Cao v. Bondi et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
PHU CAO, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-1403-G
)
)
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, )
et al., )
)
Respondents. )
ORDER
On November 22, 2025, Petitioner Phu Cao, appearing through counsel, filed a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition,” Doc. No. 1) challenging his detention
by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the matter was referred to Magistrate Judge
Suzanne Mitchell for preliminary review. Certain Respondents1 filed a Response (Doc.
No. 11) to the Petition, and Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. No. 14).
On December 24, 2025, Judge Mitchell issued a Report and Recommendation (“R.
& R.,” Doc. No. 15), recommending that the Petition be granted in part and Petitioner be
1 Respondent Scarlet Grant, Warden of Cimarron Correctional Facility, has not appeared in
this action or joined in the other respondents’ filings. The appearing respondents are:
Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General; Kristi Noem, former U.S. Secretary of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of ICE; Marcos Charles, Acting
Executive Associate Director, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”); Mark
Siegel, Field Office Director for ERO; ICE; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
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released from custody. Respondents filed an Objection (Doc. No. 16) to the R. & R., to
which Petitioner responded (Doc. No. 17).
Pursuant to controlling authority, the Court reviews de novo the portions of the R.
& R. to which specific objection has been made. See United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73
F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
I. Background
The factual background is set forth in the R. & R. and is not contested by either
party. Petitioner is a citizen of Vietnam and entered the United States in 1985. R. & R. at
1. Petitioner has been arrested for and convicted of multiple crimes while residing in the
United States. See id. at 1-2; Resp’ts’ Resp. at 10-11. Petitioner completed his most recent
period of incarceration in December 2006. See Resp’ts’ Resp. at 11.
Petitioner was ordered removed by an Immigration Judge on February 22, 2007. R.
& R. at 2. The order of removal became final that same day. Id. On August 31, 2007,
Petitioner was released by ICE on an Order of Supervision (“OOS”). Id. at 2-3.
From 2007 to 2025, Petitioner complied with the OOS’s requirements to appear for
routine check-ins with ICE and updated his address, as required, whenever he relocated.
Id. at 3.
Petitioner alleges that he has been wrongfully held in ICE detention since he was
“picked up and redetained” while attending a “scheduled check-in appointment” on
September 9, 2025. Pet. ¶ 9. Petitioner is currently housed at the Cimarron Correctional
Facility, an ICE facility located in Cushing, Oklahoma. Id. ¶¶ 17, 35.
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II. Relevant Standards
“The Government’s ability to detain, release, and revoke the release of noncitizens
subject to removal orders is governed by specific regulations.” Phongsavanh v. Williams,
No. 25-cv-00426, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 3124032, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 7, 2025).
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the Attorney General “shall detain” a noncitizen who is
ordered to be removed; this period of detention is referred to as the “removal period.” 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (2)(A); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001)
(“When an alien has been found to be unlawfully present in the United States and a final
order of removal has been entered, the Government ordinarily secures the alien’s removal
during a subsequent 90-day statutory ‘removal period,’ during which time the alien
normally is held in custody.”).
Section 1231(a)(3) prescribes that when a noncitizen is not removed within this
removal period, he or she may be released subject to “supervision” as set forth by relevant
regulations. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3); see 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4, 241.13. As relevant here, federal
authorities may revoke an order of supervised release and “return the alien to custody” “if,
on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood
that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. §
241.13(i)(2). Alternatively, an order of supervision may be revoked if the noncitizen
“violates any of the conditions of release.” Id. § 241.13(i)(1). Revocation for either reason
triggers a notification requirement and a review process:
Revocation procedures. Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the
reasons for revocation of his or her release. [ICE] will conduct an initial
informal interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford
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the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the
notification. The alien may submit any evidence or information that he or
she believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed in
the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated the order
of supervision. The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of
any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether
the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.
Id. § 241.13(i)(3).
III. Discussion
In the R. & R., after determining that the Court has jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s
claims, Judge Mitchell concluded that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful due to ICE’s
failure to follow required procedures in revoking Petitioner’s OOS and that Petitioner
therefore is entitled to release under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). See R. & R. at 10-13, 13-19;
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (prescribing that habeas corpus relief is available to a prisoner “in
custody in violation of the . . . laws . . . of the United States”).2
A. The Court’s Jurisdiction
In the R. & R., Judge Mitchell, rejected Respondents’ contention that certain
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 deprive the Court of jurisdiction over Petitioner’s habeas
corpus claim. See R. & R. at 10-13; Resp’ts’ Resp. at 25-28. Respondents object to this
2 Based upon this determination, the Magistrate Judge did not reach Petitioner’s remaining
claims for relief or request for declaratory judgment. See R. & R. at 19-21; Pet. ¶¶ 94-98,
104-113, pp. 28-29.
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conclusion, again arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s claim. See
Resp’ts’ Obj. at 3-5 (citing Tazu v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 975 F.3d 292 (3d Cir. 2020)).3
Section 1252 governs judicial review of orders of removal. “Section 1252(g) strips
courts of jurisdiction ‘to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any noncitizen arising
from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders against any noncitizen under this chapter.’” Jimenez
Chacon v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-977, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 3496702, at *4 (D.N.M. Dec.
4, 2025) (alterations omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). The statute, however, does not
“sweep in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of
the Attorney General.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018). The Supreme
Court has instructed that § 1252(g) instead “refer[s] to just those three specific actions
themselves.” Id. Addressing the term “arising from” in a related statutory provision, the
Tenth Circuit recently explained: “A claim only arises from a removal proceeding when
the parties in fact are challenging removal proceedings.” Mukantagara v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 67 F.4th 1113, 1116 (10th Cir. 2023) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)).4
3 Although Petitioner’s criminal history is discussed by both parties while discussing the
Court’s jurisdiction, see Resp’ts’ Obj. at 3; Pet’r’s Resp. at 4-7, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 does not
hinge jurisdiction upon any characteristic of the noncitizen.
4 Prior to Jennings, the Tenth Circuit had stated that “claims . . . clearly . . . included within
the definition of ‘arising from’ are those claims connected directly and immediately with a
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
execute removal orders.” Tsering v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 403 F. App’x 339, 343
(10th Cir. 2010) (alteration, omission, and internal quotation marks omitted) (interpreting
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).
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Relying on Tazu and objecting to the R. & R.’s interpretation of that decision,
Respondents argue that the “Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the validity of Petitioner’s
re-detention” because Petitioner has been “re-detained in order to execute his removal.”
Resp’ts’ Obj. at 3-5. Respondents also assert that “habeas petitions challenging an order
of removal must be filed in the court of appeals.” Id. at 3. Petitioner responds that Tazu is
distinguishable and that § 1252 does not bar challenges to immigration detention because
the relevant provisions have been construed narrowly. See Pet’r’s Resp. at 2-3.
To begin, Respondents’ citation to the Third Circuit’s Tazu decision is not persuasive
in light of “the Supreme Court’s consistent use of an exceedingly narrow construction on
the jurisdiction channeling provisions” of § 1252. Montoya v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1231-JD,
2025 WL 3733302, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025); see Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F.
Supp. 3d 137, 153 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (distinguishing the “brief” “door-to-plane” detention
challenged in Tazu from a challenge to “ICE’s ability to hold [the petitioner] in detention
without adequate process for weeks and months on end”).
Further, the Court independently concludes that its ability to consider the Petition is
not barred by § 1252(g). Petitioner is not seeking review of the Executive’s decision to
execute an order of removal. Instead, Petitioner argues that he is “detained in violation of
the INA” because “Respondents have failed to comply” with the applicable regulations
“prior to redetaining [him]” after he was previously released on an OOS. See Pet. ¶¶ 101,
103. Petitioner therefore “does not ask the Court to second-guess Respondents’
discretionary decision to commence removal proceedings against him.” Lamas Aguilar v.
Bondi, No. 25-cv-00996, 2026 WL 84520, at *3 n.2 (D.N.M. Jan. 12, 2026). Petitioner
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instead challenges one of the “many other decisions or actions that may be part of the
deportation process”—to which § 1252(g) is inapplicable. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482, 486 (1999) (“It is implausible that [§ 1252(g)’s]
mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation [is] a shorthand way of
referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings.”); see also Ceesay, 781 F.
Supp. 3d at 151 (“[D]etention under or in connection with a final order of removal always
is related to the execution of an immigration order, but courts routinely hear habeas
petitions filed by individuals subject to a final order of removal.”).
Although § 1252(g) protects the Executive’s prerogative to remove Petitioner, see
Reno, 525 U.S. at 486, that protection does not preclude judicial review of whether the
decision to revoke Petitioner’s OOS (and order him to be detained) complied with
applicable regulations. Petitioner had been released on an OOS, and the decision to revoke
the OOS—a decision for which specific regulatory requirements have been adopted—is
distinct from the mere execution of Petitioner’s prior removal order. Accordingly, the
undersigned concludes, as have multiple other district courts, that § 1252(g) does not defeat
the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a petitioner’s claim that his current detention is
illegal because he was not afforded the process required for revocation of his OOS.5
Respondents’ objection is overruled.
5 See, e.g., Barrios v. Ripa, No. 25-cv-22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8,
2025) (“[T]he Court . . . ha[s] jurisdiction to adjudicate whether Respondents complied
with their own [OOS] revocation procedures.”); Ceesay, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (noting
that district courts in the Second Circuit “have distinguished between challenges to ICE’s
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B. ICE’s Failure to Comply with Applicable Regulations
In considering Petitioner’s habeas claim, Judge Mitchell concluded that
Respondents did not comply with the regulatory requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) when
redetaining Petitioner following his 2007 release on an OOS. See R. & R. at 13-19.
1. Respondents’ Failure to Show There Was a Proper Basis for
Revocation on September 9, 2025
The undersigned concludes that Respondents did not comply with the applicable
regulations for an additional reason than does the R. & R. In short, the record reflects that
Respondents revoked the OOS and redetained Petitioner for a reason other than those
permitted by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i).
Section 241.13(i) enumerates two reasons why an OOS may be revoked: 1)
“[v]iolation of conditions of release,” and 2) “[r]evocation for removal.” 8 C.F.R. §
241.13(i)(1), (2). According to § 241.13(i)(3), [u]pon revocation, the alien will be notified
of the reasons for revocation of his or her release.” Id. § 241.13(i)(3).
According to Respondents, the basis for Petitioner’s OOS revocation on September
9, 2025, was “his criminal history and Final Order of Removal.” Thompson Decl. (Doc.
No. 11-1) ¶ 10. When Petitioner was detained, a detention officer, Julio Guzman,
“informed [Petitioner] that [the] reason for his detention is that he has a Final Order of
Removal and an aggravated felony conviction.” Guzman Decl. (Doc. No. 11-3) ¶ 4.6
discretion to execute a removal order, which are barred, and challenges to the manner in
which ICE executes the removal order, which are not”).
6 Petitioner represents that Deportation Officer Guzman did not inform him of any reason
for his detention. See P. Cao Decl. (Doc. No. 14-1) ¶ 1 (“[Officer Guzman] did not explain
to me why I was detained.”). Petitioner also disputes other statements that Officer Guzman
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These reasons, taken either individually or together, do not reasonably show that the
determination to revoke Petitioner’s OOS was made because Petitioner violated a condition
of his release or because, “on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determine[d] that
there [was] a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1), (2). Respondents have not argued that
Petitioner violated a condition of his release. And, since 2007, Petitioner’s criminal history
has not changed and his final order of removal had been in place, so it cannot be plausibly
argued that mention of these two factors is a shorthand for changed circumstances that
supported a determination in September 2025 that Petitioner’s removal had become
significantly likely.
In addition, the R. & R. concludes that “Respondents have failed to demonstrate . .
. that they made the required determination for revocation under § 241.13(i)(2) before
redetaining Petitioner.” R. & R. at 16 (emphasis added). As noted by Judge Mitchell, this
timing of the “changed circumstances” is crucial: “ICE is not permitted to hold [Petitioner]
indefinitely while it waits for travel documents from Vietnam.” Tran v. Bondi, No. C25-
01897, 2025 WL 3140462, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2025); accord Ambila v. Joyce, No.
25-cv-00267, 2026 WL 184751, at *3 (D. Me. Jan. 24, 2026) (“The Government should
attests to making to Petitioner. See id. Without deciding which version of events is correct,
the Court reaches its conclusion as to the improper basis for revocation by reference to the
reasons Officer Guzman identifies as having been told to Petitioner. Relief would likewise
be warranted, however, if Officer Guzman did not provide any reason to Petitioner.
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not be permitted to hold Mr. Ambila indefinitely while it seeks new travel documents that
may or may not be sufficient to facilitate his removal to the DRC.”).
Although Respondents argue that the circumstances have now sufficiently changed
to permit the revocation of Petitioner’s OOS, they do not squarely dispute Judge Mitchell’s
finding that Respondents have failed to show that this change occurred prior to the
redetention or show any error therein. See Resp’ts’ Obj. at 9-10. Respondents point to a
general indication that removals to Vietnam were likely because removals were occurring
more frequently in 2025 than in recent years. See id.; Thompson Decl. ¶¶ 12-13. This
vague understanding does not satisfy the § 241.13(i)(2) determination of “a significant
likelihood that the alien may be removed,” however. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) (emphasis
added); see Pham v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3243870, at *2 (W.D. Okla.
Nov. 20, 2025) (“Respondents provided no evidence of progress they made towards
removal of Petitioner himself before re-detention.”). And it was not until November 3,
2025—almost two months later—that “Cao’s Travel Document Request was submitted to
ICE headquarters,” which was “actively working with the State Department to remove Cao
to Vietnam.” Thompson Decl. ¶ 11. As correctly recognized by the R. & R., the United
States Government’s internal efforts in November 2025 do not demonstrate that any change
regarding the likelihood of Petitioner’s removal occurred prior to Petitioner’s redetention
on September 9, 2025. See R. & R. at 17; Ye v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1230-D, 2025 WL
4034264, at *5-6 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2025) (R. & R.) (“There is nothing about local ICE
authorities sending a travel document request for Petitioner to a particular ICE department
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that constitutes ‘changed circumstances’ making his removal any more likely than it ever
was.”), adopted in relevant part, 2025 WL 3485420 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2025).
2. Respondents’ Failure to Comply with Procedural Requirements
In the R. & R., Judge Mitchell concluded that Respondents did not provide written
notice as required and did not provide an informal interview as required. See R. & R. at
13-19. Respondents object, arguing that written notice is not required, that it is within
Respondents’ discretion to make the requisite determination to revoke Petitioner’s OOS,
and that the determination was properly supported as shown by the record in this case. See
Resp’ts’ Obj. at 6-10.
Without deciding whether written notice was required, the verbal notice that
Petitioner received upon his revocation did not comport with Respondent’s own regulations
because that notice did not cite a reason enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). See Guzman
Decl. ¶ 4.
Regarding Petitioner’s interview, § 241.13(i)(3) requires “an initial informal
interview promptly after . . . return to [ICE] custody to afford the alien an opportunity to
respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).
This interview allows for the noncitizen to “submit any evidence or information that he or
she believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future” “or that he or she has not violated the order of supervision.” Id. There
is no indication in the record that Petitioner received the required interview. See R. & R.
at 16; Pet. ¶ 55 (“[N]or does [Petitioner] recall having been given any sort of informal
interview to challenge the Notice.”). Respondents contend that Petitioner’s inability to
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recall whether he was given an informal interview undermines his ability to maintain this
claim. See Resp’ts’ Obj. at 8 & n. 29. Respondents fail to establish, however, that such an
informal interview would cure the improper redetention of Petitioner. See Hamidi v. Bondi,
No. CIV-25-1205-G, 2025 WL 3452454, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2025).
3. Summary
Respondents’ discussion of how the circumstances related to removals of
individuals to Vietnam have changed and allegation that such removals are now much more
frequent are beside the point. Respondents did not comply with their own regulations when
revoking Petitioner’s OOS by making the required determination prior to his revocation,
informing him of a valid reason for his revocation, or providing a prompt opportunity to
challenge the determination and his revocation. Respondents’ objection is overruled.
C. Remedy
1. Release
After concluding that Respondents violated the INA, Judge Mitchell recommended
that Petitioner be released subject to his previous OOS. See R. & R. at 18-19.
Respondents object, arguing that the Court should adopt the harmless error standard
and that a regulatory violation does not warrant habeas release because a regulation is not
a law. See Resp’ts’ Obj. at 11-14. Petitioner argues that Respondents’ authority is
distinguishable and incorrect in its conclusion. See Pet’r’s Resp. at 13-14. Petitioner also
argues that relief in the form of release is the proper remedy for an unlawful detention. See
id. at 11-12.
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This Court, in agreement with the majority view, has “found that such regulatory
defects amount to due process violations that entitle a petitioner to habeas relief.” Hamidi,
2025 WL 3452454, at *3-4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pham, 2025 WL
3243870, at *1. This matter is distinguishable from Bahadorani v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-
1091-PRW, 2025 WL 3048932 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-6177
(10th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025). Unlike in Bahadorani, where the petitioner was “provided the
reasons for his detention” and “an interview related to a review of his detention,” id. at *3,
Respondents here failed to provide proper § 241.13(i)(3) notice to Petitioner or any
meaningful opportunity to challenge his revocation, see Hamidi, 2025 WL 3452454, at *3-
4.
Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the undersigned concurs that
Respondents’ violation of § 241.13(i) denied Petitioner the process to which he was entitled
by law and that such a denial entitles Petitioner to habeas relief. See Hamidi, 2025 WL
3452454, at *3.
2. Injunctive Relief
Beyond release from detention, Petitioner seeks injunctive relief in the form of
prospective restrictions on Respondents’ ability to remove him to third countries or redetain
him pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). See Pet. at 28-29. Respondents oppose the issuance
of such relief because the issues are not yet ripe for decision and are beyond the scope of
habeas relief. See Resp’ts’ Resp. at 35-36. Judge Mitchell recommended that Petitioner’s
requests for permanent injunction of potential future conduct of Respondents be denied.
See R. & R. at 19-20. Petitioner also seeks to have the Court alter the terms of his OOS.
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See Pet. at 29. Judge Mitchell notes that altering Petitioner’s OOS would intrude on the
executive’s authority to set the terms of an OOS. See R. & R. at 19 n.4; 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(3).
The Court agrees with Judge Mitchell’s recommendation as to Petitioner’s requested
permanent injunctive relief and alteration of his OOS. As such, these requests are denied.
See Funes v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 7429, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 3263896, at *26
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2025).
3. Fees and Costs
Petitioner requests “reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access
to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).” Pet. at 29. “The Tenth Circuit recently held
that the [Equal Access to Justice Act] ‘unambiguously authorizes fees in habeas actions
challenging immigration detention.’” Marin Ramos v. Dedos, No. 26-cv-00264, 2026 WL
555338, at *8-9 (D.N.M. Feb. 27, 2026) (alteration omitted) (quoting Daley v. Ceja, 158
F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025)). However, these fees must be sought in accordance with
the requirements of the Equal Access to Justice Act and by separate motion. See id.; Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(d), (2), 81(a)(4); LCvR 54.2.
CONCLUSION
As set forth herein, Respondents’ failure to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)
resulted in the unlawful detention of Petitioner. Habeas corpus relief is warranted. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom from imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the
liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.”).
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In accordance with the above, the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 15) is
ADOPTED as modified.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED to the extent
it requests habeas release pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.7
2. Petitioner’s remaining claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
3. Respondents are directed to either:
a. Within three (3) days of the date of this Order, provide Petitioner Phu Cao
with notification of the reason for his revocation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §
241.13(i)(1) or (2), and thereafter the prompt scheduling of an informal
interview as an opportunity for Petitioner to respond to the reasons for his
revocation pursuant to § 241.13(i)(3); or
b. Immediately release Petitioner Phu Cao into the United States, subject to
the terms of his previous Order of Supervision
4. Respondents shall submit a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 within five
(5) days of the date of this Order affirming either Petitioner’s release from
custody into the United States or that the prescribed notification has been served
on Petitioner.
5. The Court will separately enter Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order and to
entertain any motion for attorneys’ fees. Petitioner shall have 45 days from the
date of this Order to file any motion seeking fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of March, 2026.
7 The undersigned’s conclusion herein does not foreclose the possibility that the occurrence
of events affecting the likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future could constitute “changed circumstances” as contemplated by 8 C.F.R. §
241.13(i)(2).
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