Young v. Rios et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
GEORGE SOLER YOUNG, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-15-641-R
)
HECTOR RIOS et al., )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff George Soler Young, a state prisoner appearing pro se, brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging several violations of his federal constitutional rights.
United States District Judge David L. Russell has referred this matter to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636. Now before
the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief (Doc. No. 138), to which Defendants
have responded (Doc. No. 139). As outlined herein, the undersigned recommends that this
Motion be denied.
DISCUSSION
While housed at Joseph Harp Correctional Center (“JHCC”) in Lexington,
Oklahoma, Plaintiff filed the present Motion seeking a “temporary restraining order and/or
injunction.” Pl.’s Mot. Injunctive Relief at 1; see id. at 6. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated
at Dick Conner Correctional Center (“DCCC”) in Hominy, Oklahoma. See Doc. No. 142.
Though labeled in the alternative, Plaintiff’s request is properly viewed as seeking
a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) rather than a
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temporary restraining order (“TRO”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b). Rule
65(b) generally contemplates that a TRO be issued only for a short term and “without
written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
Because Defendants have had notice and an opportunity to respond, the Court should treat
the request for a TRO as superseded by the alternative request for a preliminary injunction.
See, e.g., Yost v. Stouffer, No. CIV-15-783-F, 2016 WL 4154281, at *9 (W.D. Okla. June
30, 2016) (R&R), adopted, 2016 WL 4150935 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 4, 2016); see also 11A
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2951 (3d ed. 2013).
In his Motion, Plaintiff complains that he was placed in segregated housing at JHCC
pending an investigation and despite no finding of guilt being entered. See Pl.’s Mot.
Injunctive Relief at 1-2. Plaintiff asserts that: he was interrogated and taunted, prison
officials have not returned certain legal materials and other property, and he has been
“chilled” by prison officials’ harassment and retaliation. See id. at 2-5. Plaintiff requests
that Defendants be ordered to transfer him to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 4.
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded
upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). For entry of a preliminary injunction, the
applicant generally must satisfy four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood that he or she
will prevail on the merits; (2) irreparable harm unless the restraining order is issued; (3)
outweighing of the harm from the threatened injury against the adversary’s harm from the
preliminary injunction; and (4) the absence of an adverse impact on the public interest.
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir. 2001). A preliminary injunction is
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appropriate only when the movant’s right to relief is clear and unequivocal. Schrier v.
Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff is unable to show a clear and unequivocal right to relief. First, although
Plaintiff was housed at JHCC when he filed this Motion, he since has been transferred to
DCCC. There is no indication in the record that Plaintiff will return to JHCC in the
foreseeable future. Plaintiff’s request to enjoin officials’ conduct toward him at that facility
“was undoubtedly mooted by his transfer” to another facility. Stephens v. Jones, 494 F.
App’x 906, 910 (10th Cir. 2012). “A preliminary injunction directed at [JHCC] prison
officials would not . . . provide[] any ‘conclusive relief’ because [Plaintiff] [is] no longer
housed there.” Id. (quoting Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1024 (10th Cir. 2011)).
Second, a preliminary injunction grants intermediate relief of the same character as
that which may be finally granted. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S.
212, 220 (1945). The Court may not enter a preliminary injunction when the movant seeks
intermediate relief beyond the claims of the complaint. Stouffer v. Eulberg, No. CIV-09-
320-C, 2010 WL 567998, at *1, *2 & n.3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 11, 2010) (citing Omega World
Travel, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, 111 F.3d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A] preliminary
injunction may never issue to prevent an injury or harm which not even the moving party
contends was caused by the wrong claimed in the underlying action.”)). Thus, “the movant
must establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the
conduct asserted in the complaint.” Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc., 528 F.2d 1181,
1185 (10th Cir. 1975).
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Here, Plaintiff’s pending legal claims implicate only action that transpired at
Lawton Correctional Facility and conduct of that facility’s officials. See Order of Nov. 14,
2017 (Doc. No. 120) at 2. Plaintiff therefore has not shown the requisite relationship
between his legal claims and his request for injunctive relief and cannot show a substantial
likelihood he would prevail on the merits of claims related to his request for an injunction
against JHCC officials. See Little, 607 F.3d at 1251; De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd., 325
U.S. at 220; see also Defs.’ Resp. at 1 (LCF-official Defendants asserting that they “have
no involvement with the issues” outlined in Plaintiff’s Motion and are “unable to satisfy”
Plaintiff’s requests).
Moreover, a federal court considering a motion for preliminary injunctive relief
affecting the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement must give substantial weight to the
adverse impact on public safety and on prison operation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2);
Stephens, 494 F. App’x at 911-12. The Supreme Court has declared that courts are not to
substitute their judgment on matters of institutional administration for the determinations
made by prison officials. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987).
Granting the relief Plaintiff seeks would require this Court to intrude directly into the
affairs of state prison administration, which for important policy reasons is a step courts
should be reluctant to take. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-86 (1987); cf. Stephens,
494 F. App’x at 912 (affirming denial of requested injunctive relief as “overbroad and more
intrusive than necessary”). Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to demonstrate that the
injunction he requests is not adverse to the public interest—the relevant public interest here
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being prison officials’ proper administration of their prison facilities. See Kikumura, 242
F.3d at 955.
RECOMMENDATION
For all these reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief
(Doc. No. 138) be DENIED.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The parties are advised of their right to file an objection to the Report and
Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by July 20, 2018, in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. The parties are further advised that
failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950
F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation does not dispose of all issues referred to the
undersigned magistrate judge in the present case.
ENTERED this 29th day of June, 2018.
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