Arthurs et al v. Asante

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
JUNIPER ARTHURS and LYNNESA
GILBERT,
Plaintiffs,
V.
ASANTE,
Defendant.
CLARKE, United States Magistrate Judge.
Case No. 1:26-cv-00915-CL
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Juniper Arthurs and Lynnesa Gilbert ("Plaintiffs") filed this putative class
action in Jackson County Circuit Court on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated current
and former employees of Defendant Asante. The parties consent to the jurisdiction of a
magistrate judge. ECF No. 15. Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand and for an
award of attorney fees and costs. ECF No. 10. On September 15, 2026, the Court heard oral
argument. The Court finds that Plaintiff's claims are preempted in part and Plaintiffs' Motion
(ECF No. 10) is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant in a state court may remove a civil case to federal court when the case could
have originally been brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446(b). Removability is "to
Page 1 - 	OPINION AND ORDER
Case 1:26-cv-00915-CL Document 21 Filed 10/14/26 Page 1 of 10

be determined according to the plaintiffs pleading at the time of the petition or removal."
Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537-38 (1939). "[A]ny doubt about the right ofremoval
requires resolution in favor ofremand." Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241,
1244 (9th Cir. 2009). "The presumption against removal means that 'the defendant always has
the burden of establishing that removal is proper."' Id. (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F .2d
564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).
BACKGROUND
Defendant Asante operates hospitals and healthcare facilities in Oregon. Plaintiffs and the
proposed class are Defendant's current and former employees. Plaintiffs and many of the
proposed class members are subject to a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") between
the Oregon Nurses Association ("ONA") and Defendant. The CBA governs, among other things,
wages, premium pay, differential pay, rest breaks, meal breaks, and grievance procedures.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant engages in timekeeping and payroll practices that deprive
Plaintiffs and other employees of their earned wages, as specified in the CBA. For example,
Defendant has allegedly "engaged in a practice of 'rounding' employee work hours by using
timekeeping software that automatically adjusts employee clock-in and clock-out times to the
nearest quarter-hour increment." Notice of Removal, Ex. 1 (First Am. Compl. ("FAC")) ,r 12,
ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiffs further allege that "Defendant's rounding practice has caused hourly paid
employees to routinely not be paid for their actual work times. As a result of this practice,
Plaintiffs and members of the Proposed Class have not been paid all earned wages on some pay
periods." Id. at ,r 13.
On May 7, 2026, Defendant removed the case from Jackson County Circuit Court. Notice
of Removal, ECF No. 1. In its Notice of Removal, Defendant asserted that the FAC raises
Page 2 - 	OPINION AND ORDER
Case 1:26-cv-00915-CL Document 21 Filed 10/14/26 Page 2 of 10

several issues requiring preemption under§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA") 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). According to Defendant, those issues include but are "not limited
to whether plaintiffs earned and were entitled to contractual premium pay for working
consecutive shifts without a day off or consecutive weekends (se e e.g., F AC, 14), or contractual
additional pay related to rest or meal periods (see e.g., FAC, 16)." Notice of Removal, 6.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs' claims cannot be resolved without interpretation of Articles 6.1 ,
6.2, 6.3 , and 6.6 of the CBA.
Article 6.1 describes entitlement to premium pay for working consecutive weekends: "A
nurse who works on a non-scheduled weekend at the request of management will be paid at one
and one-half (1 ½) times the nurse' s regular rate of pay for all weekend hours worked." Arthurs
Deel., Ex. 1 ("CBA") at 6, ECF No. 11-1.
Articles 6.2 and 6.3 describe entitlement to additional pay when a nurse is unable to take
meal or rest breaks during a shift: "Each shift worked by a nurse will include one one-half hour
meal break on the nurse ' s own time ... [but] [i]f an RN misses a meal period, that time (thirty
(30) minutes) will be paid as worked hours." Id. at 6. And "an RN who is scheduled to work and
works six (6) hours or more and misses his/her meal break will be paid double time for the
missed meal break." Id. Article 6.3 provides that RNs will receive either two or three 15-minute
breaks depending on the length of their shifts, and that "[i]f an RN misses a break period, they
will be paid the regular hourly wage for an additional one-fourth (1/4) of an hour for the missed
break period." Id. at 6-7.
Last, Article 6.6 describes entitlement to premium pay for working more than five full
consecutive shifts: "A nurse who works more than five (5) consecutive full shifts (12-hour
scheduled RNs) .. . without a day off will be eligible for continuous days of work premium." Id.
Page 3 - 	OPINION AND ORDER
Case 1:26-cv-00915-CL Document 21 Filed 10/14/26 Page 3 of 10

at 9. "A full shift for eligibility shall be the number of hours a nurse is normally scheduled to
work." Id. A nurse who is eligible for continuous days of work premium "will be compensated at
the rate of time and-a-half for each day worked or portion thereof until granted a day off." Id. at
10 .
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs move to remand, arguing the Court lacks federal jurisdiction because their
claims arise solely under Oregon law. Defendant responds that the Court has federal jurisdiction,
and should not remand, because Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by§ 301 of the LMRA. The
Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims are preempted in part.
Under a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal-question
jurisdiction exists when a federal law completely preempts any of the state law claims in the
complaint. Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 5-8 (2003). "Whether an employment
class action is preempted by the LMRA is analyzed under a two-prong analysis." Burnside v.
Ki ewit Pac. Corp., 491 F .3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the court determines whether the
plaintiff seeks to vindicate a right that arises solely by virtue of a CBA. Kobold v. Good
Samaritan Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016). If the asserted right arises
solely by virtue of a CBA, then the claim is preempted and the analysis ends there. Burnside, 491
F.3d at 1059-60. If the right is actionable under state law, regardless of a CBA, then the analysis
proceeds to the second step. Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1032.
Under the second step, the court determines whether resolution of the state law claim "is
nevertheless substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement."
Burns ide, 491 F.3d at 1059 (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is "substantially
dependent" when the court must "interpret," as opposed to merely "look to," a CBA. Id. at 1060.
Page 4 - 	OPINION AND ORDER
Case 1:26-cv-00915-CL Document 21 Filed 10/14/26 Page 4 of 10

"Where there is such substantial dependence, the state law claim is preempted by§ 301. If there
is not, then the claim can proceed under state law." Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1033 (footnote omitted).
The Court proceeds with each step of the analysis below, and finds that Plaintiffs' claims
are preempted in part.
I. 	Whether the Asserted Right Arises Solely by Virtue of the CBA
Whether the plaintiffs asserted right arises solely by virtue of a CBA is determined by
considering "the legal character of a claim ... and not whether a [CBA] grievance arising from
precisely the same set of facts could be pursued." Id. (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S.
107 , 123 ( 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The claim is only preempted by § 301 if
"founded directly on rights created by" the CBA. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394
(1987).
For example, "[i]n Lueck, the only reason the plaintiff had an insurance claim at all was
because the CBA created an obligation on the part of the employer to provide the insurance
benefit in question." Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1065 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 21 7 ( 1985) ). The plaintiffs claim was therefore preempted at the first step of the analysis.
Lueck, 4 71 U.S. at 217. 1 In contrast, in Alaska Airlines Inc., the plaintiffs claim arose
independently of the CBA, and was not preempted, because the claim invoked a state law right to
use banked vacation days that applied to all workers, regardless of whether the workers were
covered by a CBA. Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 927 (9th Cir. 2018).
Here, Plaintiffs' wage claims involve two categories of pay specified in the CBA: (1)
shift premiums and differentials; and (2) premiums related to meal period and rest breaks.
1 The Supreme Court went on to explain that the plaintiffs claim was preempted under the second
step of the analysis as well. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 218.
Page 5 - 	OPINION AND ORDER
Case 1:26-cv-00915-CL Document 21 Filed 10/14/26 Page 5 of 10

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' claims are preempted at step one of the analysis because their
right to premiums, differentials, and breaks are derived from the CBA, not from state law. The
Court disagrees.
Plaintiffs bring four claims for relief: (1) equitable accounting of wages; (2) failure to pay
all wages at regular paydays (ORS 652.120); (3) failure to pay all wages at termination (ORS
652.140 & ORS 652.150); and (4) withholding wages without authorization (ORS 652.610 &
ORS 652.615). Notice of Removal Ex. 1, ,r,r 21-43 , 46 ("FAC"), ECF No. 1. Similar to Alaska
Airlines Inc., Plaintiffs' claims arise under state law and may be invoked regardless of whether a
worker is covered by a CBA. Plaintiffs seek to vindicate their rights under Oregon law for
accurate and timely payment of"the wages due and owing to them." ORS 652.120. Plaintiffs'
CBA merely provides the means for calculating how much a worker has earned. The fact that the
CBA contains meal and break provisions that are more generous than the rules prescribed by the
Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries does not waive Plaintiffs' rights under Oregon law to
accurate and timely payment of wages owed. The rights Plaintiffs seek to vindicate do not exist
solely because of a CBA, and the Court proceeds to the second step of the Burnside analysis.
II. 	Whether the State Law Right is "Substantially Dependent" on the Terms of the CBA
Determining whether the state law right asserted by the plaintiff is "substantially
dependent" on the terms of the CBA is not a bright-line test. Cramer v. Consol. Freightways
Inc., 255 FJd 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Aug. 27, 2001). At the second step of the
preemption analysis, courts are directed to decide whether the claim can be resolved by merely
"looking to" versus "interpreting" the CBA. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060. A claim is only
preempted if it cannot be resolved without interpreting the meaning of a CBA provision. Id.
"' Interpretation' is construed narrowly; 'it means something more than "consider," "refer to ," or
Page 6 - 	OPINION AND ORDER
Case 1:26-cv-00915-CL Document 21 Filed 10/14/26 Page 6 of 10

"apply."' Alaska Airlines Inc., 898 F.3d at 921 (quoting Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000)).
To "help[] further sharpen the look-to/interpret distinction[,]" the Ninth Circuit in
McCray examined its decision in Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg 'l Med. Ctr., 832 F .3d 1024 (9th
Cir. 2016), explaining:
Kobold considered a claim brought by an operating nurse who sought to receive
time-and-a-half pay for certain "extra" shifts she'd worked. The nurse asserted
claims under Oregon state law, which we assumed arose independently from the
CBA (thus satisfying step one of Burnside). We nevertheless found that § 301
preempted her claims because resolving her case would require interpretation of the
CBA. This was so because before the court "could calculate the total amount
Kobold is owed, it must determine which of the shifts she worked qualified for
premium pay." And the definition of which shifts qualified for premium pay was
contained not within the state law under which the action arose, but rather was
based on the terms of the CBA. Because there was a live dispute over the meaning
of a particular provision of the relevant CBA, resolving the case would mean that
the court "must interpret, not just refer to or look at" the agreement. Specifically,
the CBA did not "directly and clearly explain what constitutes a 'change of
schedule,' nor how an agreement between [the hospital] and a nurse is to be made."
Since interpretation of the CBA's terms would be necessary, preemption was
appropriate.
McCray v. Marriott Hotel Servs. , Inc., 902 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citations
omitted).
Put differently, preemption is not appropriate unless there is "an active dispute over 'the
meaning of contract terms."' Alaska Airlines Inc., 898 F.3d at 921 (quoting Livadas, 512 U.S. at
124). For example, in Burnside, the parties disputed whether the employees were entitled under
state law for time spent travelling to the jobsite. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1074. The Ninth Circuit
explained that resolving that issue did not indicate a dispute about which premium pay
provisions in the CBA "would apply to any or all hours of transportation, if those hours are
compensable." Id. Holding, the plaintiffs claims were not preempted because the basic legal
issue could be resolved without interpreting the CBA. Id.
Page 7 - 	OPINION AND ORDER
Case 1:26-cv-00915-CL Document 21 Filed 10/14/26 Page 7 of 10

Here, Plaintiffs' claims present a credible dispute over the meaning of "full shift" in
Article 6.6 of the CBA. Unlike in Burnside, where the basic legal issue was whether the plaintiff
was entitled to transportation pay under state law and the CBA could later provide the damages
calculation for unpaid hours of travel, here, the legal issue raised by Plaintiffs is whether
Defendant "maintains a practice of routinely failing to accurately calculate and pay all premiums
and differential pay." FAC 115, ECF No. 1-1. That issue, as it relates to premium pay for
working consecutive full shifts, cannot be resolved without interpreting Article 6.6 of the CBA.
Article 6.6 of the CBA provides:
A nurse who works more than five (5) consecutive full shifts (12-hour scheduled
RNs) or six (6) consecutive full shifts (eight (8) or ten (10) hour scheduled RNs)
without a day off will be eligible for continuous days of work premium.
A full shift for eligibility shall be the number of hours a nurse is normally scheduled
to work. If a nurse is normally scheduled to work shifts of varying lengths, a full
shift will be the length of the shortest scheduled shift (minimum of eight (8) hours).
Once eligible for continuous days of work premium, a nurse will be compensated
at the rate of time-and-a-half for each day worked or portion thereof until granted
a day off. Hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek that also qualify for the
consecutive day's premium will be paid at double time.
CBA at 9-10.
Defendant credibly asserts that under Article 6.6, there is room for debate about whether
an employee who clocks in a few minutes late or leaves a few minutes early has worked "the
number of hours" they are normally scheduled to work. This ambiguity, when calculating
eligibility for premium pay, is foreseeably amplified by Defendant's alleged practice of rounding
employee work hours to the nearest quarter hour. In support of its proffered interpretation
argument, Defendant also relies on the declaration of its Director of Employee & Labor
Relations who stated in a sworn declaration that "the meaning of the phrase 'consecutive full
shifts' in Article 6.6 of the CBA" was debated during the grievance process between Plaintiffs'
Page 8 - 	OPINION AND ORDER
Case 1:26-cv-00915-CL Document 21 Filed 10/14/26 Page 8 of 10

ONA union and Defendant. Payton Deel. ,r 6, ECF No. 13. Defendant's interpretation of the
CBA and resulting pay practices may prove to have been unlawful, but its "proffered ...
argument" on the need to interpret the CBA to resolve the dispute reaches a "reasonable level of
credibility." Cramer, 255 F.3d at 692. This case is therefore similar to Kobold, "because before
the court 'c[an] calculate the total amount [Plaintiff] is owed, it must determine which of the
shifts she worked qualified for premium pay."' McCray, 902 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Kobold, 832
F.3d at 1035). The Court cannot determine which shifts qualify for premium pay without
interpreting the meaning of a "full shift" under Article 6.6 of the CBA. Plaintiffs' claims are
preempted under§ 301 as they relate to Defendant's pay practices when calculating premium
pay under Article 6.6 of the CBA.
However, Defendant's proffered interpretation arguments about Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3
of the CBA lack reasonable credibility. Article 6.1 describes entitlement to premium pay for
working consecutive weekends, and Articles 6.2 and 6.3 describe entitlement to additional pay
when a nurse is unable to take meal or rest breaks during a shift. Defendant fails to cite evidence
in support of its arguments that these provisions are actively in dispute, and the hypotheticals it
presents are either purely speculative or easily resolved by looking to the unambiguous language
of the relevant CBA provision. See Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691 ("alleging a hypothetical connection
between the claim and the terms of the CBA is not enough to preempt the claim"). Plaintiffs'
claims, as they relate to working consecutive weekends and meal or rest periods under Articles
6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 of the CBA are not preempted.
II I
I II
Ill
Page 9 - 	OPINION AND ORDER
Case 1:26-cv-00915-CL Document 21 Filed 10/14/26 Page 9 of 10

"Notably, the result of preemption at the second step is generally not the extinguishment
of the state law claim." Alaska Airlines Inc. , 898 F.3d at 922. 2 Here, Plaintiffs' claims are only
preempted as they relate to Defendant's pay practices when calculating premium pay under
Article 6.6 of the CBA.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand and for an award of attorneys fees
and costs (ECF No. 10) is DENIED.
DATED this 	IL/ 	day of Q 0-h/ ~ 	2026.
MARK D. CLARKE
United States Magistrate Judge
2 After finding that a plaintiffs claims are preempted in part, courts have broad discretion on
deciding how the case should proceed. See Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691 n.2 (noting different
approaches after finding 	that CBA interpretation is required); 	Kobold, 	832 	F.3d at 	1042
(remanding for district court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over non-
preempted claims); Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1074 n.19 (Courts are "able to devise processes to
preserve the preeminent role of the CBAs' dispute resolution processes to address the discrete
dispute then arising."). That issue, however, is not before the Court.
Page 10 - 	OPINION AND ORDER
Case 1:26-cv-00915-CL Document 21 Filed 10/14/26 Page 10 of 10