Williams v. Oklahoma State of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
COYANTE JACOY WILLIAMS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-199-SLP
)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, )
)
Respondent. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Coyante Jacoy Williams, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”), Doc. 1,
challenging his state court conviction in Case No. CF-2021-520, District Court of
Comanche County, Oklahoma. United States District Judge Scott L. Palk referred this
matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-
(C). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss the
Petition to permit Petitioner the opportunity to exhaust his state court remedies.
I. Background and Procedural History
Petitioner was tried by jury in the District Court of Comanche County, and
convicted of one count of first-degree murder (Count 1) and one count of assault and
battery with a dangerous weapon (Count II). Pet. at 1-2. He was sentenced to life in prison
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for Count I and time served for Count II. Id. at 1; Williams v. State, F-2023-974 (Okla.
Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2025), slip op. at 1.1
Petitioner brought a direct appeal, raising the following propositions of error:
1. The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that
[Petitioner] is guilty of first degree (malice aforethought) murder.
2. The trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury regarding
legal principles not raised by the evidence, thus confusing and
misleading the jury on the critical issue of the defense of self-defense.
3. The mother of the decedent’s child was improperly allowed, over
defense objection, to opine that the homicide was not committed in
lawful self-defense.
4. The mother of the decedent’s child was improperly allowed to
repeatedly express highly prejudicial and inadmissible opinion about
[Petitioner’s] character.
5. [Petitioner] was deprived of the reasonably effective assistance of
counsel, guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, because his trial attorney failed to interpose
timely and specific objections, thus forfeiting appellate review of all
but plain error, and failed to utilize readily available evidence in his
cross-examination of the sole eyewitness. . . .
6. The accumulation of error in this case deprived [Petitioner] of due
process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and Article II, § 7 of the
Oklahoma Constitution.
Williams, F-2023-974, slip op. at 2. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”)
denied relief on all claims. Id. at 3-20. Petitioner did not seek review by the Supreme
1 The undersigned takes judicial notice of the docket in Petitioner’s direct appeal, available
at www.oscn.net/dockets. See United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir.
2007) (noting a court “may exercise [its] discretion to take judicial notice of publicly-filed
records in [this] court and certain other courts concerning matters that bear directly upon
the disposition of the case at hand”).
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Court of the United States or seek any post-conviction relief from the Oklahoma state
courts. Pet. at 3.
II. Petitioner’s Grounds for Relief
Before this Court, Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief on the following grounds:
1. Ground One: Under the Sixth Amendment, ineffective assistance of
trial counsel due to counsel’s failure to investigate and present
evidence, failure to retain experts, and medical incapacity. Pet. at 5.
2. Ground Two: Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, violation
of his right to present a complete defense due to the exclusion of
exculpatory evidence. Id. at 6.
3. Ground Three: “Actual innocence (fundamental miscarriage of
justice).” Id. at 8.2
4. Ground Four: Under the Fourteenth Amendment, violation of his due
process rights due to a Brady violation. Id. at 9.
Petitioner acknowledges that he did not raise any of these grounds in his direct appeal or
seek post-conviction relief on any of these grounds from the Oklahoma state courts. Id. at
3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10.
III. Screening
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts requires the Court promptly to conduct a preliminary review of habeas petitions. A
2 Petitioner’s third ground for relief is a claim of actual innocence. The undersigned
understands this claim not as a freestanding claim for federal habeas relief, but as an
assertion that Petitioner can overcome his failure to exhaust if the Court were to consider
denying habeas on that ground. See, e.g., Taylor v. Powell, 7 F.4th 920, 926 (10th Cir.
2021) (explaining a federal habeas court may consider a procedurally defaulted claim
“when it is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice” (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 324 (1995))). As set forth below, however, the undersigned does not recommend
denying habeas relief on the grounds that the claims are procedurally barred.
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petition should be dismissed “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached
exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Id. (citation
modified). Further, district courts may sua sponte consider a petitioner’s failure to exhaust
state court remedies if the failure is clear from the face of the habeas petition. See United
States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 746 n.8 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting “sua sponte consideration
of exhaustion of state remedies . . . is explicitly permitted by Supreme Court precedent”
(citation modified)). “Before acting on its own initiative, a court must accord the parties
fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.” Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S.
198, 210 (2006) (citation modified). This Report and Recommendation provides sufficient
notice to Petitioner, who can present his position by filing timely any objection to this
Report and Recommendation. See, e.g., Allen v. Zavaras, 568 F.3d 1197, 1198-99, 1202-
03 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a habeas petition
for failure to exhaust state court remedies where failure to exhaust was “clear from the face
of his petition,” and noting the district court had given petitioner “an opportunity to
respond” before ruling and “abided” by Day’s requirement for petitioner’s fair notice and
opportunity to present his position).
IV. Analysis
A. Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted.
The Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As a preliminary matter, AEDPA codifies the
exhaustion doctrine, which is a matter of comity and requires the Court to consider in the
first instance whether Petitioner has presented his grounds for relief to the OCCA. See
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Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (“The States should have the first
opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner’s federal rights.”
(citation modified)). AEDPA provides that, aside from two narrow exceptions,3 habeas
relief for a state prisoner shall not be granted unless the remedies available in state court
have been exhausted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Habeas relief may, however, be denied
notwithstanding Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies. Id. § 2254(b)(2).
“The exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the federal issue has been properly
presented to the highest state court, either by direct review of the conviction or in a
postconviction attack.” Dever v. Kan. State Penitentiary, 36 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir.
1994). To exhaust a claim, that claim must be “fairly presented to the state court.” Bland
v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1011 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation modified). That means the
“substance of the federal claim [must be] raised in state court.” Simpson v. Carpenter, 912
F.3d 542, 565 (10th Cir. 2018). As noted above, Petitioner acknowledges he did not
present his federal habeas claims to the OCCA either on direct appeal or through a request
for post-conviction relief. As such, Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted.
B. The undersigned recommends dismissal without prejudice.
When considering a petition containing only unexhausted claims, a district court
ordinarily has two options: (1) dismiss the petition so the petitioner can return to state
court to exhaust his claims, or (2) deny the petition on the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
3 Exhaustion is not required if “there is an absence of available State corrective process” or
certain circumstances “render such process ineffective to protect [a petitioner’s] rights.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). Neither exception appears to apply here.
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§ 2254(b)(2), notwithstanding the petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies.
Moore v. Schoeman, 288 F.3d 1231, 1232 (10th Cir. 2002).
A habeas petitioner may exhaust state court remedies through either direct appeal
or post-conviction proceedings. Dever, 36 F.3d at 1534. Because Petitioner has completed
his direct appeal, his only possible option for exhaustion of his federal habeas claims is an
application for post-conviction relief. Under Oklahoma law, any claim that could have
been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is considered waived in a post-conviction
proceeding. See Mann v. State, 856 P.2d 992, 993 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (explaining
that any claims for post-conviction relief that “could have been raised on direct appeal, but
were not” are deemed “waived”); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1086 (“Any ground finally
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the
proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the
applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or
was inadequately raised in the prior application.”).
Petitioner, however, asserts that each of his federal habeas claims is based on newly
discovered evidence or information. Pet. at 5, 7, 8, 10. As such, the undersigned
anticipates Petitioner could attempt to exhaust his claims in state court through an
application for post-conviction relief by presenting them as claims that could not have been
raised on direct appeal. Though the Court may consider such attempt unlikely to succeed,
it is the state court, not the federal district court, that should determine the
procedural posture of a claim. The present availability of a state remedy is a
question of state law as to which only the state courts may speak with final
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authority. This Court must be circumspect about deciding, based upon a
speculative analysis of what a state court might do, that a particular claim is
procedurally foreclosed.
Mosley v. Rankins, No. CIV-24-1139-R, 2026 WL 360040, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 9, 2026)
(citation modified).4 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the Petition be dismissed
without prejudice so Petitioner can attempt to exhaust his federal habeas claims. See id. at
*3-4 (dismissing an unexhausted petition without prejudice so the petitioner could attempt
to exhaust his claims in state court, even though noting the claims would likely be
procedurally barred); see also Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1012 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“Generally, a federal court should dismiss unexhausted claims without prejudice so that
the petitioner can pursue available state-court remedies.”).
C. The undersigned declines to recommend a stay and abeyance.
AEDPA establishes a one-year deadline for an inmate in state custody to file a
federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). For purposes here, the one-year limitation
period runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
4 The undersigned recognizes that Oklahoma law imposes a one-year period of limitation
for filing any application for post-conviction relief. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1080.1. But as
that period may begin to run on the date of discovery of new evidence, the undersigned
declines to speculate on whether Petitioner could timely file an application for post-
conviction relief. See id. § 1080.1(A)(5) (specifying “the limitation period shall run from
the latest of” several triggering events, including “the date on which the factual predicate
of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence” (citation modified)).
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Therefore, AEDPA’s one-year limitations period started when Petitioner’s state judgment
became final after direct appeal. See id.5
The OCCA ruled on Petitioner’s direct appeal on January 30, 2025. Because he had
90 days to seek review with the United States Supreme Court, his judgment became final
90 days after January 30, 2025—on April 30, 2025. See Woodward v. Cline, 693 F.3d
1289, 1292 (10th Cir. 2012) (“A judgment becomes final when the defendant has exhausted
all direct appeals in state court and the time to petition for a writ of certiorari from the
United States Supreme Court has expired (which is 90 days after the decision by the State’s
highest court).” (citation modified)).
The one-year period of limitation begins to run the day after a conviction is final.
Harris v. Dinwiddie, 642 F.3d 902, 906 n.6 (10th Cir. 2011); see also United States v.
Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256, 1260-61 (10th Cir. 2003) (adopting the “anniversary method” in
which “the day of the act from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not
be included” (citation modified, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a))). Petitioner’s one-year clock
began to run on May 1, 2025, and will expire one year later, on May 1, 2026. See Hurst,
322 F.3d at 1260-61 (explaining that, under the anniversary method, the limitations period
under AEDPA expires on the one-year anniversary of the date the limitations period
5 If a petitioner alleges newly discovered evidence, the AEDPA filing deadline is one year
from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim . . . could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Because the
undersigned does not know when Petitioner discovered his allegedly new evidence, or
whether it could have been discovered earlier with due diligence, the undersigned does not
use that section of the statute to calculate the AEDPA filing deadline.
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began). “The one-year clock is stopped, however, during the time the petitioner’s ‘properly
filed’ application for state postconviction relief ‘is pending.’” Day v. McDonough, 547
U.S. 198, 201 (2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).
The Petition was filed on February 5, 2026, but it appears Petitioner misunderstands
the one-year calculation under AEDPA. See Pet. at 13 (discussing filing the Petition
“late”). It also appears that, pursuant to the misunderstanding, Petitioner may have
intended to file the Petition as a placeholder, as he requests “more time to be able to hire
legitimate experts to help out with [his] case.” Id. at 14.
Though Petitioner does not specifically request a stay and abeyance, the
undersigned finds it prudent to consider whether a stay is warranted. Under Rhines v.
Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275-76 (2005), a stay may be available for mixed petitions containing
both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Additionally, the Rhines “rationale is potentially
applicable to a petition with wholly unexhausted claims that is protectively filed during the
pendency of state postconviction proceedings.” Doe v. Jones, 762 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th
Cir. 2014). A protectively-filed habeas petition is one that raises the same claims as an
application for post-conviction relief that was “filed simultaneously” and “just before” the
AEDPA limitations period is set to expire. Id. at 1181 (emphasis omitted).
Here, Petitioner has not filed in state court any application for post-conviction relief.
See Pet. at 12 (indication by Petitioner that he has no other petition or appeal now pending).
Nor was his Petition filed “just before” the AEDPA limitations period is set to expire.
Moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that a stay is warranted (or even to request
a stay). A stay “is an exercise of judicial discretion and the party requesting a stay bears
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the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Ind.
State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 556 U.S. 960, 961 (2009) (citation modified);
accord Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278 (setting forth the factors a district court should consider
when exercising its discretion regarding a stay). Petitioner has neither carried his burden
nor requested a stay, and the undersigned declines to recommend the case be stayed. See
Mosley, No. CIV-24-1139-R, 2026 WL 360040, at *5 (finding a stay not warranted where
petitioner had requested a stay, but had not met his burden).
V. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court DISMISS
the Petition without prejudice. Petitioner is advised of his right to object to this Report
and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed with the Clerk
of Court not later than March 13, 2026. See id. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the factual and legal issues
addressed in this Report and Recommendation. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656,
659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 20th day of February, 2026.
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