2026 status conference, Plaintiff referenced
paragraph 93 of his amended complaint and stated that he had filed
grievances sufficient to establish a retaliation claim. 3 Paragraph 93
discusses losing his legal mail and legal materials and the resulting injury
being his inability to prepare his petition under the Post Convictional Relief
Act (“PCRA”). (Doc. 52, p. 28.) Plaintiff is accurate that he filed a
grievance concerning the alleged conduct surrounding the loss of legal mail
and materials, but he did not file a grievance prior to the missing property
3 Plaintiff also addressed the claims set forth in paragraph 109 at his February 9,
2026 status conference. Paragraph 109 concerns a conversation between Plaintiff and
Defendant Elwell on August 22, 2023. (Doc. 52, p. 35.) The court is only addressing the
retaliation claims associated with the August 21, 2023 actions and the loss of legal
property (i.e. those retaliation claims previously dismissed by the court) in this
memorandum. Therefore, the court will not consider any retaliation claim in connections
with paragraph 109 at this time. However, nothing in the court’s decision to refrain from
addressing any of the alleged retaliation associated with the August 22, 2023 and August
23, 2023 events at this time should be construed as a finding on the merits of the claims.
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that named any defendants who he associates with the missing property.
(Doc. 52-1, pp. 20.) The causation element requires Plaintiff to establish
that he took some constitutionally protected action against defendants that
then resulted in retaliation by those defendants. Without alleging protected
conduct that pre-dates the loss of property involving those he alleges to have
taken his property, Plaintiff cannot establish a retaliation claim, and such
claims will be dismissed.
Considering that the court provided Plaintiff the opportunity to amend
his pleading, and he has not cured the pleading defect, any opportunity to
further amend the complaint is futile and this dismissal will be with
prejudice. See Est. of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 769 F.3d
850, 861 (3d Cir. 2014) (Self-represented litigants are to be granted leave to
file a curative amended complaint even when a plaintiff does not seek leave
to amend, unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.)
C. Plaintiff’s Access to Court Claims Will Be Dismissed.
In the original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that his legal documents were
missing after being stored in the RHU property room and implies that the loss of
documents prevented him from pursuing his PCRA petition. (Doc. 1, pp. 23–26.)
The court dismissed this claim without prejudice because he did not properly
allege that he had lost a chance to pursue a nonfrivolous claim. (Doc. 28, pp. 11-
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12.) The court finds that Plaintiff did not cure this pleading defect in the proposed
amended complaint.
Asserting an actionable claim for denial of access to the courts requires a
prisoner to allege that (1) they “lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or
‘arguable’ underlying claim” and (2) they have no available remedy for the lost
claim other than the present denial of access action. Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th
909, 915 (3rd Cir. 2022) (citing Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3rd Cir.
2008)). Most significant is the nonfrivolous nature of the claim allegedly lost. The
lost claim must be “more than hope” in order to be deemed nonfrivolous.
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was sent to the RHU on August 8, 2023 and
his property was “racked” by Defendants Tidwell and Negrun. (Doc. 52, pp. 26–
27.) He alleges that upon his release, Defendant Bennings did not give him an
opportunity to inspect and sign over his property. (Id.) When he returned to his
cell, his draft PCRA petition was missing. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that the need to redo his PRCA petition resulted in him not
sending it to the state court until February 15, 2025. (Id., p. 29.) He states that he
received a cash slip demonstrating that he sent the PCRA petition out on that date,
and this should serve as his filing date under the mail box rule. (Id.) He states that
the deadline was February 26, 2025. (Id.) He alleges that the state court received
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the PCRA petition on March 3, 2025 and ruled it untimely. (Id.) He alleges that
had he not been forced to redo the petition, he would not have been filing it so
close to the deadline, and it would not have been dismissed as untimely. (Id.)
He cites to a motion for additional time to amend his PCRA petition to
establish that his PCRA petition was nonfrivolous. (Id.) However, a review of the
documents attached to the complaint demonstrates that his attorney also states that
regardless of the timeliness of the petition, the attorney filed a letter of no merit in
the action stating that “your claims lack arguable merit and/or you were not
prejudiced.” (Doc. 52-1, pp. 25–26; Doc. 52-2.) The state court did not deny the
PCRA petition only because it was untimely, but also based on the no merit letter
filed by Plaintiff’s counsel. (Doc. 52-2.)
Based on the facts set forth in the proposed amended complaint and the
attached documents, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege that the loss of
his property in August of 2023 resulted in his PCRA petition being dismissed as
untimely in February and March of 2025. First, the deadline is nearly two years
after the draft PCRA petition went missing. Second, the alleged conduct that
resulted in Plaintiff’s inability to prove that he mailed the petition prior to the
February 26, 2025 deadline was the confiscation of a cash slip at a different
property and not the loss of the draft petition in August of 2023. Third, the court
finds that based on the documents attached to the proposed amended complaint, he
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cannot prove that his petition was nonfrivolous. Therefore, the First Amendment
denial of access to court claims will be dismissed with prejudice. 4
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the court will dismiss the First Amendment
retaliation claims associated with the events of Augst 21, 2023 and the denial of
access to court claim with prejudice. The court will serve the three newly
identified John Doe defendants and 14 of the newly named defendants.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: February 13, 2026
4 There are no further claims against Defendants Tidwell, Bennings, and Negrun as they are not
named elsewhere in the amended complaint. (Doc. 52.) Therefore, these three individuals need
not be served.
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