Flebbe v. Harris et al

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
IN RE:
DUSTIN D. HARRIS and AMANDA J.
HARRIS,
Debtors.
Case No. 25-11822-T
Chapter 7
JOHN K. FLEBBE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DUSTIN D. HARRIS and AMANDA J.
HARRIS,
Defendants.
Adv. No. 25-01025-T
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) & (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012) (the “Motion”), 1 filed by Dustin D. Harris
and Amanda J. Harris (“Defendants”); the Response, 2 filed by John K. Flebbe (“Plaintiff”); and
the Reply, 3 filed by Defendants. Defendants seek dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint, 4
filed by Plaintiff on May 14, 2026.
1 ECF No. 21.
2 ECF No. 22.
3 ECF No. 23.
4 ECF No. 20.
T
Filed/Docketed
Jun 16, 2026
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Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), 5 and venue is
proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409. Reference to the Court of this matter is proper pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 157(a). Determination as to the dischargeability of a debt is a “core” proceeding as
that term is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).
Background
On December 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed this adversary proceeding to except debts from
discharge pursuant to § 523. 6 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) on January 8, 2026, 7 which the Court denied and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. 8
Plaintiff then filed his Amended Complaint on March 25, 2026. 9 Defendants attacked the
sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint by filing a second motion to dismiss, which the
Court denied. 10 The Court also allowed Plaintiff a second chance to amend his complaint, which
he did on May 14, 2026. 11
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff holds a state court judgment against
Defendants 12 which is “based primarily upon a check from Plaintiff’s insurance company payable
to Plaintiff . . . to cover certain needed repairs to Plaintiff’s truck.” 13 On June 13, 2023, at
Defendants’ repair facility in Sand Springs, Oklahoma, Plaintiff allegedly engaged Defendants to
5 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to sections of the United States
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
6 ECF No. 1.
7 ECF No. 11.
8 ECF No. 14.
9 ECF No. 15.
10 ECF Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19.
11 ECF No. 20.
12 The Second Amended Complaint alleges Defendants, at all relevant times, were doing
business as both Harris Collision, LLC and Sand Springs Collison Repair. See ECF No. 20 at 2.
13 ECF No. 20 at 2.
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perform the repairs and Defendants promised they would do so. Plaintiff relied on Defendants’
promise to perform the repairs because he had “used [the same] facility before for body work[.]” 14
In executing a Repair Authorization Form, Plaintiff “constituted and appointed Defendants ‘as
[his] true and lawful attorney’ to endorse Plaintiff’s name to the check to pay for the repairs[.]” 15
This allegedly created a fiduciary relationship between the parties. Furthermore, per Defendants’
signing of the Repair Authorization Form, Defendants “explicitly and/or implicitly agree[d] to use
the money for the repairs[.]” 16 In August 2023, Defendants endorsed the check and deposited the
funds into an account which Defendants exercised full control and ownership over. Defendants
then allegedly used the funds “for their own benefit on something other than the repairs[.]” 17
Defendants did not complete the repairs, nor did they return Plaintiff’s truck until he “executed on
[the state court] judgment and the sheriff confiscated the truck and parts from Defendants.” 18
Based on these facts, Plaintiff claims Defendants committed fraud and defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity. Plaintiff also argues Defendants committed embezzlement or, in the
alternative, larceny. Plaintiff asserts Defendants never intended to use the money for repairs, and
thus “falsely represent[ed] to Plaintiff both that the money was to repair the truck and that they
would repair it.” 19 These actions, according to Plaintiff, were “morally corrupt” and done
deliberately and with wrongful intent. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, the debt is not dischargeable
pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6).
14 Id. at 6.
15 Id. at 2.
16 Id. at 3.
17 Id.
18 ECF No. 20 at 3.
19 Id. at 4.
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Discussion
Defendants filed the Motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), which provides that a complaint
may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 20 Rule 8(a)(2)
provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” 21 In addition, if a complaint alleges fraud or mistake, “a party must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” 22 Thus, a party alleging
fraud or mistake must plead facts establishing the “who, what, when, and where” of the allegedly
fraudulent conduct. 23 Furthermore, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 24 While the Court
is required to accept all factual allegations as true, the same does not apply to legal conclusions. 25
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” 26 A complaint cannot simply assert a legal conclusion that it has a claim for relief,
but must also plead facts that are more than consistent with the asserted liability, and that show (as
20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), made applicable to this proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012.
21 Fed. R. Civ P. 8, made applicable to this proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008; Robbins
v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008).
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), made applicable to this proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7009.
23 Fusion Indus., LLC v. Friday (In re Friday), No. 24-1076, 2025 WL 892618, at *7
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. Mar. 21, 2025) (quoting New Century Bank v. Carmell (In re Carmell), 424
B.R. 401, 412 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[T]he who, what, when, and where aspects of the fraud
need not be related with exact details in the complaint as a journalist would hope to relate them to
general public. That is, it is only necessary to set forth a basic outline of fraud in order to alert the
defendant of the purported fraud he is defending against.”).
24 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556, 570 (2007)).
25 Id. at 678.
26 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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opposed to merely allege) that the pleader is entitled to relief. 27 “The burden is on the plaintiff to
frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled
to relief.” 28
A. 	Section 523(a)(2)(A): False Pretenses, False Representation, or Actual Fraud
Exceptions to discharge pursuant to § 523 are to be construed narrowly with any doubts
resolved in the debtor’s favor. 29 Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge a debt 30 “for money,
property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by—
false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud[.]” Thus, a claim pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A)
may rest on any of the three aforementioned types of fraud, each of which must be analyzed
separately depending on the facts of the specific case. 31 However, each type of fraud must involve
“moral turpitude or intentional wrong, and does not extend to fraud implied in law which may arise
27 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
28 Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
29 See Glencove Holdings, LLC v. Bloom (In re Bloom), No. 22-1005, 2022 WL 2679049,
at *5 (10th Cir. July 12, 2022); DSC Nat’l Props., LLC v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 477 B.R. 156,
168 (10th Cir. BAP 2012).
30 Defendants once again argue the Second Amended Complaint is deficient because it
impermissibly attempts to impose personal liability on the individual Defendants even though
Plaintiff’s money was deposited in an account associated with a non-party business entity. ECF
No. 21 at 6. The Court previously addressed a similar version of this argument. See ECF No. 19 at
6 n.32. To reiterate, Plaintiff’s claims are asserted against the individual Defendants, not their
business. A debt is defined as “liability on a claim[,]” § 101(12), and a claim is defined as a “right
to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured[.]”
Id. § 101(5)(A). Plaintiff has alleged injury resulting from Defendants’ actions for which he may
have a right to payment; therefore, Plaintiff has asserted a claim and sufficiently plead a cognizable
debt. 31 Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 578 U.S. 355, 360 (2016) (“It is therefore sensible to start
with the presumption that Congress did not intend ‘actual fraud’ to mean the same thing as ‘a false
representation[.]’”).
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in the absence of bad faith or immorality.” 32 In other words, the debtor must have acted with
subjective intent to deceive. 33
A false representation is an explicit, definable statement resulting in a misrepresentation. 34
A false pretense, on the other hand, is an implied misrepresentation, which includes a material
omission or conduct intended to create and foster a false impression. 35 To establish a claim under
§ 523(a)(2)(A) for false pretenses or false representation, a plaintiff must prove the following: “1)
the debtor made a false representation; 2) the debtor made the representation with the intent to
deceive the creditor; 3) the creditor relied on the representation; 4) the creditor’s reliance was
justifiable; and 5) the debtor’s representation caused the creditor to sustain a loss.” 36
Defendants argue that the Second Amended Complaint lacks the particularity required by
Rule 9(b). Regarding the alleged representation, Defendants complain that the Second Amended
Complaint “does not identify what was said, who made the statement, when it was made, or how
it was communicated.” 37 The Court disagrees with Defendants’ overall assessment. Plaintiff
alleges Defendants, acting together, made either a false representation by promising to repair
Plaintiff’s truck using the funds issued to Plaintiff by the insurance company or falsely implied as
much. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts Defendants made such a promise or implication knowing that
32 In re Van De Water, 180 B.R. 283, 288 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1995) (citation omitted); see
also Ritz, 578 U.S. at 360.
33 In re Johnson, 477 B.R. at 169; Skyline Air Ops, Inc. v. Conkle (In re Conkle), No. 23-
01053, 2024 WL 1460286, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. Apr. 3, 2024).
34 Argento v. Cahill (In re Cahill), No. 15-72418, 2017 WL 713565, at *6 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2017).
35 William W. Barney, M.D. P.C. Ret. Fund v. Perkins (In re Perkins), 298 B.R. 778, 788
(Bankr. D. Utah 2003).
36 Okla. Heritage Bank v. Ward (In re Ward), 589 B.R. 424, 428 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2018)
(citing Johnson v. Riebesell (In re Riebesell), 586 F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir. 2009)). See Scheideler
v. Berken, No. 16-cv-02310, 2017 WL 3315550, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2017).
37 ECF No. 21 at 5.
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they did not intend to use the money to complete the repairs. 38 Plaintiff also included specific
allegations as to when and where the representation was made. In an ideal world, the Second
Amended Complaint would identify the particulars of what exactly was said, such as what repairs
would be made and when they would be completed, as well as which Defendant made such
statements. However, “the who, what, when, and where aspects of the fraud need not be related
with exact details in the complaint” if a basic outline of fraud is alleged so as to alert Defendants
to the underlying facts supporting Plaintiff’s claims. 39 Defendants also assert that Plaintiff “fails
to plead reliance in a way that connects any specific representation to any specific action.” 40 The
Second Amended Complaint states that Plaintiff justifiably relied on Defendants’ representation
to perform the repairs as promised due to his previous dealings with what Plaintiff thought was
the same business. Because of this reliance, Plaintiff paid Defendants funds which were not used
for their intended purpose.
Therefore, the Court finds the Second Amended Complaint meets the pleading standards
of Rules 8(a) and 9(b) and the applicable case law interpreting said Rules. Thus, the Court finds
Plaintiff has stated a claim pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A).
B. 	Section 523(a)(4): Fraud or Defalcation While Acting in a Fiduciary Capacity
Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge debts “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.” To state such a claim for fraud or defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity, “‘a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a fiduciary relationship existed
between the debtor and the creditor, and (2) the debt owed to the creditor is attributable to a fraud
38 ECF No. 20 at 2, 3.
39 In re Friday, 2025 WL 892618, at *7 (quoting In re Carmell, 424 B.R. at 412).
40 ECF No. 21 at 5.
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or defalcation committed by the debtor in the course of the fiduciary relationship.’” 41 The issue of
whether a fiduciary relationship existed is a question of federal law, although state law is
relevant. 42 The fiduciary relationship necessary to satisfy the first element is one that arises from
an express or technical trust established or imposed prior to the allegedly tortious conduct creating
the debt. 43 As stated in the Court’s previous order, “a power of attorney may create § 523(a)(4)
fiduciary status” under certain circumstances. 44 Such a determination is typically fact-specific and
usually requires further factual development; as such, it would be inappropriate to make a
determination as to whether the power of attorney alleged here created a fiduciary relationship for
purposes of § 523. 45
As to the second element, fraud is defined as “positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving
moral turpitude or intentional wrong . . . and not implied fraud, or fraud in law, which may exist
without the imputation of bad faith or immorality.” 46 Defalcation, on the other hand, does not
require a showing of bad faith, moral turpitude, or immoral conduct; instead, it requires a finding
41 In re Ward, 589 B.R. at 429-30 (quoting In re Burton, 463 B.R. 142 (Table), 2010 WL
3422584, at *5 (10th Cir. BAP Aug. 31, 2010)).
42 In re Van De Water, 180 B.R. at 289 (citing Ragsdale v. Haller, 780 F.2d 794, 795 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
43 Fowler Bros. v. Young (In re Young), 91 F.3d 1367, 1371 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Thus, an
express or technical trust must be present for a fiduciary relationship to exist under § 523(a)(4));
White v. White (In re White), No. 20-01061, 2021 WL 450992, at *7 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. Feb. 8,
2021). 44 Cundy v. Woods (In re Woods), 284 B.R. 282, 290 (D. Colo. 2001) (citing Jacobs v.
Mones (In re Mones), 169 B.R. 246, 257 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994)); see In re Van De Water, 180 B.R.
at 289 (citing In re Burgess, 106 B.R. 612, 620 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re Barwick, 24 B.R. 703
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982)); Hubanks v. Jouett (In re Jouett), 512 B.R. 277, 293 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
2014). 45 See Brown Media Corp. v. K&L Gates, LLP, 586 B.R. 508, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
(citation omitted) (explaining that whether a fiduciary relationship exists is “‘necessarily [a] fact
specific’ inquiry . . . which is typically unsuited for a motion to dismiss.”); In re Mones, 169 B.R.
at 257 (stating that the determination of whether a power of attorney created a fiduciary
relationship for purposes of § 523(a)(4) should be an issue for trial and not a motion to dismiss).
46 Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267, 273 (2013).
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“that the debtor acted with wrongful intent, or, at a minimum, with a conscious disregard of his or
her fiduciary duties.” 47
Defendants again argue the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under
§ 523(a)(4), claiming that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a fiduciary relationship. As stated
previously, the Court finds that the determination as to whether the Repair Authorization Form
created a fiduciary relationship at this stage would be premature given the case law suggesting that
a power of attorney may indeed create § 523(a)(4) fiduciary status. Furthermore, for the same
reasons articulated above, the Court finds Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support a finding
of fraud or defalcation. Thus, the Second Amended Complaint meets the applicable pleading
standards provided by Rules 8(a) and 9(b) required to support a plausible claim for relief for fraud
or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.
C. Section 523(a)(4): Embezzlement or Larceny
Embezzlement is defined as “the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom
such property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawfully come, and it requires fraud
in fact, involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong, rather than implied or constructive fraud.” 48
Larceny, on the other hand, is “the fraudulent and wrongful taking and carrying away of the
property of another with intent to convert [such property] to the taker’s use and with intent to
47 Okla. DHS Child Support Servs. v. Bryan (In re Bryan), 612 B.R. 618, 627 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 2020) (quoting Jantz v. Karch (In re Karch), 499 B.R. 903, 906 (10th Cir. BAP 2013)); see
Bullock, 569 U.S. at 273-74 (“Where actual knowledge of wrongdoing is lacking, we consider
conduct as equivalent if the fiduciary ‘consciously disregards’ (or is willfully blind to) ‘a
substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that his conduct will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty.”).
48 Fire Fighters Credit Union v. Burd (In re Burd), No. 16-1037-R, 2017 WL 1191536, at
*3 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2017) (quoting Cousatte v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 300 B.R. 526, 531
(10th Cir. BAP 2003)) (quotations omitted).
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permanently deprive the owner of such property.” 49 The critical difference between the two “is
that with embezzlement, the debtor initially acquires the property lawfully, whereas larceny
requires that the funds originally come into the debtor’s hands unlawfully.” 50 Additionally, the
fraudulent intent required to prove embezzlement or larceny differs from that required under
§ 523(a)(2) in that “the property must generally be appropriated or converted with the intent
permanently to deprive.” 51 Furthermore, unlike fraud or defalcation, a plaintiff is not required to
provide proof of a fiduciary relationship to allege embezzlement or larceny under § 523(a)(4). 52
Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege embezzlement or larceny
because the Second Amended Complaint “does not identify what was done with the funds, how
the funds were allegedly misappropriated, or what specific act constitutes a wrongful taking.” 53
Plaintiff’s factual allegations assert that Defendants promised to repair his truck to induce Plaintiff
to pay them but that Defendants never intended to perform said repairs. The money which was
earmarked for repairs was not used for such and it is reasonable to infer that Defendants used the
money for their own purposes given that it was also never returned to Plaintiff. “‘Using access that
has 	been 	granted 	to 	funds 	to 	misappropriate 	those 	funds 	constitutes 	embezzlement.’” 54
Furthermore, Defendants fail to point to any authority supporting their argument that Plaintiff must
49 Id. (quoting Bryant v. Tilley (In re Tilley), 286 B.R. 782, 789 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2002))
(quotations omitted).
50 Friday, 2025 WL 892618, at *11 (citing Bombardier Cap., Inc. v. Tinkler (In re Tinkler),
311 B.R. 869, 876 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2004); In re Padilla, 493 B.R. 248, 252 (Bankr. D. Colo.
2013); Tilley, 286 B.R. at 789).
51 Chenaille v. Palilla (In re Palilla), 493 B.R. 248, 252 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013) (quoting
2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 385 (15th ed. 1993)) (emphasis added).
52 Klemens v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 840 F.2d 762, 765 (10th Cir. 1988); Hernandez v.
Dorado (In re Dorado), 400 B.R. 304, 309 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2008).
53 ECF No. 21 at 4.
54 Groom v. Krook (In re Krook), 615 B.R. 479, 486 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020) (quoting
Kontos v. Manevska (In re Manevska), 587 B.R. 517, 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018)).
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allege facts as to how the funds were ultimately used. Therefore, this Court finds Plaintiff has
successfully stated a claim for embezzlement pursuant to § 523(a)(4).
However, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts supporting his claim for larceny. As
discussed above, “[t]he primary difference between larceny and embezzlement involves the initial
taking of the property. For larceny, the taking must be unlawful.” 55 According to the Second
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff willingly gave his money to Defendants for a specified purpose.
Thus, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants gained possession of his money lawfully. Therefore,
Plaintiff failed to provide any allegations supporting a claim for larceny pursuant to § 523(a)(4).
D. Section § 523(a)(6): Willful and Malicious Injury
Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt “for willful and malicious injury by the
debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” In this context, willfulness “is more
akin to intentional torts than negligent or reckless torts or a ‘knowing breach of contract.’” 56 There
must have been “a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that
leads to injury.” 57 “This description generally encompasses intentional torts, which require the
actor intend the consequences of his act and not simply the act itself.” 58 To be malicious, “the
debtor must have ‘acted with a culpable state of mind vis-à-vis the actual injury caused the
55 Lewis v. Spivey (In re Spivey), 440 B.R. 539, 544 n.1 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2010) (citing 4
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.10[2], at 523-77 (16th ed.)).
56 In re Bloom, 2022 WL 2679049, at *7 (quoting Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-
62 (1998)).
57 Owens v. Yiannos (In re Yiannos), 673 B.R. 453, 489 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2025) (quoting
Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 61) (emphasis original and quotations omitted); Blue Sky Bank v. Sitton
(In re Sitton), No. 24-1046, 2024 WL 4481704, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. Oct. 11, 2024) (“The
‘willful’ element requires both an intentional act and an intended harm; an intentional act that leads
to harm is not sufficient.”).
58 Myers Operations, Inc. v. Noles (In re Noles), No. 22-01058, 2023 WL 2636311, at *11
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. Mar. 24, 2023) (citing In re Smith, 618 B.R. 901, 912 (10th Cir. BAP 2020)).
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creditor.’” 59 In other words, the debtor’s actions must have been intentional, wrongful, and done
without justification or excuse. 60
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s § 523(a)(6) claim is subject to dismissal for failing to
plead facts showing a deliberate or intentional injury. However, taking the factual allegations as
true, as the Court is required to do at this stage, Defendants’ actions were intentional in that they
deliberately induced Plaintiff into giving them funds under false pretenses. Moreover, it is not
unreasonable to infer Defendants knew with substantial certainty that such actions would result in
injury to Plaintiff and that they took said action without justification or excuse. Thus, the Court
finds the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads a plausible claim pursuant to § 523(a)(6).
Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) & (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012), filed by
Dustin D. Harris and Amanda J. Harris, Defendants herein, at ECF No. 21, is hereby GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED IN
PART as to Plaintiff’s claim for larceny pursuant to § 523(a)(4).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED as to
Plaintiff’s claims for embezzlement pursuant to § 523(a)(4); fraud or defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity pursuant to § 523(a)(4); false pretenses, false representation, or actual fraud
pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A); and willful and malicious injury pursuant to § 523(a)(6).
59 In re Yiannos, 673 B.R. at 489 (quoting In re Smith, 618 B.R. at 919).
60 Gerlich v. Barwick (In re Barwick), No. 19-01060, 2021 WL 839079, at *5 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. Mar. 4, 2021) (citing Bertone v. Wormington (In re Wormington), 555 B.R. 794, 800 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 2016)).
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, on or before Tuesday, June 30, 2026, Defendants shall
file an answer to the Second Amended Complaint.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2026.
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