SALLEY v. CALIGIURI et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MALEAK KEON SALLEY, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-5104
:
RNS CALIGIURI, et al., 	:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM
MCHUGH, J. 	OCTOBER 14, 2026
Plaintiff Maleak Keon Salley, a convicted prisoner currently incarcerated at SCI Phoenix,
filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of his
constitutional rights and related state law claims arising from the Defendants’ alleged deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. Currently before the Court are Salley’s Complaint
(“Compl.” (ECF No. 2)), his Motions for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF Nos. 1, 7),
and his Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement, (ECF No. 3).1 Salley asserts claims against
RNS Caligiuri, Dr. Gohman,2 Superintendent J. Terra, each named in their individual and official
capacities, and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”). ((Compl. at 2, 3.) The
Court will grant Salley leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons provided, Salley’s
1 Also before the Court are two motions for appointment of counsel. (ECF Nos. 6, 8.) The
requests for appointment of counsel are premature at this stage of the litigation because the Court
concludes that no claims in the Complaint may proceed as pled. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d
147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (before exercising discretion to appoint counsel “the district court must
consider as a threshold matter the merits of the plaintiff’s claim”). The Court will therefore deny
the motions without prejudice to Salley’s right to file a renewed motion for appointment of
counsel in the future in accordance with the factors set forth by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Tabron.
2 Gohman is identified as a nurse in the Complaint.
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deliberate indifference claims and grievance-based claims against Terra will be dismissed with
prejudice. The remainder of his constitutional claims will be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Salley’s state law claims will
be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Salley will be granted
leave to file an amended complaint.
I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS3
The events giving rise to Salley’s claims occurred between August 30, 2025 and
September 9, 2025 at SCI Phoenix. (Compl. at 4, 5.) Salley alleges that during this period, he
developed cellulitis on his right arm, which he suggests originated from a bite or from his having
volunteered to clean showers. (Id. at 4.) He describes his arm at this time as “bigger than his
head and green and purple with pus coming out.” (Id. at 5.) On August 30, 2025, he complained
because he had not received medical treatment for his arm. (Id. at 4.) Subsequently, he was sent
to the medical unit “multiple times.” (Id.) He claims that Defendant Gohman did not document
one of his visits. (Id.) During another visit, an unidentified nurse cut his arm in order to clean
out the infection but allegedly cut it in the wrong place. (Id.) Following this procedure, Salley
was unable to sleep or eat because of pain. (Id. at 5.) On September 2, 2025, he was admitted to
Einstein Montgomery Hospital in Norristown through the Emergency Room and later underwent
surgery on his arm. (Id. at 4.) He was discharged from the hospital on September 9, 2025. (Id.)
Salley avers that individuals including his cellmate Tysheen Santiago, Sergeants
Venoblee and Turner, Unit Manager Shoneberger, and other inmates on his unit had observed his
3 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Salley’s Complaint (ECF
No. 2). The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system. Where
appropriate, grammar, spelling, and punctuation errors in Salley’s pleading will be corrected for
clarity.
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arm and were aware that he was “being neglected.” (Id. at 5.) His surgeon, Dr. Kris Williams,
also became aware of his condition and placed photographs of his arm in his medical record. (Id.
at 5.)
Salley filed a grievance reflecting the foregoing. (Id. at 4.) Attached to the Complaint is
an Initial Review Response to the grievance Salley filed based on (1) the alleged failure of an
unidentified officer to request medical care for his arm on August 30, 2025 when he reported
pain, (2) the denial of care by a nurse when he was permitted to go to the medical unit on August
31, 2025, (3) and the absence of documentation reflecting his September 1, 2025 visit to the
medical unit. (Id. at 11.) It also reflects that Salley was seen in the medical unit on September 2,
2025, where he was prescribed a seven-day course of antibiotics following drainage of the
infection on his arm. (Id.) He was also prescribed wound care. (Id.) The Response reflects that
the grievance was upheld in part (based on the missing documentation of the September 1, 2025
visit) and denied in part (because Salley received treatment on September 2, 2025), and his
request for monetary compensation was denied. (Id.) Salley’s Appeal to Facility Manager
following the partial denial of his grievance is also attached to the Complaint. (Id. at 14.) On
appeal, the Facility Manager, Defendant Terra, upheld the decision of the grievance officer. (Id.
at 10.) Salley appealed the Superintendent’s decision, and his appeal is attached to the
Complaint.4 (Id. at 13.) Also attached are copies of Inmate Passes reflecting that Salley reported
to the medical unit for wound care on several occasions. (Id. at 16-17.)
Salley asserts Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims, and state law medical
malpractice claims against the Defendants. (Id. at. 3.) He seeks money damages. (Id. at 5.)
4 The final decision, if any, is not included with the exhibits.
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II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Salley leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he
is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.5 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether
a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard
applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher
v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v.
Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage of the litigation, the Court will
accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed, contains facts
sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021),
abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir.
2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Salley is proceeding
pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir.
2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
Additionally, the Court must review the pleadings and dismiss the matter if it determines,
inter alia, that the action fails to set forth a proper basis for this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Group Against Smog and Pollution, Inc.
5 Because Salley is a prisoner, the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that he pay the full
filing fee in installments regardless of the outcome of this case.
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v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua
sponte”). A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing
federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015)
(“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.”
(citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006))).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Salley asserts claims based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The vehicle
by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to
be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957
F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020).
A. 	Claims Against the DOC and Official Capacity Claims
Salley asserts claims for money damages against the DOC and names Commonwealth
employees in their official capacities. (See Compl.) However, the Commonwealth, its agencies,
as well as its employees named in their official capacities are not considered “persons” for
purposes of § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (explaining that
a state is not a “person” for Section 1983 purposes); Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.
1973) (explaining that a state agency may not be sued under Section 1983 because it is not a
“person”); Metroka v. Pa. State Law Enforcement, Nos. 23-2004, 23-2220, 23-2847, 2024 WL
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4164272, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2024) (“[T]he Pennsylvania State Police is a state agency, not a
person within the meaning of § 1983.”); Foye v. Wexford Health Sources Inc., 675 F. App’x 210,
215 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against prison and Department
of Corrections because they “are not persons subject to suit under” Section 1983). Also, the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal court that seek
monetary damages. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100
(1984); Allen v. N.J. State Police, 974 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment “to shield States and certain State-affiliated
entities from suits for damages in federal court” (quoting Bradley v. W. Chester Univ. of Pa.
State Sys. of Higher Educ., 880 F.3d 643, 654 (3d Cir. 2018)); Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ.,
845 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Amendment bars suits against states for
damages and against “arms of the state”). Finally, suits against state officials acting in their
official capacities are really suits against the employing government agency, and as such, are
also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Allen, 974 F.3d at 506; Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev.
Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)); McCauley
v. Univ. of the Virgin Islands, 618 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71).
Accordingly, the claims for money damages Salley seeks to assert against the DOC and all
official capacity claims against DOC employees will be dismissed without prejudice. See
Merritts v. Richards, 62 F.4th 764, 769 (3d Cir. 2023) (holding that dismissals based on Eleventh
Amendment should be without prejudice).
B. 	Deliberate Indifference Claims
Salley asserts Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims based on the
Defendants’ alleged indifference to his serious medical need. (Compl. at 4, 5.) He alleges that
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his initial request for medical care for cellulitis on his arm was refused on August 30, 2025, that
he was refused care on a visit to the medical unit, and that another visit to the medical unit was
not properly documented. (Id. at 4, 5.) He also alleges that the care he received – an incision to
drain the infection from his arm – was performed incorrectly, which resulted in his later
admission to the hospital for emergency surgery. (Id.) The Court understands him to allege that
his treatment was delayed, and the care he received was inadequate. (Id. at 3, 4.) His claims, as
pled, are not legally plausible.
A prison official is not deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “A medical need
is serious, . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one
that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)
(internal quotations omitted). Deliberate indifference is properly alleged “where (1) prison
authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment, (2) knowledge of the need for
medical care is accompanied by the intentional refusal to provide it, (3) necessary medical
treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons, [or] (4) prison authorities prevent an inmate from
receiving recommended treatment for serious medical needs.” Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127,
141 (3d Cir. 2025) cert. denied, 146 S.Ct. 2731 (2026) (citation omitted). This standard is met
when a delay or denial of medical care is intended to inflict pain without medical justification or
is based solely on a nonmedical reason without any effort to mitigate harm. DiFraia v. Ransom,
171 F.4th 622, 630 (3d Cir. 2026).
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Inadequate medical care rises to the Eighth Amendment level only when a plaintiff can
show both a serious medical need and acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate
deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, (1976). Not every
complaint of inadequate prison medical care rises to the level of deliberate indifference.
Anderson v. Price, No. 22-3058, 2023 WL 5814664, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2023) (per curiam).
“Where a prisoner is receiving some amount of medical treatment, [courts] presume that the
treatment is adequate absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.” Id.
(affirming dismissal of deliberate indifference claims on screening) (citing Brown v. Borough of
Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Hayes v. Gilmore, 802 F. App’x 84,
88 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Where a prisoner has received some amount of medical
treatment, it is difficult to establish deliberate indifference, because prison officials are afforded
considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.”); Davis v. Superintendent
Somerset SCI, 597 F. App’x 42, 45 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[w]here a prisoner has received some
medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, ‘federal courts are
generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which
sound in state tort law.’”) (per curiam) (quoting United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette County,
599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979)). Moreover, mere disagreement with a prison medical
provider’s treatment plan is insufficient to allege a plausible deliberate indifference claim. See
Ryle v. Fuh, 820 F. App’x 121, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Ryle also cannot show deliberate
indifference with regard to Nurse Green or Dr. Jackson because he expressed only “mere
disagreement” with their post-surgery treatment plan.”).
Salley alleges that he requested medical care on August 25, 202 and that his request was
denied. (Compl. at 4, 11.) He does not identify who denied his request or why and, as a result,
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has not stated a plausible claim based on this occurrence. He next alleges that when he went to
the medical unit on August 31, 2025, he was denied care. (Id.) He does not identify who denied
him care or why and, as a result, has not stated a plausible claim based on this occurrence. It
may be that Salley intends to state a claim based on these incidents insofar as they delayed his
medical treatment. For the reasons stated, he has not done so plausibly and any claims based on
a delay in care will be dismissed without prejudice to Salley’s providing additional factual
support in an amended complaint.
Salley next alleges that Defendant Gohman did not document his September 1, 2025 visit
to the medical unit. (Id.) He does not allege that Grohman denied, refused, delayed, or
prevented treatment, only that the visit was not documented. The allegations regarding
Grohman’s conduct are undeveloped and do not provide a plausible basis for an Eighth
Amendment violation. Salley’s claims against Gohman will be dismissed. The dismissal will be
without prejudice to Salley filing an amended complaint with additional factual allegations.
Salley next alleges that when he was treated on September 2, 2025, the unidentified
nurse, in the course of draining his infection, cut his arm in the wrong place. (Id. at 4, 5.) Salley
concedes that this procedure was performed (see id. at 13), but claims that it was ineffective, and
as a result, he required admission to the hospital and emergency surgery. (Id.) This incident
does not provide a basis for an Eighth Amendment claim in part because Salley does not identify
the nurse who provided the care, but more importantly because it reflects that Salley did receive
care – his wound was incised and cleaned out and he was prescribed antibiotics, and when that
course of treatment proved ineffective, he was sent to the hospital for additional care. (See id. at
10, 11.) At best, Salley’s claims asserts that the attempt to drain his arm was negligent. 	But
“[m]ere negligence, . . . even if it constitutes medical malpractice[,] falls short of deliberate
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indifference. So does mere disagreement between the prisoner and medical personnel over the
proper course of treatment.” Montanez, 154 F.4th at 141 (first citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d
192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999); then citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 227 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Allegations of mere negligent treatment
or even medical malpractice do not trigger the protections of the Eighth Amendment.”) As such,
he has not stated a plausible claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs based
on the treatment he received. Davis, 597 F. App’x. at 45. Salley’s deliberate indifference claims
will be dismissed as not plausible, and he will be granted leave to amend these claims to address
the deficiencies identified.
D. 	Claims Against Terra
1. 	Eighth Amendment and Grievance Based Claims
Salley asserts claims against Terra but does not allege that he participated in the delay or
denial of medical care giving rise to his claims, or that he was aware of the alleged violations at
the time they occurred. (See Compl.) Any such claim against Terra, however, would not be
plausible. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . , a non-medical prison official will
generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Carter v. Smith, 483 F. App’x 705, 708 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(“Prison officials cannot be held to be deliberately indifferent merely because they did not respond to the
medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison medical staff.”). Further,
“absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or
not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with . . . deliberate
indifference.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. As pled, Salley was, at all relevant times, under the care of the
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SCI Phoenix medical staff, and Terra is a non-medical prison official. Therefore, Salley cannot state a
plausible deliberate indifference claim against Terra and any such claim will be dismissed with prejudice
Salley may base his claims against Terra on Terra’s review of Salley’s appeal of the
partial denial of his grievance. However, participation in the grievance process does not, without
more, establish involvement in the underlying constitutional violation. See Curtis v. Wetzel, 763
F. App’x 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“The District Court properly determined that
Defendants Wenerowicz, Lewis, and Shaylor – who participated only in the denial of
Curtis’ grievances – lacked the requisite personal involvement [in the conduct at issue].”); Folk
v. Prime Care Med., 741 F. App’x 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Although some of these
defendants were apparently involved in responding to some of Folk’s prison grievances, there are
no allegations linking them to the underlying incidents and thus no basis for liability based on
those later grievance reviews.”). Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (holding that attaching documents to
grievance form is insufficient under Rode to show personal direction or actual knowledge by
recipient of underlying facts)). See also Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, 2022 WL
17248100, at *2 (3d. Cir. Nov. 28, 2022) (per curiam) (“Contrary to Robinson’s assertions,
awareness of a grievance or complaint after the allegedly unconstitutional conduct has occurred,
without more, is insufficient to establish personal involvement.”) Any claim against Terra based
on his participation in the grievance process will be dismissed with prejudice.
2. 	Claims Based on Supervisory Position
Salley may be attempting to assert claims against Terra in light of his supervisory
position at SCI Phoenix. However, a supervisor cannot be held liable ‘simply because of his
position as the head of the [agency].’” (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir.
2005)). Also, liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior basis.
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227; Robinson, 2022 WL 17248100, at *2. Rather, “[s]uits against
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high-level government officials must satisfy the general requirements for supervisory liability.”
Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2017). There are “two general ways in which a
supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.”
Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by
Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015). First, a supervisor may be liable if he or she “‘with
deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or
custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Id. (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v.
Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)).
“Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating
the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge
of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227.
The first type of liability includes a failure to supervise, however, a plaintiff asserting
such a claim must “identify a supervisory policy or practice that the supervisor failed to employ,
and then allege plausibly that: (1) the policy or procedures in effect at the time of the alleged
injury created an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the defendant-official was
aware that the policy created an unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to that risk;
and (4) the constitutional injury was caused by the failure to implement the supervisory practice
or procedure.” Barkes, 766 F.3d at 317; see also Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227. A supervisory
claim requires “a showing that there was an actual constitutional violation at the hands of
subordinates” before finding liability on the part of the supervisor prison official. Allen v.
Eckard, 804 F. App’x 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (concluding that failure to train and
supervise claims asserted against supervisor defendants were meritless where the plaintiff failed
to make a plausible showing of an underlying constitutional violation).
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For the reasons stated herein, Salley has not plausibly alleged that his Eighth Amendment
rights were violated. See supra. As such, he has not stated a plausible supervisory liability
claim. Allen, 804 F. App’x at 127. Because Salley has not stated a plausible claim against Terra,
these claims will be dismissed without prejudice. Salley will be granted leave to amend these
claims.
D. 	State Law Claims
Because the Court has dismissed Salley’s federal claims, the Court will not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims. See Doe v.
Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 567 (3d Cir. 2017) (“A court may [decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction] under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) when it dismisses all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction.”)
Accordingly, the only independent basis for jurisdiction over any such claims is 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction over a case “where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between
. . . citizens of different States.” Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all
plaintiffs and all defendants,’ even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required.
This means that, unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen
of the same state as any defendant.’” Lincoln Ben. Life Co., 800 F.3d at 104 (quoting Lincoln
Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d
412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the state
where he is domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain.
See Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). “[D]omicile is established
by an objective physical presence in the state or territory coupled with a subjective intention to
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remain there indefinitely.” Id. Residence alone is insufficient to establish domicile. See
Freidrich v. Davis, 767 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[c]itizenship is
synonymous with domicile, and the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and permanent
home and place of habitation. It is the place to which, whenever he is absent, he has the
intention of returning.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). “[T]he domicile of a prisoner
before his imprisonment presumptively remains his domicile during his imprisonment.” Pierro
v. Kugel, 386 F. App’x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish diversity
of citizenship. Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 800 F.3d at 105 (“The burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.” (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S.
at 342 n.3)); see also Haiying Xi v. Shengchun Lu, 226 F. App’x 189, 190 (3d Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (stating that, in diversity cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate complete diversity
between the parties and that the amount in controversy requirement has been met).
Salley does not allege the citizenship of the parties. Rather, he provides only
Pennsylvania addresses for himself and the Defendants, which suggests that he and some, if not
all, of the Defendants may be Pennsylvania citizens. Accordingly, Salley has not sufficiently
alleged that the parties are diverse for purposes of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction over any
state law claims he intends to pursue, and these claims will be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See Williams v. Francois, No. 22-3339, 2023 WL 2203570, at *2 (3d Cir.
Feb. 24, 2023) (per curiam) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of state law claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to adequately allege the citizenship of any party
to the action). The dismissal will be without prejudice, and Salley may address the deficiencies
identified in his state law claims in an amended complaint or may file his state law claims in the
appropriate state court if he chooses to do so, where federal jurisdiction will not be an issue. See
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Associated Builders & Contractors W. Pa. v. Cmty. Coll. of Allegheny Cnty., 81 F.4th 279, 291
(3d Cir. 2023) (“[A] dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the
merits and thus should be ordered ‘without prejudice.’” (quoting Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel
Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 1999))); see also N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. President of U.S., 653
F.3d 234, 241 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that dismissals for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction are “by definition without prejudice” (citation omitted)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Salley leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Salley’s deliberate indifference claims and grievance-based claims against Terra will be
dismissed with prejudice. The remainder of his constitutional claims will be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). His state law
claims will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He will be
granted leave to file an amended complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002).
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gerald Austin McHugh
__________________________________________
GERALD A. MCHUGH, J.
Case 2:26-cv-05104-GAM Document 11 Filed 10/14/26 Page 15 of 15