Mahler v. Texas County Sheriffs Office et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
SHAWN D. MAHLER, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-481-D
)
TEXAS COUNTY SHERIFFS 	)
OFFICE et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Shawn D. Mahler, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed
this § 1983 complaint against the Texas County Sheriff’s Office, the then Texas
County Sheriff, Matt Boley, and Chris Bird, then a District Attorney Task
Officer for District 1. Doc. 1.
Plaintiff sues Defendants Boley and Bird in their official capacities. Id.
at 4-5. Chief United States District Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti has referred
the 	matter 	to 	the 	undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	for 	initial 	proceedings
consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Docs. 4 & 15. The undersigned
recommends the Court dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
I. 	Standard of review.
Rule 8(a) provides that a complaint “must contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, . . . (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a
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demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The twin purposes of a complaint are to
give the opposing parties fair notice of the basis for the claims against them so
that they may respond and to allow the Court to conclude that the allegations,
if proven, show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Monument Builders
of Greater Kan. City, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass’n of Kan., 891 F.2d 1473, 1480
(10th Cir. 1989). Rule 8’s requirements seek to meet these purposes.
A complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” and the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
The Court construes pro se pleadings liberally. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 f.2d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[D]ismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to
state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail
on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to
amend.” 	Gee 	v. 	Pacheco, 	627 	F.3d 	1178, 	1195 	(10th 	Cir. 	2010) 	(quoting
Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001)). An amendment is
futile if the amended claims would be subject to immediate dismissal under
the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A standards. Bradley v. Val-
Mejias, 379 F.3d 892, 901 (10th Cir. 2004).
When determining whether to dismiss a pro se complaint, the Court
“must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and construe those
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allegations, and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them, in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222,
1224 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Hall, 935 F.3d at 1110. But the Court “will not
supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or
construct a legal theory on plaintiff’s behalf.” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d
1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170,
1173–74 (10th Cir. 1997)).
II. 	Plaintiff’s claims.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants unlawfully seized and retained $12,966
in violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, causing
him financial and reputational harm. Doc. 1, Att. 1, at 1. He also raises the
state-law claims of conversion and fraud and misrepresentation. Id. at 2. He
maintains the District Attorney’s office falsely represented that he forfeited his
rights to these funds in a guilty plea agreement he entered in 2012 to a drug
charge in the Texas County District Court. Id. at 1-2.1 He seeks return of the
1 	See 	State 	v. 	Mahler, 	No. 	CF-2011-00221,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=texas&number=C
F-2011-00221&cmid=6038025 (last visited Sept. 18, 2025). The undersigned
takes judicial notice of the docket in Plaintiff’s underlying state case. See
United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (exercising
“discretion to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in our court and
certain other courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition
of the case at hand”).
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funds, plus interest, $5,000,000 in compensatory damages, fees, and costs and
any other relief the Court deems just and proper. Id. at 2.
III. 	Analysis.
A. 	The Court should dismiss the Texas County Sheriff’s Office
because it is not a suable entity.
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis added). Although
municipalities and local governments are “persons” subject to suit under
§ 1983, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978),
“generally, governmental sub-units are not separate suable entities that may
be sued under § 1983,” Hinton v. Dennis, 362 F. App’x 904, 907 (10th Cir. 2010).
The Texas County Sheriff’s Office is a governmental sub-unit and so it is not a
person or a legally created entity that can be sued under § 1983. See Martinez
v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985) (“‘The City of Denver Police
Department’ 	is 	not 	a 	separate 	suable 	entity, 	and 	the 	complaint 	will 	be
dismissed as to it”).
B. 	The Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims
against Defendants Boley and Bird.
“Personal-capacity 	suits 	seek 	to 	impose 	personal 	liability 	upon 	a
government official for actions he takes under color of state law,” whereas
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“[o]fficial capacity suits . . . generally represent only another way of pleading
an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). As long as the government entity receives
notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects
other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. See Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in
his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official’s office.”). “As such, it is no different from a suit against the
State itself.” Id. So, while an award of damages against an official in his
personal capacity can be executed only against the official’s personal assets, “a
plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit
must look to the government entity itself.” Graham, 473 at 166.
Any claims Plaintiff asserts against Defendants Boley and Bird sued in
their official capacities are construed as claims against the Texas County
Sheriff’s Office. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55 (explaining that official
capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”). Thus, Plaintiff is attempting
to sue Texas County under § 1983. As currently framed, his claims fail to show
that a county policy or custom caused his alleged constitutional injury. City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Myers v. Okla Cnty. Bd. of
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Cnty. Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316-20 (10th Cir. 1998). The Court should
dismiss these claims.
C. 	The 	Court 	should 	not 	allow 	Plaintiff 	to 	amend 	his
complaint because it would be futile.
According to the docket sheet in Plaintiff’s state court case, the Texas
County District Court sentenced him in 2012. Mahler, No. CF-2011-00221
(docket entry date June 19, 2012). Federal statutory law does not provide an
express statute of limitations for claims brought under § 1983. “When Congress
has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled
practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not
inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
266–67 (1985). For § 1983 claims, the appropriate local time limitation is
Oklahoma’s “two-year limitation for ‘an action for injury to the rights of
another.’” Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1523 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting
OKLA . STAT . tit. 12, § 95(A)(3)), abrogated on other grounds by Schneider v. City
of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760 (10th Cir. 2013).
“[S]tate law governs the application of tolling in a civil rights action.”
Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004). “Section 1983
claims accrue, for the purpose of the statute of limitations, when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.”
Johnson v. Johnson Cnty Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991)
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(internal quotation marks omitted). Oklahoma’s discovery rule allows the
tolling of the statute of limitations “until an injured party knows of, or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of or discovered the injury,
and resulting cause of action.” Alexander, 382 F.3d at 1217 (internal quotation
marks and emphasis omitted).
Plaintiff’s claims appear to have accrued in 2012 when the state district
court sentenced him after he entered a guilty plea to the drug charge. So the
two-year statute of limitations related to the forfeiture of cash that the Texas
County authorities seized expired in 2014.2 See id. Because Plaintiff’s claims
are time-barred, allowing Plaintiff to amend his complaint would be futile. See,
e.g., Avington v. Bank of Am., N.A., 857 F. App’x 442, 445 (holding district court
“correctly concluded further amendment would be futile” where statute of
limitations on pro se plaintiff’s claims had expired).3
2 	Plaintiff has also raised state law claims. Doc. 1, Att. 1, at 2. “‘A district
court’s 	decision 	whether 	to 	exercise 	[supplemental] 	jurisdiction 	after
dismissing 	every 	claim 	over 	which 	it 	had 	original 	jurisdiction 	is 	purely
discretionary.’” Apache Tribe of Okla. v. Brown, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1197–
98 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (quoting Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S.
635, 639–40 (2009)). “When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court
may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining
state law claims.” Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011).
Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the Court decline to exercise
supplement jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and dismiss them
without prejudice.
3 	“[B]efore acting on its own initiative, a court must accord the parties fair
notice and an opportunity to present their positions.” Day v. McDonough, 547
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IV. Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
(1) dismiss the Texas County Sheriff’s Office as a non-suable entity, (2) dismiss
Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants Boley and Bird, and (3)
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, without leave to amend.
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this
Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before October
9, 2025, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to make a timely
objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. See Moore v.
United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this day of September 18, 2025.
U.S. 198, 210 (2006). This Report and Recommendation provides Plaintiff with
notice, and he can present his position on the statute of limitations by objecting
to the recommendation.
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