Owdetallah v. Bondi et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MOHAMMAD OWDETALLAH, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-1546-SLP
)
PAMELA BONDI, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Mohammad Owdetallah, a noncitizen1 and Palestinian national, filed a
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his
detention by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). 	Doc. 1. 	United
States District Judge Scott L. Palk referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). 	Respondents timely filed a Response
and Petitioner timely filed a Reply. 	Docs. 11, 14. 	For the reasons set forth below, the
undersigned recommends that the Court grant the Petition to the extent it requests habeas
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for release from ICE custody.
1 Unless directly quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
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I. 	Background
Petitioner, a citizen of Palestine,2 lawfully entered the United Stated in October
2005 on a student visa to attend the Edmond Language Institute. Resp. at 10. On May 10,
2007, ICE initiated immigration proceedings against Petitioner by issuing a Notice to
Appear alleging that he failed to comply with the terms of his visa because he failed to
attend or disenroll from the Edmond Language Institute from December 2005 to May 2007.
Doc. 11-2 at 1, 3. Further, ICE alleged that from December 2006 to May 2007 Petitioner
was employed for compensation without authorization. 	Id. at 3. 	On August 15, 2011,
Petitioner was ordered removed. 	Resp. at 10; Doc. 11-2 at 1. 	That same day, Petitioner
withdrew all pending applications for asylum and withholding of removal and waived
appeal of his order of removal, making it final. 	Resp. at 10; Doc. 11-2 at 1; Pet. at 2
(confirming that Petitioner waived appeal of the removal order making it administratively
final).
At some point after Petitioner’s order of removal became final, he was released on
an Order of Supervision (“OOS”). Pet. at 2. Neither party alleges how long Petitioner was
in ICE custody before he was released on an OOS. See id. at 3 (“Petitioner does not recall
if he was detained for any length of time prior to December 11, 2025”); Resp. at 18
2 Petitioner alleges that he is “stateless” because he is a citizen of Palestine, “a country
which no longer exists.” 	Pet. at 2. 	However, ICE’s records indicate that Petitioner is a
native and citizen of Israel. 	Doc. 11-1 at 3. 	Further, he was ordered removed to Israel.
Doc. 11-2 at 1. 	However, Respondents do not contest that Petitioner is a Palestinian
national, see Resp. at 9-10, and whether Petitioner is a national of Palestine or Israel is not
relevant to the disposition of his claims.
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(asserting that Petitioner is attempting to shift the burden to Respondents of demonstrating
the length of his prior detention, but refusing to provide any factual information).
Petitioner alleges that when ICE placed him on an OOS “pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 and
8 C.F.R. § 241.13,” “ICE necessarily determined that he had demonstrated to ICE’s
satisfaction that his removal would not occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Pet. at
2. Petitioner asserts that he complied with all check-in requirements of the OOS. Id.
On December 11, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained by ICE at a scheduled check-in
appointment. Id.; Resp. at 10. According to Petitioner, he “has not received any Notice of
Revocation of Release” informing him of the reason for his re-detention, nor has he
“received a notice of Custody Determination or any other written decision explaining what
changed circumstances allegedly justified or currently justify his re[-]detention.” Pet. at 3-
4. 	Finally, Petitioner alleges he has not received “any sort of interview at which he can
present evidence demonstrating there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 4.
Petitioner alleges that he cannot be removed to his country of origin of Palestine
because of Palestine’s dissolution. Id. He further alleges Respondents have not identified
any third country willing to accept Petitioner or obtained travel documents for Petitioner
to any country. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner alleges Respondents are “not in possession of
any credible or persuasive documents or evidence that Petitioner’s removal is likely to
occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.
Respondents assert that Petitioner was taken back into ICE custody “to effect his
removal.” Resp. at 10. Respondents allege that Petitioner “is detained as an alien who is
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deportable for violating the terms of his visa and who has been ordered removed.” 	Id.
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)). 	Respondents do not address any changed circumstances
leading to Petitioner’s re-detention or assert whether he could be removed to Palestine,
Israel, or any potential third country.
When Petitioner filed his Petition, he was detained at Cimarron Correctional Facility
in Cushing, Oklahoma, and he is still detained there. 	Pet. at 3; see ICE Online Detainee
Locator System, at https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited Jan. 22, 2026).
II. 	Petitioner’s Claims
The Petition raises four grounds for relief.
• 	Ground One: Petitioner requests declaratory judgments that (1) he is
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1); (2) he has previously
demonstrated 	to 	ICE’s 	satisfaction 	that 	there 	is 	no 	significant
likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future; (3) ICE
did not rebut his prior showing; and (4) he cannot be re-detained until
ICE rebuts that showing. Pet. at 22-23.
• 	Ground Two: Petitioner alleges that his re-detention is in violation of
the 	Immigration 	and 	Nationality 	Act 	(“INA”), 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(2)-(3), because Respondents failed to comply with these
regulations before re-detaining him. Pet. at 23.
• 	Ground Three: Petitioner alleges that his re-detention is in violation
of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because there is no
significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future. 	Further, Petitioner asserts that his right to due process was
violated because he previously established there was no significant
likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and
Respondents have not rebutted this prior showing with credible
evidence. 	Finally, Petitioner alleges his right to due process was
violated because his re-detention was intended to punish him and send
a message to similarly situated individuals. Id. at 24.
• 	Ground Four: Petitioner alleges that his re-detention violates the
Administrative Procedures Act because Respondents have failed to
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articulate any reasoned explanation for re-detaining him or for failing
to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3). 	Further, Respondents’
decision to re-detain Petitioner is arbitrary, capricious, and not in
accordance with law because that decision represents changes in
policy, results from consideration of factors that Congress did not
intend to be considered, and fails to consider important aspects of
Petitioner’s case. 	Pet. at 25.
Petitioner seeks immediate release from ICE detention. Id. at 26.
In addition, Petitioner seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, including:
• 	emergency 	preliminary 	orders 	restraining 	Respondents 	from
attempting to move him from Oklahoma during the pendency of this
proceeding and providing 72-hour notice of any intended movement.
Id.
• 	an emergency preliminary order requiring Respondents to give him
due process before removing him to a third country and for the Court
to permanently enjoin Respondents from deporting him to a third
country without due process in the form of a full merits hearing. Id.
• 	declarations that Respondents’ actions are arbitrary and capricious
and failed to adhere to binding regulations and precedent, and that his
detention violates the Due Process Clause. Id. at 27.
• 	an order permanently enjoining Respondents from re-detaining him
until Respondents have obtained a travel document allowing his
removal, and, if he is re-detained, that he not be detained more than
three days after receiving a travel document. Id.
• 	reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act (“EAJA”).3 Id.
3 To the extent Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs, Petitioner must seek
those separately. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); see also Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166
(10th Cir. 2025) (interpreting “EAJA’s broad language to unambiguously authorize fees in
habeas actions challenging immigration detention”). 	Accordingly, the undersigned does
not address this request at this juncture.
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III. 	Relevant Standards
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
The INA mandates that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General
shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). The 90-day period is known as the “removal period.” Id. Detention of
an alien subject to a final order of removal may not be indefinite and is presumptively
reasonable for only six months beyond the removal period. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
“This 6–month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed must
be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it
has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Id.
Ordinarily, “if the alien does not leave or is not removed within the removal period,”
he may be released “subject to supervision.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (citation modified).
As relevant here, after ICE releases a noncitizen on an OOS, federal authorities may later
revoke his OOS and return the noncitizen to custody if he violates conditions of release, 8
C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1), or “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that
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there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future,” id. § 241.13(i)(2).4 Such revocation triggers a notification and review process:
Revocation procedures. Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the
reasons for revocation of his or her release. [ICE] will conduct an initial
informal interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford
the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the
notification.
Id. § 241.13(i)(3).
IV. 	Analysis5
A. 	ICE failed to abide by its regulations when it revoked Petitioner’s
OOS.
In Count Two, Petitioner alleges that Respondents failed to comply with the INA
and ICE’s applicable regulations “prior to re[-]detaining Petitioner after Petitioner’s release
on an OOS.” Pet. at 23. “‘It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens
to due process of law’ in the context of removal proceedings.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S.
4 After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Zadvydas, federal officials codified Zadvydas
principles into immigration regulations governing the detention review process with
amendments to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and the addition of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. 	See Continued
Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg. 56967-01, 56968,
2001 WL 1408247 (F.R.) (Nov. 14, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. Parts 3 and 241) (“In
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas, this rule revises the Department’s
regulations by adding a new 8 CFR 241.13, governing certain aspects of the custody
determination of a detained alien after the expiration of the removal period. Specifically,
the rule provides a process for [ICE] to make a determination as to whether there is a
significant likelihood that the alien will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.”).
5 Petitioner claims he was not required to exhaust statutory or administrative remedies
before filing the Petition. Pet. at 10-13. Respondents do not allege he failed to exhaust his
remedies before filing the Petition. The undersigned agrees that Petitioner was not required
to exhaust before filing the Petition, and therefore does not address exhaustion at length.
See Soberanes, 388 F.3d at 1310 (holding exhaustion requirements do not apply to
challenges to immigration detention brought in habeas proceedings).
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670, 673 (2025) (per curiam) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). The Due
Process Clause is also implicated where “an individual has reasonably relied on agency
regulations promulgated for his guidance or benefit and has suffered substantially because
of their violation by the agency.” United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 752-53 (1979).
Since Petitioner was released on an OOS, his re-detention is governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(3) and its related regulations. Petitioner alleges that his OOS was issued because
“ICE necessarily determined that he had demonstrated to ICE’s satisfaction that his
removal would not occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Pet. at 2. The issue before
the Court is whether Petitioner’s OOS was properly revoked when he was recently re-
detained in ICE custody. The undersigned determines that it was not.
Neither party has presented the court with a copy of Petitioner’s OOS, nor have they
alleged what month or year the OOS was issued. Respondents do not specify why the OOS
was originally issued or even acknowledge that Petitioner was released on an OOS. Nor
do they try to rebut Petitioner’s allegations that he was previously released because ICE
determined there was no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future. The undersigned, then, reasonably infers that ICE must have determined “there was
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(a), (b)(1), before issuing Petitioner’s OOS. See, e.g., Hamidi v. Bondi, No. CIV-
25-1205-G, 2025 WL 4034263, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 14, 2025) (finding “it is reasonable
to infer that ICE must have made a determination that ‘there was no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future’” in similar circumstances) (R&R),
adopted, 2025 WL 3452454 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2025); Pham v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1157-
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SLP, 2025 WL 3477023, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 30, 2025) (same) (R&R), adopted, 2025
WL 3243870 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025).
1. 	Violation of § 241.13(i)(2)
ICE may revoke an OOS and “return the alien to custody” if he violates the
conditions of supervised release or “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE]
determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” 	8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1)-(2). 	Respondents do not allege
Petitioner violated any conditions of release, so Respondents must rely solely on the
“changed circumstances” prong as the justification for revocation.
This Court has previously concluded “the burden [is] on Respondents to establish a
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future in the context of re-
detention under § 241.13(i)(2).” 	Pham v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1157-SLP, 2025 WL
3243870, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025) (citation modified). Respondents merely state
that ICE detained Petitioner “intending to effect [his] removal” and that he “is detained as
an alien who is deportable for violating the terms of his visa and who has been ordered
removed.” Resp. at 8, 10 (citation modified). These statements by Respondents’ counsel
in no way satisfy the regulatory standard of a determination by ICE that “there is a
significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). 	Further, Respondents make no attempt to address Petitioner’s
allegations that (1) he cannot be removed to Palestine because Palestine no longer exists;
(2) the government is not in possession of any credible or persuasive documents or
evidence that his removal is likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future; (3)
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Respondents have not identified any third country willing to accept him; (4) Respondents
have not obtained travel documents for him to be deported to any country; or (5) ICE has
not begun the steps of having him apply for a travel document to any third country. 	See
Pet. at 2, 4, 15-16.
In sum, Respondents provide no information about the possibility of Petitioner’s
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Instead of addressing Petitioner’s assertion
that ICE violated his due process when they revoked his OOS and failed to establish
changed circumstances regarding the likelihood of his removal, or that his removal is
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, see 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2),
Respondents concentrate their Response to argue Petitioner’s Zadvydas claim is premature
because he has not been detained for more than six months. See Resp. at 13-21.6
Respondents fail to establish under § 241.13(i)(2) that ICE determined there were
changed 	circumstances 	and 	a 	significant 	likelihood 	of 	Petitioner’s 	removal 	in 	the
reasonably foreseeable future before revoking his OOS and detaining him. 	Respondents
have provided no sworn declaration by an ICE officer explaining efforts at removal; nor
have Respondents even provided vague or conclusory assertions of efforts to remove
Petitioner. This silence by Respondents is insufficient to establish a significant likelihood
6 The undersigned notes, without recommending disposition on the issue, that any
Zadvydas claim may certainly be premature—whether the Court were to aggregate all of
Petitioner’s detentions or not—as Petitioner has failed to allege any detention before his
release on an OOS. 	See Pet. at 3. 	The Court need not address application of Zadvydas
here if it adopts the undersigned’s recommendation to grant habeas relief based on
Respondents’ violations of ICE regulations.
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that Petitioner may be removed to any country in the reasonably foreseeable future,
whether it be Israel, Palestine, or a potential third country. See Hamidi v. Bondi, No. CIV-
25-1205-G, 2025 WL 3452454, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2025) (finding that even vague
and conclusory assertions from Respondents about third country removal did not satisfy §
241.13(i)(2)); Momennia v. Bondi, No. CV 25-1067-J, 2025 WL 3006045, at *1 (W.D.
Okla. Oct. 27, 2025) (granting habeas relief because Respondents “have not identified any
countries with which any level of progress has been made toward obtaining the country’s
acceptance of Petitioner”).
This analysis is consistent with other district courts. See, e.g., Yee S. v. Bondi, 2025
WL 2879479, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025) (finding “the record does not support a
determination that Petitioner is significantly likely to be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future” when ICE could “direct the Court to no facts in the record supporting
a conclusion that any specific country where Petitioner is not a citizen would agree to
accept him,” and “Respondents simply repeat the vague and conclusory assertions that
‘ICE is in the process of obtaining a travel document’”); Sun v. Noem, 2025 WL 2800037,
at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025) (“Respondents say they are ‘putting together a travel
document [TD] request to send to [the] Cambodian embassy,’ and that ‘[o]nce ICE receives
the TD, it will begin efforts to secure a flight itinerary for Petitioner.’ The Court finds these
kind of vague assertions—akin to promising the check is in the mail—insufficient to meet
ICE’s own requirement to show ‘changed circumstances’ or ‘a significant likelihood that
the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”) (record citations
omitted); Hoac v. Becerra, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (“The fact
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that Respondents intend to complete a travel document request for Petitioner does not make
it significantly likely he will be removed in the foreseeable future.”); Roble v. Bondi, 2025
WL 2443453, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025) (finding insufficient the government’s
assertion that ICE “requested third country removal assistance from [Enforcement and
Removal Operations] HQ”).
2. 	Violation of § 241.13(i)(2)
Petitioner also alleges that he “was never served with a Notice of Revocation of
Release,” as required by § 241.13(i)(3). Pet. at 3-4, 13. Further, Petitioner claims he did
not receive an individualized post-detention interview to determine whether his OOS
should be reinstated or otherwise to allow him to provide information that demonstrates
there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, as
required by § 241.13(i)(2)-(3). Id. Again, Respondents wholly fail to address Petitioner’s
central allegations about these violations of ICE regulations.7
As to any 2025 Notice of Revocation of Release, Respondents do not rebut
Petitioner’s allegation of its non-existence, and neither party has presented the Court with
a copy. 	Accordingly, the undersigned assumes that no such Notice exists. 	ICE’s
regulations, however, provide that a Revocation of Release Notice should have been
7 Respondents also fail to address Petitioner’s assertions that he satisfies the criteria for
release under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e). 	See Pet. at 14-15. 	However, since the undersigned
concludes that Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because Respondents did not
meet their burden to show that the revocation of his release was made in compliance with
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), the undersigned does not address whether he should now be re-
released pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e).
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provided to Petitioner and should have stated the reasons for his revocation of release. See
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) (“Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for
revocation of his or her release.”). 	Further, with no evidence to the contrary from
Respondents, the undersigned also concludes ICE did not comply with requirements for an
“initial informal interview” under § 241.13(i)(3) so Petitioner could respond to ICE’s basis
for his revocation and re-detention.
3. 	Habeas relief as an appropriate remedy
Respondents have failed to show that ICE abided by its own regulations when
revoking Petitioner’s OOS, making the revocation unlawful. Having concluded that ICE
violated its own regulations in re-detaining Petitioner, the undersigned next considers
whether a writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy for ICE’s failure to comply with
its own regulations. Three District Judges in this District, including this Court, have found
that “fail[ure] to comply with § 241.13(i)(2) in establishing a change of circumstances that
demonstrated a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future at the
time of Petitioner’s re-detention” or “not providing the Petitioner with written notice of the
reasons for his revocation” under § 241.13(i)(3) “amounts to a due process violation,
entitling the petitioner to habeas relief.” 	Pham, 2025 WL 3243870, at *1; see also Ye v.
Bondi, No. CIV-25-1230-D, 2025 WL 3485420, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2025) (finding
“ICE’s failure to abide by its own regulations in making the decision to revoke Petitioner’s
OOS renders the revocation unlawful, and that his release is therefore appropriate”);
Hamidi, 2025 WL 3452454, at *4 (granting habeas relief where respondents failed to
satisfy § 241.13(i)(2)). Respondents rely on one local District Judge’s decision that “a writ
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of habeas corpus is not meant to address alleged regulatory violations.” 	Resp. at 23-24
(citing Nguyen v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1204-JD, Order, Doc. 20 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 31, 2025)
(citation modified)). The undersigned agrees with the three District Judges in this District,
including this Court, who have found habeas relief to be appropriate when ICE violates its
own regulations in re-detaining a petitioner like the circumstances here.8
Therefore, because ICE violated its own regulations, the undersigned concludes that
Petitioner’s 	detention 	is 	unlawful 	and 	his 	release 	is 	appropriate 	under 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). 	See Nguyen v. Warden of the Golden State McFarland Detention Facility,
No. 2:25-CV-03297-SKO (HC), 2026 WL 72110, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2026) (“Because
the Government was required to, but failed to comply with, section 241.13(i) when it
revoked Petitioner’s supervised release on October 16, 2025, issuing a writ to reinstate that
release is warranted to preserve the status quo before the Government's unlawful actions.”);
Sanchez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-02287-CNS, 2025 WL 3484756, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 4,
2025) (granting petitioner’s release because the revocation of his OOS was effected
without compliance with applicable regulations); Tran v. Bondi, No. C25-01897-JLR, 2025
WL 3140462, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2025) (finding petitioner showed his re-
detention did not comply with the requirements set forth by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 and granting
habeas relief); E.M.M. v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-08212 (MMG), 2025 WL 3077995, at *4
8 The undersigned is aware of two factually distinguishable cases in this District where
habeas relief was not granted. See, e.g., Nguyen, No. CIV-25-1204-JD, Order, Doc. 20 at
9-10; Bahadorani v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1091-PRW, 2025 WL 3048932, at *3-4 (W.D.
Okla. Oct. 31, 2025).
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(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025) (holding that “[i]f the Government’s violation of its own
regulations culminates in an alien’s detention, due process may require that alien’s release”
and granting habeas relief); Yee S., 2025 WL 2879479, at *6 (ordering release because
Petitioner has shown that ICE’s re-detention of him “violated the law because ICE did not
comply with its own regulations under section 241.13(i)(2)”); Roble, 2025 WL 2443453,
at *5 (holding that “[i]t goes without saying that ICE, like all government agencies, must
follow 	its 	own 	regulations” 	and 	ordering 	release 	based 	on 	violation 	of 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)); Sarail A. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-2144 (ECT/JFD), 2025 WL 2533673, at *7
(D. Minn. Sep. 3, 2025) (ordering release based on violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)).
B. 	The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s additional claims for
relief.
Petitioner also alleges that his re-detention was in violation of his Fifth Amendment
right to due process pursuant to Zadvydas and under the Administrative Procedures Act.
Pet. at 24-25. Because the undersigned recommends that the Court grant the Petition after
finding ICE violated its own regulations by revoking Petitioner’s OOS and re-detaining
him, the Court should decline to address his remaining claims. 	See Sanchez, 2025 WL
3484756, at *1 (declining to reach petitioner’s Zadvydas claim after agreeing with him on
his regulatory violation claim); see also Ye, 2025 WL 3485420, at *2 n.2 (acknowledging
the Magistrate Judge did not consider petitioner’s remaining arguments for habeas relief
after recommending habeas relief on the regulatory violation); Hamidi, 2025 WL 3452454,
at *2 n.2 (same). Further, considering the recommended relief, the Court need not address
Petitioner’s other requests for injunctive and declaratory relief. See Pet. at 22-23, 26-27.
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V. 	Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT the
Petition to the extent Petitioner requests habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for release
from ICE custody. 	The undersigned recommends that the Court order Respondents to
release 	Petitioner 	from 	custody 	immediately, 	subject 	to 	an 	appropriate 	Order 	of
Supervision. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (“The choice, however, is not between
imprisonment and the alien ‘living at large.’ It is between imprisonment and supervision
under release conditions that may not be violated.” (citation modified)). The undersigned
further recommends that the Court order Respondents to certify compliance by filing a
status report within five business days of the Court’s order.
Parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See
28 U.S.C. § 636. 	Any objection must be filed not later than January 29, 2026. 	See id.
§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	If a party wishes to respond to the other party’s
objections, such response must be filed not later than February 3, 2026. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the factual and
legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. 	See Moore v. United States,
950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge in this matter.
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ENTERED this 22 nd day of January, 2026.
Case 5:25-cv-01546-SLP Document 15 Filed 01/22/26 Page 17 of 17