Hill v. Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority et al

5:24-cv-01298OkwdOct 8, 2026

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DALTON GAGE HILL, 	)
Administrator and Personal 	)
Representative of THE 	)
ESTATE OF JEFFREY ALLEN 	)
HILL, Deceased 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-24-1298-D
)
OKLAHOMA COUNTY 	)
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 	)
AUTHORITY, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On January 30, 2024, Decedent Jeffrey Allen Hill died while at the SSM
Health St. Anthony Hospital following complications from an infected tooth.
The administrator and personal representative of Hill’s estate brought this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant Major Bradley Logan
deprived Hill of constitutionally adequate medical care in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Doc. 53, at 9–10.1 United States District Judge Timothy
D. DeGiusti referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for
1 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
Case 5:24-cv-01298-D Document 213 Filed 10/08/26 Page 1 of 16
2
initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 58. Before
the Court is Defendant Logan’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 182.
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, Docs. 186 & 187, and Defendant Logan
has replied. Doc. 189. So the matter is at issue. The undersigned recommends
the Court grant Defendant Logan’s motion for summary judgment.
I. 	Legal standards.
A court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is material
if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the
claim.” Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A dispute about a material
fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); see also Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 952 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2020)
(explaining that a dispute over a material fact is genuine “if a rational jury
could find in favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented” (quoting
Jones v. Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 573 (10th Cir. 2015))). In applying this standard,
the 	Court 	“‘review[s] 	the 	facts 	and 	all 	reasonable 	inferences 	those 	facts
Case 5:24-cv-01298-D Document 213 Filed 10/08/26 Page 2 of 16
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support[ ] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Doe, 952 F.3d
at 1189 (second alteration in original) (quoting Evans v. Sandy City, 944 F.3d
847, 852 (10th Cir. 2019)). “In reviewing the facts, at summary judgment, the
party who bears a burden of proof on an issue bears the burden of production
rather than the burden of persuasion.” Markley v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 59
F.4th 1072, 1080 (10th Cir. 2023).
II. 	Background.
This case presents yet another tragic death at an Oklahoma county jail.
During the relevant dates, the Oklahoma County Detention Center (OCDC)
employed Defendant Logan as a Major. He testified his job was to oversee the
OCDC’s captains to make sure they “were doing the job that they were
supposed to be doing.” Doc. 182, Ex. 1, at 2. Defendant Logan worked at the
OCDC for over twenty years. Id. at 8.
Decedent entered OCDC on November 15, 2023. Doc. 53, at 6; Doc. 186,
at 19. In the weeks following Decedent’s January 5, 2024 sentencing, he
developed a severe toothache and complained to OCDC personnel about it. Doc.
53, at 6; Doc. 186, at 17-18.2 On January 22, 2024, he was transported to St.
2 	The Amended Complaint, Doc. 53, and Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant
Logan’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 186, differ regarding the timeline
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Anthony’s Hospital and he died on January 30, 2024, after developing sepsis
from his infected tooth. Doc. 53, at 6-7; Doc. 186, at 19-21.3
III. 	Analysis.
A. 	Defendant Logan’s qualified immunity defense.
Defendant Logan raises the defense of qualified immunity. Doc. 182, at
9. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that “shields officials from civil
liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009)). Defendant Logan argues that he is entitled to qualified
immunity because he did not violate Decedent’s constitutional rights. Doc. 182,
at 11-12.
of events between Decedent’s initial complaints of toothache and his transfer
to St. Anthony’s Hospital. The details are not important for purposes of this
Report and Recommendation.
3 	Included here are those material facts supported by the record and not
genuinely disputed in the manner required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To the
extent 	either 	party 	has 	made 	unsubstantiated 	allegations, 	general 	and
conclusory statements, or require “one inference too many to adequately
support 	the 	assertion” 	made, 	such 	matters 	have 	not 	been 	included. 	See
generally Double Eagle Alloys, Inc. v. Hooper, 134 F.4th 1078, 1087, 1100 n.21
(10th Cir. 2025).
Case 5:24-cv-01298-D Document 213 Filed 10/08/26 Page 4 of 16
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While 	Plaintiff 	insists 	that 	genuine 	issues 	of 	material 	fact 	exist
“concerning Defendant Logan’s authority, personal participation, knowledge,
deliberate 	indifference, 	causation, 	and 	qualified 	immunity,” 	he 	does 	not
address 	Defendant 	Logan’s 	claim 	to 	qualified immunity 	apart from 	that
fleeting reference. Doc. 186, at 25. 	Once properly asserted, the defense of
qualified immunity “creates a presumption that the defendant is immune from
suit.” Crowson v. Washington County, 983 F.3d 1166, 1178 (10th Cir. 2020)
(quotation 	marks 	and 	brackets 	omitted). 	To 	overcome 	the 	presumption,
Plaintiff 	“must 	show 	that 	(1) 	the 	officers’ 	alleged 	conduct 	violated 	a
constitutional right, and (2) it was clearly established at the time of the
violation… that such conduct constituted a violation of that right.” Id. Plaintiff
has not made this showing. Without any rebuttal from Plaintiff, the Court
must presume that Defendant Logan is entitled to qualified immunity. Medina
v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[A]lthough we will review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record must
clearly demonstrate the plaintiff has satisfied his heavy two-part burden;
otherwise, 	the 	defendants 	are 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity.”) 	(internal
citation omitted).
B. 	Defendant Logan is entitled to judgment on the merits.
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Even 	if 	Defendant 	Logan 	were 	not 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity,
Plaintiffs have failed to show that he violated Decedent’s constitutional rights.
1. 	Deliberate indifference standard.
To recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting
under color of state law “violated his constitutional or statutory rights.” Dodds
v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010). “[A] prison official’s
deliberate 	indifference 	to 	a 	convicted 	prisoner’s 	serious 	medical 	needs
constitutes 	cruel 	and 	unusual 	punishment 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Eighth
Amendment.” Prince v. Sheriff, 28 F.4th 1033, 1043 (10th Cir. 2022).
Deliberate indifference has two components: (1) “an objective component
requiring that the pain or deprivation be sufficiently serious,” and (2) “a
subjective 	component 	requiring 	that 	the 	offending 	officials 	act 	with 	a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1569 (10th
Cir. 1991). “In other words, the focus of the objective component is the
seriousness of the plaintiff's alleged harm, while the focus of the subjective
component is the mental state of the defendant with respect to the risk of that
harm.” Prince, 28 F.4th at 1044.
The 	objective 	component 	is 	met 	if 	the 	deprivation 	is 	“sufficiently
serious.” Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting
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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). “A medical need is sufficiently
serious ‘if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Uphoff,
199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999)). The objective component must be
evaluated by the actual harm suffered, not by symptoms perceived by the
defendant. See Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 753 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that
symptoms displayed are only relevant to the subjective component of the
deliberate indifference test).
The subjective component is met if a prison official “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,” meaning “the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and []he must also draw the inference.”
Id. at 751 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). It “can be satisfied under two
theories: failure to properly treat a serious medical condition (‘failure to
properly treat theory’) or as a gatekeeper who prevents an inmate from
receiving treatment or denies access to someone capable of evaluating the
inmate’s need for treatment (‘gatekeeper theory’).” Lucas v. Turn Key Health
Case 5:24-cv-01298-D Document 213 Filed 10/08/26 Page 7 of 16
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Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1137 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing Sealock, 218 F.3d at
1211).
2. 	Plaintiff’s allegations do 	not 	amount to 	deliberate
indifference.
Plaintiff sues Defendant Logan in his individual capacity, Doc. 53, at 5,
alleging deliberate indifference for failure to provide adequate medical care.
Id. at 9. Because Defendant Logan is not a medical professional, the Court
proceeds under the gatekeeper theory. See Doc. 139, at 9 (“[T]he undersigned
reads Plaintiff’s amended complaint as stating a claim against Defendant
Logan under the gatekeeper theory.”).
The objective component is met here. “An inmate’s death meets [the
objective] requirement ‘without doubt.’” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 994
(10th Cir. 2019). Defendant Logan claims that there was not “a sufficiently
serious observable medical need observed by Major Logan,” but the standard
for the objective component is the harm to the plaintiff, not the observations of
the defendant. Doc. 182, at 7; Mata, 427 F.3d at 753. So, the remaining issue
is whether the subjective component is met with regard to Defendant Logan.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Logan “had personal
knowledge that Mr. Hill was not receiving proper medical treatment, was not
eating, was immobile, and . . . in severe pain,” but “failed to ensure that Mr.
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Hill received the medical care he . . . obviously and desperately needed.” Doc.
53, 	at 	7. 	He 	maintained 	that 	on 	January 	12 	and 	13, 	2024, 	Decedent
“complained about his pain to John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 who relayed the
information 	to 	[Defendant] 	Logan 	who 	in 	turn 	did 	nothing 	to 	assist
[Decedent].” Id. at 6. He asserted that Defendant Logan failed to provide Mr.
Hill “with prompt and adequate medical assessment, evaluation, treatment
and supervision despite the obvious need.” Id. at 12. 	He alleged that as a
“Jailer Defendant,” Defendant Logan acted with “deliberate indifference to his
health and safety” which “was a proximate cause of [his] unnecessary pain and
suffering, and . . . untimely death.” Id.
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court held that these allegations
sufficed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Doc. 139 (Report and
Recommendation 	recommending 	denial 	of 	Defendant 	Logan’s 	motion 	to
dismiss); Doc. 150 (Order adopting Doc. 139). The Court found that “the
allegations 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	Amended 	Complaint—taken 	as 	true—sufficiently
allege[d] that Defendant Logan had personal knowledge of Mr. Hill’s serious
medical needs.” Doc. 150, at 4. Further, the Court found that Defendant Logan
had failed to adequately raise the defense of qualified immunity and thus
denied Defendant Logan’s motion to dismiss. Doc. 139; Doc. 150.
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But at summary judgment, the Court can no longer accept Plaintiff’s
allegations on faith. Plaintiff must provide some evidence to support his
account of events. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (“A party asserting that a fact…
is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts
of materials in the record…”); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)
(“[T]he 	plain 	language 	of 	Rule 	56(c) 	mandates 	the 	entry 	of 	summary
judgment… against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”). He has not done so.
Defendant Logan states he had “no role in the medical care and no direct
role, only a remote supervisory role, in security oversight of the deceased.” Doc.
182, at 1. He states his “first and only involvement with [Decedent] was when
he fortuitously happened upon [him] at an exit on a gurney as he was being
transferred to an ambulance for transport to the hospital.” Id. (citing Ex. 1, at
32). 	Defendant 	Logan 	claims 	he 	“did 	not 	know
before this that Decedent was sick, that he needed a transfer, or about his
medical 	diagnosis,” 	and 	that 	he 	“never 	had 	an 	opportunity 	to 	observe
[Decedent] prior to the transfer to the hospital.” Id. at 2, 8.
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Plaintiff disputes this account as Defendant Logan’s first and only
involvement. Doc. 186, at 13. He cites no record evidence to support this
allegation. Rather, he points to Defendant Logan’s “affirmative actions after
this encounter, including [Defendant Logan’s] researching release options and
communicating with [the Department of Corrections (DOC)], and efforts to
‘transfer’ custody while Decedent was already admitted to the hospital.” Doc.
186, 	at 	13 	(emphasis 	added). 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	Defendant 	Logan’s
researching 	of 	a 	Medical 	Own 	Recognizance 	release 	and 	his 	continued
conversations with DOC to “pursue the transfer of custody [of Decedent] to
DOC” were “indicative of personal, historical knowledge of Decedent’s serious
medical condition[.]” Id. at 6-7. These events undisputably occurred after his
encounter with Decedent and after Decedent was transferred to the hospital,
and they do not show any prior knowledge on Defendant Logan’s part.
Plaintiff, in his response, abandons all allegations of John Doe jail staff
reporting Decedent’s condition to Defendant Logan. Doc. 53, at 6, 7 (complaint
alleges “Mr. Hill told Deputy John Doe #2 who relayed the information to Major
Logan”); Doc. 186. Instead, Plaintiff relies entirely on Defendant Logan’s
“supervisory” position to prove knowledge of Decedent’s condition. See, e.g.,
Doc. 186, at 8. Plaintiff does not support his allegations with record evidence
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in response to the motion for summary judgment. And the mere fact that
Defendant Logan supervised jail staff is not adequate to show his personal
involvement in a constitutional violation. See Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416,
1423 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on
personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.”).
Defendant Logan testified that when he heard Decedent was being
hospitalized for his tooth he thought “[t]hat got to be a bad tooth.” Doc. 182,
Ex. 1, at 4. Then Defendant Logan “went out and looked him up. And that’s
when [he] saw he was sentenced to DOC” and Defendant Logan decided to “see
if we can get him transferred to DOC custody physically.” Id. He did not “look
and see” Decedent’s previous medical requests. Id. And Plaintiff points to no
evidence, apart from his managerial duties over the captains at OCDC, that
Defendant Logan had any knowledge of any calls from Decedent’s family
members 	to 	OCDC. 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Defendant 	Logan 	oversaw 	all
operations within the jail. Doc. 186, at 24 (citing Ex. 9, at 54-56). 	He also
“oversaw all captains and communications with [Turn Key Health Care], which
was contracted with OCDC to provide inmate healthcare during the relevant
time.” Id. Plaintiff identifies no record evidence showing that Defendant Logan
received, 	reviewed, 	or 	otherwise 	learned 	of 	Decedent’s 	medical 	requests,
Case 5:24-cv-01298-D Document 213 Filed 10/08/26 Page 12 of 16
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reported symptoms, treatment history, or communications from Decedent’s
family 	before 	Decedent’s 	transfer 	to 	the 	hospital. 	The 	same 	applies 	for
Defendant Logan’s knowledge about Decedent’s condition or the treatment he
received before and after he departed OCDC. Plaintiff’s conclusory statements
do not meet the subjective component.
The parties contest whether Decedent was in DOC’s custody. Doc. 186,
at 4-6; Doc. 182, Ex. 3 (citing Ex. 4 DOC Custody). Plaintiff points to the
January 31, 2024 hearing set before Oklahoma County Judge Truong to
consider Decedent’s motion to withdraw his plea in support of his contention
that Decedent remained in OCDC custody. Doc. 186, at 6-7, 15-16, 21. And
Defendant insists that the St. Anthony Hospital records that state “DOC
Custody” establish that Decedent was no longer in OCDC custody, without
offering any DOC policy or paperwork establishing the transfer. Doc. 182, at 3.
For purposes of the present motion, the Court need not resolve which entity
retained legal custody of Decedent after his transfer to the hospital because
that dispute does not create a genuine issue regarding Defendant Logan’s
knowledge of Decedent’s medical condition before the transfer.
Plaintiff’s 	conclusory 	statements 	do 	not 	amount 	to 	showing 	that
Defendant Logan acted with deliberate indifference toward Decedent’s serious
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medical needs. Seeking a transfer of custody for Decedent, who was amidst
transport to the hospital, did not violate a constitutional right. Moreover, it did
not occur until after the alleged deprivation of medical care. Plaintiff identifies
no other action or inaction to show Decedent’s knowing disregard of an
excessive risk. 	The undersigned does not agree that there is any “evidence
demonstrat[ing] 	that 	Defendant 	Logan’s 	behavior” 	showed 	his 	“personal,
historical knowledge of Decedent’s medical condition and inability to receive
treatment at the hands of Defendants.” Doc. 186, at 6.
C. 	Plaintiff’s other arguments.
Counsel for Plaintiff accuses opposing counsel of “extrajudicial coercion,
statutory blackmail, and systemic client harassment to forcefully attempt to
purge the record of evidence fatal to” his client’s defense. Id. at 26; see id. at 9-
12. Such accusations are not taken lightly and should not be part of a
responsive pleading. Defense counsel’s rehashing Plaintiff’s counsel’s personal
struggles and any repercussions on his legal career are also unnecessary.
Neither Defendant Winchester’s nor Plaintiff’s counsel’s personal histories are
relevant to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference
against Defendant Logan. This Court expects professional and civil behavior
from all practitioners, particularly those who have been practicing before this
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Court 	for 	many 	years. 	Counsel 	are 	reminded 	that 	filings 	must 	remain
professional and directed to relevant legal and factual issues. The Court does
not countenance such behavior and counsel for all parties are on notice that
further ad hominem attacks will result in the Court’s striking the pleading(s)
in their entirety.
IV. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant Defendant Logan’s motion for summary judgment. Doc. 182.
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to
this report and recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before
October 22, 2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises the parties that
failure to make a timely objection to this report and recommendation waives
the right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained
herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This report and recommendation does not terminate the referral to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2026.
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 5:24-cv-01298-D Document 213 Filed 10/08/26 Page1of16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

DALTON GAGE HILL,
Administrator and Personal
Representative of THE
ESTATE OF JEFFREY ALLEN
HILL, Deceased

Plaintiff,

Vv. Case No. CIV-24-1298-D
OKLAHOMA COUNTY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AUTHORITY, et al.,

4 444 4444 4 4, _ 4. 4. 4 4 4

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On January 30, 2024, Decedent Jeffrey Allen Hill died while at the SSM
Health St. Anthony Hospital following complications from an infected tooth.
The administrator and personal representative of Hill’s estate brought this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant Major Bradley Logan
deprived Hill of constitutionally adequate medical care in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Doc. 53, at 9-10.! United States District Judge Timothy

D. DeGiusti referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for

1 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.

2
initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 58. Before
the Court is Defendant Logan’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 182.
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, Docs. 186 & 187, and Defendant Logan
has replied. Doc. 189. So the matter is at issue. The undersigned recommends
the Court grant Defendant Logan’s motion for summary judgment.
I. 	Legal standards.
A court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is material
if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the
claim.” Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A dispute about a material
fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); see also Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 952 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2020)
(explaining that a dispute over a material fact is genuine “if a rational jury
could find in favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented” (quoting
Jones v. Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 573 (10th Cir. 2015))). In applying this standard,
the 	Court 	“‘review[s] 	the 	facts 	and 	all 	reasonable 	inferences 	those 	facts
Case 5:24-cv-01298-D Document 213 Filed 10/08/26 Page 2 of 16

3
support[ ] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Doe, 952 F.3d
at 1189 (second alteration in original) (quoting Evans v. Sandy City, 944 F.3d
847, 852 (10th Cir. 2019)). “In reviewing the facts, at summary judgment, the
party who bears a burden of proof on an issue bears the burden of production
rather than the burden of persuasion.” Markley v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 59
F.4th 1072, 1080 (10th Cir. 2023).
II. 	Background.
This case presents yet another tragic death at an Oklahoma county jail.
During the relevant dates, the Oklahoma County Detention Center (OCDC)
employed Defendant Logan as a Major. He testified his job was to oversee the
OCDC’s captains to make sure they “were doing the job that they were
supposed to be doing.” Doc. 182, Ex. 1, at 2. Defendant Logan worked at the
OCDC for over twenty years. Id. at 8.
Decedent entered OCDC on November 15, 2023. Doc. 53, at 6; Doc. 186,
at 19. In the weeks following Decedent’s January 5, 2024 sentencing, he
developed a severe toothache and complained to OCDC personnel about it. Doc.
53, at 6; Doc. 186, at 17-18.2 On January 22, 2024, he was transported to St.
2 	The Amended Complaint, Doc. 53, and Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant
Logan’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 186, differ regarding the timeline
Case 5:24-cv-01298-D Document 213 Filed 10/08/26 Page 3 of 16

4
Anthony’s Hospital and he died on January 30, 2024, after developing sepsis
from his infected tooth. Doc. 53, at 6-7; Doc. 186, at 19-21.3
III. 	Analysis.
A. 	Defendant Logan’s qualified immunity defense.
Defendant Logan raises the defense of qualified immunity. Doc. 182, at
9. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that “shields officials from civil
liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009)). Defendant Logan argues that he is entitled to qualified
immunity because he did not violate Decedent’s constitutional rights. Doc. 182,
at 11-12.
of events between Decedent’s initial complaints of toothache and his transfer
to St. Anthony’s Hospital. The details are not important for purposes of this
Report and Recommendation.
3 	Included here are those material facts supported by the record and not
genuinely disputed in the manner required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To the
extent 	either 	party 	has 	made 	unsubstantiated 	allegations, 	general 	and
conclusory statements, or require “one inference too many to adequately
support 	the 	assertion” 	made, 	such 	matters 	have 	not 	been 	included. 	See
generally Double Eagle Alloys, Inc. v. Hooper, 134 F.4th 1078, 1087, 1100 n.21
(10th Cir. 2025).
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While 	Plaintiff 	insists 	that 	genuine 	issues 	of 	material 	fact 	exist
“concerning Defendant Logan’s authority, personal participation, knowledge,
deliberate 	indifference, 	causation, 	and 	qualified 	immunity,” 	he 	does 	not
address 	Defendant 	Logan’s 	claim 	to 	qualified immunity 	apart from 	that
fleeting reference. Doc. 186, at 25. 	Once properly asserted, the defense of
qualified immunity “creates a presumption that the defendant is immune from
suit.” Crowson v. Washington County, 983 F.3d 1166, 1178 (10th Cir. 2020)
(quotation 	marks 	and 	brackets 	omitted). 	To 	overcome 	the 	presumption,
Plaintiff 	“must 	show 	that 	(1) 	the 	officers’ 	alleged 	conduct 	violated 	a
constitutional right, and (2) it was clearly established at the time of the
violation… that such conduct constituted a violation of that right.” Id. Plaintiff
has not made this showing. Without any rebuttal from Plaintiff, the Court
must presume that Defendant Logan is entitled to qualified immunity. Medina
v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[A]lthough we will review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record must
clearly demonstrate the plaintiff has satisfied his heavy two-part burden;
otherwise, 	the 	defendants 	are 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity.”) 	(internal
citation omitted).
B. 	Defendant Logan is entitled to judgment on the merits.
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Even 	if 	Defendant 	Logan 	were 	not 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity,
Plaintiffs have failed to show that he violated Decedent’s constitutional rights.
1. 	Deliberate indifference standard.
To recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting
under color of state law “violated his constitutional or statutory rights.” Dodds
v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010). “[A] prison official’s
deliberate 	indifference 	to 	a 	convicted 	prisoner’s 	serious 	medical 	needs
constitutes 	cruel 	and 	unusual 	punishment 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Eighth
Amendment.” Prince v. Sheriff, 28 F.4th 1033, 1043 (10th Cir. 2022).
Deliberate indifference has two components: (1) “an objective component
requiring that the pain or deprivation be sufficiently serious,” and (2) “a
subjective 	component 	requiring 	that 	the 	offending 	officials 	act 	with 	a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1569 (10th
Cir. 1991). “In other words, the focus of the objective component is the
seriousness of the plaintiff's alleged harm, while the focus of the subjective
component is the mental state of the defendant with respect to the risk of that
harm.” Prince, 28 F.4th at 1044.
The 	objective 	component 	is 	met 	if 	the 	deprivation 	is 	“sufficiently
serious.” Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting
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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). “A medical need is sufficiently
serious ‘if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Uphoff,
199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999)). The objective component must be
evaluated by the actual harm suffered, not by symptoms perceived by the
defendant. See Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 753 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that
symptoms displayed are only relevant to the subjective component of the
deliberate indifference test).
The subjective component is met if a prison official “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,” meaning “the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and []he must also draw the inference.”
Id. at 751 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). It “can be satisfied under two
theories: failure to properly treat a serious medical condition (‘failure to
properly treat theory’) or as a gatekeeper who prevents an inmate from
receiving treatment or denies access to someone capable of evaluating the
inmate’s need for treatment (‘gatekeeper theory’).” Lucas v. Turn Key Health
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Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1137 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing Sealock, 218 F.3d at
1211).
2. 	Plaintiff’s allegations do 	not 	amount to 	deliberate
indifference.
Plaintiff sues Defendant Logan in his individual capacity, Doc. 53, at 5,
alleging deliberate indifference for failure to provide adequate medical care.
Id. at 9. Because Defendant Logan is not a medical professional, the Court
proceeds under the gatekeeper theory. See Doc. 139, at 9 (“[T]he undersigned
reads Plaintiff’s amended complaint as stating a claim against Defendant
Logan under the gatekeeper theory.”).
The objective component is met here. “An inmate’s death meets [the
objective] requirement ‘without doubt.’” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 994
(10th Cir. 2019). Defendant Logan claims that there was not “a sufficiently
serious observable medical need observed by Major Logan,” but the standard
for the objective component is the harm to the plaintiff, not the observations of
the defendant. Doc. 182, at 7; Mata, 427 F.3d at 753. So, the remaining issue
is whether the subjective component is met with regard to Defendant Logan.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Logan “had personal
knowledge that Mr. Hill was not receiving proper medical treatment, was not
eating, was immobile, and . . . in severe pain,” but “failed to ensure that Mr.
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Hill received the medical care he . . . obviously and desperately needed.” Doc.
53, 	at 	7. 	He 	maintained 	that 	on 	January 	12 	and 	13, 	2024, 	Decedent
“complained about his pain to John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 who relayed the
information 	to 	[Defendant] 	Logan 	who 	in 	turn 	did 	nothing 	to 	assist
[Decedent].” Id. at 6. He asserted that Defendant Logan failed to provide Mr.
Hill “with prompt and adequate medical assessment, evaluation, treatment
and supervision despite the obvious need.” Id. at 12. 	He alleged that as a
“Jailer Defendant,” Defendant Logan acted with “deliberate indifference to his
health and safety” which “was a proximate cause of [his] unnecessary pain and
suffering, and . . . untimely death.” Id.
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court held that these allegations
sufficed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Doc. 139 (Report and
Recommendation 	recommending 	denial 	of 	Defendant 	Logan’s 	motion 	to
dismiss); Doc. 150 (Order adopting Doc. 139). The Court found that “the
allegations 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	Amended 	Complaint—taken 	as 	true—sufficiently
allege[d] that Defendant Logan had personal knowledge of Mr. Hill’s serious
medical needs.” Doc. 150, at 4. Further, the Court found that Defendant Logan
had failed to adequately raise the defense of qualified immunity and thus
denied Defendant Logan’s motion to dismiss. Doc. 139; Doc. 150.
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But at summary judgment, the Court can no longer accept Plaintiff’s
allegations on faith. Plaintiff must provide some evidence to support his
account of events. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (“A party asserting that a fact…
is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts
of materials in the record…”); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)
(“[T]he 	plain 	language 	of 	Rule 	56(c) 	mandates 	the 	entry 	of 	summary
judgment… against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”). He has not done so.
Defendant Logan states he had “no role in the medical care and no direct
role, only a remote supervisory role, in security oversight of the deceased.” Doc.
182, at 1. He states his “first and only involvement with [Decedent] was when
he fortuitously happened upon [him] at an exit on a gurney as he was being
transferred to an ambulance for transport to the hospital.” Id. (citing Ex. 1, at
32). 	Defendant 	Logan 	claims 	he 	“did 	not 	know
before this that Decedent was sick, that he needed a transfer, or about his
medical 	diagnosis,” 	and 	that 	he 	“never 	had 	an 	opportunity 	to 	observe
[Decedent] prior to the transfer to the hospital.” Id. at 2, 8.
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Plaintiff disputes this account as Defendant Logan’s first and only
involvement. Doc. 186, at 13. He cites no record evidence to support this
allegation. Rather, he points to Defendant Logan’s “affirmative actions after
this encounter, including [Defendant Logan’s] researching release options and
communicating with [the Department of Corrections (DOC)], and efforts to
‘transfer’ custody while Decedent was already admitted to the hospital.” Doc.
186, 	at 	13 	(emphasis 	added). 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	Defendant 	Logan’s
researching 	of 	a 	Medical 	Own 	Recognizance 	release 	and 	his 	continued
conversations with DOC to “pursue the transfer of custody [of Decedent] to
DOC” were “indicative of personal, historical knowledge of Decedent’s serious
medical condition[.]” Id. at 6-7. These events undisputably occurred after his
encounter with Decedent and after Decedent was transferred to the hospital,
and they do not show any prior knowledge on Defendant Logan’s part.
Plaintiff, in his response, abandons all allegations of John Doe jail staff
reporting Decedent’s condition to Defendant Logan. Doc. 53, at 6, 7 (complaint
alleges “Mr. Hill told Deputy John Doe #2 who relayed the information to Major
Logan”); Doc. 186. Instead, Plaintiff relies entirely on Defendant Logan’s
“supervisory” position to prove knowledge of Decedent’s condition. See, e.g.,
Doc. 186, at 8. Plaintiff does not support his allegations with record evidence
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in response to the motion for summary judgment. And the mere fact that
Defendant Logan supervised jail staff is not adequate to show his personal
involvement in a constitutional violation. See Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416,
1423 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on
personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.”).
Defendant Logan testified that when he heard Decedent was being
hospitalized for his tooth he thought “[t]hat got to be a bad tooth.” Doc. 182,
Ex. 1, at 4. Then Defendant Logan “went out and looked him up. And that’s
when [he] saw he was sentenced to DOC” and Defendant Logan decided to “see
if we can get him transferred to DOC custody physically.” Id. He did not “look
and see” Decedent’s previous medical requests. Id. And Plaintiff points to no
evidence, apart from his managerial duties over the captains at OCDC, that
Defendant Logan had any knowledge of any calls from Decedent’s family
members 	to 	OCDC. 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Defendant 	Logan 	oversaw 	all
operations within the jail. Doc. 186, at 24 (citing Ex. 9, at 54-56). 	He also
“oversaw all captains and communications with [Turn Key Health Care], which
was contracted with OCDC to provide inmate healthcare during the relevant
time.” Id. Plaintiff identifies no record evidence showing that Defendant Logan
received, 	reviewed, 	or 	otherwise 	learned 	of 	Decedent’s 	medical 	requests,
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reported symptoms, treatment history, or communications from Decedent’s
family 	before 	Decedent’s 	transfer 	to 	the 	hospital. 	The 	same 	applies 	for
Defendant Logan’s knowledge about Decedent’s condition or the treatment he
received before and after he departed OCDC. Plaintiff’s conclusory statements
do not meet the subjective component.
The parties contest whether Decedent was in DOC’s custody. Doc. 186,
at 4-6; Doc. 182, Ex. 3 (citing Ex. 4 DOC Custody). Plaintiff points to the
January 31, 2024 hearing set before Oklahoma County Judge Truong to
consider Decedent’s motion to withdraw his plea in support of his contention
that Decedent remained in OCDC custody. Doc. 186, at 6-7, 15-16, 21. And
Defendant insists that the St. Anthony Hospital records that state “DOC
Custody” establish that Decedent was no longer in OCDC custody, without
offering any DOC policy or paperwork establishing the transfer. Doc. 182, at 3.
For purposes of the present motion, the Court need not resolve which entity
retained legal custody of Decedent after his transfer to the hospital because
that dispute does not create a genuine issue regarding Defendant Logan’s
knowledge of Decedent’s medical condition before the transfer.
Plaintiff’s 	conclusory 	statements 	do 	not 	amount 	to 	showing 	that
Defendant Logan acted with deliberate indifference toward Decedent’s serious
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medical needs. Seeking a transfer of custody for Decedent, who was amidst
transport to the hospital, did not violate a constitutional right. Moreover, it did
not occur until after the alleged deprivation of medical care. Plaintiff identifies
no other action or inaction to show Decedent’s knowing disregard of an
excessive risk. 	The undersigned does not agree that there is any “evidence
demonstrat[ing] 	that 	Defendant 	Logan’s 	behavior” 	showed 	his 	“personal,
historical knowledge of Decedent’s medical condition and inability to receive
treatment at the hands of Defendants.” Doc. 186, at 6.
C. 	Plaintiff’s other arguments.
Counsel for Plaintiff accuses opposing counsel of “extrajudicial coercion,
statutory blackmail, and systemic client harassment to forcefully attempt to
purge the record of evidence fatal to” his client’s defense. Id. at 26; see id. at 9-
12. Such accusations are not taken lightly and should not be part of a
responsive pleading. Defense counsel’s rehashing Plaintiff’s counsel’s personal
struggles and any repercussions on his legal career are also unnecessary.
Neither Defendant Winchester’s nor Plaintiff’s counsel’s personal histories are
relevant to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference
against Defendant Logan. This Court expects professional and civil behavior
from all practitioners, particularly those who have been practicing before this
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Court 	for 	many 	years. 	Counsel 	are 	reminded 	that 	filings 	must 	remain
professional and directed to relevant legal and factual issues. The Court does
not countenance such behavior and counsel for all parties are on notice that
further ad hominem attacks will result in the Court’s striking the pleading(s)
in their entirety.
IV. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant Defendant Logan’s motion for summary judgment. Doc. 182.
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to
this report and recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before
October 22, 2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises the parties that
failure to make a timely objection to this report and recommendation waives
the right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained
herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This report and recommendation does not terminate the referral to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2026.
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Case 5:24-cv-01298-D Document 213 Filed 10/08/26 Page 16 of 16

Aga Ler

SUZANNE MITCHELL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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