Troppman et al v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JACKIE TROPPMAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
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v. 	)
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Case No. 24-cv-00748-PRW
ALLSTATE VEHICLE AND
PROPERTY INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
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ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiffs Jackie Troppman and Jodi Roberts’s Motion to
Compel the Attendance of Sade Jackson and Jade Lusk at Their Depositions (Dkt. 35);
Defendant Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company’s Response in Opposition
(Dkt. 38); and Plaintiffs’ Reply (Dkt. 39). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES
the Motion (Dkt. 35).
Background
This discovery dispute arises from a breach-of-contract case pending in the Western
District of Oklahoma. Troppman and Roberts submitted two insurance claims to Allstate
after their home sustained wind and hail damage. During the inspection process, Allstate
assigned claims adjusters Sade Jackson and Jade Lusk to evaluate Plaintiffs’ case.
Following the full investigation, Allstate allegedly failed to adequately compensate
Plaintiffs for their home’s damage, leading to this lawsuit.
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Because Jackson and Lusk were involved in handling Plaintiffs’ claims, Troppman
and Roberts sought to depose both on August 18, 2025. Plaintiffs never subpoenaed the
adjustors. Instead, Plaintiffs filed a Notice to Take Deposition for Jackson and Lusk after
Allstate’s counsel stated they would be representing both adjustors for the purpose of
deposition. Although all attorneys were present, both Jackson and Lusk failed to appear on
August 18. In response, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Compel on November 12, 2025, in
which they ask this Court to compel Jackson and Lusk to attend their deposition.1
Legal Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern discovery disputes, including the
failure of a party or a non-party to attend a deposition.2 Rule 30(a) provides that a party
may compel a person’s attendance at a deposition by subpoena under Rule 45. Though Rule
30 does not say so explicitly, courts generally agree that filing a notice as described under
subsection (b)(1) is sufficient to require a party or an officer, director, or managing agent
of a party to attend a deposition.3 Yet “a non-party may only be deposed via subpoena;
notice is insufficient to compel a non-party’s submission to a deposition.”4 Thus, without
1 Plaintiffs also requested that the Court sanction Allstate. However, while the Motion was
pending, Allstate agreed to pay Plaintiffs the fees and costs associated with the missed
deposition and Plaintiffs have agreed to withdraw the request for sanctions.
2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a), 45(g), 37(b).
3 Herron v. Progressive Car Finance, LLC, No. CIV-22-638-SLP, 2023 WL 11762874, at
*2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 13, 2023).
4 Id. (quoting Livesay v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., No. 4:22-CV-19-TLS-JEM, 2022 WL
17432341, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 5, 2022)).
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a subpoena, a court does not have the authority to compel a non-party’s deposition.5 But if
a valid subpoena was served, Rule 45 permits a court to impose contempt sanctions on non-
parties when the subpoena is violated. Rule 37, on the other hand, generally governs the
issuance of sanctions when a party fails to obey a discovery order.
Discussion
Plaintiffs’ motion focuses on whether courts have the authority under Rule 37 to
order non-parties to attend depositions. Of importance, Plaintiffs request that the Court
enter an order compelling Jackson and Lusk to appear at their depositions. To support the
Motion, Plaintiffs rely on Sali v. Corona Regional Medical Center, where the Ninth Circuit
upheld a district court order that directed the opposing party to secure the attendance of
their own expert witness (a nonparty) at a deposition.6
Plaintiffs misapply the holding of Sali. Although the Ninth Circuit has interpreted
Rule 37 to permit an order compelling “the party to use its best efforts to secure the
nonparty’s attendance at the deposition,”7 this is not the relief Plaintiffs seek. Instead,
Plaintiffs request an order compelling Jackson and Lusk themselves to attend the
deposition, rather than an order compelling Defendant to secure Jackson and Lusk’s
attendance.8 Plaintiffs point to no legal authority where a court has used Rule 37 to directly
5 Duncan Group, LLC v. Cimarex Energy Co., No. CIV-18-123-JD, 2020 WL 13682444, at
*2 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2020) (collecting cases).
6 Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr., 884 F.3d 1218, 1224–25 (9th Cir. 2018).
7 Id. at 1224 (emphasis added).
8 Mot. to Compel (Dkt. 35), at 10–11.
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compel a non-party without using a party as the middleman. And this relief issue is
especially problematic considering Plaintiffs have not subpoenaed Jackson or Lusk. Even
in Sali, the Ninth Circuit wrote that “without a subpoena neither plaintiffs nor the court
could have compelled [the nonparty expert witness] to appear at the deposition.”9
Therefore, while Plaintiffs may nominally invoke Rule 37, in effect they ask the Court to
compel a non-party under Rule 45 without any of Rule 45’s protection.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Jackson and Lusk did not need to be subpoenaed
because they consented to only receiving notice of the deposition. Plaintiffs rely on dicta
from a Northern District of Texas case to assert that “[a] party need not comply with Rule
45 and issue a subpoena if a non-party will consent to having his deposition taken by notice
alone.”10 But Plaintiffs again do not cite any case where a district court actually ordered a
non-party individual to attend a deposition without a subpoena. Accordingly, the Court
finds no legal reason to depart from Rule 45’s subpoena requirement as to Jackson and
Lusk.
9 Sali, 884 F.3d at 1224.
10 Morawski v. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:14-mc-21-D-BN, 2014 WL 717170,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2014) (citing Ulin v. Lovell’s Antique Gallery, No. C-09-03160
EDL, 2010 WL 2680761, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2010)). In Ulin, the court limited the
consent-waiver rule to depositions under Rule 30(b)(6), which covers subpoenas directed
at organizations. Ulin, 2010 WL 2680761, at *2.
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Conclusion
Because Plaintiffs did not first issue a subpoena, the Court DENIES the Motion to
Compel (Dkt. 35).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of January 2026.
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