Johnson v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections et al

1:21-cv-00516PamdMar 24, 2026

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
AQUIL JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 1:21-CV-00516
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Currently before the court are two motions in limine from Aquil Johnson
(“Plaintiff”) and one motion in limine from Dr. Richard Ellers and Dr. Fernando
Tejeda (“Defendants”). (Docs. 249, 251, 262.) The court will defer a decision on
Plaintiff’s first motion in limine and Defendants’ motion in limine. Since
Plaintiff’s second motion in limine is unopposed, the court will grant the motion
and exclude evidence of the criminal histories of Plaintiff and various witnesses.
BACKGROUND
This action was initially filed in the Court of Common Pleas in Centre
County, Pennsylvania and removed to federal court on March 22, 2021. (Docs. 1,
1-2.) On March 9, 2022, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson entered a report and
recommendation recommending that Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint
be granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. 39.) After ruling on Plaintiff’s
objections, the court adopted the report and recommendation in part. (Doc. 45.)
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The only surviving claims were the Eighth Amendment claim as to
Defendants Ellers, Tejada, and Fisher, the negligence per se claim as to all
Defendants and the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim as to all
Defendants. (Doc. 45.) Defendants then answered the complaint as to the
surviving claims. (Docs. 46, 48.)
In September of 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming an
additional medical defendant, Dominicis, the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of
Correct Care Solutions. (Docs. 62, 65.) In November and December of 2022, the
remaining and new Defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint.
(Docs. 70, 74.)
Following the court’s decision on the pending motions to dismiss, the
surviving claims included an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Ellers,
Tejeda, and Fisher. (Doc. 102.)
Following the closure of fact discovery, Defendants Ellers, Tejeda, and
Fisher filed motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 123, 125.) After resolution of
the motions, the Eighth Amendment claim associated with the missed August 5,
2019 appointment and the subsequent requests for treatment on August 15, 2019,
September 14, 2019, November 20, 2019, and December 31, 2019 survived the
motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 149.) The claims against Defendant Fisher
were later settled. (Doc. 235.)
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A jury trial is scheduled to begin on March 30, 2026 to address the
remaining Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Ellers and Tejeda. (Doc.
220.) Plaintiff has filed two motions in limine, and Defendants have filed one.
(Docs. 249, 251, 262.) Briefing is complete on the motions in question, and the
court will now resolve each in turn.
DISCUSSION
A. Motions in Limine Standard
“The Court is vested with broad inherent authority to manage its cases,
which carries with it the discretion and authority to rule on motions in limine prior
to trial.” Ridolfi v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., No. 1:15-cv-00859, 2017
WL 3198006, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2017) (citations omitted). A motion in
limine permits “the trial court to rule in advance of trial on the admissibility and
relevance of certain forecasted evidence.” See United States v. Tartaglione, 228 F.
Supp. 3d 402, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2017); see also United States v. Hamdan, 537 F. Supp.
3d 870, 878–79 (E.D. La. 2021) (“[T]he purpose of a motion in limine is to
prohibit [an opponent] ‘from mentioning the existence of, alluding to, or offering
evidence on matters so highly prejudicial to the moving party that a timely motion
to strike or an instruction by the court to the jury to disregard the offending matter
cannot overcome its prejudicial influence on the jurors’ minds.’” (quoting O’Rear
v. Fruehauf Corp., 554 F.2d 1304, 1306 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977))).
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Moreover, this court has held the following in regards to motions in limine:
[o]n a motion in limine, evidence should only be excluded “when the
evidence 	is 	clearly 	inadmissible 	on 	all 	potential 	grounds.”
[Tartaglione, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 406.] Evidentiary rulings on motions
in limine are subject to the trial judge’s discretion and are therefore
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 	Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d
1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995); Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d
149, 161 (3d Cir. 1994). . . . Further, “[c]ourts may exercise this
discretion in order to ensure that juries are not exposed to unfairly
prejudicial, confusing or irrelevant evidence.” 	[Ridolfi, 2017 WL
3198006, at *2] (citation omitted).
“A trial court considering a motion in limine may reserve judgment
until trial in order to place the motion in the appropriate factual
context.” 	[Tartaglione, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 406] (citation omitted).
“Further, a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine is ‘subject to
change when the case unfolds, particularly if actual testimony differs
from what was contained in the movant’s proffer.’” Id. (citing Luce v.
United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984)).
See United States v. Larry, 537 F. Supp. 3d 766, 768 (M.D. Pa. 2021).
B. Plaintiff’s First Motion In Limine Will Be Deferred.
On February 10, 2026, the court received and docketed Plaintiff’s motion in
limine seeking the exclusion of “all evidence and reference to claims that were
dismissed and irrelevance matters and in the interest of justice and in support
thereof.” (Doc. 249.)
The claims at issue in the upcoming trial include a missed appointment on
August 5, 2019, unanswered requests for treatment of Tooth Number 8 on August
15, 2019, September 14, 2019, and December 31, 2019, and an unanswered inmate
request form on November 20, 2019. (Doc. 149.) Plaintiff is seeking the
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exclusion of evidence that he declined treatment for Tooth Number 8 prior to and
following the period that his requests for treatment went unanswered. (Doc. 250.)
In summary judgment, Defendant Tejeda presented evidence that the extraction of
the tooth was recommended and refused on March 22, 2019 and January 6, 2020,
which was prior to the eventual removal of the tooth on April 13, 2020. (Doc. 148,
pp. 15–16; Doc. 124-1, pp. 3–6, 17, 24–27.) 1 While Plaintiff does not point to this
specific evidence, the court construes his motion in limine as seeking the exclusion
of these refusals on March 22, 2019 and January 6, 2020 as irrelevant and having
the potential to mislead the jury. (Doc. 250.) Plaintiff’s argument is that the
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Policy 13.2.1 reprioritization clause mandates
that treatment be reprioritized following the filing of a dental sick call regardless of
past refusal of treatment or release forms. (Doc. 250, p. 9.) Therefore, based on
this policy, any past refusal of treatment is irrelevant to the current dates since he
submitted sick call forms that went unanswered. (Id.)
On March 3, 2023, Defendants filed a brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s
motion in limine stating that they do not object to the portion of Plaintiff’s request
seeking to exclude evidence regarding dismissed claims. (Doc. 277.) However,
Defendants argue that while the refusal of treatment and release forms may pertain
to previously dismissed claims, that does not mean the evidence does not apply to
1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
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the relevant remaining claims or defenses. (Id.) Defendants state that the evidence
will show that leading up to the timeframe Plaintiff alleges he was denied
treatment, he had a pattern of failing to attend his appointments or refusing
treatment. (Id.) Defendants argue that such evidence “is directly relevant to
whether or not Defendants violated his rights,” and requests that the court defer
from ruling on Plaintiff’s first motion until trial. (Id., p. 4.)
The admissibility of the evidence challenged by Plaintiff is governed, at
least in part, by Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403. Federal Rule of
Evidence 402 states that all relevant evidence is admissible. Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 states that evidence is relevant where it has “any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable than it would without the evidence, and the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Federal Rule of Evidence 403 excludes
relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
The court acknowledges that motions in limine may serve as a useful pretrial
tool that enables more in-depth briefing than would be available at trial, but a court
may defer ruling on such motions “if the context of trial would provide clarity.”
Frintner v. TruePosition, 892 F.Supp.2d 699, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2012). Indeed,
“motions in limine often present issues for which final decision is best reserved for
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a specific trial situation.” Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 518
n.10 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, certain motions, “should generally be deferred until
trial to allow for the resolution of questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential
prejudice in proper context.” Leonard v. Stemtech Health Scis., Inc., 981
F.Supp.2d 273, 276 (D. Del. 2013). Moreover, “pretrial Rule 403 exclusions
should rarely be granted. . . [A] court cannot fairly ascertain the potential relevance
of evidence for Rule 403 purposes until it has a full record relevant to the
putatively objectionable evidence.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d
829, 859 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original).
The issue before the jury will be whether or not Plaintiff can establish that
Defendants Ellers and Tejeda were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. The Supreme Court has held that such an evaluation under the Eighth
Amendment includes a subjective component of Defendants’ state of mind. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (A prison official is deliberately
indifferent when he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.”). While the court acknowledges Plaintiff’s argument that DOC
Policy 13.2.1 reprioritization clause renders any prior refusal of treatment or
release forms null and void, it remains this court’s finding that “a prison policy
manual does not have the force of law and does not rise to the level of a
regulation” and that “a violation of internal policy does not automatically rise to
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the level of a Constitutional violation.” Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F. Supp. 2d 532, 556
n.24 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (citations omitted); see Bullard v. Seism, 449 F. App'x 232,
235 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that, even if prison officials violated a regulation,
such a violation “is not actionable”). Therefore, the court will defer any
determination as to admissibility of the refusal of treatment and release forms so as
to better determine relevancy and potential prejudice in the context of trial.
C. Plaintiff’s Second Motion In Limine Will Be Granted.
On February 10, 2026, the court received and docketed a second motion in
limine from Plaintiff seeking the exclusion of evidence concerning his own
criminal history and the criminal history of witnesses Danny Johnson, Earl
Handfield, Emru Kebede, and Warren S. Evans. (Docs. 251, 252.) Plaintiff’s
argument is that all the criminal convictions are greater than ten years old. (Doc.
252.)
On March 2, 2026, the court received a letter from Defendants’ counsel
stating “[u]pon review of the criminal histories of these individuals, including
Plaintiff, it does not appear that any would have admissible crimens falsi
regardless, and as such, Defendants do not intent to make issue of any past
criminal histories at trial.” (Doc. 274.) Based on this letter, the court views
Plaintiff’s second motion in limine as unopposed, and will grant the motion.
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Evidence concerning the criminal histories of Plaintiff, Danny Johnson, Earl
Handfield, Emru Kebede, and Warren S. Evans will be excluded from the trial.
D. Defendants’ Motion In Limine Will Be Differed.
On February 23, 2026, Defendnats filed a motion in limine seeking the
exclusion of evidence relevant to the dismissed claims. (Doc. 262.) Defendants
argue that “Plaintiff should only be permitted to present evidence related to his
Eighth Amendment claim against Ellers and Tejada.” (Doc. 262, p. 3; Doc. 263, p.
3.)
On March 3, 2026, the court received and docketed Plaintiff’s brief in
opposition to Defendants’ motion. (Doc. 275.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants’
motion is overly broad, unclear, and potentially hazardous to relevant evidence.
(Id.) The court agrees.
Defendants’ motion repeats the same request: “Plaintiff should only be
permitted to present evidence related to his Eighth Amendment claim against
Ellers and Tejada.” (Doc. 262, p. 3; Doc. 263, p. 3.) Granting Defendants’ motion
doesn’t actually preclude any evidence until the court determines whether or not
such evidence is related to the claims against Ellers and Tejada. Issuing a blanket
statement would potentially preclude the evidence that Defendants sought to
preserve in their brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion in limine. See supra.
Therefore, the court will defer making a decision on Defendants’ motion until trial
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where it can better determine relevancy and potential prejudice in the proper
context.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the court will defer making a determination on
Plaintiff’s first motion in limine, grant Plaintiff’s second motion in limine as
unopposed, and defer making a determination on Defendants’ motion in limine.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: March 24, 2026
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