USA v. Dixon et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 3:24-cr-73(1)
vs.
DENZEL DIXON, 	District Judge Michael J. Newman
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO HIS
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
_____________________________________________________________________________
Previously in this felony criminal case, Defendant Denzel Dixon and the Government
entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which Defendant pled guilty to knowing and intentional
distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, its isomers, or salts of its isomers,
a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).
Doc. Nos. 73, 77. In the Statement of Facts attached to the plea agreement, Defendant admitted
he “knowingly and intentionally distributed controlled substances[.]” Doc. No. 73 at PageID 181.
Defendant raises one objection to the final Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) and
Probation has responded. The Government did not respond. The Court has reviewed all relevant
filings, and the matter is now ripe for decision.
I. Applicable Legal Standards
This Court “must—for any disputed portion of the [PSR] or other controverted matter—
rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not
affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing[.]” Fed. R. Crim.
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P. 32(i)(3)(B) (brackets added). 	“As a threshold matter, the defendant must actively raise the
dispute during the sentencing hearing before the district court’s duty to find facts arises.” United
States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 415 (6th Cir. 2007). Once a defendant meets this threshold, “the
‘court may not merely summarily adopt the factual findings in the presentence report or simply
declare that the facts are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.’” 	Id. (quoting United
States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 598 (6th Cir. 2003)). Literal compliance with this Rule is required
“‘for a variety of reasons, such as enhancing the accuracy of the sentence and the clarity of the
record.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Treadway, 328 F.3d 878, 886 (6th Cir. 2003)).
“Generally, 	factual 	findings 	relevant 	to 	sentencing 	must 	be supported 	only 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing
United States v. Zajac, 62 F.3d 145, 148 (6th Cir. 1995)); see United States v. McReynolds, 964
F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2020) (“all facts used against a defendant at sentencing must be supported
by a preponderance of the evidence[.]”); see also United States v. Gates, 461 F.3d 703, 708 (6th
Cir. 2006) (“judicial fact-finding for sentencing purposes must continue as it was conducted prior
to Booker, under a preponderance of the evidence standard.” (citing United States v. Coffee, 434
F.3d 887, 897-98 (6th Cir. 2006))).
II. The PSR
The PSR applies the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), to place
Defendant’s total offense level at 31. The PSR places Defendant’s criminal history category at II.
Defendant’s total offense level of 31, along with his criminal history category of II, results in a
Guidelines sentencing range of 121 to 151 months.
III. Analysis
Defendant objects to the PSR’s inclusion of facts relating to fentanyl in paragraphs 5, 15,
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16, 17, 26, 27, 28, 30, 97, and the Justification section. Defendant indicates that the references to
fentanyl will likely have negative effects on any application of the First Step Act. 	Pub. L. No.
115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.
While there are no facts relating to fentanyl in the Statement of Facts and Plea Agreement,
the Court is not bound by the parties’ stipulations and may, with the aid of the PSR, determine the
relevant facts for sentencing. U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d). The offense level in the PSR is determined
based on relevant conduct, which includes “all acts and omissions” committed by the defendant.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). 	Here, the drugs distributed by Defendant were tested by the U.S.
Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration Laboratory and were determined to
include both methamphetamine and fentanyl. 	The Court finds the facts relating to fentanyl,
therefore, to be relevant conduct for sentencing purposes.
Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objection to the PSR. This ruling does
not preclude Defendant from seeking a variance or otherwise raising arguments related to his
objection under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) during his sentencing hearing.
IV. Conclusion
For the above reasons, Defendant’s objection to his PSR is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to renewal during his sentencing hearing. Defendant’s offense level thus remains
31 and his criminal history remains II, resulting, as noted above, in a Guidelines sentencing range
of 121 to 151 months.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
January 9, 2026 	s/Michael J. Newman
Hon. Michael J. Newman
United States District Judge
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