Moore v. City of Dayton Law Department et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
STEPHEN MOORE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF DAYTON
LAW DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:26-cv-13
Judge Thomas M. Rose
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
______________________________________________________________________________
ENTRY AND ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
______________________________________________________________________________
Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Response to Order to Show Cause Regarding Subject
Matter Jurisdiction (“Response”) (Doc. No. 35). 	In this matter, pro se Plaintiff Stephen Moore
(“Moore”) challenges the constitutionality of events surrounding a charge brought against him in
the Dayton Municipal Court for the misdemeanor of criminal trespass. (Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID
7.) Upon initial review, the Court found that Moore failed to adequately allege the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 16 at PageID 53-54.) In the interest of justice, the Court ordered
Moore to show cause why his case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
on January 22, 2026. (Id.) In Response, Moore attests that this case involves serious civil rights
claims, rather than a simple attack on orders of the Dayton Municipal Court. 	(Doc. No. 35 at
PageID 77.) Ultimately though, the Court’s jurisdictional concerns are not assuaged by Moore’s
Response and, for the reasons stated below, the Court DISMISSES Moore’s case for a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
To reiterate the Court’s prior Order to Show Cause, Moore was allegedly arrested for
trespassing at his elderly mother’s place of abode on December 1, 2025. (Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID
7.) In addition, Moore alleges that his mother’s landlord stole $700 from him before calling the
police to arrest Moore for trespassing. (Id.) The City of Dayton proceeded to prosecute Moore
for trespass and, in a case that is currently still pending, the Dayton Municipal Court allegedly
entered a no contact order barring Moore from being present at his mother’s address. (Id.) 	By
filing the instant Complaint, Moore seeks to have the Court enjoin the state court’s no contact
order and find his mother’s landlord liable for theft. (Id.) Since filing his Complaint, Moore has
submitted an amendment thereto, which adds a vague allegation that the Dayton Police validated
Moore’s position on Monday, January 26, 2026. (See Doc. No. 42 at PageID 100.)
On January 21, 2026, the Court granted Moore leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.
No. 13) and the Court swiftly screened Moore’s Complaint. On January 22, 2026, the Court found
that Moore had failed to adequately establish the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and ordered
Moore to show cause why his case should not be dismissed accordingly. (Doc. No. 16 at PageID
53-54.) Moore timely responded to the Court’s order to show cause on January 27, 2026. (Doc.
No. 41.)
II. 	ANALYSIS
Moore claims that the Court possesses jurisdiction to hear his claims under 28 U.S.C. §
1331, for jurisdiction predicated on the presence of a federal question, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343,
granting federal courts original jurisdiction over civil rights cases. (Doc. No. 35 at PageID 77.)
The Court notes that Moore does not claim to invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332. Nevertheless, Moore contends that the Court must exercise jurisdiction to enjoin
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the criminal prosecution against him in the Dayton Municipal Court due to the existence of
extraordinary circumstances. (Doc. No. 35 at PageID 78.) Specifically, Moore appears to claim
that Defendants have promulgated a state-created danger, which requires federal intervention. (Id.
at PageID 77.)
Again, federal district courts possess subject matter jurisdiction over matters raising a
question of federal law. 	28 U.S.C. § 1331. Additionally, under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, federal district
courts are given original jurisdiction over civil rights claims. 	Though, whether jurisdiction is
alleged by way of Section 1331 or Section 1343, district courts are generally without jurisdiction
to review the final judgments of a state court, as such federal jurisdiction tends to lie exclusively
with the Supreme Court of the United States. 	See RLR Invs., LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge,
Tennessee, 4 F.4th 380, 385 (6th Cir. 2021). 	Similarly, “federal district courts don’t have
jurisdiction over appeals of interlocutory state-court orders.” Id. In this regard, Moore’s claim of
extraordinary circumstances is irrelevant. 	The Court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin the
Dayton Municipal Court’s orders.
What is more, federal district courts must typically abstain from “staying or enjoining
pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.” 	Childress v. City of
Cincinnati, Ohio, 765 F. Supp. 3d 662, 687 (S.D. Ohio 2025) (quoting Powers v. Hamilton Cnty.
Pub. Def. Comm’n., 501 F.3d 592, 605 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,
where Moore does not explicitly ask the Court to enjoin a state court order, he bases his civil rights
claims on the assertion that he is not guilty of criminal trespass. (See Doc. No. 42 at PageID 98.)
The Court finds this to be precisely the scenario in which it is obligated to abstain. If Moore is not
guilty, he must make that case to the Dayton Municipal Court.
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Indeed, Moore cannot establish exceptional circumstances to infringe upon Dayton
Municipal Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of the state-created danger doctrine. To successfully lay
claim to the state-created danger doctrine requires three showings: “that the state actor took an
affirmative act that created or increased the risk that the plaintiff would experience private acts of
violence”; “that the risk was special to the plaintiff as distinguished from the public at large”; and,
“that the state actor acted with the requisite culpability.” Steeb v. Ehart, — F.4th —, 2026 WL
194498, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan 26, 2026) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (cleaned up).
Moore fails at the first prong. 	Even assuming Moore’s allegations to be true, he has nowhere
claimed or otherwise indicated that he or his alleged ward face any risk that they will experience
private acts of violence.
Consequently, the Court finds itself to be without jurisdiction to hear Moore’s case, and,
even were the Court to possess jurisdiction, abstention is required here.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby DISMISSES Moore’s Complaint (Doc. No. 14)
and his Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 42), as neither document adequately alleges the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. Moore’s remaining motions (Doc. Nos. 8, 11, 18, 25, 27, 29, 41) are
DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court is directed to TERMINATE this matter on the Court’s
docket. 	Finally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal of
this decision would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, should not be permitted to proceed
in forma pauperis.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Thursday, January 29, 2026.
s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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