Prince v. State Of Ohio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
KELLIE J. PRINCE, 	Case No. 2:25-cv-1273
Petitioner,
Graham, J.
v. 	Litkovitz, M.J.
STATE OF OHIO, 	REPORT AND
Respondent. 	RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner has filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging
her 2022 convictions and sentence in the Scioto County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas, case
number 21-CR-488B.1 Petitioner raises the following seven grounds for relief in the petition:
Ground 1 – Confrontation Clause Violation (Sixth Amendment)
The trial court admitted testimonial statements from a non-testifying codefendant
and out-of-court remarks (including jail calls and statements made in police
custody) without cross-examination, violating Crawford v. Washington, Bruton v.
United States, and Ohio v. Clark. The Ohio Courts failed to apply the proper
“primary purpose” analysis, depriving Petitioner of her right to confront witnesses.
Ground 2- Admission of Prejudicial “Other Acts” Evidence (Due Process)
The trial court admitted irrelevant and prejudicial “other acts” evidence--including
Petitioner’s medical records, phone calls, and prior victimization--without meeting
constitutional safeguards required by State v. Hartman and State v. Smith. Despite
defense objections, the Ohio Court of Appeals mischaracterized the record and
ignored transcript proof, depriving Petitioner of a fair trial in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Ground 3- Prosecutorial Misconduct (Due Process)
The prosecutor mischaracterized recordings as “drug deals” and presented facts not
in evidence, repeatedly painting Petitioner as guilty by association with drug
dealers. Despite objections and a motion for mistrial, the court allowed this
misconduct to influence the jury. This deprived Petitioner of a fundamentally fair
trial under the Due Process Clause.
1 On November 5, 2025, the undersigned issued a Deficiency Order requiring petitioner to pay the filing fee or file a
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 5). The Court’s docket records indicate that on November 17,
2025, petitioner submitted a check for the filing fee. However, because it was not made payable to “Clerk, U.S.
District Court” the check was returned to petitioner. To date, petitioner has not paid the filing fee or filed a motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Case: 2:25-cv-01273-JLG-KLL Doc #: 14 Filed: 11/18/25 Page: 1 of 6 PAGEID #: <pageID>

Ground 4- Constructive Possession Jury Instruction (Due Process)
The jury was instructed that it could convict based on Petitioner’s “mere presence”
near a large amount of drugs, even though the evidence was hidden in a speaker
box and there was no proof of dominion or control. Other Ohio appellate courts
require “plus factors” for constructive possession. This instruction lowered the
burden of proof in violation of In re Winship and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Ground 5- Admission of Inaccurate Transcript/Listening Aid (Due Process)
The jury was provided a transcript prepared by law enforcement as a “listening
aid,” admitted into evidence despite being inaccurate. Trooper Lewis admitted its
unreliability. Allowing the jury to rely on this inaccurate transcript deprived
Petitioner of a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Ground 6 – Insufficient Evidence of Guilt (Due Process-Jackson v. Virginia)
The evidence was constitutionally insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. No fingerprints or forensic evidence tied Petitioner to the drugs, which were
hidden in another person’s possession (a locked speaker box). A co-defendant
admitted ownership of the methamphetamine. Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979), no rational juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ground 7- Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Sixth Amendment)
Trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
prejudicing the defense in violation of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Specific failures include: failing to effectively litigate and preserve
Confrontation Clause objections; failing to fully preserve objections to prejudicial
404(B) evidence; failing to object adequately to the constructive possession
instruction; failing to request fingerprint, DNA, or other forensic testing on the
baggies, trunk, or speaker box, which could have excluded Petitioner; and failing
to challenge the accuracy of the transcript provided to the jury. These cumulative
failures undermined the fairness of the trial.
(Doc. 1 at PageID 1-3).
It appears from the record before the Court and review of petitioner’s state court docket
records that petitioner was convicted of aggravated trafficking in drugs and aggravated
possession of drugs on December 27, 2022 and subsequently sentenced to an indefinite term of
imprisonment of four to six years in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. In
the trial court’s judgment entry, petitioner was granted bond and a stay of execution while the
case was pending on appeal. It appears that petitioner has appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals
Case: 2:25-cv-01273-JLG-KLL Doc #: 14 Filed: 11/18/25 Page: 2 of 6 PAGEID #: <pageID>

and Ohio Supreme Court, which declined jurisdiction over her appeal on October 10, 2025.
Petitioner has filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of jurisdiction and for continuation
of her bond pending appeal, which remain pending before the Ohio Supreme Court.2
This matter is currently before the Court on petitioner’s motion for release on bond
pending habeas corpus review (Doc. 2), which is opposed (see Doc. 8, 12). Petitioner argues that
extraordinary circumstances warrant release in her case due to her medical needs. Specifically,
petitioner indicates that she “was shot three times and still carries bullets in her back.” On this
basis, petitioner contends that incarceration poses a risk of inadequate medical care. Petitioner
also claims she is the primary caregiver for her 53-year-old uncle, who has brain cancer, Stage
IV COPD, and depends on her daily care. In support of her motion, petitioner also notes that she
has no previous criminal record, has complied with her previous bond conditions, and a Justice
of the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged her medical issues and would have granted bond
during the pendency of her appeal. (See Doc. 2 at PageID 15).
Although a federal court has authority to grant bail in a habeas corpus action pending a
decision on the merits of the petition, see Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 78-79 (6th Cir. 1990),
release of a state prisoner pending consideration of his federal habeas petition “is reserved for the
extraordinary case.” Lordi v. Ishee, 22 F. App’x 585, 586 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Lee v. Jabe,
989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993)). The Sixth Circuit has explained that “[s]ince a habeas
petitioner is appealing a presumptively valid state conviction, both principles of comity and
common sense dictate that it will indeed be the very unusual case where a habeas petitioner is
2 Petitioner’s state court docket records were viewed at https://www.sciotocountycpcourt.org/eservices/ under Case
Nos. 21CR000488B and 23CA004014, and https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/clerk/ecms/#/search under Case No.
2025-1253. This Court may take judicial notice of court records that are available online to members of the
public. See Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 648 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 332 n.3 (6th
Cir. 1999)).
Case: 2:25-cv-01273-JLG-KLL Doc #: 14 Filed: 11/18/25 Page: 3 of 6 PAGEID #: <pageID>

admitted to bail prior to a decision on the merits in the habeas case.” Lee, 989 F.2d at 871.
Therefore, in order to obtain release on bail pending a decision on the merits, the petitioner must
show “not only a substantial claim of law based on the facts surrounding the petition but also the
existence of ‘some circumstance making [the motion for bail] exceptional and deserving of
special treatment in the interests of justice.’” Id. (quoting Dotson, 900 F.2d at 79, in turn quoting
Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5, 13 L.Ed.2d 6 (1964) (Douglas, J., in chambers)); see also Nash v.
Eberlin, 437 F.3d 519, 526 n.10 (6th Cir. 2006); Greenup v. Snyder, 57 F. App’x 620, 621 (6th
Cir. 2003).
Respondent opposes petitioner’s motion in this case, first on the ground that petitioner
has failed to show a substantial claim of law based on the fact surrounding the petition.
Specifically, respondent contends that petitioner’s second through seventh grounds for relief are
procedurally defaulted; her second, fourth, and fifth grounds for relief are generally not
cognizable in federal habeas corpus; and her first ground for relief is without merit. (See Doc. 8
at PageID 32). Second, respondent contends that petitioner has not shown the type of
exceptional circumstance necessary to warrant release pending review of her habeas corpus
petition. (Id. at PageID 32-33).
Upon review of the petitioner’s motion, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that
petitioner’s motion for bond (Doc. 2) be DENIED. Even assuming, arguendo, that petitioner is
able to present a “meritorious challenge” to her conviction, she has not met the “high bar”
necessary to demonstrate that exceptional or unusual circumstances exist in her case, which
warrant her release during the pendency of this action. See Gideon v. Treglia, No. 3:21-cv-2087,
2021 WL 6031492, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2021) (collecting cases with respect to the “high
bar” to be released for health conditions). See also Henderson v. Bunting, No. 1:14cv2557, 2015
Case: 2:25-cv-01273-JLG-KLL Doc #: 14 Filed: 11/18/25 Page: 4 of 6 PAGEID #: <pageID>

WL 196058, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2015) (in denying motion to set bond in § 2254 habeas
case, the court reasoned that even if the petitioner “were able to demonstrate that his habeas
claim was substantial, he would still have to show some exceptional circumstance ‘deserving of
special treatment’”). As argued by respondent, district courts have found “exceptional
circumstances” justifying bail where the prisoner is “gravely ill,” serving a short sentence, or
where there has been extraordinary delay in processing the habeas petition. See Blocksom v.
Klee, No. 11-cv-14859, 2015 WL 300261, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2015) (in denying bail in a
§ 2254 habeas case, the court pointed out that although neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth
Circuit have “provided definitive guidance for determining whether a petitioner’s
‘circumstances’ are so ‘exceptional’ to justify release pending review of his habeas claims,”
lower courts have suggested that the finding of “exceptional circumstances” has been limited to
cases where the prisoner is “gravely ill” or serving a short sentence, or “possibly” where there
has been “‘extraordinary delay’ in processing the habeas petition”). No such showing has been
made in this case. And while the Court is sympathetic to petitioner’s care of her uncle, it does
not amount to an extraordinary circumstance justifying release. See Heflin v. Black, No. 1:22-cv-
863, 2023 WL 5353133, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 2023) (Report and Recommendation)
(finding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that caretaking responsibilities constitute
exceptional circumstances for relief, noting that “this Court cannot find precedent in this Circuit
where other courts released a habeas petitioner for such a reason”), adopted 2023 WL 5352047
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2023).
Accordingly, in sum, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s motion for bail (Doc. 2)
be DENIED. In light of this recommendation, it is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that
Case: 2:25-cv-01273-JLG-KLL Doc #: 14 Filed: 11/18/25 Page: 5 of 6 PAGEID #: <pageID>

petitioner’s motion for a temporary continuation of bond while the Court resolves her motion for
bond (Doc. 3) also be DENIED.
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of
the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations. 	This period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected
to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report
and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections
WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Date:
Karen L. Litkovitz
United States Magistrate Judge
11/18/2025
Case: 2:25-cv-01273-JLG-KLL Doc #: 14 Filed: 11/18/25 Page: 6 of 6 PAGEID #: <pageID>