Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAMARYS PACHECO,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARTIN O’MALLEY,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
: 	NO. 1:23-CV-02078
:
: 	(CAMONI, M.J.)
:
:
:
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), seeking
judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff Damarys Pacheco’s claim for supplemental security
income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Court has
jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)
(incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference). For the reasons stated
herein, the Court affirms the decision of the Commissioner.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural History
On September 3, 2020, Pacheco applied for supplemental security
income 	benefits, 	alleging 	disability 	beginning 	February 	1, 	2013.
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Transcript, 	Doc. 	7-3 	at 	34.1 	Following 	an 	initial 	denial, 	Pacheco
submitted an appeal, requesting a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge 	(ALJ). 	Doc. 	7-4 	at 	16. 	The 	ALJ 	conducted 	the 	hearing 	and
determined that Pacheco was not disabled. Doc. 7-2 at 27, 40.
Pacheco filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the
Appeals Council denied. Id. at 2. The ALJ’s decision, therefore, became
the final decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pending before
this 	Court 	is 	Pacheco’s 	action 	seeking 	judicial 	review 	of 	the
Commissioner’s decision. Complaint, Doc. 1. This case is fully briefed
(docs. 10, 14, 17) and ripe for resolution. The parties consented to the
jurisdiction 	of 	a 	United 	States 	Magistrate 	Judge 	to 	conduct 	all
proceedings in this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 73, including entry of final judgment. Doc. 9.
B. 	The Disability Determination Process
To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act (“Act”),
a claimant must be unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable . . . impairment which can . . .
1 Pacheco later amended the alleged onset date to September 3, 2020.
See Doc. 7-2 at 57.
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result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Under the Act, a claimant is disabled “only if his . . . impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 	§ 423(d)(2)(A). 	An 	impairment 	is 	one 	that 	“results 	from
anatomical, 	physiological, 	or 	psychological 	abnormalities 	which 	are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” § 423(d)(3).
Social 	Security 	regulations 	provide 	a 	“five-step 	sequential
evaluation process” to determine if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(1). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through
step four, while at step five, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show
that the claimant can perform substantial gainful employment other
than the claimant’s past relevant work. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d
1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1992), citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5
(1987).
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At the first step, the claimant must establish that he has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset of the alleged
disability. 	See 	§ 416.920(a)(4)(i). 	At 	the 	second 	step, 	claimant 	must
establish that he suffers from a “severe medically determinable . . .
impairment that meets the duration requirement . . . (“impairment . . .
must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at
least 12 months”).” § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, the claimant
must provide evidence that his impairment “meets or equals one of our
listings in appendix 1.” § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates
his impairments meet those listings, he is considered to be disabled. See
id.; § 416.920(d). If he cannot establish severity of impairment at the
third step, the eligibility analysis proceeds to step four in which the ALJ
determines whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
allows 	the 	claimant 	to 	continue 	his 	previous 	employment.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv). RFC “is the most [a claimant] can still do despite”
impairments. 	§ 404.1545(a)(1). 	To 	prevail 	on 	step 	four, 	claimant’s
“impairment(s) must prevent [him] from doing . . . past relevant work.”
§ 416.920(f). At the fifth step, the Commissioner bears the burden to
demonstrate that the claimant’s RFC and his “age, education, and work
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experience . . . [allows] adjustment to other work.” § 416.920(a)(4)(v). If
the Commissioner cannot satisfy this burden, the claimant’s claim is
granted. See § 416.920(g).
C. 	The ALJ’s Decision
Here, the ALJ determined that Pacheco “has not been under a
disability, . . . from September 3, 2020, the date the application was filed.”
Doc. 7-2 at 27. The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through
the five-step sequential analysis required by the Social Security Act.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v); see Doc. 7-2 at 13-27.
At step one, the ALJ determined that Pacheco “has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since September 3, 2020.” Doc. 7-2 at 13. At
step 	two, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	that 	Pacheco 	has 	the 	following 	severe
impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, right hip
bursitis, right gluteal tendinitis, chronic pain syndrome, arthritis of the
carpometacarpal 	(CMC) 	joint 	of 	the 	left 	thumb, 	polyarthralgia,
tenosynovitis of the left second digit and left wrist, and lupus. Id. At step
three, the ALJ determined that Pacheco “does not have an impairment
or 	combination 	of 	impairments 	that 	meets 	or 	medically 	equals 	the
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severity of one of the listed impairments in” 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart
P, appendix 1. Id. at 17.
Between steps three and four, the ALJ found that Pacheco has the
following RFC:
[T]o perform less than the full range of light work as defined
in 20 CFR 416.967(b). She can sit, stand, and walk for six
hours each per eight hour workday. She can frequently climb
ramps 	and 	stairs 	and 	occasionally 	balance, 	stoop, 	kneel,
crouch, and crawl. She can occasionally climb ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds. She is limited to frequent handling and fingering
of the left upper extremity.
Id. at 20.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Pacheco “is capable of
performing past relevant work as a school childcare attendant . . . and
medical assistant . . . . This work does not require the performance of
work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional
capacity.” Id. at 26. As an alternative, the ALJ conducted the analysis at
step five, denying Pacheco’s disability claims because, considering her
“age, education, work experience, and [RFC], the claimant is capable of
making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy.” Id. at 27.
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D. 	Issues on Appeal
Pacheco raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the ALJ erred by
determining that Pacheco is limited to frequent handling and fingering
of the left upper extremity; and (2) whether the ALJ committed multiple
errors in evaluating Pacheco’s symptoms. Pl.’s Br., Doc. 10 at 11, 14. The
Court, adhering to the deferential standard of review outlined below,
affirms the decision of the Commissioner.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s
application for benefits, the Court is limited to determining whether the
findings 	of 	the 	final 	decision-maker 	are 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence 	in 	the 	record. See 42 	U.S.C. 	§ 1383(c)(3) 	(incorporating 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d
198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D.
Pa. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court examines an
existing administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficient
evidence 	to 	support 	the 	agency’s 	factual 	determinations. 	Biestek 	v.
Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019). Substantial evidence does not mean a
large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather “such relevant
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 103; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565
(1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence
but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ
ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by
the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an
adequately developed factual record, however, substantial evidence may
be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
[the 	ALJ’s 	decision] 	from 	being 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In
determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v.
Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). In reviewing the
record for substantial evidence, “[n]either the district court nor [the Third
Circuit] is empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions
for those of the fact-finder.” Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. To reverse the
ALJ’s findings and decision, the Court “must find that the evidence not
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only 	supports 	[a 	contrary] 	conclusion 	but 	compels 	it.” 	Immigr. 	&
Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Pacheco is
disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s finding that Pacheco is not
disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based
upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No.
12-2417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been
held 	that 	an 	ALJ’s 	errors 	of 	law 	denote 	a 	lack 	of 	substantial
evidence.”); Burton 	v. 	Schweiker, 	512 	F. 	Supp. 	913, 	914 	(W.D. 	Pa.
1981) (“The [Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim
requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright
v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of
review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he
court 	has 	plenary 	review 	of 	all 	legal 	issues 	decided 	by 	the
Commissioner.”). In determining that question, the Court must evaluate
whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation necessary to
enable judicial review; that is, the ALJ must articulate the reasons for
his decision beyond stating bare conclusions. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Pacheco 	primarily 	challenges 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC 	determination 	of
Pacheco’s upper extremity functionality and generally argues that the
ALJ made multiple errors in evaluating Pacheco’s symptoms. Doc. 10 at
11, 14. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A. 	The 	ALJ’s 	RFC 	determination 	is 	supported 	by
substantial evidence.
Pacheco first argues that “the ALJ erred by failing to limit Ms.
Pacheco to occasional handling,” in her RFC determination. Id. at 13.
Pacheco contends that she did not testify that she could frequently
handle, finger, and feel and that “no physician opined this limitation.” Id.
Pacheco further asserts that the ALJ cited no particular medical evidence
to support his RFC limitation to frequent handling and fingering of the
left upper extremity. Id. Each of Pacheco’s arguments fail.
1. 	The ALJ’s burden in determining RFC
The ALJ must make the final RFC determination—not treating or
examining physicians or state agency consultants. Chandler v. Comm’r
of 	Soc. 	Sec., 	667 	F.3d 	356, 	361 	(3d 	Cir. 	2011), 	citing 	20 	C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(e)(1), 404.1546(c). The ALJ must choose whom to credit,
while ensuring that the ALJ does not “reject evidence for no reason or for
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the wrong reason.” Mason, 994 F.2d at 1066, citing Cotter v. Harris, 642
F.2d 700, 707 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ’s RFC determination at times
requires 	the 	ALJ 	to 	fashion 	an 	RFC 	that 	falls 	between 	competing
opinions. Durden v. Colvin, 191 F. Supp. 3d 429, 455 (M.D. Pa. 2016). The
ALJ here did exactly that. See Doc. 7-2 at 20-24.
Undercutting 	Pacheco’s 	arguments, 	the 	ALJ 	assessed 	a 	more
favorable RFC limitation compared to that called for in the medical
opinion. The ALJ’s RFC limitation provided “a somewhat more restrictive
residual functional capacity than is indicated by the opinions of the State
agency 	medical 	consultants.” 	Id. 	at 	24. 	The 	ALJ 	did 	this 	to 	“fully
accommodate the claimant’s symptoms,” id., despite substantial evidence
warranting a less restrictive RFC. See Doc. 7-2 at 21-23 (citing ample
records of normal findings for the upper extremities). Thus, Pacheco’s
argument, 	that 	the 	ALJ 	should 	have 	fashioned 	an 	RFC 	limitation
identical to an RFC in a physician’s opinion, 	see 	Doc. 10 at 13, is
self-sabotaging, 	as 	the 	state 	agency 	medical 	consultant 	found 	that
Pacheco’s upper extremity exertional limitation is unlimited other than
lifting and carrying. Doc. 7-3 at 40. Instead, the ALJ fashioned a more
favorable RFC for Pacheco, by determining an RFC that falls between
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competing opinions, even though “no physician opined this limitation.”
Doc. 10 at 13; Durden, 191 F. Supp. 3d at 455. Accordingly, the ALJ did
not err in determining the RFC.
2. 	Harmless error
Pacheco also requests the Commissioner’s decision to be remanded,
arguing that the ALJ’s RFC error was not harmless because a limitation
to occasional handling would have affected the outcome of the case. Id. at
13-14. As explained above, the ALJ did not err. But, even assuming
arguendo that the ALJ erred by limiting Pacheco to frequent handling,
Pacheco’s argument still fails because the error would be harmless.
In fact, the ALJ here specifically asked this hypothetical scenario
to the vocational expert. See Doc. 7-2 at 92. Asked to consider Pacheco’s
requested 	limitation 	of 	occasional 	handling 	as 	a 	hypothetical, 	the
vocational expert still testified that there are jobs that Pacheco could
perform in the national economy. See id. at 92-93. The claimed error,
therefore, would not change the outcome of the ALJ’s determination and
remand is thus unwarranted. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 556
(3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting a claimant’s argument that the error was not
harmless where the ALJ considered her claimed need in a hypothetical
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question submitted to the vocational expert and in the ALJ’s final
decision).
B. 	The 	ALJ’s 	evaluation 	of 	Pacheco’s 	symptoms 	is
supported by substantial evidence.
Pacheco’s remaining arguments also fail. First, Pacheco contends
that the ALJ erred in noting that Pacheco was in 	“no acute/apparent
distress” during some office visits, and that this was an irrelevant and
unwarranted 	independent 	medical 	finding. 	Doc. 	10 	at 	14-15. 	This
argument minimizes the ALJ’s analysis and overlooks the significant
medical evidence that the ALJ reviewed and explained, which support
normal findings in the upper extremities, full range of motion and muscle
strengths, and normal results from diagnostic testing, not to mention the
claimant’s own denial of pain. Doc. 7-2 at 22-23. Further, Pacheco has not
made any showing of how this alleged error affected the ALJ’s decision.
Second, Pacheco argues that the ALJ erred in noting that Pacheco
did not experience medication side effects. Id. Upon review of the ALJ’s
RFC assessment, the Court finds that the ALJ adequately explained
these findings. See Doc. 7-2 at 23. Despite Pacheco’s claim that she
suffered numerous such side effects, the ALJ cited medical records to
explain that Pacheco did not persistently complain of side effects to her
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medical 	providers. 	Id. 	Nor 	did 	the 	medical 	evidence 	suggest 	that
Pacheco’s symptoms resulted from medications. Id. Thus, the ALJ did not
err and stood on solid evidentiary ground in concluding that Pacheco
“does not experience any medication side effects with such frequency,
intensity, or persistence that they require any limitation in her [RFC].”
Id.; see Grandillo v. Barnhart, 105 F. App’x 415, 419 (3d Cir. 2004)
(finding that, absent evidence that a claimant reported adverse side
effects to her treating physicians or that those physicians adjusted the
dosage or nature of the medication to control for poor toleration, the mere
fact that a claimant was taking medication known to induce adverse side
effects 	did 	not 	require 	the 	ALJ 	to 	assume 	the 	claimant 	actually
experienced those side effects); Bynaker v. Bisignano, No. 25-16, 2025 WL
2349803, at *9-10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2025) (finding no basis for remand
because the only evidence of side effects from the claimant’s medications
is the claimant’s own testimony).
Third, Pacheco argues that the evidence demonstrates she could
only perform minimal activities of daily living and that, given this
limitation, the ALJ failed to explain how Pacheco could perform work
tasks. Doc. 10 at 18. The ALJ’s decision, however, clearly discredited
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Pacheco’s self-reported limitations because the ALJ found that they are
“not consistent with her testimony . . . as well as clinical examination
findings.” Doc. 7-2 at 23. The medical evidence, among other findings,
reflected normal and full range of motion and muscle strength in all
extremities. Id. Because the ALJ adequately explained that Pacheco’s
claimed 	limitations 	were 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	medical 	evidence,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. See Davis
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 240 F. App’x 957, 960-61 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding
that substantial evidence supports an ALJ’s RFC determination because
a 	plaintiff’s 	claimed 	limitation 	was 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	medical
evidence); Garret v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 274 F. App’x 159, 164 (3d Cir.
2008) (affirming an ALJ’s RFC assessment where a plaintiff’s medical
records 	and 	conservative 	treatment 	failed 	to 	substantiate 	claimed
impairments); Sanchez v. Bisignano, No. 24-1627, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
193285, at *19 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2025) (concluding that the ALJ
properly assessed a plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms as not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence).
Overall, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence
and will be affirmed.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
An appropriate order follows.
Date: January 2, 2026 	s/Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge
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