Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION (DAYTON)
KIMBERLY D.,1
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Case No. 3:24-cv-00319
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
(by full consent of the parties)
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits is before this Court for the
second time. Plaintiff appeals Defendant’s finding that she was not under a “disability” as
defined in the Social Security Act. Plaintiff seeks an order remanding this matter to the
Commissioner for the award of benefits or, in the alternative, for further proceedings. The
Commissioner asks the Court to affirm the non-disability decision. For the reasons set
forth below, this Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts that she has been under a disability since March 25, 2016.2 At that
time, she was twenty-nine years old and was considered a “younger person” during the
1 See S.D. Ohio General Order 22-01 (“The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management
of the Judicial Conference of the United States has recommended that due to significant privacy concerns
in social security cases federal courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last
initials.”).
2 Plaintiff initially asserted that her disability began on March 2, 2012. (AR, Doc. No. 6-5 at PageID 573.)
She later amended her alleged disability onset date to March 25, 2016. (AR, Doc. No. 6-10 at PageID
1873.)
Case: 3:24-cv-00319-CHG Doc #: 12 Filed: 03/17/26 Page: 1 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
period at issue.3 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c). Plaintiff has a “high school education and
above.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(4).
The evidence in the Administrative Record (“AR,” Doc. No. 6) is summarized in
the decision of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Deborah F. Sanders (First ALJ Decision,
Doc. No. 6-2 at PageID 29-48), the decision of ALJ Heidi Southern (“Second ALJ
Decision,” Doc. No. 6-10 at PageID 1832-56), Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (“SE,” Doc.
No. 9), and the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (“Mem. In Opp.,” Doc. No.
11). Rather than repeat these summaries, the Court will discuss the pertinent evidence in
its analysis below.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Social Security Administration provides Disability Insurance Benefits to
individuals who are under a “disability,” among other eligibility requirements. Bowen v.
City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 423(a)(1), 1382(a).
The term “disability” means “the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1505(a).
This Court’s review of an ALJ’s unfavorable decision is limited to two inquiries:
“[W]hether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the
3 The period at issue begins March 25, 2016, the alleged onset date of disability, and ends September 30,
2017, the date Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act. (AR, Doc. No.
6-13 at PageID 2029.)
Case: 3:24-cv-00319-CHG Doc #: 12 Filed: 03/17/26 Page: 2 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
ALJ are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d
399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of
Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”).
“Unless the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of
fact unsupported by substantial evidence,” this Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.
Emard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 953 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, the Court “may
not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of
credibility.” Id.
“Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing
administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the
agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)
(citation omitted). This limited standard of review does not permit the Court to weigh the
evidence and decide whether the preponderance of the evidence supports a different
conclusion. Instead, the Court is confined to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, which “means—and means only—‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id.
(citation omitted). This standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which
the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Mullen v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). Thus, the Court may be required to affirm the
ALJ’s decision even if substantial evidence in the record supports the opposite
conclusion. Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997).
Case: 3:24-cv-00319-CHG Doc #: 12 Filed: 03/17/26 Page: 3 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
The other line of judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal
criteria—may result in reversal even when the record contains substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651
(6th Cir. 2009). “[E]ven if supported by substantial evidence, ‘a decision of the
Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and
where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a
substantial right.’” Id. (citations omitted). Such an error of law will require reversal even
if “the outcome on remand is unlikely to be different.” Cardew v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
896 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
III. 	FACTS
A. 	Summary Of The Administrative Record
Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits on March 3, 2017. Plaintiff’s
claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing at Plaintiff’s request,
ALJ Deborah F. Sanders concluded that Plaintiff was not eligible for benefits because she
was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act. (First ALJ Decision,
Doc. No. 6-2 at PageID 29-48.) ALJ Sanders found that Plaintiff had the severe
impairments of chronic right knee pain, obesity, history of traumatic brain injury with
residual effects, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Id. at PageID 35.) ALJ Sanders
concluded that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) for a reduced range of
light exertion, subject to the following mental limitations:
[L]imited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, but not at a production
rate pace; no strict production quotas; occasional interaction with
coworkers; no shared or tandem tasks; occasional interaction with
Case: 3:24-cv-00319-CHG Doc #: 12 Filed: 03/17/26 Page: 4 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

5
supervisors; no interaction with the general public; can adapt only to a
relatively static work environment where there is very little change in the
work routine or job duties from day to day; and the individual may be off-
task 5% of the workday, and absent for six to eight days per year.
(Id. at PageID 38.)
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of that decision (AR,
Doc. No. 6-2 at PageID 20-23) and Plaintiff filed an action with this Court.4 After full
briefing, the Court remanded the case to the Commissioner under Sentence Four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). (“Remand Order,” AR, Doc. No. 6-11 at PageID 1928-33.) Plaintiff
challenged the ALJ’s conclusions about: “(1) the extent to which Plaintiff would be off-
task during the workday and (2) how many days of work she would miss because of her
mental impairments.” (Id. at PageID 1931.) Magistrate Judge (now District Judge)
Newman concluded that the ALJ’s RFC limitations regarding off-task behavior and
absenteeism were unsupported by substantial evidence, explaining as follows:
Certainly, no medical source of record opines regarding the extent to which
Plaintiff would be off-task during the workday or how often she would be
absent from work and, thus, such a conclusion “is purely a creation of the
ALJ[.]” Eminian v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:11 CV 696, 2012 WL
4504511, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2012). In other words, “the ALJ
inappropriately interpreted the severity of raw medical data, a task the ALJ
is not entitled to perform.” Tipton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:16-CV-
00493, 2018 WL 524876, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2018); see also
Eminian, 2012 WL 4504511, at *3.
The undersigned thus concludes that the ALJ’s non-disability finding is
unsupported by substantial evidence, and should be reversed.
(Id. at PageID 1932-33.)
4 Assigned to Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman, Case Number 3:19-cv-00121.
Case: 3:24-cv-00319-CHG Doc #: 12 Filed: 03/17/26 Page: 5 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

6
The Appeals Council remanded the case pursuant to the Remand Order. (AR,
Doc. No. 6-11 at PageID 1395-37.) ALJ Heidi Southern held a hearing and issued a
second unfavorable decision in this case, again concluding that Plaintiff was not under a
“disability” as defined in the Social Security Act. (Second ALJ Decision, Doc. No. 6-10
at PageID 1832-56) The Appeals Council declined to assume jurisdiction (AR, Doc. No.
6-10 at PageID 1826-30), and Plaintiff subsequently filed this action.
B. 	ALJ Southern’s Factual Findings
ALJ Southern was tasked with evaluating the evidence related to Plaintiff’s
application for benefits. In doing so, ALJ Southern considered the five sequential steps
set forth in the Social Security regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. She made the following
findings of fact:
Step 1: 	Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the
period at issue from the alleged onset date of March 25, 2016
through the date last insured of September 30, 2017.
Step 2: 	She had the severe impairments of degenerative joint disease of the
right knee, peripheral vestibular disorder due to traumatic brain
injury (TBI), cognitive dysfunction due to TBI, migraine headaches,
obstructive sleep apnea, post-traumatic stress disorder, depressive
disorder, and anxiety disorder.
Step 3: 	She did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
met or equaled the severity of one in the Commissioner’s Listing of
Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Step 4: 	Her residual functional capacity (RFC), or the most she could do
despite her impairments, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276
F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2002), consisted of light work as defined in
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), subject to the following limitations: “(1)
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, and crouch; (2)
never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, or crawl; (3) frequently
balance; (4) occasionally operate foot controls with the right lower
Case: 3:24-cv-00319-CHG Doc #: 12 Filed: 03/17/26 Page: 6 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

7
extremity; (5) no exposure to unprotected heights or moving
mechanical parts; (6) no requirement to perform commercial driving
as part of the job duties; (7) limited to unskilled, simple, routine,
repetitive tasks; (8) unable to perform at a production-rate pace (e.g.
assembly-line work) but able to perform goal-oriented work (e.g.
office cleaner); (9) occasional interaction with coworkers and
supervisors, but no teamwork or tandem tasks and no over-the-
shoulder supervision; (10) no interaction with the general public as
part of the job duties; and (11) occasional changes in an otherwise
routine work setting.”
She was unable to perform any of her past relevant work.
Step 5: 	Through the date last insured, considering Plaintiff’s age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she
could have performed.
(Decision, Doc. No. 6-10 at PageID 1838-49.) These findings led the ALJ to conclude
that Plaintiff did not meet the definition of disability. (Id. at PageID 1849-50.)
IV. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts just one error: The ALJ “incorrectly created and relied on a
residual functional capacity (RFC) that produced relevant work while evaluating
[Plaintiff] under prong five of the sequential process.” (SE, Doc. No. 9 at PageID 2523.)
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in formulating the RFC because she did
not include any restrictions “based on off task allowances in the workplace, or absences,
due to [Plaintiff’s] severe impairments.” (Id. at PageID 2523-25.) For the reasons
discussed below, this assertion is not well-taken and the ALJ’s decision shall be affirmed.
A. 	Applicable Legal Framework
It is well-established that administrative agencies must follow federal court orders.
Mabry-Schlicher v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-3811, 2025 WL 1604376, at *4 (6th Cir.
Case: 3:24-cv-00319-CHG Doc #: 12 Filed: 03/17/26 Page: 7 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

8
June 6, 2025) (citing Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken, 200 F.3d 942, 950 (6th
Cir. 1999)); see also Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 886 (1989) (“Deviation from the
court’s remand order in the subsequent administrative proceedings is itself legal error,
subject to reversal on further judicial review.”) Moreover, “when a court decides upon a
rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages
in the same case.” (Id. at *4 (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)).
Therefore, “on the remand of a case after appeal, it is the duty of the … agency
from which appeal is taken[] to comply with the mandate of the court and to obey the
directions therein without variation and without departing from such directions.” Mefford
v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 748, 758 (6th Cir. 1967). Indeed, “[d]eviation from the court’s
remand order in subsequent administrative proceedings is itself legal error, subject to
reversal on further judicial review.” Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 886 (1989). The
ALJ “may not do anything expressly or impliedly in contradiction to the district court’s
remand order.” Hollins v. Massanari, 49 F. App’x 533, 536 (6th Cir. 2002).
B. 	The ALJ Did Not Err By Failing To Include Limitations In The RFC
For Off-Task Behavior or Absenteeism.
Plaintiff argues that ALJ Southern’s RFC is unsupported by substantial evidence
because she did not include any limitations for off-task behavior or absenteeism. (See
generally SE, Doc. No. 9 at PageID 2523-25.) This argument fails because any such
limitations are barred by the Remand Order, which held that ALJ Sanders reversibly
erred by including precisely these RFC limitations. (Remand Order, Doc. No. 6-11 at
PageID 1932.) Judge Newman explained that ALJ Sanders erred because “no medical
Case: 3:24-cv-00319-CHG Doc #: 12 Filed: 03/17/26 Page: 8 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

9
source of record opines regarding the extent to which Plaintiff would be off-task during
the workday or how often she would be absent from work.” (Id.) He reasoned that the
limitations were therefore “purely a creation of” ALJ Sanders, who “inappropriately
interpreted the severity of raw medical data.” (Id.) ALJ Southern was bound by these
holdings when she issued her decision.
The law of the case, as established by the Remand Order, is that if the record does
not contain a medical opinion regarding the extent to which Plaintiff would be off task
during the workday or absent from work, any RFC limitation that addresses these issues
is unsupported by substantial evidence. Here, the record did not meaningfully change
between the first and second ALJ hearings. Plaintiff did not introduce any new medical
opinion evidence during the second hearing, much less a medical opinion regarding the
extent to which Plaintiff would be off task during the workday or absent from work. ALJ
Southern therefore could not craft an RFC with off-task or absenteeism limitations.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s assertions are not well-taken
and therefore affirms ALJ Southern’s decision.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. No. 9) is OVERRULED;
2. 	The Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s non-disability determination;
and
3. 	The case is terminated on the Court’s docket.
s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge
Case: 3:24-cv-00319-CHG Doc #: 12 Filed: 03/17/26 Page: 9 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>