Parada-Marcia v. Mullin et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CARLOS PARADA-MARCIA,
Petitioner,
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al.,
Respondents.
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Case No. CIV-26-2063-G
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Carlos Parada-Marcia, a noncitizen,1 seeks a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.2 United States District Judge Charles
B. Goodwin referred the case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). Doc. 3. Respondents filed a response to the
petition, Doc. 8, and Petitioner replied, Doc. 9. So the matter is at issue.
For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends the Court deny
Petitioner’s habeas petition.
1 	This 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	“uses 	the 	term 	‘noncitizen’ 	as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578
n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
2 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
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I. 	Factual background and Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner is a citizen of Honduras who entered the United States
without admission or inspection in 1998 and was later granted Temporary
Protected Status. Doc. 1, at 5. He has committed three alcohol-related driving
offenses while in the United States in 2011, 2018, and 2021. Id.
Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement 	took 	him 	into 	custody 	on
February 	25, 	2025. 	Id. 	On 	March 	19, 	2025, 	an 	Immigration 	Judge 	(IJ)
determined that Petitioner posed a danger to the community during a custody
redetermination hearing and denied his request for a change in custody status.
Id. & Ex. 1. Petitioner requested and received a second hearing on January 5,
2026, where an IJ denied relief because “Respondent has not met his burden
to demonstrate that he is not a danger to the community.” Id. at 6 & Ex. 2.3 On
May 11, 2026, an IJ ordered Petitioner removed, and his appeal of that decision
remains pending. Doc. 1, at 6.
He 	argues 	that 	he 	has 	been 	deprived 	of 	due 	process 	because 	the
Government did not bear the burden to show danger and risk of flight at the
redetermination hearings. Id. at 7-9. He requests another hearing where the
3 	Petitioner does not state whether he appealed these decisions to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(f) (allowing bond
appeal to the BIA).
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Government bears the burden of proving his “present dangerousness or risk of
flight.” Id. at 9-10. Respondents ask the court to dismiss the petition and deny
Petitioner’s claims because he received two constitutionally adequate bond
hearings. Doc. 8, at 1-3.
II. 	Standard of review.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of
the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are
properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d
1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88
(2001)).
III. 	The Court cannot encroach upon an IJ’s discretionary weighing
of the evidence.
In determining whether a noncitizen is a flight risk, the IJ may consider
the following factors:
(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2)
the alien’s length of residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s
family ties in the United States, and whether they may entitle the
alien to reside permanently in the United States in the future; (4)
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the alien’s employment history; (5) the alien’s record of appearance
in court; (6) the alien’s criminal record, including the extensiveness
of 	criminal 	activity, 	the 	recency 	of 	such 	activity, 	and 	the
seriousness of the offenses; (7) the alien’s history of immigration
violations; (8) any attempts by the alien to flee prosecution or
otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) the alien’s manner of
entry to the United States.
In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006).
When a noncitizen like Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
“the Attorney General may exercise his discretion to either detain or release
an alien on bond or conditional parole.” Mwangi v. Terry, 465 F. App’x 784, 786
(10th Cir. 2012). “But the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion is not
subject to judicial review.” Id. “In the context of an immigration bond hearing,
district courts have jurisdiction to review [an IJ’s] discretionary bond denial
only 	‘where 	that 	bond 	denial 	is 	challenged 	as 	legally 	erroneous 	or
unconstitutional.’” Diaz-Calderon v. Barr, 535 F. Supp. 3d 669, 675 (E.D. Mich.
2020) (quoting Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).
“To be sure, ‘[d]ue process is not satisfied by rubberstamp denials [of bond].’”
Kumar v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. CIV-26-164-R, 2026 WL 753944, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. Mar. 17, 2026) (quoting Chi Thon Ngo v. I.N.S., 192 F.3d 390, 398 (3d
Cir. 1999)). But “a district court sitting in habeas . . . review[ing] due process
challenges to immigration bond hearings must proceed carefully, as it ‘has no
authority to encroach upon an IJ’s discretionary weighing of the evidence.’”
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Diaz-Calderon, 535 F. Supp. 3d at 675 (quoting Arrellano v. Sessions, No. 18-
cv-6625, 2019 WL 3387210, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).
Respondents 	provided 	Petitioner 	with 	two 	custody 	redetermination
hearings.4 Both IJs found Petitioner to pose an unmanageable danger to the
community if released. Doc. 1, Exs. 1-2. Although these findings may appear
rote and minimal they were made “[a]fter full consideration of the evidence
presented.” Id. The Court should therefore conclude the hearings comported
with due process. See, e.g., In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40 (“An Immigration
Judge has broad discretion in deciding the factors that he or she may consider
in custody redeterminations. The Immigration Judge may choose to give
greater weight to one factor over others, as long as the decision is reasonable.”).
Given the two IJs’ findings that Petitioner posed a danger to the community,
the undersigned recommends the Court deny Petitioner’s request for habeas
corpus relief because Respondents have not deprived him of an individualized
custody determination.5
4 	Petitioner may request another bond hearing upon a showing of changed
circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e).
5 	Petitioner argues his bond hearings were constitutionally inadequate
because he bore the burden of proof. Doc. 9, at 1. Respondents dispute this
claim arguing that “due process does not require the burden to shift to the
government 	at 	such 	hearings.” 	Doc. 	8, 	at 	2. 	Respondents’ 	argument
corresponds with the holdings of 	this 	Court. 	See, e.g., 	Pupo Socarras 	v.
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IV. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
deny Petitioner habeas corpus relief because he was not deprived of an
individualized custody determination.
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to
this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by October 27,
2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72. The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely
objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United
States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation
disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the
captioned matter.
Figueroa, No. CIV-26-571-HE, 2026 WL 2100499, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 21,
2026) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment Due Process clause is not offended by leaving
the burden of proof on the non-citizen in a § 1226(a) bond hearing.”); Gomez
Toro v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-315-JD, Doc. 19, at 18 & n.7 (W.D. Okla. May 15,
2026) (concluding “that placing the danger and flight risk burdens of proof on
the alien does not offend the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause”). So the
Court should decline Petitioner’s burden of proof argument.
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ENTERED this 13th day of October, 2026.
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