Singh v. Cerna et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DALJIT SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT CERNA, et al.,
Respondents.1
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Case No. CIV-26-1950-R
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Daljit Singh, a noncitizen proceeding with counsel,2 seeks a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.3 United States District
Judge David L. Russell referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge for proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3.
Respondents filed a response, Doc. 10, and Petitioner has replied, Doc. 11.
1 	Chris Gantt, the current Warden of Cimarron Correctional Facility, is
not a federal official and the Government did not file a response on his behalf.
Doc. 10, at 2 n.1.
2 	This 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	“uses 	the 	term 	‘noncitizen’ 	as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578
n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
3 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
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For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant Petitioner’s request for habeas relief in part and order Respondents to
provide Petitioner with an individualized custody hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) within ten days or otherwise release Petitioner.
I. 	Factual background and procedural history.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of India. Doc. 10, at 2. On September 1,
2018, he entered the United States at an unknown location. Id. On September
4, 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a
Notice and Order of Expedited Removal. Id. Ex. 1. On October 2, 2018, a U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services officer determined Petitioner had a
credible fear of returning to India. Id. Ex. 2. DHS then placed Petitioner into
standard removal proceedings by serving him with a Notice to Appear (NTA)
which charged Petitioner as inadmissible for arriving in the United States at
a time or place not designated by the Attorney General and without possession
of a valid entry document. Doc. 1, Ex. 1.
On 	October 	26, 	2018, 	an 	Immigration 	Judge 	(IJ) 	issued 	an 	order
releasing Petitioner on a $25,000 bond. Doc. 10, Ex. 3. On December 1, 2025,
an IJ ordered Petitioner removed from the United States and denied his
applications for relief from removal. Id. Ex. 4. His appeal remains pending. Id.
at 3 & Ex. 6.
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On July 22, 2026, Petitioner was involved in a motor vehicle accident
and Oklahoma authorities took him into custody. Id. Ex. 7. The next day,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) took him into custody. Id. Ex. 7,
at 2, Ex. 8. ICE then transferred Petitioner to the Cimarron Correctional
Facility in Cushing, Oklahoma, where he remains detained. Doc. 1, at 8.
II. 	Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner 	asserts 	four 	claims 	for 	relief: 	(1) 	unlawful 	detention 	in
violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); (2) a violation of
procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment; (3) a violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA); (4) a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause; (5) a violation of the Suspension Clause; and (6) a violation of the
Accardi doctrine for detaining him without a warrant in violation of agency
regulations. See Doc. 1, at 21-33.
Petitioner requests an order setting an expedited resolution of the
matter. Id. at 33. He also requests an injunction barring Respondents from
transferring him out of this District or removing him during the pendency of
these proceedings.4 Id. He seeks declaratory relief as to the unlawfulness of his
detention and requests his immediate release. Id. In the alternative, Petitioner
4 	The Court addressed these issues in part in its Order for Response, Doc.
8, at 2.
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asks this Court to conduct a bond hearing within seven days of the Court’s
order. Id. Finally he seeks an award of attorney’s fees and costs under the
Equal Access to Justice Act,5 and any further relief deemed appropriate by this
Court. Id.
III. 	Standard of review.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of
the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are
properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d
1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88
(2001)).
5 	To the extent that Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as
a 	prevailing 	party, 	Petitioner 	must 	seek 	those 	separately 	after 	a 	final
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); see also Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152,
1166 (10th Cir. 2025) (interpreting “EAJA’s broad language to unambiguously
authorize fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention”). Thus,
the Court need not address this request at this time.
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IV. 	Discussion.
A. 	8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention.
Respondents 	contend 	Petitioner 	is 	detained 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), but they acknowledge that the “matter is controlled by the
Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1237
(10th Cir. 2026),” and that Petitioner should receive a bond hearing. Doc. 10,
at 4-5. They ask that the Court limit any relief to an order directing a bond
hearing within seven days. Id. at 5.
“[B]ecause the legality of Petitioner’s continued detention depends upon
the source of the Government’s detention authority,” the undersigned must
identify the statutory basis for Petitioner’s detention as a threshold matter.
Zhakhonov v. Grant, No. CIV-26-350-J, 2026 WL 1865418, at *2 (W.D. Okla.
June 29, 2026).
Section 1225 and 1226 authorize detention in different domains. Section
1225 applies primarily to aliens “seeking admission” to the United States,
while § 	1226 “generally 	governs 	the 	process 	of 	arresting and 	detaining”
noncitizens “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89 (2018). Section
1225 generally applies at the border and § 1226 in the interior. See, e.g.,
Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1237 (“We hold that noncitizens who entered
the United States and were thereafter detained in the interior of the country
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are 	usually 	subject 	to 	§ 	1226(a) 	(and 	thus 	eligible 	for 	bond), 	not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).”).
Petitioner’s current detention “is not part of the inspection process,” and
it did not “arise from an attempted entry at a port of entry.” Zhakhonov, 2026
WL 1865418, at *3. Rather, like the petitioner in Zhakhonov, “Petitioner was
paroled into the United States, permitted to reside in the interior of the country
for several years, [] and complied with the conditions of his release before being
re-detained.” Id. “Under those circumstances, Petitioner’s detention is more
naturally characterized as detention ‘pending a decision on whether the alien
is to be removed from the United States’ within the meaning of § 1226(a).” Id.
B. 	A bond hearing is the appropriate remedy.
Because 	Petitioner 	is 	detained 	under 	§ 	1226(a), 	the 	undersigned
concludes a bond hearing is the appropriate remedy.
“Unlike § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(a) contemplates individualized custody
determinations and authorizes release on bond or conditional parole pending
completion of removal proceedings.” Zhakhonov, 2026 WL 1865418, at *3.
Here, the Government has not provided Petitioner with an individualized
custody determination since his re-detention. Doc. 1, at 8; see, e.g., Zhakhonov,
2026 WL 1865418, at *3 (“[T]he process afforded by § 1226(a) itself serves as
the mechanism through which a detainee’s liberty interest is protected.”).
Because this is “the very process Congress prescribed for detainees held
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pursuant 	to 	§ 	1226(a),” 	the 	Court 	should 	order 	Respondents 	to 	provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a). Id.; see also Navarrete v.
Mullin, No. CIV-26-224-SLP, 2026 WL 2323345, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 11,
2026) (finding the petitioner had a “protected liberty interest arising from her
release on her own recognizance” and that the level of process owed to her was
“for Respondents to provide [her] with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226”); Todyrenchuk v. Warden of Diamondback Corr. Facility, No. CIV-26-
1243-J, 2026 WL 2186977, at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 29, 2026) (“[T]he Court
concludes the proper remedy in this case is not immediate release, but an
individualized 	bond 	hearing 	before 	an 	Immigration 	Judge 	exercising
jurisdiction under § 1226(a).”); cf. Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1237.
The Court should thus grant the petition in part and order Respondents
to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within ten days or
otherwise release Petitioner. See Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1251 n.13
(directing district court to order the government to provide the petitioner a
bond hearing within seven days “[b]ecause [the petitioner] can properly be
subject to detention under § 1226(a)”); see also Colin v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1189-
D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025) (“Petitioner has not
received a bond hearing and Respondents raise no objection challenging their
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obligations to provide bond hearings for noncitizens that are detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a).”).6
C. 	The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s remaining
claims.
Given the undersigned’s recommendation to grant Petitioner a bond
hearing, the Court should decline to address Petitioner’s remaining claims for
relief. The Court can grant him relief under § 1226(a). See Colin, 2025 WL
3645176, at *6 n.3 (“Because the Court grants the relief the Petitioner requests
based on the applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Court declines to decide
the merits of Petitioner’s due process claim.”); 	see also Singh, 2026 WL
1973892, at *1 (declining to address the petitioner’s due process and “other
claims” because the court was granting the petitioner habeas corpus relief on
the basis of his statutory claim and directing the respondents to provide him
with a bond hearing under § 1226(a)).
V. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant 	Petitioner’s 	habeas 	petition 	in 	part 	and 	order 	Respondents 	to
6 	Petitioner argues in his reply that the Court should decide this case like
it did Singh v. Cerna, No. CIV-26-757-R (W.D. Okla. July 8, 2026), and release
him rather than order a bond hearing. See Doc. 11, at 2. But the Court similarly
determined in that case that a bond hearing was the appropriate remedy. See
Singh v. Cerna, No. CIV-26-757-R, 2026 WL 1973892, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July
8, 	2026) 	(“Judge 	Stephens 	recommends 	that 	the 	proper 	remedy 	is 	an
individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a). The Court agrees.”).
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provide 	Petitioner 	with 	an 	individualized 	bond 	hearing 	before 	a
neutral IJ within ten days or else release Petitioner. The undersigned
also recommends that the Court order Respondents to certify their compliance
with the Court’s order by filing a status report within ten business days of the
Court’s order and promptly providing a copy of this order to counsel for the
Warden of the Cimarron Correctional Facility.
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to
this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by October 15,
2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72.7 The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely
objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United
States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation
7 	Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has
reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that
rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas corpus
petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings under
Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x
227, 231 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be
applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they
need not be in every instance–particularly where strict application would
undermine the habeas review process”).
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disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the
captioned matter.
ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2026.
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