Miami Valley Fair Housing Center, Inc. et al v. Dietz Management Company et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
MIAMI VALLEY FAIR
HOUSING CENTER, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs, Case No. 3:25-cv-386
vs.
DIETZ MANAGEMENT COMPANY District Judge Michael J. Newman
d/b/a DIETZ PROPERTY GROUP, et al., Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DIETZ MANAGEMENT COMPANY d/b/a DIETZ
PROPERTY GROUP’S MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 12)
______________________________________________________________________________
In this civil case, premised on federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiffs Miami Valley Fair
Housing Center, Inc. (“MVFHC”) and Alexis Wiley allege, through counsel, that Defendants Dietz
Management Company d/b/a Dietz Property Group (“Dietz”) and WCT Dayton, LLC (“WCT
Dayton”) illegally discriminated against Wiley and her family on the basis of disability and
familial status. Doc. No. 8 at PageID 79–81. Plaintiffs bring their claims under the Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., Ohio law, and certain Tipp City, Ohio ordinances. Id. Currently
before the Court is Dietz’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) partial motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 12.
Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition (Doc. No. 16), and Dietz filed a reply (Doc. No. 17).
This motion is now ripe for review.
I.
Rule 12(b)(6), like all other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “should be construed,
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
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To challenge whether a plaintiff, in his or her complaint, states a claim upon which relief
can be granted, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c). In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
At this stage, “all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party
must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless
clearly entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir.
2007) (quotation omitted). The Court “construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accept[s] its allegations as true, and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Royal Truck & Trailer Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Kraft, 974 F.3d 756, 758 (6th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2008)). However, the Court “need
not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Winget, 510 F.3d at 582–
83 (citation omitted) (quotation omitted).
A complaint will not suffice if it offers only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Instead, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it
‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
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II.
Having carefully and thoroughly considered the pleadings and briefing in support of, and
in opposition to, Dietz’s motion to dismiss, along with the procedural posture of this case, the
efficient and appropriate way forward is to permit discovery to occur and consider the parties’
arguments on summary judgment, not earlier at the motion-to-dismiss phase of litigation. See,
e.g., Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 514 (6th Cir. 2021). Proceeding in this manner will
ensure that the Court reviews these arguments only after appropriate discovery has been completed
and will guarantee that the Court’s consideration of the parties’ arguments is not premature. Id.;
see Wilson v. Gregory, 3 F.4th 844, 861 (6th Cir. 2021); Mercer v. Athens Cnty., Ohio, 72 F.4th
152, 165–66 (6th Cir. 2023); cf. Nuchols v. Berrong, No. 04-5645, 2005 WL 1634370, at *2 n.2
(6th Cir. July 11, 2005) (“Because a more developed record would be useful in resolving such a
difficult issue, we conclude here that the issue should be decided in the context of a summary
judgment motion rather than at the pleading stage.”).
III.
Accordingly, Dietz’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. No. 12) is
DENIED. The Court anticipates reviewing the parties’ arguments on summary judgment after the
completion of discovery.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
October 9, 2026 s/Michael J. Newman
Hon. Michael J. Newman
United States District Judge
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