Redman v. Case, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION (DAYTON)
DAISCIA N. REDMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
REHABILITATION AND
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:25-cv-351
District Judge Thomas M. Rose
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Dayton Correctional Institution (DCI), filed a pro se
civil rights Complaint in this Court on October 17, 2025. (Doc. 1). On November 24,
2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Supplement Complaint (Doc. 7), which is hereby
GRANTED. On December 5, 2025, Plaintiff provided the financial certificate that
enables her to proceed in forma pauperis, which motion was granted by separate order.
This matter is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge for the required initial
screen of the Complaint and Supplemental Complaint to determine whether these
pleadings, or any portion of them, should be dismissed because they are frivolous,
malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
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Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint
A. Legal Standard
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31
(1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and
court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic
incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern,
Congress included subsection (e)(1), which provides in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
* * *
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, Section
1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that
the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
1 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
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To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See
also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a)
“imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield
Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . .
. [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint
will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference
depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of
competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504
(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent
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standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “‘courts
should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,
482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989)).
B. Allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1) & Supplemental Complaint (Doc. 7)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have unlawfully failed to protect her from harm
inflicted by another inmate and have retaliated against her. Plaintiff names as Defendants
the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (ODRC), inmate Tamara
McLoyd, Institutional Investigator Chris Case, DWO Katie Nixon, Institutional Inspector
Wesley Gaddis, Lieutenants Adleta and Shonks, and Unit Managers Gilbert and Allen.
Plaintiff alleges that in August of 2024 she asked to be moved from her cell due to
fear of her safety. Specifically, Plaintiff sought protection from her cellmate Tamara
McLoyd—a named Defendant to this action—who Plaintiff claims was violent,
delusional, and stole Plaintiff’s personal property. Plaintiff alleges that she brought the
issues with McLoyd to the attention of Defendant Unit Manager Gilbert multiple times.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims that from August to November 1, 2024, “McLoyd had
bitten me, cut me with razors, burned me with a hair straightener, stabbed me with a
pencil, pulled me head first off the top bunk” and choked her to the point that she was
rendered unconscious on five occasions. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that her interactions with
McLoyd resulted in significant injuries, including concussions and visible wounds
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throughout her body. Plaintiff claims McLoyd also forced sexual acts on her, claimed to
“own” Plaintiff, and threatened to kill Plaintiff if she reported her or moved cells.
Plaintiff alleges that on November 1, 2024, after McLoyd threatened her with a
blade, she “finally demanded a bed move from Operations Staff.” (Id. at PageID 5). In
the Supplemental Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that previously she repeatedly requested
that unit staff separate her from McLoyd and reported the issue(s) in multiple grievances
to Defendant Institutional Inspector Gaddis, but Gaddis denied the grievances and refused
to allow Plaintiff to escalate them. (Doc. 7 at PageID 37-38). Upon moving cells, Plaintiff
claims McLoyd stole multiple items from her and broke her television. (Doc. 1 at PageID
5). Plaintiff claims she immediately reported the issues with her property to Defendant
Lt. Shonks. Although Shonks allegedly conducted a cell search and found several stolen
items in McLoyd’s possession, Plaintiff claims Shonks refused to confiscate them.
According to Plaintiff, during the following months McLoyd has stalked and
harassed her. Apparently during this time, Plaintiff claims that McLoyd also “sexually
assaulted me by coming out of place from her housing unit, to mine, locking herself into
my cell and refusing to leave.” (Id. at PageID 6). On one occasion, Plaintiff alleges that
several officers and Gilbert were present and physically restrained McLoyd after she
threatened to stab Plaintiff. (Doc. 7 at PageID 38). And although several conduct reports
were written against McLoyd based on her threats of physical violence, Plaintiff claims
security staff refused to place McLoyd in restrictive housing. (Doc. 1 at PageID 6).
In February 2025, Plaintiff claims that McLoyd assaulted her again, causing
injuries to Plaintiff and resulting in McLoyd’s placement in restrictive housing. Although
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the details are not entirely clear from the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that despite
reporting her ongoing issues with McLoyd and requesting a separation order, Plaintiff
and McLoyd both ended up in restrictive housing in March 2025. (See id. at PageID 6-7).
Plaintiff claims Defendants DWO Katie Nixon and Unit Manager Allen denied her a
separation order and Defendants Case and Shonks had her placed in restrictive housing,
where she claims she “endured 29 days in RH with McLoyd,” during which Plaintiff
claims she was harassed and assaulted. (Id. at PageID 9). Plaintiff claims that no one at
the institution acted to keep her safe from McLoyd, resulting in alleged sexual and
physical assaults on August 17, 2025 and August 20, 2025.
Plaintiff also claims that she has been retaliated against for reporting her issues
with McLoyd and filing grievances. Plaintiff alleges that she previously had no rules
infraction board tickets but has since accumulated tickets that are all related to McLoyd.
For example, Plaintiff alleges that in January 2025, she reported that McLoyd pushed her
down a set of stairs and Sgt. Shonks retaliated against her by placing Plaintiff in
restrictive housing for reporting the assault and stating she would escalate the incident to
a superior officer after Shonks declined to take action. (See Doc. 7 at PageID 38-39).
Plaintiff alleges that Investigator Case issued a conduct report against her for allegedly
reporting an assault by McLoyd in March 2025. (Id. at PageID 39-40). Plaintiff claims
that the conduct report was issued “for allegedly aiding McLoyd in coming in[to] my cell
to attack me.” (Id. at PageID 40).2 Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Adleta and Gaddis
2 Around the same time, Plaintiff alleges that McLoyd arranged for contraband to be sent to the
facility in Plaintiff’s name. According to Plaintiff, Case—who she alleges protects McLoyd from
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retaliated against her by improperly taking her property. (Doc. 1 at PageID 9-10).
Finally, Plaintiff claims Defendant DWO Katie Nixon refused to implement a separation
order between her and McLoyd. Instead, Plaintiff claims that on October 1, 2025, Nixon
tried to manipulate her into signing a form that would result in Plaintiff being transferred
to another institution. (Id. at PageID 10). Plaintiff claims that when she refused to sign
the document, Nixon placed restrictions on her tablet preventing her from accessing mail,
news, the law library, kites or grievances.
In the Supplemental Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was again placed in the
same housing unit with McLoyd from November 4, 2025, until November 11, 2025. (See
Doc. 7 at PageID 42). Plaintiff alleges that she requested protective custody from staff—
including Defendants Allen—to no avail. (Id. at PageID 41-42). According to Plaintiff,
Nixon provided a decision regarding Plaintiff’s protective custody placement but refused
to provide her with a form to appeal the decision. Plaintiff claims she sent a kite to
multiple individuals regarding the appeal form but no one responded. (Doc. 1 at PageID
12).
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. (Id. at PageID 13).
C. Analysis
At this juncture in the proceedings, without the benefit of briefing by the parties to
this action, the undersigned Magistrate Judge concludes that Plaintiff may proceed with
infractions—placed her in restrictive housing based on the incident. According to Plaintiff,
“McLoyd arranged this so I could be placed in RH as revenge for continuously reporting her.” (Id.
at PageID 8).
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her claims in the Complaint and Supplemental Complaint against Defendants Case,
Nixon, Gaddis, Shonks, Adleta, Allen, and Gilbert, based on allegations that these
Defendants failed to protect her from harm and/or retaliated against her.3 However, for
the reasons below, Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants should be
dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).
First, the Court should dismiss all claims against Defendant ODRC. Title 42
U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under the color of any statute . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With respect to the ODRC, a
correctional facility or department of corrections is not a “person” subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Parker v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 65 F. App’x 922, 923 (6th
Cir. 2003) (Department of Corrections not a “person” under § 1983). See also, e.g.,
McGlone v. Warren Corr. Inst., No. 1:13cv126, 2013 WL 1563265, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 12, 2013) (Bowman, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation) (and numerous cases cited
therein) (holding that claims against a state prison and the ODRC should be dismissed at
the screening stage because “neither the state prison facility nor the state corrections
department is an entity capable of being sued under § 1983”), adopted, 2013 WL
3 The Court has not made a determination as to the merits of the claims or potential defenses
thereto, nor are Defendants precluded from filing a motion to dismiss, motion for more definite
statement, or other appropriate motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wiley
v. Austin, No. 8:20CV220, 2020 WL 6204382, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2020).
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2352743 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2013) (Dlott, J.); see also Hix v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr.,
196 F. App’x 350, 355-56 (6th Cir. 2006) (and cases cited therein); Rodgers v. Michigan
Dep’t of Corr., 29 F. App’x 259, 260 (6th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the Complaint should
be dismissed against the ODRC.
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against inmate McLoyd should also be dismissed.
In order to maintain an action under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that a defendant acted
under color of state law. Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 804 F.2d 953,
957 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part
on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails
to allege any facts showing that inmate McLoyd acted under color of state law.
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a procedural due process claim
based upon the confiscation or destruction of her property, Plaintiff’s claim should be
dismissed. To assert such a claim, Plaintiff must first “plead . . . that state remedies for
redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir.
1983). See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). “If satisfactory state procedures
are provided in a procedural due process case, then no constitutional deprivation has
occurred despite the injury.” Jefferson v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583,
587-88 (6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, in order to state a procedural due process claim
under Section 1983, “the plaintiff must attack the state’s corrective procedure as well as
the substantive wrong.” Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 934 F.2d 726, 731 (6th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Vicory, 721 F.2d at 1066). A plaintiff “may not seek relief under Section 1983
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without first pleading and proving the inadequacy of state or administrative processes and
remedies to redress [his] due process violations.” Jefferson, 360 F.3d at 588.
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that indicate her remedies under Ohio law
to redress the wrong of which she complains were inadequate. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails
to explain why a state tort remedy for conversion would not suffice to address her
property claims. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 349 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore,
at this juncture she has failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim that is
actionable under Section 1983.
In sum, Plaintiff may proceed with the development of her First Amendment
retaliation and Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against Defendants Case,
Nixon, Gaddis, Shonks, Adleta, Allen, and Gilbert. However, Plaintiff has failed to
provide completed summons and U.S. Marshal forms for service on these Defendants. It
is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff, within forty-five (45) days of the date of this
Order, submit completed summons and U.S. Marshal forms for Defendants Case, Nixon,
Gaddis, Shonks, Adleta, Allen, and Gilbert. Once the Court receives the requested forms
from Plaintiff, the Court will order service of process by the United States Marshal.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that failure to comply with this Order will result in the
dismissal of this action for want of prosecution.
In addition, having found that the remaining claims alleged in the Complaint fail
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the undersigned recommends that
Plaintiff’s remaining claims be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).
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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), with
the exception of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation and Eighth
Amendment failure-to-protect claims against Defendants Case, Nixon, Gaddis,
Shonks, Adleta, Allen, and Gilbert.
2. 	The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing
reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation
would not be taken in good faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601
(6th Cir. 1997).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. 	The Clerk shall send blank summons and U.S. Marshal forms to Plaintiff to
complete for service on Defendants Case, Nixon, Gaddis, Shonks, Adleta,
Allen, and Gilbert.
2. 	Plaintiff shall, within forty-five (45) days of the date of this Order, submit
completed summons and U.S. Marshal forms for Defendants Case, Nixon,
Gaddis, Shonks, Adleta, Allen, and Gilbert. Once the Court receives the
requested forms the Court will order service of process, the Complaint and the
Supplemental Complaint by the United States Marshal. Plaintiff is ADVISED
that failure to comply with this Order may result in the dismissal of this
action for want of prosecution.
3. 	Plaintiff shall inform the Court promptly of any changes in her address which
may occur during the pendency of this lawsuit.
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Date: 	January 7, 2026 	/s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific,
written objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by
the Court on timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall
specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s
objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those
objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit
rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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