Jarrell et al v. Haaji et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LYNN JARRELL, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AHMED IBRAHIM HAAJI, et al.,
Defendants.
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) 	Case No. CIV-23-37-PRW
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ORDER
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Defendants 	Ahmed 	Ibrahim 	Haaji 	and 	U.S. 	Roadways
Enterprises, Inc.’s Amended Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 46).
Plaintiffs responded (Dkt. 50) and Defendants replied (Dkt. 52). The parties also submitted
a Joint Stipulation as to Arguments on Negligence per se Claims (Dkt. 82), following
Plaintiff’s submission of an Amended Complaint (Dkt. 81). The parties stipulate that the
negligence per se allegations at the center of Defendants’ Haaji and Roadways’s Amended
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 46) are materially unchanged since
Defendants filed their Motion and the related briefing papers are still responsive. For the
reasons given below, the Court GRANTS the Motion (Dkt. 46) and DISMISSES the
negligence per se claims in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Dkt. 81) as to violations of 47
O.S. §§ 11-102, 11-403(C), and 11-602(A).
Background
This case arises out of a vehicle collision between Plaintiffs and Defendant Haaji.
On or about December 9, 2020, Defendant Haaji was operating a commercial motor vehicle
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owned by his employer, Roadways. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Haaji made a negligent
U-turn onto westbound US-412, blocking the roadway down which Plaintiffs were
traveling and resulting in an unavoidable accident. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant
Haaji first attempted to flee the scene of the accident, then failed to render aid to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs filed this action on December 5, 2022, and have since amended their Complaint,
alleging several claims against Haaji and Roadways, but central to the present Motion are
the claims for negligence per se against Haaji and the claim for vicarious liability against
Roadways for Defendant Haaji’s negligence per se under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. 	Defendants Roadways and Haaji move the Court to dismiss both claims with
prejudice, arguing that Plaintiff’s negligence per se claims improperly rely on violations
of state law that do not contain the sort of fixed standards required to bootstrap a successful
negligence per se claim.
Legal Standard
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may
move for judgment on the pleadings.”1 The Court treats motions for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) as motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).2 When reviewing such a motion to dismiss, “[a]ll well-pleaded facts, as
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
2 Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000).
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distinguished from conclusory allegations,”3 must be accepted as true and viewed “in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.”4 Parties must “provide the grounds of their
entitlement to relief,” requiring “more than labels and conclusion, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”5 The pleaded facts must be
sufficient to establish that the claim is plausible.6 In considering whether a claim is
plausible, the Court “liberally construe[s] the pleadings and make[s] all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”7
Discussion
The claims at issue here allege violations of a series of Oklahoma state laws referred
to as “Rules of the Road.”8 Plaintiffs allege that Haaji violated five different provisions of
the Rules of the Road, 47 O.S. §§ 11-102, 11-403(C), 11-602(A), 10-102(A),9 and 10-
104(A), upon which they premise their negligence per se claims.
3 Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1105 (10th Cir.
2017).
4 Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting David v.
City & Cnty. of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1352 (10th Cir. 1996)).
5 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up).
6 See id.
7 Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1105.
8 47 O.S. § 11-101, et seq.
9 The Court notes that Plaintiffs cite “47 O.S. § 11-102(A)” at ¶ 45 of their Amended
Complaint. The Court can find no evidence that such a provision exists and instead
presumes that Plaintiffs intended to cite 47 O.S. § 10-102(A).
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Under Oklahoma law, “[t]he negligence per se doctrine is employed to substitute
statutory standards for parallel common law, reasonable care duties.”10 In order for a party
to make out a claim for negligence per se, a plaintiff must show that the statutory violation
caused the injury, the injury was the type intended to be prevented by the statute, and the
“injured party must be one of the class intended to be protected by the statute.”11 	In
substituting the common law reasonable care standard, though, the underlying statute in a
negligence per se claim must provide a standard of care “fixed and defined by law and . . .
the same in all circumstances.”12 In order for the negligence per se claim to borrow the
underlying 	statutory 	standard 	of 	care, 	the 	statute 	must 	“impose 	positive 	objective
standards.”13
As to all negligence per se claims, Defendants argue that none of the underlying
statutes provide a necessary objective standard of conduct upon which to base a successful
negligence per se claim.
Taking each in turn, the Court finds that none of the statutes proffered by Plaintiffs
in the Amended Complaint can carry a negligence per se claim.
Plaintiffs first allege that Haaji violated 47 O.S. § 11-102, which incorporates the
other Rules of the Road: “It is unlawful . . . to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any
10 Howard v. Zimmer, 299 P.3d 463, 467 (Okla. 2013).
11 Id. (citations omitted).
12 Smith v. Barker, 419 P.3d 327, 333 (Okla. Civ. App. 2017) (citation omitted).
13 Id.
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act required [by the Rules of the Road].” Mere commands to follow the law do not provide
the sort of “fixed and defined” standard of care necessary to sustain a negligence per se
claim.14 To hold otherwise would essentially turn all traffic injuries into negligence per se
claims and would necessarily widen the doctrine in all other areas of state law that include
general statutes that command citizens to follow the law.
Plaintiffs then allege Haaji violated 47 O.S. § 11-403(C), which states:
The driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall in obedience to such
sign slow down to a speed reasonable for the existing conditions, or shall
stop if necessary as provided in subsection (e) of Section 11-703 of this title,
and shall yield the right-of-way to any pedestrian legally crossing the
roadway on which the driver is driving, and to any vehicle in the intersection
or approaching on another highway so closely as to constitute an immediate
hazard. Said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other
vehicles approaching the intersection shall yield to the vehicle so proceeding,
provided, however, that if such driver is involved in a collision with a
pedestrian in a crosswalk or vehicle in the intersection after driving past a
yield sign without stopping, such collision shall be deemed prima facie
evidence of the driver’s failure to yield right-of-way.
Again, this statute cannot lay the foundation for a negligence per se claim. The
nebulous requirement to slow to a reasonable speed is neither fixed nor defined, as is the
command that drivers stop if necessary. These are context-dependent duties that point to
common law reasonableness principles. Further, Plaintiffs allege that Haaji “utilized the
center median turn lane to make a U-turn” when the accident occurred.15 The accident did
not occur “in the intersection after driving past a yield sign without stopping[.]” Therefore,
14 Id.
15 Amend. Compl. (Dkt. 81), ¶23.
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Plaintiffs may not rely on 47 O.S. § 11-403(C) to make a prima facie showing of
negligence.
Next, Plaintiffs allege a violation of 47 O.S. § 11-602(A): “Unless otherwise
prohibited by law, the driver of a vehicle shall not turn the vehicle so as to proceed in the
opposite direction unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and
without interfering with other traffic.” On its face this provision incorporates a common
law reasonableness standard and will not support a negligence per se claim. While
Plaintiffs were able to provide precedent demonstrating that Oklahoma courts have held
that driving an automobile on the wrong side of the road is “‘prima facie evidence of
negligence’” when done so in violation of the Rules of the Road,16 Plaintiffs concede that
the caselaw is distinguishable from this case, since Haaji was not driving on the wrong side
of the road.17
Plaintiff’s fourth negligence per se allegation relies on a violation of 47 O.S. § 10-
102(A), which states:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in a nonfatal
injury to any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such
accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and
in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled
the requirements of Section 10-104 of this title. Every such stop shall be
made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.
16 Shoopman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 518 P.2d 1108, 1110 (citation omitted).
17 Plfs.’ Resp. (Dkt. 50), at 12.
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This provision again incorporates a context-dependent standard of care in requiring
a driver to stop “as close [to the scene of an accident] as possible[.]” For the previously
stated reasons, this will not support a negligence per se claim. Further, nothing in this
provision is targeted at the cause of the injury but rather mandates particular actions after
the injury has occurred. This does not provide the necessary ingredient of causation to
make out a negligence per se claim under Oklahoma law.18
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Haaji violated 47 O.S. § 10-104(A), which states:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or
death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by
any person shall give his or her correct name, address and registration
number of the vehicle he or she is driving, and shall upon request exhibit his
or her driver license and his or her security verification form, as defined
in Section 7-600 of this title, to the person struck or the driver or occupant of
or person attending any vehicle collided with, and shall render to any person
injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the
making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician,
surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such
treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person.
Any driver who provides information required by this section which is
intentionally inaccurate shall be subject to the provisions of Section 10-
103 of this title.
This provision does not support a negligence per se claim for the same reasons that
47 O.S. § 10-102(A) fails to do so. Specifically, while there are clear commands here,
requiring the provision of information to victims of traffic accidents, those requirements
18 Howard, 299 P.3d at 467.
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are not aimed at preventing traffic injuries. Further, the requirement to render aid is again
premised on a requirement that such aid be “reasonable assistance.”
Plaintiffs were unable to direct the Court to any caselaw that demonstrated that
Oklahoma courts have allowed any of these aforementioned provisions to form the basis
of a negligence per se claim in a case similar to this one. While Plaintiffs have provided
cases where Oklahoma courts have allowed some Rules of the Road to serve as a basis for
a negligence per se claim, none of those cases are applicable here. However, to the extent
that Plaintiffs can bring claims against Defendants for violations of 47 O.S. §§ 10-102(A)
and 10-104(A), Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend their Amended Complaint.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs
negligence per se claims as to violations of 47 O.S. §§ 11-102, 11-403(C), and 11-602(A).
Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend their Complaint to properly plead violations of 47 O.S.
§§ 10-102(A) and 10-104(A).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of September 2025.
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