Kudratov v. Siegel et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ISLOM SHUKHRAT UGLI 	)
KUDRATOV, 	)
)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-26-83-SLP
)
MARK SIEGEL et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Islom Shukhrat Ugli Kudratov, a noncitizen,1 seeks a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.2 United States District Judge
Scott L. Palk referred the case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3. The Government
responded, Doc. 11, and the time to reply has expired. So the matter is at issue.
For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends the Court grant
Petitioner’s 	habeas 	petition, 	in 	part, 	and 	order 	Respondents 	to 	provide
1 	This 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	“uses 	the 	term 	‘noncitizen’ 	as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578
n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
2 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 1 of 13

2
Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven business
days or otherwise release Petitioner if he has not received a lawful bond
hearing within that period.
I. 	Factual background and procedural history.
Petitioner is a citizen of Uzbekistan who entered the country over two
years ago and has been legally employed as an over the road truck driver. Doc.
1, at 4, 10. He has been detained since January 9, 2026. Doc. 11, at 13. He has
no criminal history or arrests. Doc. 1, at 10. Respondents state Petitioner has
a pending asylum claim. Doc. 11, at 13, 27 & Ex. 2.
Petitioner 	claims 	exhaustion 	would 	be 	futile 	because 	Immigration
Judges 	(IJs) 	take 	the 	position 	they 	are 	constrained 	by 	the 	Board 	of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N.
Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Id. at 4, 7.3
II. 	Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner raises four grounds for relief:
Ground One: Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (Unlawful Denial of Release
on Bond);
3 	In Hurtado, the BIA held that those who entered the country without
admission or parole are ineligible for a bond hearing and are detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 29 I. & N. Dec. at 216. Hurtado is not binding on this
Court. 	See 	Loper 	Bright 	Enters. 	v. 	Raimondo, 	603 	U.S. 	369, 	413 	(2024)
(“[C]ourts 	need 	not 	and 	under 	the 	APA 	may 	not 	defer 	to 	an 	agency
interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”).
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 2 of 13

3
Ground Two: Violation of the Bond Regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1,
1236.1, and 1003.19 (Unlawful Denial of Release on Bond);
Ground Three: Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (Unlawful Detention
Under This Provision); and
Ground Four: Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process.
Doc. 1, at 10-12. At bottom, he argues that he is not subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2) and Respondents continued detention of him
violates the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) and his due process
rights.
Petitioner asks this Court to order Respondents to show cause why his
habeas 	petition 	should 	not 	be 	granted 	within 	three 	days,4 	issue 	a 	writ
requiring his immediate release or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with
“a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or the Due Process Clause
within seven days;” issue an order declaring that should he be re-detained
Respondents should provide him with a bond hearing within seven days, and
issue an order declaring his detention unlawful. Doc. 1, at 13.
4 	The Court addressed Petitioner’s request for an order to show cause
when it ordered a response to the petition. See Doc. 9.
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 3 of 13

4
III. 	Standard of review.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of
the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are
properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d
1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88
(2001)).
“When called on to resolve a dispute over a statute’s meaning,” the Court
should “seek[] to afford the [statute’s] terms their ordinary meaning at the time
Congress adopted them” and to “exhaust all the textual and structural clues
bearing on the meaning.” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 160 (2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted). This Court’s “‘sole function’ is to apply the
law as the Court finds it, . . . not defer to some conflicting reading the
government might advance.” Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Oklahoma
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 107 F.4th 1209, 1222 n.11 (10th Cir.
2024) (stating that the court “must independently interpret the statutory
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 4 of 13

5
phrase irrespective of the parties’ positions”), judgment vacated on other
grounds, 145 S. Ct. 2837 (2025).
IV. 	Discussion.
A. 	The Court has jurisdiction to consider the petition.
Respondents do not challenge the Court’s jurisdiction to consider the
petition. So the undersigned has dispensed with the general jurisdictional
analysis and recommends the Court find there is no jurisdictional bar to
consideration of Petitioner’s claims. See, e.g., Cortes v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1176-
SLP, 2026 WL 147435, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20, 2026) (“Petitioner’s claim
that Respondents are detaining him without a bond hearing in violation of the
INA does not divest the Court of jurisdiction. Such a claim does not ‘arise from’
and is not directly connected to the commencement of removal proceedings, the
adjudication of removability, or the execution of any removal order. Rather,
Petitioner 	challenges 	the 	legality 	of 	his 	continued 	detention 	under 	the
statutory framework governing custody and bond determinations.”); Cruz-
Hernandez v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1378-D, 2026 WL 18932, at *1 (W.D. Okla.
Jan. 2, 2026) (“Here, because Petitioner challenges the legal question of
whether 	he 	is 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	under 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A) 	or
detention under § 1226(a), and he does not challenge Respondents’ decision to
commence or adjudicate proceedings or execute removal orders, § 1252(g) does
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 5 of 13

6
not jurisdictionally bar consideration of the Petition.); 	see also Hasan v.
Crawford, 2025 WL 2682255, at *3 n.7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025) (“Federal
courts throughout the country have similarly found that these jurisdiction-
stripping provisions do not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to review
a noncitizen’s challenge to the legality of his detention.” (collecting cases)).
B. 	Section 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention.
Petitioner asserts that Respondents have violated the INA by detaining
him under the mandatory detention provision in § 1225(b)(2). Doc. 1, at 6-7.
He argues this provision does not apply to him because he had previously
entered and had been residing in the United States for more than two years.
See id. at 9. So, as someone who is not a recent arrival seeking inspection and
admission 	into 	the 	United 	States, 	Petitioner 	asserts 	his 	detention 	is
governed—not by § 1225(b)(2)—but by § 1226(a). Id. at 10-11. Respondents
contend that Petitioner and other noncitizens who have entered the country
without inspection are applicants for admission under § 1225(a)(1) who are
seeking admission under § 1225(b)(2)(A), whether they are passively residing
in the country or not. Doc. 11, at 10, 16, 22-26.
Section 1225(a)(1) describes an “applicant[] for admission” as “an alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United 	States.” 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(a)(1). 	According 	to 	its 	plain 	language,
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 6 of 13

7
“§ 1225(b)(2)(A) applies ‘in 	the case 	of an alien who is 	an 	applicant for
admission, if the examining officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be
detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.’” Cortes, 2026 WL
147435, at *4 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis in original)). This
section “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission
into the country.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018).
Section 1226(a), on the other hand, “authorizes the Government to
detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal
proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). “Section 1226(a)
sets out the default rule: The Attorney General may issue a warrant for the
arrest and detention of an alien ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to
be removed from the United States.’” Id. (quoting § 1226(a)). “‘Except as
provided in [Section 1226(c)],’ the Attorney General ‘may release’ an alien
detained under § 1226(a) ‘on . . . bond’ or ‘conditional parole.’” Id. (quoting
§ 1226(a)(1)-(2)).
This Court has previously compared §§ 1225 and 1226 and decided
noncitizens like Petitioner are entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226. See,
e.g., Cortes, 2026 WL 147435, at *3-7; see also Lopez v. Corecivic Cimmaron
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 7 of 13

8
Corr. Facility, No. CIV-25-1175-SLP, 2026 WL 165490, at *3-7 (W.D. Okla.
Jan. 21, 2026). The Court should reach the same result in this case.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “unambiguously requires that an ‘applicant for
admission’ 	also 	be 	‘seeking 	admission’ 	for 	the 	section 	to 	control,” 	and
“[n]oncitizens ‘seeking admission’ are those who have not effected an entry into
the United States.” Colin v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1189-D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *4
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025). Because Petitioner effected entry into the country
over two years ago, he is not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention
requirement. 	Numerous 	Judges 	in 	this 	District 	have 	held 	likewise. 	See
Ramirez Rojas v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1236-HE, 2026 WL 94641, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. Jan. 13, 2026) (“The court also agrees that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A),
governs petitioner’s detention.”); Valdez v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1250-R, 2025 WL
3709021, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2025) (“Because Petitioner has been
unlawfully 	living 	in 	the 	United 	States 	for 	many 	years 	without 	seeking
admission, this provision does not apply to him. Instead, Petitioner’s detention
is controlled by § 1226(a).”); Escarcega v. Olson, No. CIV-25-1129-J, 2025 WL
3243438, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025) (“[B]ased on the plain language of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the phrase ‘seeking admission’ only applies to noncitizens who
are presently and actively seeking lawful entry into the United States at the
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 8 of 13

9
border.” 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	alterations 	omitted));5 	see 	also
Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir.
2025) (“[I]t is Congress’s prerogative to define a term however it wishes, and it
has chosen to limit the definition of an ‘applicant for admission’ to ‘an alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). It could easily have included noncitizens
who are “seeking admission” within the definition but elected not to do so.”).6
As well as determining that if “all ‘applicants for admission’ are also ‘seeking
admission,’ then § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s inclusion of the phrase ‘seeking admission’
would be redundant and courts should avoid statutory interpretations that
‘make[] any part [of the statute] superfluous.’” Escarcega, 2025 WL 3243438,
at *3 (quoting Fuller v. Norton, 86 F.3d 1016, 1024 (10th Cir. 1996)).
Respondents argue the Court should reconsider because Petitioner’s
asylum request as well as his decision not to voluntarily depart transforms him
into one who is actively seeking admission into the country. Doc. 11, at 13-14,
5 	But see Gutierrez Sosa v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1257-PRW, 2026 WL 36344,
at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2026) (holding § 1225 applied to the petitioner’s
detention); Montoya v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302, at *12
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2026) (same).
6 	But see Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 506 (5th Cir. 2026)
(applying § 1225 to a similar habeas challenge).
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 9 of 13

10
27. But the Court has “declined to find” that either refusing to voluntarily
depart or seeking asylum “constitutes seeking admission for purposes of this
subsection.’” Malacidze v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1527-D, 2026 WL 227155, at *3
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 28, 2026) (quoting Cruz-Hernandez v. Noem, No. CIV-25-
1378-D, 2026 WL 18932, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 2, 2026)); Li v. Grant, No. CIV-
25-1426-HE, 2026 WL 147438, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20, 2026) (finding
Ҥ 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply even though petitioner filed an application for
asylum”).
When Petitioner was detained after residing in the country for over two
years, he was not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Instead, Petitioner is subject to § 1226, and “is entitled to a prompt bond
hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to § 1226(a).” Cortes, 2026 WL
147435, at *7.
The undersigned therefore recommends the Court grant Petitioner’s
habeas 	petition 	and 	order 	Respondents 	to 	provide 	Petitioner 	with 	an
individualized 	bond 	hearing 	before 	a 	neutral 	immigration 	judge 	under
§ 1226(a) within seven business days of the Court’s adoption of this Report and
Recommendation or, in the alternative, immediately release Petitioner.
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 10 of 13

11
C. 	The 	Court 	should 	decline 	to 	address 	the 	merits 	of
Petitioner’s due process claim.
Given 	the 	undersigned’s 	recommendation 	as 	to 	the 	disposition 	of
Petitioner’s claim for relief under the INA, the undersigned recommends the
Court refrain from addressing the merits of Petitioner’s due process claim. The
Court can grant him the relief he seeks under § 1226(a). See Cortes, 2026 WL
147435, at *7 (“The Court declines to decide the merits of such claim and
Petitioner may renew such a claim if he is not provided with a bond hearing or
released within seven days of this Order.”).
V. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant Petitioner’s habeas application, in part, and order Respondents to
provide 	Petitioner 	with 	an 	individualized 	bond 	hearing 	before 	a
neutral 	immigration 	judge 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a) 	within 	seven
business days or otherwise release Petitioner if he has not received a
lawful bond hearing within that period. The undersigned further
recommends that the Court order Respondents certify compliance by
filing a status report within ten business days of the Court’s order.
The undersigned further recommends the Court order that:
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 11 of 13

12
• 	Respondents 	shall 	not 	re-detain 	Petitioner 	without 	a 	pre-
deprivation hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
• 	Counsel for Respondents provide a copy of this order to Counsel for
the Warden of the Diamondback Correctional Facility without
delay;
• 	Respondents file a Notice of Compliance with this Order with the
Court as soon as is practicable.
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to
this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by March 26,
2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72.7 The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely
objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
7 	Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has
reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation to seven
days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition
(noting that rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas
corpus petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings
under Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484
F. App’x 227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases
may be applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that
“while 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	may 	be 	applied 	in 	habeas
proceedings, they need not be in every instance – particularly where strict
application would undermine the habeas review process”).
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 12 of 13

13
review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United
States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation
disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the
captioned matter.
ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2026.
Case 5:26-cv-00083-SLP Document 12 Filed 03/19/26 Page 13 of 13